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
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S E R M O N S
UPON THE NATURE AND THE EFFECTS
OF FAITH.

NIHIL NOVI DOCEMUS, SED VETERA ET QUÆ ANTE NOS APOSTOLI
ET OMNES PII DOCTORES DOCUERUNT, INCULCAMUS ET STABILIMUS.
ET UTINAM BENE POSSEMUS INCULCARE ET STABILIRE, UT NON SOLUM
IN ORE, SED IN PROFUNDO CORDE EA BENE MEDITATA HABEREMUS,
ET PRÆCIPUE IN AGONE MORTIS UTI POSSEMUS.

LUTHER. IN EP. AD GALATT. CAP. I.

*AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN AND ESTABLISH THE
DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY,*

IN TEN SERMONS

UPON

THE NATURE AND THE EFFECTS

OF

FAITH,

PREACHED IN THE CHAPEL OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

BY

JAMES THOMAS O'BRIEN, D.D.

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ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE volume which is now reprinted appeared first so long ago as the year 1833. The edition then published was very speedily sold; but I thought it better not to send out another at once. I was painfully aware of manifold deficiencies in the work, and I hoped that, by keeping it back for a little, I might be able to supply some of them; and so to make it—not materially less unworthy, indeed, of its great subject, but—somewhat better fitted for the important practical purpose for which it was written. It did not seem that the additions and improvements which I planned would delay the Second Edition long. And, no doubt, a little time ought to have enabled me to effect at least the most important of them. But the fact is, that when, not very many months ago, I resolved to republish the volume, they were not merely still unfinished, but, though materials for them to a considerable amount had been laid up from time to time, they could scarcely be said to have been begun.

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RESERVE

How it was that for so long a period I was, year after year, prevented altogether from taking the work in hand, or obliged to lay it down almost as soon as I had taken it up, I do not mean to make any attempt to explain. Such an explanation would have no interest for those to whom the work is entirely new. And even those who are already acquainted with it are much more concerned to hear what they have to expect in the present edition, than why it has been so long delayed. I may, therefore, confine myself here altogether to the object of giving information upon the former point. And as the Preface (retained from the first edition) contains an account of the plan and contents of the volume, as it was originally published, I need only state the alterations it has since undergone, and the purpose for which they have been made.

In keeping it back at the first, I had no intention of making any addition to the *SERMONS*, or indeed any alterations in them beyond whatever verbal corrections they might, upon revision, appear to require. However imperfect they were, I resolved, for reasons given in the Preface, to leave that part of the work in the state to which it had been brought in preparing it for publication. But I felt it to be very desirable to do something to improve the other part. There were not a few points connected with my subject—some of them of special importance to my object in selecting it—which could not find a place in the text, but

which would be naturally looked for in the Appendix. I could not but be conscious, however, that, while several of these points were left unnoticed there, others were very insufficiently treated. And it seemed that, by enlarging some of the Notes, and adding some others, the book might be better fitted to accomplish its purpose of rendering assistance to Divinity Students in coming to right views upon the fundamental Doctrine which I had ventured to take in hand, and of impressing upon them a due sense of its great importance.

This plan has been executed but in part. The Sermons and the Appendix have been corrected throughout. The principal object of all the corrections which have been made in both has been to render my meaning clearer. But, though I have taken considerable pains to attain that object, I do not flatter myself that I have always succeeded. The corrections, in fact, were made, not in a continuous revision of the volume, but from time to time, as I took it up at leisure moments. And as one's impression of the clearness or obscurity of a sentence or a phrase often varies with his own mood at the time of reading it, I shall not be surprised if I should see reason hereafter to think that of the alterations which I have made for the sake of clearness, some were unnecessary, and that some have rendered the sense more obscure. Still, I trust that, for the most part, they will not be found to have been made unnecessarily or entirely without success.

In the revision of the Appendix, besides some new matter, introduced here and there, which I should find it hard to specify, substantial additions have been appended to two of the Notes (B and N). The additions to the latter have run out to unexpected and undesirable length—such length, indeed, as I fear, even the great importance of the subject of the Note will be hardly held to excuse. And there are six additional Notes, (I, O, P, R, X, Z,) to the two last of which, the same remark applies.

I have little doubt that this part of the work might have been brought within narrower limits, if I had been able to revise it carefully with a view to abridging it. But, without being disposed to depreciate the importance of the object, I did not think that, under all the circumstances, I ought to expend more time upon the chance of securing it. I did not feel warranted, indeed, in delaying the publication longer, even for the more important object of reviewing the works which have been published upon Justification, or upon kindred subjects, since this volume first appeared. There is no one of the omissions in the work which is more likely to be felt by others, and none which I was myself so reluctant to leave without doing more towards supplying it. One of the publications referred to—the one which, upon various grounds, seemed entitled to the first place—has been considered. But I found that I could not go farther. The length to which the Note containing the notice of that single work (Note X) ran made

it probable that a review even of the most important of the remainder would have rendered it impossible to keep the volume within reasonable compass, or to bring it out within any moderate time. And though I may, perhaps, be able to do something to repair this defect hereafter, I felt that for the present it must remain.

There is another work, published in the interval, —though not exactly of the class alluded to above, —to which reference is often made in the new matter in the Appendix: I mean Dean Alford's valuable edition of the New Testament. I could not doubt that it was extensively used by Divinity Students and by the Clergy, who can nowhere else, within the compass of a single work, find so much of the help they need, both in the way of information and of criticism, in the most important part of their studies. And in discussing particular texts, I felt it right to refer to it, rather than to other recent commentaries, which were less likely to be in the hands of those for whom, chiefly, the Notes were intended. The work is too well known, and estimated too highly, to need any testimony to its merits. But, as I have sometimes been obliged to express my dissent from particular parts of it, I am anxious, if only for my own sake, to say, that few even of those who have no such differences with the respected author can think more highly than I do of his ability, industry, and honesty, or set a greater value upon the important contribution which he has made to the illustration of the New Testament.

I shall only add that in all that has been done in this new edition, the chief object of the original work—which was to aid Theological Students, whether in my own University or elsewhere—has been kept steadily in view. I am aware that the result is, that not a little has been introduced of which more advanced scholars will not unnaturally be impatient. But it will be enough, I hope, to bespeak the forbearance of such readers—if I should have any such—to remind them, that what is unnecessary and useless, as regards them, may be very necessary and very useful for the class for whom the book is chiefly intended. For these, I have little fear that too much has been done. On the contrary, indeed, though, since I set about revising the volume for the press, I have laboured at it as diligently as many engagements and many interruptions, ordinary and extraordinary, would allow, I feel that much less has been done for them than I should have desired, and than I hoped would have been done. Still, I trust that if the volume, as it was originally published, were calculated to give them any aid, it will be found somewhat more useful to them in its present form. And, however I may regret that more has not been done, I feel that, if I have been enabled to do even so much, I ought to be content and thankful.

TO
THE STUDENTS
OF
TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,
FOR WHOM IT WAS WRITTEN,
AND FOR WHOM, CHIEFLY, IT IS NOW PUBLISHED,
THIS COURSE OF SERMONS
IS INSCRIBED.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

I do not believe that any topic will be found in the following Discourses, for which their title ought not to prepare my readers; but it is not unlikely that several may be looked for in them which they do not contain. Some of these omissions possibly occur through inadvertence, or ignorance; but those that will probably be thought the most important have no such excuse. I have been most anxious to omit nothing really essential to the great truth which I have undertaken to establish and explain: but I have *designedly* avoided every reference to other doctrines, which, however easily and commonly connected with the Scriptural Doctrine of Justification, are not, in my apprehension, necessary to a right understanding and full belief of it. I have not adopted this plan

from want of fixed views upon most of those disputed points, or from any reluctance to state distinctly my views upon them to the congregation that I addressed, or to any other, when I thought the discussion of them likely to be useful. But, through this course of Sermons, I resolved, from the first, to abstain steadily from such discussions; partly from a desire to avoid embarrassing myself and my hearers by a needless multiplication of subjects, when we had such abundant occupation in the one which I was professedly treating; but chiefly because I am sure that they who differ, and who are perhaps always to differ, widely, upon those more doubtful, and, I think, far less important points, may agree cordially upon this certain and fundamental truth: and I was anxious to avoid throwing any obstacles in the way of this agreement, by the unnecessary introduction of questions upon which it could not be reasonably hoped for.

But even upon the subject to which I have confined myself, I believe I have to account for some omissions: some arguments in support of this truth, which are highly valued by its advocates, are passed lightly over in these Sermons, and others wholly omitted. I cannot, of course, enter into a detailed defence of the line that I have taken throughout; but I desire, in general, to obviate the impression,

that I disapprove of all the arguments of which I make no use. Some certainly have been left out, because I was not able to ascribe to them the force which they appear to many to possess. But I have omitted some merely because I found it difficult, within my limits, to manage them so as to give them their due force: while some do not appear, because they were too familiar to my hearers; and not a few, I doubt not, because they were unknown to myself. In those that I knew and approved, however, there was sufficient variety to make selection absolutely necessary. I have, of course, no right to presume that I have always made a wise choice; but I may venture to say that I have not often chosen carelessly: and even where different arguments seemed to me of nearly equal value, I, in general, endeavoured to consider my hearers and myself in comparing them, so as to select what I was capable of doing most justice to, and what was likely to impress them most.

The plan of the Sermons is very simple, and it will be found steadily adhered to throughout. I begin by attempting (Sermons I. and II.) to ascertain the Scriptural meaning of *Faith*; how the principle is wrought in the mind; and what is the whole preceding or accompanying change of mind which is essential to the existence of genuine faith.

I next seek (Sermon III.), in the same way, to fix the sense of *Justification* in the Bible: and then to determine (Sermon IV.) what is the connexion which the Scriptures declare to exist between this change of mind which God has wrought in us, and this change of our condition before Him. This ought to end in the establishment of the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only*; with a clear understanding of its meaning. And to this are added, in the way of confirmation, a review of the chief corruptions of this doctrine (Sermon V.) and an answer to the chief objections against it (Sermon VI.). Regarding this great truth, then, sufficiently explained, established, and guarded, I pass, in the remaining Sermons, to a consideration of the other effects of *faith*:—its operation in the sanctification of believers;—how it moves and restrains them; and how it calls into exercise and sustains all the other *natural* forces by which God designs to restrain and to move His people.

This is the outline of my plan. And upon the full re-consideration of it, which has been forced upon me while this volume has been passing through the press, I see nothing in the plan itself which I desire to alter; while I can add unfeignedly, that, in the execution of it, every reference to what I have written discovers to me some new defects. Many

of these, I know, arise from want of power and skill: and these would, of course, remain or be replaced by similar defects, were I to re-write the book now. There are others, however, which I should certainly hope to remove, if I could devote more time to revision. But there must be some limit to the process of correcting; and, whatever be my success in it, I am more inclined to apprehend that I have expended too much than too little time upon it.

I have found it necessary to add some Notes. They are intended to supply explanations and enforcements of my reasoning, which could not easily be comprised in the Sermons;—which, at least, I found myself unable to introduce there, without awkwardness and confusion. But their leading object is to sustain the doctrinal statements in the Discourses, by authorities from the Confessions of the Protestant churches, and the writings of the eminent Protestant divines of the period of the Reformation. They are, in both ways, chiefly fitted to assist or direct students in Divinity: but some of them, and parts of almost all, will be intelligible to every one to whom the Discourses are intelligible; and will interest all whom *they* interest.

In stating the opinions of others, and in maintaining my own, whether in the Sermons or the Notes, I am not conscious that I have neglected

any reasonable, or indeed any practicable pains to avoid errors; but I am fully prepared for finding that I have not always succeeded. It would be very false humility to express any anticipation that I shall be shown reason to change my views, in any respect, upon the main points of the volume; but, upon subordinate matters, I not only hold myself open to correction, but I shall not be surprised if it should appear that I have left much room for it: that I have made some hasty assertions; admitted some over-statements, or some under-statements; pressed some arguments too far, and refrained from carrying others as far as I ought. These, and similar lapses, notwithstanding my anxiety to avoid them, I may, no doubt, have committed: and though I am unable to detect any of any importance myself, many may disclose themselves to a keener and less partial eye. I shall always hold myself ready to receive any proofs of such mistakes. They must be offered, indeed, with a very great want of courtesy, if they do not find me ready to receive them thankfully. But, in whatever spirit or tone they may be offered, I hope I shall always weigh them fairly, and endeavour to profit by them.

Some will, I am sure, be disappointed that I have not carried the proofs given in the Notes much higher, and added authorities from the Fathers of

the Christian Church, to those which I have supplied in such abundance, from the illustrious restorers of true religion in the sixteenth century. It would have been very easy to have made this addition, if I had thought it necessary. For however I may be myself *in Patrum scriptis plane hospes**, the early divines from whom I draw so largely were certainly at home there; and they were led to con-

* This has been commented upon as a confession on my part of ignorance of the views of the Fathers upon the Doctrine of Justification. Whether I could have made such a confession truly, or not, I need not say: it is enough that I did not intend to make it. Having stated that there was to be no attempt in the following pages to prove that, upon this great Doctrine, the Reformers agreed with the Fathers no less than with each other, I was anxious to make it clear that whatever were my reasons for declining the task, a dread of its difficulty could not have been among them; for that even if I were unable to draw proofs of their agreement from the proper sources for myself, they were provided to my hand in abundance by the great divines of the Reformation. And I did not like to refer to them in connexion with such a question, without doing justice to their eminent claims to be heard in speaking upon it. As to the form in which this was done, it was borrowed from Bishop Bull. If the sentence of that eminent scholar which suggested mine had been in the memory of my Critic, he would probably have understood that it was not my object to make any confession or profession about myself, but to bear testimony to the Patristic learning of the Divines of whom I was speaking. And as it may perhaps be a safeguard against similar misinterpretations, I subjoin the sentence referred to: "*Si mihi hic non credat D. Tullius, quem putat in Patrum Scriptis plane hospitem esse, saltem fidem habeat duobus testibus, in veterum monumentis extra controversiam versatissimis, iisque viris integerrimis.*" *Apol. pro Harm.* Sect. vii. Subsect. 19.

duct the great contest which they maintained for this vital truth, so as to furnish any one who desires to make an array of ancient authorities in support of it, with an ample store of citations, and with great facilities for enlarging it.

But Romish controversial writers produced counter-authorities from the same sources ; and, though I am far from believing that upon this, any more than upon the other points which divide the Churches, there is room for reasonable doubt about the opinions, or, at least, the principles of the ancient Fathers ; yet to fix with precision the meaning of writers who, confessedly, (at least, before the Pelagian controversy), wrote somewhat loosely upon this doctrine, would require much reading and thought. I should not, I hope, decline any labour to which I was equal, if I believed it to be necessary for clearly apprehending, or successfully maintaining, the true doctrine of Justification. But I confess that I shrank from a task to which I was not led by any such sense of its necessity, either as regarded myself or others. For myself, in all such conflicts of ancient opinions, I feel ready heartily to adopt the spirit of Calvin's summary decision of one of them :—*Scio eos posse Origenem et Hieronymum citare, sum expositionis suffragatores : possem et illis vicissim Augustinum opponere : sed quid illi*

opinati sint nostra nihil refert, si constat quid voluerit Paulus.—And I think, in the present case, that I have shown,—I am sure I see,—that we are able to make out Paul's meaning very clearly without their assistance.

In this matter—ininitely the most important, doubtless—we are not less independent of the other authorities, about which I take so much pains. But even one who does not feel differently towards *them*, must allow that we bear a very different relation to them. I acknowledge that, where the great doctrine which I have undertaken to treat is in question, I entertain for the Martyrs and Confessors to whom, under Him who raised them up, and enlightened and strengthened them, we owe the Reformation of the sixteenth century, a far deeper feeling of reverence than for any guides which the Church has had since the Apostles*.

* In writing this, I was very well aware that I was expressing myself more strongly than many even of those who hold the doctrines of the Reformation would choose to do. And it was therefore with much pleasure that I saw the same view stated several years after, with no less distinctness and strength, by Archdeacon Hare, who was certainly as well qualified by extensive reading and deep thought to pronounce upon such a question as any divine of his day. In the Notes to his *Mission of the Comforter*, the learned author has often occasion to contrast Patristic and Reformation Divinity,—especially in the interpretation of the parts of Holy Writ which relate to the scheme of redemption,—and he does not hesitate to state that, in simplicity,

But the importance of the citations which I give from those illustrious men does not rest entirely upon this feeling, in which my readers may not be prepared to share. As a Protestant, I cannot be entirely indifferent about my agreement with the views of the early Protestant Churches and divines upon every doctrine on which they are all shown to agree among themselves. And as a member and a minister of the United Church of England and Ireland, I feel that I have a more direct interest in proving my agreement with her recorded principles upon this fundamental doctrine of the Gospel. Upon every ground, therefore, both of feeling and principle, I confess to a real anxiety to establish, that the doctrine of Justification by Faith only, as it is maintained in these Discourses, was the Doctrine of our own Church, and of all

spirituality, and depth, the latter generally very far exceeds the former,—that, *if we desire to see the living power of the words of Scripture set forth in their spiritual simplicity and depth, we must come down to the age of the Reformation.* His view upon the whole question is fully stated in an interesting passage in Note W, beginning with the sentence: “Yet in the foregoing notes I have several times had occasion to point out how inferior even the chief among the Fathers were in their understanding of Scripture, with regard to certain heads of Evangelical truth, to the great divines of the Reformation.” And in what follows (pp. 705–712), this strong statement is explained and vindicated with a full measure of the ability and learning which are exhibited in the whole of the very valuable Note referred to.

the great Protestant Churches at the period of the Reformation, and of all the great Protestant divines by whom their reformation was effected.

And, accordingly, this point is laboriously pursued in the Notes ; and proofs of it are multiplied and reiterated, so as, I fear, to try the patience of those who, coming to the question with a moderately fair spirit themselves, can hardly form a due estimate of the extent to which it is necessary to provide here against evasions of the plain force of the plainest language. But I am sure that they who know best the way in which this controversy has been conducted, will be least likely to complain of any precautions against misrepresentation, as superfluous. I have not, however, multiplied and guarded these proofs in the vain expectation of rendering misrepresentation impossible, but with the hope of lessening its force. And I do entertain some hopes that what I have done will be found sufficient to convince all who are accessible to evidence upon the point:—that ALL Protestant churches, however separated by differences in discipline and doctrine, and ALL early Protestant divines to whom any reverence is due, whatever were their differences upon other points, agreed in maintaining the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY, as it is maintained in these Discourses. This strong

assertion is made in the body of the work ; and if the Notes establish it, they have, as I have said, attained their chief end. To those who are better qualified for the task, and who have more time and more inclination for it, I leave willingly the office of tracing this doctrine to remoter times. If I have proved that the doctrine of Justification, which I have found in the Bible, was found there by the Reformers of the Continent and of Britain, I have traced my views of the doctrine to the only human parentage which I feel very solicitous to establish for them.

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SERMON I.

ON THE NATURE OF FAITH.

Fides ergo est fiducia constans misericordie Dei erga nos, in corde vivens, et officio iter agens, quâ proiciamus nos toti in Deum, et permittimus nos Deo, quâ certò freti non dubitemus millies mortem oppetere.

LUTHER, *Prefat. Method. in Ep. ad Rom.*

Fayth is, then, a lively and steadfast trust in the favour of God, wherewith we commit ourselves altogether unto God, and that trust is so surely grounded, and sticketh so fast in our hartes, that a man would not once doubt of it though he should die a thousand times therefore.

TYNDALL, *On the Epistle to the Romans.*

SERMON I.

ACTS XVI. 31.

Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.

I do not mean to spend any time now, in recalling to your minds, my brethren, the circumstances under which these memorable words were spoken. It is probable, indeed, that the striking narrative from which they are taken is distinctly in the recollection of most of my hearers. Sufficiently remembered for my purpose, it must be by all. For, for my purpose in bringing forward the passage, it is quite enough that you remember, that it is an authoritative answer to the demand of an alarmed conscience, earnestly desiring to be satisfied upon the only subject that an alarmed conscience feels to be of any importance:—that it is the answer made by God's ambassadors to a sinner, who, in an agony of newly-awakened terror for his soul, demands of them, *What must I do to be saved?*

Since this fundamental doctrine of the Gospel of Christ was thus simply and distinctly promulgated, many centuries have passed away, And during all the time, the Church of Christ, through severe and varied trials—through the hard trials of *the times of its tribulation*, and the harder trials of *the times of its wealth*—has been going on unceasingly extending itself, until it has now obtained some footing

in almost every part of the habitable globe, and is to be found, in some form, in almost *every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people*. During its entire progress, wherever the Gospel has been preached, this doctrine, however corrupted and neutralized it may *in fact* have been, has always been *in terms* preached. Wherever the Gospel is professed, *faith* in the Redeemer is professed; and wherever it is truly embraced, there men truly *believe on the Lord Jesus Christ*. Everywhere there have been, and there are, true followers of the Lord, upheld through all the trials of life, and cheered under all its afflictions, by the *peace, and hope, and joy*, which are fruits and marks of this *belief in Him*. Yea, there are daily some whose *warfare is accomplished*,—who, having *fought a good fight, and finished their course, and kept the faith*, are by it enabled, in pain, and weakness, and decay, to triumph over man's *last enemy*, and to depart from this scene of our cares and affections, in the humble but undoubting hope which, in that trying hour, *belief in the LORD JESUS CHRIST*, and it only, is able to sustain.

Yet, notwithstanding this wide profession of *faith in CHRIST*, and the extent, too, to which men truly *believe in Him*, if we ask, What is *faith*?—What is *believing on the Lord Jesus Christ*?—we are met continually by answers the most vague or conflicting. The notions annexed to these words appear as unsettled, as if the words themselves had now for the first time been introduced into religious language. And, in consequence, questions are now raised continually, and controversies continually carried on, concerning the real import of the emphatic declaration in my text, and of the similar publications of the Gospel with which the New Testament abounds; which yet, at their first delivery, were addressed to all, without distinction—to Jew and Gentile—to bond and free—to learned and unlearned alike—without any apprehension of misconception—without explanation given, or asked, or needed!

This is very strange; and, at first sight at least, very depressing. Where there is such wide variance, there must be much uncertainty and much error. And, whatever *faith* be, it has a degree of prominence in the Scripture plan of salvation which can hardly allow us to regard uncertainty about it as comfortable, or error, safe.

In abatement of such apprehensions, it is true that it may be remarked, that as the healthful exercise of our bodily organs, fortunately for us, does not require an acquaintance with physiology or animal mechanics, so the full enjoyment and use of our mental powers are equally independent of any knowledge of the nature or modes of operation of the mind. They whose feelings are all in a sound state, and all exercised upon their proper objects, may employ language the most confused in endeavouring to describe them. Even the mental states with which we are most familiar, are, by one little accustomed to reflect carefully upon the movements of his own mind, recalled with great difficulty and very indistinctly: and they, of course, assume still more distorted forms, when it is attempted to put them into words. Though there may be, therefore, in the world, much gross and dangerous error upon this important subject, we are not obliged or warranted to believe that there is quite as much as there appears to be,—that true *faith* is at all as rare as just notions or correct statements concerning it.

This is no doubt true, and it is of some importance too. But, while there is much error to which it does not profess to apply, how far is it from showing that the misapprehensions to which it is really applicable are wholly without danger! For even in this, the most mitigated form in which such error can exist—where the faith, that is, of an individual, is sound, and where his erroneous views of *the nature of faith* result entirely from his inability to present distinctly to himself or others the real state of his own

mind—would it not be rash to represent his error as of no practical importance? We can easily conceive various ways in which his false views may react unfavourably upon such a one; and they may certainly produce ill effects upon him, in ways that we cannot conceive, and to an extent that we are quite incapable of appreciating. But, supposing their entire innocence with respect to himself, is it not plain that they may be introduced into the minds of others, where the principle does not already exist, to neutralize their injurious influence, and that there they may produce all the ill effects that such error is capable of producing? For how different the two cases are, and how greatly the disadvantage and the danger lie on the side of the latter, it cannot, I suppose, be necessary to expend time in pointing out.

Indeed, even if we were at liberty to consider the principle of *faith* as of little importance in religion, and this question concerning it as purely a speculative one, we should still have but a suspicious excuse for indifference about it. When any earthly object thoroughly engages the mind, the interest that we feel about it is, certainly, not often confined so strictly to fundamentals and essentials as to allow of no care for anything beyond them. On the contrary, in the very degree in which the main object interests us, do matters remotely or accidentally connected with it derive attractions from it which secure to them a measure of attention, to which, of themselves, they would be felt to have but slender claims. And we seem to have good cause to distrust the reality of our concern about religion, when we find it so much more easily regulated than our interest about anything else.

But to leave the subject in this state would be to do great injustice to its importance. In religion, *faith* surely cannot be spoken of as a thing subordinate or accessory. It holds, as all who know anything of the Bible must know,

a prominent and a most important place in that scheme of redemption which was designed to display the character of God in new lustre both to men and angels. And it would seem eminently weak and presumptuous in us to speak or think lightly of any errors which have a direct tendency to disfigure or to obscure, in any degree, that glorious manifestation of the divine nature. I may add too, without entering prematurely upon a consideration of the effects of revealed truth upon the character, that to regard as purely speculative any errors which tend to alter our apprehensions of the object of our adoration, of our relation to Him, and of His dealings with us, betrays a strange ignorance of the design and mode of operation of all religion.

In engaging your attention, therefore, my brethren, for a plain attempt to state and establish the true Scriptural doctrine concerning the *nature* and the *effects* of FAITH; and to point out some popular errors upon both these important subjects, I have no apprehensions that I shall be regarded as misemploying this opportunity of addressing you. It ought no doubt to be felt, that the main business of the Preacher is to win men to accept the offers of mercy held out in the Gospel; or *to stir up, by way of remembrance, the pure minds* of those who have already embraced these gracious offers, *that they may walk worthy of their calling*. But it can hardly, I should hope, be thought beside his office, anywhere, to labour to supply correct views upon an important part of that message of reconciliation which is designed to draw men to God, and to keep them in the course that He has appointed for them. And least of all can this be thought, when he is addressing a congregation, whence so many chosen vessels to diffuse divine truth are to be taken; and in which truth and error assume new and awful importance from the certainty that, whichever be taught here, it will not lie idle, but will be widely propagated through the land.

Among old errors concerning the *nature* of *faith*—old, that is, among the errors of Protestants upon it—are to be placed all those representations which, in some shape or other, more or less important, make obedience to God's law a part of the notion for which *faith* stands. There are, no doubt, different shades of misrepresentation which would thus be classed together; and elsewhere, and for other purposes, it might be important to consider them distinctly. But discriminating between them carefully, or examining them in detail, is not necessary for any concern that I have with them here. Whatever points of difference they have, they agree in what may be shown to be an error; and whatever, therefore, be their differences, they may be overthrown together. To include obedience in the notion expressed by the term *faith* is to deviate manifestly from its meaning in common language, as I presume all who contend for this as its Scriptural sense would be ready to acknowledge. That it is no less a deviation from its Scriptural sense will speedily, I trust, appear, by the investigation upon which I am about to enter to establish that sense. And this, for my immediate purposes, ought to be enough.

But there are some who would be inclined to grant this also—who would grant that, of its general signification in the Bible, obedience forms no part—and yet would maintain that, in certain important texts where *faith* is found in connexion with *justification*, it is necessary, in order to avoid gross and dangerous error, that *obedience* should be understood as a part, at least, of the meaning of the word. That is, instead of employing the meaning which *faith* bears elsewhere in the Bible to fix the sense of the texts referred to, they propose to determine the signification of *faith* by the sense which they think fit to assign to the texts; and so they in effect derive the signification of the word, in the cases in which its signification is most important, from their own doctrinal views concerning the mode of reconciling sinners to God.

To enter upon a discussion of these views now would be to invert the course,—the fairer, I think, and more natural course,—which I have laid down for myself. I shall have to examine them in the progress of this inquiry, and I trust that I shall show, that they differ no less widely from the doctrine of Scripture, than the meaning which those who uphold them assign to *faith* does from the sense which its common use in Scripture establishes:—that they are all opposed to express and reiterated statements of the Apostle to whom we owe the most copious and exact information which the Bible furnishes upon the subject; and not less to the whole current of his reasoning about it:—so that the interpretation of the texts in question for which this unusual meaning of *faith* is required, sets them in direct opposition to the clearest authoritative declarations of Holy Scripture, and to reasoning no less authoritative and clear.

All this, which many of my hearers, I trust, already know, I expect to be able to prove distinctly by and by; inasmuch that it is not easy to conceive how any inquirer, resorting to the Bible with the simple object of obtaining truth, could find there either this erroneous view of the nature of *faith*, or the false doctrine with which it is connected. Nor do I believe that either of these errors has often arisen in so humble and honest a course. It appears rather, as I said, that some who have drawn their views of the nature, design, and mode of operation of the Gospel, not from Holy Scripture, but from their own false conceptions of the nature both of God and man, have found it necessary to modify the meaning of *faith*, in order to accommodate such Scriptural declarations of the way of salvation as my text contains, to their own misrepresentations of the Gospel. When the motives are the best that are compatible with such a mode of dealing with Revelation, this, I believe, is the account that is to be given of the proceeding. Ill-grounded fears of the moral consequences of proclaiming, as the

Gospel does, full and gratuitous pardon to all Believers, send such persons in search of conditions to clog the freeness of this offer of mercy, or to limit its fulness. *Faith*, in its true Scripture sense, is ill fitted to serve such a purpose; but *obedience* is found in the Bible to be the unfailing characteristic of Believers; and this, which should in fairness show that God has himself guarded effectually against the consequences apprehended, is misused to suggest the human safeguard of enlarging the meaning of *faith*, and to supply some of the weak sophistry by which the proceeding is defended. But this is matter for future consideration.

Similar principles of inquiry, if this should be styled inquiry, have led others into directly opposite errors. Some, who are no less zealous for God's honour, but who regard His honour as chiefly involved in the maintenance of the freeness of the Gospel, seem in the same way to consider themselves at liberty to fix upon such a notion of the nature of *faith* as may consist best with their view of what the freeness of the Gospel is, and what it requires. Were their views on this point in all respects unimpeachably correct, it is plain that they would not be secure from error, in attempting to derive from them the meaning of *faith*. And I think it is curious to observe that, in fact, this course has led these theorists to the same representation of its nature that is given by the Church which is most opposed to the freeness of the Gospel; and that the account of *faith* for which these ardent assertors of Gospel-freeness contend concurs with that of the Romish Church in representing it as a process purely intellectual; and ends in describing it as a belief of the truth of the history of our blessed Lord, as contained in the Bible; or an intelligent assent to certain propositions concerning His incarnation, life, and death.*

But whatever may be thought of this curious coinci-

* Note A.

dence, it is, I think, very certain, and I am sure that it deserves to be noticed, that though this view of *the nature of faith* has been maintained by divines of different schools among Protestants, it in none wears any appearance of having been originally found in the Bible, or sought for there. It seems, as I intimated, to have been taken up under an apprehension that we cannot ascribe to *faith* a closer connexion with the affections without impairing the simplicity of the Gospel, or prejudicing the doctrines of free grace, or leading to some form of self-righteousness.

As this misrepresentation, however, only errs in defect, the progress of the inquiry into the true meaning of *faith* will sufficiently exhibit the extent of it. I am, therefore, here only concerned with the principle of the proceeding. And this is plainly the same as that which has led to the former class of errors, though the results are so widely different. In both cases the plain statements of the Word of God are modified, from a fear of the consequences to which it is supposed that they will lead,—of licentiousness, on the one hand, and of self-righteousness, on the other. Thus both alike manifest a forgetfulness of man's relation to divine truth, and make him teach where it ought to be his desire humbly to learn. Both therefore require, and both equally, to be denounced as presumptuous attempts to supply safeguards which God has seen fit to omit. And the issue is in both cases as unhappy as might be anticipated from a principle of investigation so preposterous. All attempts to guard the purity of the Law at the expense of the freeness of the Gospel, end, as, by the wise connexion between the Law and the Gospel, they must end, in the overthrow of both. Nor are human devices for the protection of the freeness of the Gospel, more justifiable in their nature, or likely to be more innocent in their results. God's servants are, indeed, to be zealous for His honour. But the carnal pride and blindness of our fallen nature make it needful

that we should be continually reminded, that God's honour is to be maintained by the right use of the safeguards which He Himself has provided for it, not by our devising new muniments for its protection.

Investigating the subject upon sounder principles, in a more patient course, and in a humbler spirit, you, my brethren, will find, I am persuaded, that of the true meaning of FAITH, where we are most concerned to ascertain the meaning of the word, TRUST is an essential and leading constituent; and that the true meaning of *faith in Christ*, or *in God through Christ*, is not merely or properly belief of the truth of the Scripture narrative concerning our Lord; or an assent of the understanding to certain propositions derived from that narrative, however true and however important they be; but that it is TRUST IN CHRIST, or IN GOD THROUGH CHRIST, founded upon such a belief or assent; an entire and unreserved *confidence* in the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us; a full *reliance* upon Him and upon His work.

There are several significations of the word which we may safely pass over with little notice. It sometimes signifies *fidelity to engagements*, sometimes *honesty or sincerity* in general, sometimes *reliance upon the veracity* of another; and tracing out the connexion of these and other senses of the word might be in various ways pleasant and profitable. But, it is not necessary to dwell upon any of these meanings, in order to determine the sense of the word in that use of it in which it is my immediate object to fix and explain its sense,—I mean in the use of it in which it stands for the saving principle which unites us to Christ, and makes us partakers of all the benefits of His life and death; —justifies us before God, and reconciles us to Him. And

that the *faith* by which all this is said to be done is *faith in Christ*¹, *faith in His name*², *faith in His blood*³, or *faith in God*⁴ through Him, must be too well known to every reader of the Bible to require distinct proof.

Now, whatever diversity of meaning the word may have in its other uses, that, in these and all such like uses of it, it naturally expresses *trust* or *confidence*, seems to admit of very little question. That *faith in* any being, or *in* any quality of any being, is *confidence in* him or it, can hardly, I suppose, be questioned by any one. *Faith in* a person (and the same is true also of *faith in* a thing) stands so naturally for *trust in* him, as the sure instrument by which something desirable or useful is secured to us, or *trust in* him, as the certain source from which such benefits are to flow, that reliance upon the procurer or the bestower of good would be by most persons, I presume, expressed indifferently by *faith in* him, or *trust in* him.

There is, it is true, a limited meaning of the phrase, in which *faith in a man*, is used to express *reliance upon his veracity*. But even there it is clearly distinct from *belief in his testimony*, of which it is properly the foundation. *Belief in a man's testimony* may spring from *faith in him*, in this more confined meaning of the phrase; or may give rise to *faith in him*, in its more enlarged meaning; but it is plainly distinguishable from such *faith*, in either sense: as distinguishable as it is from any other species of evidence upon which belief is grounded, or any other emotion to which belief gives rise.

Thus, to apply these general principles to the case before us, *faith in the truth of God* is the fit foundation of *belief in his testimony*⁵, while that belief might, according to the

¹ Rom. iii. 22; Eph. i. 15; Col. i. 4, ii. 5; Gal. ii. 16, 20, iii. 26.

² John i. 12; 1 John iii. 23; v. 13.

³ Rom. iii. 25; see Note P.

⁴ Rom. iv. 5; 1 Thess. i. 8; 1 Pet. i. 21.

⁵ John iii. 33; 1 John v. 9, 10.

nature of the thing to which the testimony is given, call into exercise various feelings and affections of the mind; might raise surprise, or joy, or sorrow, or aversion, or love, or hope, or fear; might render God Himself, or any other being, an object of dread or an object of confidence. No one can confound things so manifestly distinct as the simple state of mind in which we acquiesce in the evidence for a truth which we understand, and the state of feeling which results from an application of this truth to ourselves, our own interests, or our own desires. But what I wish here to impress upon you is, that, in the case before us, common language keeps distinct these very distinct states of the mind. And that while *faith in a truth*, means not merely *firm belief of that truth*, but also the emotion of *hope* which the application of it to ourselves adds to belief of it; *faith in a person* includes, in addition to both, *the notion of a particular being* as the instrument by which the thing hoped for is to be procured, or as the source from which it is to flow. So that you must see that, when we interpret *faith in Christ*, or *faith in God through Christ*, as *trust in Christ* as the procurer of salvation, or *trust in God* as the giver of salvation for Christ's sake, we have all the advantage which belongs to the interpretation that makes the Bible employ words in their common meaning, in a case which seems to furnish no occasion for departing from the common use of language, and in which no intimation of any design to deviate from it is given.

But if there be a doubt about the meaning of a word used in Scripture, the question must be ultimately determined by an appeal to Scripture itself. And though I am confined, by the circumstances of this inquiry, to a very limited portion of the Bible, I am persuaded that a fair examination even of that portion will be abundantly sufficient for my purpose. I avoid all reference to the Old Testament;

not because it would be difficult to find there very certain instances of this use of the word, but because the application of them would require more preliminary discussion than we could find time for now. And from a large proportion of the texts in the New Testament, in which the word occurs, I am excluded, obviously, by the course of investigation which I have laid down. But the remainder will, I think, supply abundant materials, when fairly considered, for the satisfactory determination of this question*.

The Bible, however, is, as you know, a book of a cast so little formal and didactic, that you can hardly expect to find there regular definitions of the terms employed in it, but must be content, for the most part, to collect their meaning from their use. Of the examination required in the present case, I can, of course, give but an outline: but it will, I hope, be defective in few points which there can be any difficulty in supplying.

When, for example, you find our Lord thus addressing His disciples, "Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more shall he clothe you, O ye of little *faith*!"⁶ you can have no doubt, I presume, of the sense in which He employs the word *faith*. No one can, I suppose, question that He means by it, that *confidence in God's protection*, which their observation of His care for the lowest parts of His creation ought to imprint upon the hearts of His children—who should feel that they are objects of far warmer love and of far tenderer care. A glance at the whole passage will show that it is designed to condemn, in God's children, all that unreasonable solicitude about life and its wants in which they are so prone to indulge—to banish a *doubtful mind* concerning the supply of our necessities, by the recollection that *our heavenly Father knoweth that we have need*

* Note B.

⁶ Matt. vi. 30; Luke xii. 28.

of these things: to dispel all vain anxieties and too curious care, not merely by the depressing reflection that they can really do nothing for us, but by the more cheering thought that *we are better* than those animals which are harassed by no such anxieties, and can exercise no such care, and yet for which *He who is our Father* amply provides. You will see, that in the reproof which I have quoted, it is so little the Lord's purpose to charge those to whom He speaks with ignorance of God's providential care, or disbelief of it, that, on the contrary, the justice of His reproof of their want of *faith* rests chiefly upon the impossibility of their being ignorant of, or doubting, the facts upon which such confidence in God ought to be grounded.

Again, when the wild alarm to which they all give way at the approach of danger draws from Him the rebuke, "Why are ye so *fearful*, O ye of *little faith*?" or, "Why are ye so *fearful*? how is it that ye have *no faith*?" or, "Where is your *faith*?"—you have plain instances of a similar use of the term. The rebuke is here addressed to all the Apostles; but, upon another occasion, there is recorded a touching reproof of one of them, in particular, which furnishes a clear example of the same kind. One of the evangelists relates that, upon a stormy night, when His disciples were in the midst of the sea, tossed with the waves, the Lord was seen coming to them, *walking upon the sea*: that when He drew nigh to the ship, and made Himself known to them, Peter intreated that he might be commanded to go down to Him upon the water: and that, being commanded, His ardent follower at once went down. But when he saw himself surrounded by the dangers which he had voluntarily encountered, his heart died within him. His confidence in his Lord's power and in His love was strong enough to make him dare peril, but too weak to

⁷ Matt. viii. 26.⁵ Mark iv. 40.² Luke viii. 25.

keep him tranquil when it came; “and beginning to sink, he cried, saying, Lord, save me! And immediately Jesus stretched forth His hand, and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of *little faith*, wherefore didst thou *doubt*?” —And to these striking instances, to fix the sense of the word, your own memory will probably add others of the same class.

Now, on the other hand, look at any of those instances of *faith* which draw forth the Lord’s gracious approbation, and analyze the state of mind that He commends. Take, for example, the notable case of the Syrophenician woman, whose faith He seems to have regarded as especially worthy of remark; and see in what it consists¹⁰. Believing that He had come from God, and that He was invested with miraculous powers to execute God’s gracious purposes, she had sought Him out to engage His assistance on behalf of her child, whose disease was beyond all human aid. She is received by Him, as you remember, in a way calculated to extinguish all the hopes of relief which she had cherished — “He answered her not a word.” But she perseveres, under this heavy discouragement, in earnestly supplicating His compassion; so earnestly, indeed, that the disciples interpose in her behalf, but less, as it would seem, from sympathy with her in her distress than from impatience of her urgent entreaties for relief. They ask Him to grant her petition, that she may go away, and no longer follow them with her outcries. In answer to them, the Lord speaks, though He had refused to vouchsafe any reply to the supplicant herself. But His words are more discouraging than His silence. “I am not sent,” said He, “but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” His mission did not extend to the outcast race to which this heartbroken mother belonged. Of what avail, then, can it be to press her petition upon Him any more?

¹⁰ Matt. xiv. 25—31.

¹¹ Matt. xv. 21—28; Mark vii. 25—29.

But she does press it still upon Him with deeper humility, but with greater earnestness than before. And when, at length, her importunity wrings from Him an answer addressed to herself, it is even harsher and more disheartening than the one given to her through the disciples:—"It is not meet," He says, "to take the children's bread, and to cast it unto dogs."

To confidence less steadfast, such an answer would have been a final repulse; but hers was too genuine and too strong to be repelled. Her memorable reply shows at once the nature, the foundation, and the strength, of the principle which urged her to prayer, and sustained her in it. It showed that she confided in the Ruler of the world, not because she was insensible to the great and perplexing inequalities of human condition which He has established here; but because she had been enabled to see in all the arrangements of His providence, the gracious character which pervades them all—to see that His *tender mercies are over all His works*—that nothing, however humble, is overlooked or neglected by Him, but that He has wisely and kindly accommodated the circumstances to the nature even of the meaner animals, so as to secure a due provision for the wants of the very lowest of the beings that He has made. Her reply, I say, proves that she had been enabled to discern all this, and enabled too to draw, from all that she saw, the very lesson of humble confidence in God which the Lord's touching exhortation, just now adverted to, was designed to teach to those who were so much more favourably circumstanced for collecting it. "Truth, Lord," she replies; "yet the dogs eat of the crumbs that fall from their masters' table."

Is it not the conviction thus affectingly expressed—that however low were the place that she occupied among mankind—however far removed she was from the high privileges which she unrepiningly saw others enjoying,—she was not scorned or neglected by her Creator; but that, filling the

station assigned to her by His wisdom, she was still the object, in the proper degree, of which He alone was the proper judge, of His love and care:—is it not manifest, I say, that it is this humble and steadfast *confidence* in God,—acquired under circumstances so untoward, and retained under a trial so severe—that moves the admiration, and wonder (if we may so speak) which appear in the Lord's reply, "O woman, great is thy faith!"

I need hardly direct your attention to the importance of this example, as confirmatory of the conclusion which we drew from those which we looked at before. Those instances, rightly considered, seemed not only to fix the true nature of the principle, but sufficiently to overthrow both the erroneous notions of it. For we saw that, when the Lord reprehends the want of *faith* of those to whom He speaks, there is not anything in what draws forth His reproof which can be fairly described as a failure in *obedience*—or a want of *belief* in any specific proposition proposed as the object of *belief*—or a want of *belief*, in any sense which does not identify *belief* with *trust*:—it is plainly want of *trust* that he condemns. And you must see how strikingly this last example, which is of a different kind, confirms the conclusion as to the proper sense of the word, to which the former examples led. For here His emphatic commendation of *faith* is drawn forth by no signal act of *obedience*—by no act of *obedience* of any kind; and as little by any act of *belief*, as distinguished from *trust*. It is manifestly, as I have before said, an exhibition of *trust in God*, every way deserving of wonder; but of *trust*, it is to be remarked, not manifested in believing what the Lord said, but in disbelieving it, when, in its apparent sense, it contradicted her views of God's character, and tended to shake her confidence in Him, by representing Him as careless about her sufferings, and indisposed to relieve them.

Here, then, is as strong a confirmation as could be

desired of the sense which the former cases seem so clearly to assign to the word. And if you examine, in the same way, other instances, you will find, I think, just the same elements in the state of mind commended by our Lord under the name of *faith*. Not merely will you find in all of them, strong desire for some benefit, and a strong hope of obtaining it; but, moreover, firm *confidence* that the Being applied to could and would bestow it, appears clearly to all.

But I must leave it to private investigation to establish this; and must pass over all intermediate instances of the use of this word, in the Acts and the Epistles, that we may have time for considering a passage which it is impossible to omit, and which seems to render the consideration of others superfluous: I mean the well-known account of *faith* which occurs in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The Apostle, as you know, there describes it as “the substance of things hoped for; the evidence of things not seen¹².” And though there may be felt to be, at first, a little obscurity in the word “substance,” yet, I suppose most persons understand the sentence as conveying, that it is the character or property of *faith* to give to things future and hoped for all the reality of actual existence—all the effect upon the feelings and the conduct of *substantial realities*. And this is so easy a figure, and so fairly represents what is most important in the Apostle’s meaning, that I do not know whether it be worth mentioning here, that the original probably expresses his meaning more directly. For while “substance” (taken in its common signification) is one of the primitive meanings of the Greek word, for which it stands in our translation, that word has, among its derived meanings, *confident expectation*; and is, in fact, used

¹² Heb. xi. 1.

familiarly in that sense both by sacred and profane writers*. And when you recollect that, in this way of writing, the *things not seen*, in the second clause, of which *faith* is the evidence (or conviction), are the *things hoped for* in the first, you must see that this character of *faith*,—which describes it as *the confident expectation of the things for which we hope*, and *a conviction that though unseen they are real and sure*,—coincides with the account which I have attempted to give from other sources: and the entire of what follows falls in perfectly with this account, and strongly confirms it.

I do not mean to go through, in detail, all the instances of the force of *faith in God*, which the Apostle takes from the lives of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Martyrs, to illustrate his general account of the principle. But, by referring to the place, you will easily see that, in all these servants of God, the principle,—though existing doubtless in different degrees,—and though tried and exhibited in very different ways, and upon very different occasions,—is everywhere the same: that it is *confidence in God*, grounded upon such a manifestation of His character as He saw fit to make:—a *reliance* so deep and sincere upon His power, His goodness, and His truth, as enabled them to hope undoubtingly for all that He promised, and in hope, to endure patiently all that He appointed, and to perform resolutely whatever He enjoined.

The Apostle points to Noah, for example, sustained by this principle amidst the scoffs of a faithless generation, in his patient preparation of the appointed refuge against the day of God's wrath:—to the severely tried father of the faithful, in the strength of the same principle, raising his hand to slay his son—*his only son Isaac, whom he loved*¹³, at the command of Him who had given him that son by a

* Note C.

¹³ Gen. xxii. 2.

miracle, and in whom he trusted as able and true to restore him by a miracle again:—to Moses, in *faith* abandoning the luxuries of a sinful court; choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, and esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than all the treasures of Egypt, in certain hope of a future *recompense of reward*; and fearlessly encountering the vindictive rage of an earthly monarch, under a sense of the presence of *Him who is invisible*:—to Jephthah, and Gideon, and the other heroes of Jewish history, who in *faith* renounced the arm of flesh in peril, and fearlessly trusted in Him who is mighty to save:—yea, even to the heathen Rahab, in *faith*, severing so many of the strongest human ties, forsaking her country and her country's idols, and taking her portion with the people of the true God.

But are these exercises of faith *in Christ*? Some excellent persons maintain that they *all* are; but I think, without sufficiently weighing the nature of some of them, or the design of the Apostle in bringing the whole forward. They have probably been led into the error (for such I cannot help regarding it) by a desire to uphold the certain and important truth that “the fathers looked not only for transitory promises.” But that sound doctrine does not require that we should strain the meaning of any passage of Holy Writ in its support. And I certainly think that we are doing this, and very obviously too, when we take some of these instances as anything more than evidences of the extent to which *reliance* upon God was able to sustain His servants of old. We cannot take some at least of these instances for anything more than this, without offering great violence to very plain language. And there seems to be no purpose in forcing them to speak more. For, under this view of them are they not all pertinently brought forward by the Apostle, both as illustrating his general account of the principle and as supporting the exhortations to the same

course of persevering obedience which he addresses to those who professed a reliance upon promises far more glorious, and whose trust rested on a foundation so much more secure*?

All these instances are, I say, in this view of their nature, pertinent to the purpose of the Apostle; because the principle, by which those whom he addressed ought to be animated, is the same as that exhibited and exercised in all the cases to which he directs them. It is still *trust in God*; but under larger information and with better support. The distinction being, as he intimates, that of the Christian's *faith* CHRIST is "the author and the finisher"¹⁴—He bestows it and perfects it, and is Himself its foundation and consummation. It is *trust in God*; but it is *trust in Him* through our Lord Jesus Christ, "through whom we have boldness and access, with confidence, through the faith of Him"¹⁵. It is still grounded upon the manifestation of God's character; but its foundation is that brighter manifestation of all His infinite perfections as they shine concentrated in Him in whom "dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily"¹⁶. We are not left to collect God's lovingkindness and tender mercies from the predominant indications, certain as they are, of a benevolent design, amidst the conflicting appearances of the course of his providence,—we have the infinitely stronger and more persuasive proofs of benevolence which the mysteries of redemption supply—proofs, which seem framed to meet and satisfy every movement of distrust in the human breast, and to fill it with confidence and good hope towards God. The appeal, indeed, which the Apostle founds upon them,—“He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things¹⁷?—seems to address

* Note D.

¹⁴ Heb. xii. 2.

¹⁶ Col. ii. 9.

¹⁵ Ephes. iii. 12.

¹⁷ Rom. viii. 32.

itself with equal force to the understanding and to the affections,—to challenge the scrutiny of the reason for the claims that it makes upon the confidence of the heart. But the reasonableness of the appeal may be distinctly felt, while this confidence is withheld; and, until it be yielded by the heart, *faith*, as we have seen, is not possessed. Nor will the firmest belief in the Scripture narrative, with the clearest apprehensions of the Gospel scheme, and the soundest views of Christian doctrine, constitute *faith in CHRIST*, until, to this clear conviction of the sufficiency of His atoning sacrifice, are added a real desire for its fruits, and heartfelt confidence in its efficacy; until the Spirit has enabled us to cast ourselves in humble reliance, for time and for eternity, upon the mercy and the truth of a reconciled God.

How entirely those admirable men, the Martyrs and Confessors, to whom we owe the Homilies of our Church, agree in this view of the nature of *faith*, none can need to be informed who are at all acquainted with that valuable body of sound scriptural divinity. They declare that “true lively faith is not only the common belief of the articles of our faith, but it is also a *true trust and confidence in the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ; and a steadfast hope of all good things to be received at God’s hands.*” They tell us that “the right and true Christian faith is not only to believe that Holy Scripture and all the articles of our faith are true, but also to have a *sure trust and confidence in God’s merciful promises.*” And they, in substance, deny that any *knowledge or belief*, until it has issued in such *trust*, deserves the name of *faith*,—in any other sense than that in which the clear apprehensions and firm belief of devils are styled *faith*.

And to this decisive testimony of our own Church, I could add, if the occasion allowed such details, declarations equally express of the same views, from the public acts of ALL Protestant Churches, and from the writings of ALL the early

Reformers to whose names those Churches still attach most and best-deserved weight*.

But it will be said, supposing all this to be true, of what real importance are these distinctions? Upon the one hand, you maintain that good works are the certain fruits of *faith*, in the believer's life; why then labour so much, to prove that they are not included in the notion of that saving grace? Is this a point of any practical importance? On the other hand many of those who hold that *faith* is a process purely intellectual would allow, and even maintain, that, from the nature of the truths revealed, and from their relation to us, *trust* in God must be the result of genuine belief in them; how is it then practically of so much moment to establish that, instead of being thus among the necessary results of *faith*, such *trust* is really an essential part of the proper signification of the word?

Objections of this kind are constantly heard to discussions of the nature of that in which I have sought to engage you. In the present case, they certainly admit of a sufficient reply of the description that they ask for. To give that reply, however, fully now, would require an anticipation of doctrinal views, which would be a deviation from my plan, even if it did not demand details for which no time remains. But I trust that grievously misconceived and abused as the word *practical* is in religion, there can be few of my hearers who will be inclined to doubt, that differences concerning the mode of reconciling sinners to God, if they be not themselves *practical*, must at least *lead to* momentous *practical* results. And I trust, indeed, that some who hear me would feel that, even were we unable to point out any such consequences, these objections would deserve but little attention—that we are departing widely from that modesty which, in matters of

* Note E.

this nature, is surely our true wisdom, when we presume to determine the value of revealed truth by our power of distinctly ascertaining its value. If there be, as there plainly is, an intelligible distinction between these accounts of the *nature of faith*, is it not manifestly the very height of arrogant folly in us to pronounce, that it is of little consequence to determine which of them is the Scriptural account?

For some, I trust, this reflexion would be enough. To others, I can only say, that, if this principle of fixing the importance of revelation were as sound and safe in the general, as I am sure it is unsound and dangerous, the present offers no fair occasion for the application of it. For that ~~we can see~~ *practical* differences resulting from these different statements of the nature of *faith*; and see too that they are of no small moment. These differences, which, for the reason assigned above, I can only glance at now, will probably appear more distinctly when I am able to pursue the second part of my subject—the *effects of faith*; which I hope to be able to do at some future opportunity.

SERMON II.

ON THE SOURCE OF FAITH,
AND ON THE REPENTANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL
TO TRUE FAITH.

DE contritione præcidimus illas otiosas et infinitas disputationes, quando ex dilectione Dei, quando ex timore pœnæ doleamus? Sed dicimus contritiones esse veros terrores conscientiae quæ Deum sentit irasci peccato, et dolet se peccasse. Et hæc contritio ita fit quando verbo Dei arguuntur peccata, quia hæc est summa prædicationis Evangelii, arguere peccata, et offerre remissionem peccatorum et justitiam propter Christum; et Spiritum Sanctum, et vitam æternam; et ut renati beneficiamus.

APOLOGIA AUGUSTANÆ CONFESSIONIS

SERMON II.

HEBREWS XI. 1.

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for; the evidence of things not seen.

BEFORE I begin, as I proposed when I last addressed you, my brethren, the consideration of the *effects* of faith, I shall have something to say to you of its *source*. But I must first employ a moment in bringing back to your minds, what we were then able to collect from Scripture concerning its *nature*.

Declining all merely curious investigations of the various senses of the word and their connexion, and inquiring simply into its meaning where it stands for a saving principle, we saw, you will remember, that the leading part of the notion which it is then employed to convey is TRUST.

The Apostle's account of the nature of the principle in general is, that it is a *confident expectation of the things for which we hope, and a conviction of their existence though they be not seen*. This coincides sufficiently exactly with the sense which the common use of language assigns to it. And he proceeds to illustrate the particular exercise of the principle with which he is more immediately concerned, by striking instances of the force of FAITH IN GOD, taken from the lives of the most remarkable characters in Jewish history. In these, as might be expected in his purpose,

there is great variety in the objects hoped for; and the grounds of the expectations entertained are as different, as the degrees of acquaintance with God's character and designs which the several individuals possessed were different. But the principle unequivocally manifested in all is the same—it is *the confident expectation* of some benefit at God's hands, or by His appointment—it is firm *trust* in Him for some good that is desired—it is *reliance* upon the faithfulness and the loving-kindness of the Most High*.

Such is the general account which this remarkable passage supplies of the nature of *faith in God*.

And, with this account, we found that several important cases of its use in other parts of Scripture, which were abundantly clear, and which might very easily have been multiplied, perfectly concurred.

Now *faith in GOD through CHRIST*—the exercise of this principle with which we have to do—differs plainly from any case of *faith in GOD* only in the grounds upon which it rests, and the object about which it is exercised: not at all—manifestly not at all—in the state of mind which the words are intended to express. The distinction is, that the benefit hoped for from God is *salvation*; and the foundation of the hope, the merits and the sufferings of Christ. It includes,—as every other case of *faith in GOD* (or, I may add, in any being) does,—*desire* of something to be received from Him†, and *trust* that we shall receive it. And to this confidence in Him who is to bestow the benefit upon us, it adds confidence in Him who has earned it for us. It is grounded upon the testimony of God's word, and requires, of course, a belief in that testimony; but it is manifestly distinct from such belief. It leads, we learn, to obedience to God's will; but it is even more manifestly distinct from such obedience.

Of the two misrepresentations of the meaning of *faith*, which the true account of the nature of the principle thus

* Note F.

† Note G.

equally overthrows, that which makes it mere *belief in the testimony of the Bible* is the one against which I felt, and feel, especially solicitous to guard you. The opposite error, in which obedience to God's will is made a part of the notion for which *faith* stands, is easily exposed; even independently of any exact knowledge of the true meaning of the term. But against this more dangerous error there is, I think, no effectual security, except in clear views of the true nature of the principle which it misrepresents. I call it more dangerous, not because I regard it as more injurious in its effects, or in itself more opposed to divine truth. On the contrary, though I cannot avoid ascribing to it, much of what is most to be condemned in the heartless and paralyzing religious system of which it forms a part, I am sure that it is much less at war with the principles of the Gospel than the other. But it is far more dangerous, as being far more likely to mislead. In fact, the other, as I said, rests exclusively upon doctrinal views, which assume generally the form of such gross and palpable misrepresentations of Scripture as can deceive, only so long as a spirit of party, deference to authority, or utter carelessness about the matter, prevents men from bringing them to the test of God's word. And even in their best form, when their opposition to it is most carefully softened down and best concealed, a moderately diligent examination of the Bible, under the direction of moderate honesty, can hardly, I think, fail to provide any inquirer with a satisfactory refutation of them: while further study will certainly only serve to show more clearly, how entirely irreconcilable they are to the fundamental principles of the scheme of mercy which it is the object of the Bible to reveal.

But the error which makes *faith* stand for *belief in the truth of the facts and doctrines contained in the Word of God*, does not admit of this direct refutation from the first principles of the Gospel: it seems, on the contrary, to assert

these principles in their fullest extent. It seems, too, to exhibit the characteristic simplicity of the Gospel, no less than the truer statement; and, under favour of the ambiguities of language, it seems sometimes to have the support of express texts of Holy Scripture. All these advantages it owes to the fact to which I before adverted—of its erring *in defect*. So long as a misstatement of the nature of *faith* makes no addition to the real constituents of that principle, it is plain that it cannot oppose the freeness or the simplicity of the Gospel. And it requires but a little consideration to see how such a system is likely to secure the other advantage also; I mean the advantage of apparent support in *some passages of Holy Scripture*. Supposing our account of the principle correct, you could not, upon reflexion, be surprised to find *faith* sometimes employed to express a belief of those Scripture truths upon which our *trust* in God is founded; or to find such *belief* sometimes used for *faith*. For you must be aware that this occurs constantly, with respect to our complex ideas, in all writings whatsoever. Where but a part of the notion is wanted, the word which expresses the entire is sometimes used for that part; and, on the other hand, when the whole is required, it may be occasionally conveyed, too, by expressing an important part and leaving the rest to be implied. And this, as every one knows, occurs familiarly, in writings far more artificial and exact than the books of the New Testament, and without giving rise to mistake or uncertainty*.

But the instances in the Bible, to which we are called upon to apply this fair and obvious principle, are of a kind that makes the application peculiarly easy. They are cases in which belief in *the record that God has given of His Son* is used as equivalent to *saving faith*. Now this record comprehends all the promises which form the foundation of all our hopes. And that *belief* in these promises should be employed

* Note H.

for *trust* in Him who has promised, though it furnishes an occasion to apply this principle, seems among the simplest cases that could offer themselves for the application of it.

And, on the whole, when you have once fixed the true sense of the term, by completing the Scriptural investigation of which I gave you an outline,—if you apply discreetly the remark which I have just made, and remember too the fair rule of interpretation—to explain the parts which are doubtful by those which are clear—I do not think that there is in the Bible any latitude in the use of this term which can create any considerable or permanent embarrassment.

It might be thought unnecessary here to add anything of the source of this important principle; for all who profess submission to the authority of God's word must agree—and do, in fact, agree—in representing it as the gift of God¹. But under this agreement in words, there lies, as might be expected, a real and very wide difference; a difference which, for various reasons, it seems important to exhibit clearly.

Those who hold the view of the nature of *faith* which I have endeavoured to support, find an obvious necessity for the operation of the Spirit of God to produce it. Who that knows his own mind, indeed, can doubt that the agency of that omnipotent being is needed to convince the sinner of his sin—to awaken in him a lively sense of his guilt and danger—to inspire a real desire for deliverance, and prompt the repentant cry, “What must I do to be saved?”—and then to extinguish all self-dependence—to repress all self-righteous strivings, and effectually to teach that *in confidence and quietness is our strength*²;—to tranquillize the fears of the awakened sinner by the efficacy of the atoning

¹ John xvi. 7-11; Rom. xii. 3; Gal. v. 22; Eph. ii. 8, vi. 23; 1 Tim. i. 14; 2 Pet. i. 1; Note I.

² Is. xxx. 15.

work of the Saviour;—and, what is harder still, to cleanse his conscience and silence its reproaches by the sufficiency of the same stupendous offering for sin? All this must be done before the heart can truly feel that *confidence in God through Christ*, which we maintain to be an essential part of saving faith. And to effect this change in all the natural feelings of the heart, will, assuredly, by all who know the heart, be easily admitted to be the work, *not of man's might or of his power, but of the Spirit of the Lord of Hosts*³.

But those who hold that view of *faith* to which I have so often adverted—who represent it, that is, as merely an intelligent assent to the testimony of the Bible concerning our Lord, profess to believe, no less than we, that to the production of FAITH the operation of God's Spirit is essential. They must, therefore,—and I think the necessity adds plainly to the difficulties with which their system is pressed,—they must represent that divine agency as required to enable us to estimate the evidence for the divine authority of revelation, or to apprehend the terms in which it is conveyed.

Now this is a subject upon which I hope I should be most anxious to speak guardedly. And, no doubt, as there are many cases in which the first direction of the mind to the consideration of religion in any shape is due to the secret influences of the Spirit of God, so is it possible that there are many where, in the wisdom of God, the same agent is employed in leading the mind to yield assent to the force of the evidence for the divine origin of revelation, and in opening the understanding to the perception of its meaning. This is doubtless to be confessed; but this is plainly not enough for this position. And to maintain all that the position requires—to pronounce this agency in *all* cases essential to effects which seem such proper results of man's unassisted powers—seems certainly a great sacrifice to system.

That the evidence for revelation is so essentially differ-

³ Zech. iv. 6.

ent from all other evidence, that it is only by the aid of the Spirit of God that a man can *ever* properly estimate its force; that the Scripture narrative of our Lord's life and death, or the Scripture statements concerning His Atonement, which we are required to believe, contain notions so different in kind from those with which we come to be furnished naturally, that the same higher aid is *always* necessary to enable us to apprehend them: these are positions so plainly taken up and maintained, because a narrow view of the nature of *faith* makes it necessary to maintain them, that I do not feel called on to point out in detail the mistakes on which they are founded, and the inconsistencies to which they lead.

But it is retorted, 'Does not a desire for the objects of *faith* necessarily flow from a correct apprehension of them?—and is not *trust in Christ* thus a necessary result of a true belief of what He is recorded to have wrought for us?—And does not *faith* thus, even in your view of its nature, seem attainable by man without the necessity of spiritual aid?' This would no doubt follow, if the foundation of the inference were granted; but it is denied, and I think, too, denied on very sufficient grounds. That the salvation which Christ lived and died to secure is an object of real desire to man, so soon as he knows what it is, seems ~~certain~~ not true in any sense which is important to the question before us. Happiness is no doubt universally desired, and salvation is certainly happiness. But it is not presented to the mind as happiness in the abstract. It is happiness of a particular kind, and bestowed in a particular way. Present pardon and restoration to God's favour are no doubt offered in the gospel to ALL, freely,—without any of those limitations and qualifications with which we are so disposed to restrict and encumber that gracious offer. But this pardon and reconciliation are only objects of real desire to those who feel their need of them deeply. Have men naturally this deep feeling of their real wants? None, it is said, can believe the truth without

feeling this need, and consequently this desire. But this is assuming the very point at issue, or a most important part of it; it is assuming that a man cannot believe a truth without making such an application of the truth to himself, as to feel all the emotions to which his relation to it ought to give rise. I do not know many positions which I believe to be more at war with the common experience and common judgment of mankind.

But it may be said that, whatever becomes of the general principle, the objects in this case are too plainly of momentous importance to allow one who truly believes the Scripture testimony concerning them not to feel a real desire for them. Be it so. Let it be supposed that belief in the truth in this case necessarily generates some feeling of desire. Has the desire for deliverance no difficulties to overcome before the heart *submits itself to the righteousness of God*⁴, and trusts, not in profession, but truly, not in part, but altogether, in the blood and merits of the Redeemer? Is man's moral pride an inconsiderable obstacle to this trust in another; or is it the same thing to be convinced that this pride is wrong, or injurious, or destructive even, and to cease to feel it?

Suppose, however, that this obstacle too is overcome, it is not the only one which the corruption of the human heart offers to trusting in the Redeemer, even under the fullest knowledge and firmest belief of the truth. I said, that of the salvation which Christ died to secure us, pardon of all sin and full acceptance with God are but a part; a deliverance from the power of sin is no less fully secured, and no less distinctly promised. And may not this latter promise be an object of dread to one to whom the former is an object of desire? I think this is not barely conceivable; but I am sure that, in fact, an apprehension of the fulfilment of this part of the promise, —under a knowledge of the way in

⁴ Rom. x. 3.

which it is to be fulfilled,—often abates effectually the desire that men feel for the blessings held out in the former part ; disposes them,—not to relinquish all hopes of obtaining these blessings, or to renounce their conviction that they are to be obtained but in one way, but—to postpone seeking for them in that way. I am sure, I say, that, even when we *tremble at judgment to come*, a corrupt dread of *righteousness and temperance* often prevails to make us defer to a more convenient season the commencement of the course, which we feel commences with our acceptance of God's free justification of us in Christ ; and that this is among the most potent of the causes why we *will not come to Him that we might have life*.

All who believe or understand the truth must see that it is distinctly declared to us, that to fit those who embrace God's offers of mercy for the blessings which He has prepared for them, it is essential that they be freed from the dominion of sin, and conformed to the image of their Redeemer. And they see too that, in God's ordinary dealings, this change of character is effected by a course of discipline, and they learn that upon this course they are entering when they become believers in Christ. All know that His word declares, that *without taking His yoke and burden upon us, denying ourselves daily, taking up the cross and following Him*, renouncing the friendship of the world, which is enmity against God ; turning in heart and affection, not from its vanities and vices merely, but, at His call, from its most allowed enjoyments ; abandoning at His command everything dear to man's natural heart—wealth, and ease, and reputation—love, and friendship, and kindred affections—we *cannot* be His disciples⁵. They hear in the Bible reiterated warnings that, in coming to Christ, this is the profession in which we are engaging, that we are engaging in a warfare in which we

⁵ Mark viii. 34, x. 21 ; Matt. x. 38 ; Luke xiv. 26, 27, 33, ix. 23.

must endure hardness, as His soldiers⁶, that God scourgeth every son whom he receiveth⁷, and that it is only through much tribulation that we can enter upon the promised bliss⁸, if we be indeed followers of Him who entered not into His reward, but first He suffered. Is there nothing formidable in the prospect of such a course? I do not ask, Do all men desire this kind of happiness?—but, Do they desire any kind of happiness which is to be bestowed in this way? I believe that the power, which all confess to be essential to sustain us in such a course, is no less necessary to vanquish our repugnance to entering upon it.

Nor do I mean that men cease to desire to be reconciled to God, from apprehending that this arduous course of obedience to His will is demanded of them, as the price or condition of that reconciliation. I do not suppose in the case any such gross misconception of the true nature of the gospel, or any misconception of any kind. On the contrary, I suppose that they fully understand that they are pressed to be reconciled to God *now*; that they are *now* offered, upon His part, pardon of all their offences, and free acceptance in Christ as dear children; and that they know, too, that to enable them to walk as becomes children, a power is engaged which can and will support them in this most arduous course. But I am sure that, from this message thus understood, fallen man *naturally* recoils with an aversion just proportioned to the degree in which he understands it. And if this be the case—if it be that, when this message of mercy is best understood, it is naturally most distasteful—there is plainly an obstacle to *trust* in the Redeemer which no degree of knowledge, and no strength of conviction, can of themselves overcome; which nothing but the power of God's Spirit can effectually subdue.

There is doubtless no part of the mysteries of our faith

⁶ 2 Tim. ii. 3.

⁷ Heb. xii. 6.

⁸ Acts xiv. 22.

upon which it less becomes us, *that are but dust and ashes*, to dogmatize, than the mode of operation of the Infinite Spirit, who deigns to take upon Him the work of our conversion to God. But I hope there is nothing in these views which makes them fairly liable to the charge of such presumption. We say that we find in Scripture the most express reference of *faith* to the power of God upon the heart; but that we find there no assertion that this supernatural agency is in all cases exercised to produce belief in the testimony of the Bible, which we have proved to be but a part of *faith*; and that reason does not show, in the nature of the thing, a necessity for such influence. But we add, that, whether this influence be thus exerted or not, to enable us to appreciate the evidence for revelation, and to understand its meaning, we do see a necessity for influences from above, to fill our hearts with a genuine desire for salvation, and to enable us, in entire self-renunciation, to trust for it unreservedly to the work of the Redeemer, and to it alone.

If the aim of dwelling upon the difference, in this respect, between the two views of *faith* which I have been considering were merely to confirm the refutation which I have given of the one that I hold to be erroneous, it might be more easily attained. It would be enough for this purpose to ask, with respect to the desire which the truth is said to produce, When is it produced in the mind? If it be said to follow that belief in the testimony of the Bible which in this view constitutes *faith*, then may you be assured that this *faith* is not the *faith* of St Paul; for, according to him, *faith* is the confident expectation of *things hoped for*⁹. No expectation of an event, therefore, until the event be an object of hope, and therefore, of desire, in his view of the principle, constitutes *faith*. If it be said that a belief in a part of the truth produces this desire, and that belief in the remain-

⁹ Heb. xi. 1.

der follows it, then you must remark that this statement *and in representing desire and belief not merely as actually existing together in the Believer's mind, but as necessarily existing together there before he can be styled a Believer.* And so far as this coincides with the account of that character which the Apostle gives, it is plainly an abandonment, for all practical purposes, of the view of the nature of *faith* which I have been opposing.

But the controversial bearing of what I have been saying is but incidental to its main design, and of far inferior importance. My chief purpose was to show that what we know of the nature of our own minds furnishes a sufficient reason for what the Bible so distinctly reveals—for the necessity of the influence of the Spirit to effect that change of heart which ends in a joyful and humble acceptance of redemption in the way which God has appointed. And I hope that, for this object, what has been said is enough, if it be but fairly considered.

I hope, too, that, at the same time, a sufficient account has been given of what that change of heart includes; and that thus materials are supplied for an answer to a question which is often asked, though not always, perhaps, with a sincere desire for information, namely, How far is *repentance* essential to *faith*? For, if by *repentance* be meant the whole change of mind which a sinner undergoes under the operation of divine grace, it is only necessary to recal what we have established about *the nature of faith*, to be enabled to give to this question a sufficient reply; since just so much of that change as is necessary to render faith real, is to be pronounced strictly essential to it, and no more.

FAITH in CHRIST, as we have said, is *trust* in Him and in His work. But that this trust should be genuine, it is plainly necessary that we should feel truly our need of redemption, and truly desire it; as well as truly believe that Christ died to redeem us. *Faith*, then, is not the act of

one careless about the interests of his immortal soul, and therefore consenting easily to confide any where or in any one a charge in which he feels but little concern; but of one alive to the soul's infinite value, and to the momentous importance of eternity. It is not the act of one at ease about the safety of his soul, with little sense of guilt and little fear of punishment; but of one who feels himself condemned by God's righteous law, and, by its sentence, a sinner in thought, and word, and deed; and who feels, too, the certainty of his danger as well as the reality of his guilt; and who seeks relief from this terror and remorse in none of those *refuges of lies* by which such salutary alarm is so often mitigated and finally extinguished; but who, feeling the nothingness of them all, and renouncing them all, has, under this sense of sin, and danger, and helplessness, come in sincerity to Christ for everything,—for safety and innocence, and strength. When we say that *Faith* in Christ is *trust* in Him, this is the *trust* that we mean,—*trust* founded upon the Word of God by one who has thus entirely received and believed its testimony concerning sin and the Saviour. A serious impression, therefore, of the importance of eternity and its interests—a real conviction of sin and of its exceeding sinfulness—a heartfelt sense of our own guilt and depravity—a heartfelt sense too, of our helplessness, of our weakness, and our wants—must be felt by all who can be truly said to *trust in CHRIST*; as *knowing in whom they trust*, and knowing, also, what they are confiding to His care.

This part of *repentance*, therefore, is implied in *faith* rightly understood, and is, strictly speaking, essential to it.

And this reply to the question, in its more important sense, offers a sufficient answer to it in what is perhaps its more common meaning, in which *repentance* is used in the more confined signification of *sorrow for sin*. It is plain that, by all who really apprehend and believe the state to

which sin has brought them, sorrow for sin must be felt. And, though the predominant feeling is likely to be that sorrow which an apprehension of punishment produces, yet no one who knows anything of the human mind can imagine that this is the only sorrow that it feels under such convictions. However enfeebled it is, conscience has survived the general degradation of our nature in the fall, and the further depravation of it in each of us, by his own iniquity. And though it is too weak to restrain man from yielding to his evil propensities, yet when he does yield to them, it still raises its voice within him, to reproach and to condemn him. And it does this with authority,—making itself felt to be *de jure* the ruling principle of his nature, even while *de facto* other principles are exercising dominion over him. No one can be entirely at ease when what he feels to be the highest part of his nature, even when it is the weakest, thus authoritatively testifies against him, as sinful, guilty, blameworthy. Compunction and remorse must, from time to time, more or less, harass and disturb his mind. Wherever therefore the convictions of sin which I have described as essential to genuine faith exist, there too will be found those painful emotions which the conscience has still a power of producing. And as they include a measure of sorrow for sin independently of its consequences, such sorrow for sin must be felt in some measure by all whom the Spirit brings through such convictions to *faith*.

But there is a sorrow for sin which is the portion of God's reconciled children, and which cannot be felt by the unreconciled. Sorrow for sin, as rebellion against the rightful Lord of our hearts, as ingratitude to our gracious Saviour, as displeasing to our merciful Father, as shaming the profession of the Gospel, and grieving the Spirit of grace—this is manifestly the feeling of those who have received from Him, by *faith*, the Spirit of adoption, and is to be looked for only in those hearts in which the *love of God has been shed*

abroad by the power of the Holy Ghost¹⁰. The graces of filial love, and of that filial fear that is its inseparable companion, from which spring a genuine desire to obey, and genuine sorrow at all our failures in obedience, are themselves (as will, I trust, hereafter more distinctly appear) wrought by the Spirit of God mainly through the instrumentality of the *faith* which He has bestowed, and under that sense of entire reconciliation with God which *faith* supplies. And to require the actual possession of these graces as essential to the genuineness of *faith*, is to mistake the nature of *faith*, to misrepresent the order of the Spirit's gifts, and in its direct tendency to overthrow the principles, and to frustrate the whole design, of the Gospel.

In what ways the Spirit of God, in bestowing *faith*, scatters, too, the seeds of all those graces which *by faith* He afterwards brings to maturity, we cannot without great presumption determine. And any attempt to fix strictly the order in which they appear, the relative rapidity of their advancement, and their relative strength as constituents of the Christian character, is not only a presumptuous limitation of the *free Spirit* by whom they are wrought, but a weak forgetfulness of those wide diversities of natural character and disposition, by which all the effects of religion upon men are so extensively modified. The first operations of the Spirit upon the heart, with which alone I have at present any concern, are of course liable to be considerably affected by such differences in the subjects of His operation. In one mind alarm at the divine threatenings, in another desire of the promises, may strikingly predominate over all the accompanying feelings: in another the leading feature may be remorse; while another may be penetrated and melted down, by the unmerited love and generous compassion which the Gospel displays. And in all the statements that I have made of the change of mind which is

¹⁰ Rom. v. 5.

essential to *faith*, I desire to be understood to speak, not only with a full allowance for such variations as these in the work of the Holy Spirit upon man; but also with a reservation for all further variations which, in the perfect freedom of His ways, that Omniscient Agent may see fit to introduce. Such reservations being made, however, I think this question has been truly answered, and that our knowledge of the human mind allows us, with great confidence, to say, that the trust in the Redeemer for which *faith* stands, may be felt by any heart which the Spirit of God has, by the Word of God, brought to a true sense of its lost state before Him; and in which the same Spirit has also wrought a real desire of deliverance from the destruction which it dreads. There is in such convictions, and in such desire, plainly a sufficient foundation for genuine *trust* in the Redeemer—a *reliance* upon Him not blind or careless, but intelligent and cordial; and wherever such *trust* is felt, there is genuine *faith**.

When questions of this kind are raised by man's perverse or contentious spirit, it seems necessary to settle them. But the preaching of the truth, which takes the Word of God for its example, will not often have a tendency to engage the mind in such inquiries. The Bible does little to lead a sinner from a contemplation of that work which is the proper foundation of faith, to a scrutiny into the state of his own mind in repenting and believing. It calls upon all to repent and to believe; and brings to act upon all, forces fitted to move in all remorse and alarm. But it treats our sorrow and fear not as means of propitiating an offended Deity; but as the course through which sinners are to be brought to confide in a reconciled God. To all it presents the same grounds of trust, and gives no warrant to any to delay faith, or to disquiet the peace of believing, by the old inquiry, *Have I repented enough to believe?* And as

* Note J.

little does it countenance the new one, by which, in the same spirit, the professors of a very opposite system impede or disturb the communion of the soul with God,—‘*Do I believe correctly enough to be allowed to pray?*’

Knowing that the Spirit works in and by means, he who preaches the truth in simplicity will employ appointed means, in humble reliance on the secret agency by which they are rendered effectual to the salvation of souls—will seek to abase the sinner’s mind by the terrors of the Law, and to raise it again by the mercies of the Gospel. And if there be any, whose solicitude about their soul is awakened, and who can find no rest—who feel strong convictions, but whose confidence is cold—to them he will not hesitate to say,—Persevere. However imperfectly we can trace it, there is doubtless connected with the mysterious dispensations of God’s grace, a constitution as regular as that by which His providence administers the affairs of the natural world. And they who, in the humble use of appointed means, are presenting their hearts to the influence of the source of spiritual life, may trust that that life will spring up within them, and go on to perfection; as he who casts his seed into the ground, relies on an influence no less unseen and uncontrollable to bring it to maturity¹¹. And above all, remember that the Bible directs us to PRAYER, as the prevailing instrument by which these transforming influences are to be brought down from on high; assuring us that our heavenly Father is ready to give his Holy Spirit to them that ask him¹². *Ask, therefore, and it shall be given you*¹³.

What? the class of religionists to whom I have alluded are ready to exclaim, upon every such exhortation as this, ‘desire a man to *pray* before he has *faith*?’ No, we do not desire a man to pray before he has *faith*. The Apostle sufficiently guards us against such an error, if it were possible

¹¹ Mark iv. 26.

¹² Luke vii. 13.

¹³ Matt. vii. 7; Luke vii. 9.

to fall into one which is so like a contradiction in terms. He tells us that it is impossible to approach God acceptably without *faith*; but he at the same time declares expressly the kind of *faith* which is necessary to enable us to draw nigh to Him: and we should surely beware how we add to the conditions. "He that cometh to Him," saith he, "must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him¹⁴." Now, is not prayer to God—(I do not mean a repetition of a form of words, but real prayer)—the proper expression of this kind of *faith*, presupposing it and prerequiring it? And is not a man, who is convinced upon the evidence of the Bible that *faith in Christ* is the gift of God; and that He is ready to bestow it upon all who ask it, in a condition to offer this prayer, which is *of FAITH* and *for FAITH*.[#]

Doubtless he is. And of all the errors of this religion of the intellect—and they are many—the interposing of barriers between God and a soul, which, wrung with remorse, or softened by affliction, or shaken by terror, is about to cast itself upon Him for pardon, and strength, and succour, seems the worst,—the most presumptuous, and the most pernicious.

But prayer is too extensive a subject to be entered upon incidentally, and too important not to make me anxious to return to it. Meanwhile, I have no apprehensions—none at all—that I am misleading you, my brethren, when I say,—If any of you be convinced, by God's Word, that you are lost sinners, and that it is only by *faith in Christ* that you can be saved; and if you feel that your *faith* in Him falls far short of that entire *trust in Him* which He deserves and demands; and if you believe, on the same evidence, that *faith* is the gift of God, and that God is a *hearer of prayer*;—thrust from you the frigid system,—as shallow and false as it is cold,—which would bar your access to the throne of grace, and stifle the cry of spiritual distress from rising to

¹⁴ Heb. xi. 6.

[#] Note K.

Him before whom it never rose in vain. In the self-abasement of conscious guilt,—in the self-renunciation of conscious helplessness,—with the fervour of heartfelt *poverty, and nakedness, and blindness, and misery*, implore Him *who giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth not*, that He would *help your unbelief, and increase your faith, and it shall be unto you, even as you will.*

I have been led away from the subject which I proposed—the effects of faith—too far to return to it now; but I hope to be able to pursue it when I have next an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON III.

ON THE NATURE AND THE GROUNDS OF
JUSTIFICATION.

Justificare ergo nihil aliud est, quam eum qui reus agebatur, tanquam approbata innocentia a reatu absolvere. Quum itaque nos Christi intercessionem posuimus Deum, non proprio innocentie approbatione, sed justitie imputatione nos absolvit: ut pro justis in Christo censeamur, qui in nobis non sumus.

CALVIN. *Inst. lib. III, cap. 11, § 3.*

In presentiarum vero breviter dico, credere me peccatores sola Christi obedientia justos constitui: et quod justitia Christi, sola meritoria causa sit, propter quam Deus credentibus peccatum condonet, eosque pro justis reputat; non aliter atque si legem perfecte impleverissent. Quoniam vero Deus justitiam Christi nemini imputat nisi fidelibus, statuo hoc sensu bene et proprie dici, fidem homini credenti, in justitiam, ex gratia imputari: quatenus Deus Jesum Christum Filium suum proposuit tribunal gratiae sive propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius. Sed quidquid hic sit, *mea sententia* non usque adeo discrepat a *sententia Calvin.* quem tamen nemo nostrum reprehendit atque male in hac re sentientem, quin paratus essem manus meae subnotatione subscribere illis, quæ in tertio libro Institutionum suarum de hac re dicit, iisque calculum meum adjicere.

ARMINIUS. *Declaratio Sententiæ suæ, &c.*

SERMON III.

ACTS XIII. 38, 39.

Be it known unto you, therefore, men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you forgiveness of sins; and by Him all that believe are justified from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses.

EVERY one must, I suppose, have noticed how strong and how widely spread the impression is, that we ought to ascribe to the leading terms of Scripture some sense different from that which they bear in other writings, or in common discourse. And if it were important, it would not be very difficult to assign some, at least, of the causes which may have given currency to this strange impression. It leaves almost indefinite room for evasion in argument, which answers the purposes of some who entertain it. It favours vague notions in matters of religion, which to most minds are far more comfortable than more exact ones. And it indulges that passion for the mysterious in theology, which, in some degree or other, is, I believe, natural to us all.

It might be possible, perhaps, to add to these reasons for its easy reception; but we are much more interested in its truth than in its origin. Upon that, however, I can at present only stop to say, that, whatever foundation such a view may have in general—and I cannot help thinking that it has in all cases much less than is usually supposed—it

manifestly can have none at all, where these terms stand for states of the human mind. All the processes of man's intellect, and all the varieties of his affections, are manifestly the same in kind, whether they be employed about things temporal or things eternal—about this world or the next. Whether we reason, and judge, and believe, concerning law, or politics, or religion, no one can, I suppose, doubt that we reason, and judge, and believe, in the same way. And, surely, just as little ground is there for questioning that, whether our hopes and fears, our desires and aversions, be excited by the passing shadows of the present scene, or by the permanent realities of the invisible world, they are essentially the same emotions. They differ when exercised about objects of these widely different spheres, it is true; but only as they differ when employed about different objects of the one which surrounds us, and acts upon our senses.—They differ, that is, in duration and in intensity,—in the facility and certainty with which they answer the calls fitted to draw them forth,—in the degree in which they enter into man's character,—in the extent to which they regulate his conduct: in these and such like ways they differ, but in no other. They are essentially the same affections, whether they be lavished, as they so often are, upon some of the transitory objects which engross and debase them; or find a worthy exercise in what tasks and baffles the faculties of angels—in God and in His law,—in the mysteries of redemption,—in the bounties of grace,—in heaven and in hell,—in judgment, and eternity!

The truth of this is, I presume, too evident to make any confirmation of it necessary. It might rather appear, perhaps, that some excuse was required, for putting forward a principle so obvious, in so detailed a form. For you, however, my brethren, this, too, would be superfluous. The class of truths, of any value, of which men do not require sometimes to be reminded is a very scanty one; and you

cannot think that this is among them, when you recollect that we have been engaged in combating some errors concerning one important Scripture term, which could not easily have existed, if this principle were not sometimes either disbelieved or forgotten.

You will, however, also, I hope, remember that, neither in the refutation of these errors, nor in the investigation of the true meaning of the term, was any assistance borrowed from this principle, indisputable as it is; but that it was ascertained, by direct examination of the Bible, that the sense in which *faith* (the term with which we had to do) is used there is, in no respect, different from that which it bears in the ordinary use of common language with reference to the affairs of this life. So that they who know what is meant by *faith* in a *promise* know what is meant by *faith* in the *Gospel*;—they who know what is meant by *faith* in a *remedy* know what is meant by *faith in the blood of the Redeemer*;—they who know what is meant by *faith in a physician, faith in an advocate, faith in a friend* know, too, what the Scriptures mean to express when they speak of *faith in the Lord Jesus Christ*.

Where this is held, and remembered, the sense of this important phrase is fixed, with all the exactness that is practicable or desirable. No one who bore it in mind could easily, for example, be led into the gross error of those who regard *faith in the Redeemer* as standing for that combination of spiritual graces and active virtues which forms the Christian character. Nor would he readily be beguiled even into the opposite mistake of those who understand by it simply a belief in the truth of the statements—whether historical or doctrinal—which the Holy Scriptures contain concerning our blessed Lord. For though the error in doctrine which this interpretation involves is more covert than that which is embodied in the other, yet the interpretation itself is no less widely at variance with the common mean-

ing of the word. Such a misuse of common language, indeed, as it ascribes to the Sacred Writers would hardly be committed by any one in relation to matters of common life; and if it were fallen into accidentally by a speaker, it would be at once felt and detected by all who heard him.

If a man, for example, expresses his *faith* in a physician, or a lawyer, or a statesman, or a general of his own country and his own times, no one is surprised at what he says, or feels any difficulty as to what he means. But who is there who would not be startled, if we professed our *faith* in a physician, or a lawyer, or a statesman, or a general of ancient Greece or Rome? And what is the difference between the two cases, which makes the profession in the one, natural and intelligible, and in the other, harsh and improper? The evidence for the skill, or the probity, or whatever be the appropriate merit or good quality of the individual, may be just as unimpeachable in the case of the ancient as in that of the modern; and our belief of all to which the evidence testifies may be equally firm in both cases. If, therefore, this common phrase conveyed nothing more than such belief, it might be used in one case just as properly as in the other. And the true reason why it cannot be so used is, that it is universally felt that the word does convey something more,—that, besides a state of belief concerning the individual of whom it is used, it expresses a state of feeling towards him. This state of feeling is *trust*. Now any of our contemporaries, official or professional, may be an object of this feeling. And if we professed to have *faith* in any of them, it would be presumed that we were really *trusting* in him,—that, in regard to our personal interests or to other interests, public or private, which we regard as our own, we were *trusting* in him,—*relying upon* him,—for the benefit which it belongs to his office or profession, to bestow or procure. But it is plainly impossible that we can so *trust* in one who has passed out of life, and can exercise no influence

upon its concerns ; and therefore it would be felt universally, that in speaking of *faith* in such a one, we were using a false and vicious mode of expressing the state of our mind towards him. This sense of the impropriety of the phrase would arise in every mind ; not merely in the minds of those who can see clearly and explain clearly where the impropriety lies, but in the minds of many who might find it hard to render any satisfactory account of it. But the correctness with which such persons use the phrase themselves, and their instinctive detection of any departure from the proper use of it, show how widely diffused and how firmly fixed is the true impression, namely, that a profession of *faith* in any object, whether person or thing, is equivalent to a declaration of *trust* in the object, as the source of some good which we desire, or as the instrument in procuring it.

What is true, and universally felt to be true, of such language, when applied to common life and its concerns, we found, as I said, on examination of the Bible, to hold true also in religion. And it is its connexion with the conscience and the heart, which belongs to this element of the principle, that constitutes, as we saw reason to believe, the proper necessity of the operation of the Spirit of God to produce in us *faith in CHRIST*. We did not presume absolutely to affirm or to deny the actual exercise of this mysterious agency, in aiding the intellectual part of the process ; but we were able to see that in effecting the remaining part, that agency was essential. To feel the reality of the danger and of the guilt of sin,—the certainty and the justice of God's condemnation of it,—without which REDEMPTION may indeed be sought in words, but can hardly be sought in sincerity and truth,—certainly cannot be sought as a deliverance from a righteous as well as a sure sentence, and therefore cannot be sought as God has willed and commanded that it should be sought ;—to submit the heart to God's humbling plan for forgiving and for restoring us—to abjure all trust in our-

—in anything in ourselves—in our purity of conduct, in our goodness of heart, or our sincerity of purpose, in our knowledge, or in our faith—to trust wholly in the SAVIOUR, in what He has done and suffered for sinners,—and in Him to trust so truly, as to leave our natural alienation from God and our natural fear of Him so vanquished, and to be enabled, however far or long we may have wandered from Him, to return to Him, in humble confidence, as erring but repentant children to a reconciled Father;—all this is too hard for flesh and blood; and our best knowledge of the constitution of our own minds confirms the testimony of the Bible upon the subject,—that *faith* in CHRIST, to which all this is essential, is truly the gift of God*.

* It has been objected to this passage that it seems to represent as essential to faith what really belongs to the principle only in its highest stage of advancement. This would be a serious mistake. But I am much more anxious to define the proper application of such an objection, supposing it to be well grounded, than to prove that there is no foundation for it. It cannot apply, then, to the constituents of the principle enumerated above, as if they included some which might be, and therefore ought to be, left out. Thus I say cannot be a legitimate application of the objection, because the elements of faith are the same at all its stages from the very first. The principle advances by the growth and corroboration of the elements of which it is composed, and not by addition to their number. The number therefore continues the same through all stages of its advancement. And moreover, as each of these elements, however it may be developed and strengthened, continues always in nature and essence the same, the objection cannot apply to anything that is said of the general nature of any of them. The only way in which such a passage can be open to such an objection is, that the individual elements, or some of them, are spoken of in language which is rather appropriate to some of the more advanced than to the earlier stages of the principle, and which might give rise to the impression that, in those earlier stages, the principle was not really *faith*, as truly as in its highest stage. I did not attempt to determine whether what I say is naturally calculated to lead to such a conclusion. But I am quite sure that there is enough in the Volume to make it very clear that in whatever degree it does so, it misrepresents my real views. Indeed, in the second Sermon, quite enough is said to prove that I had no doubt that faith might be very weak, without being less real than if it were strong. And it is not unlikely that the consciousness of having written so distinctly just before, may have rendered me less careful in withholding the exact force of the language in the passage than I should have been, if I had not been led to express myself so distinctly, and

Having seen so much of the *nature of faith*, and of its *source*, we are now to inquire, my brethren, into what alone gives to either all that it has beyond speculative interest for us,—into its *effects*. And these divide themselves so easily into *effects upon the sinner's state before God*, and *effects upon his character*; and there is such an obvious convenience in employing so simple and natural a division of the subject, that, in all that I shall say to you upon it, I will endeavour to keep these two heads distinct.

As to the first, then,—the effect of faith upon our state before God—the Bible is upon it so clear and copious that I do not think it too much to say, that a plain man, who had read no other book on the subject, would find it hard to conceive how any difficulty about it could have ever arisen. It is there very expressly, and in a great variety of forms, asserted that, in the matter of *justification* before GOD, *faith* is, by His gracious appointment, *counted for righteousness*;—that it is by *faith* that we are restored to that state of favour and acceptance with Him, in which the perfect righteousness of His law would have sustained us, had we been able to have attained to that righteousness, and to have preserved it.

This fundamental doctrine of the gospel of Christ—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION by FAITH *only*—the undoubted doctrine of our Church, and of all pure Reformed Churches,—I have been anxious to state thus,—as simply and as unequivocally as I am able to state it: mainly, I hope, because I regard it as of vital importance to true religion; but certainly, in some degree also, I acknowledge, because vague apprehensions of its tendency have often led to a reluctance to state it in distinct terms, and that in this reluctance I should be most sorry to be understood to share. I do not share, in any degree, in the apprehensions that give

so recently, upon the point in question. See also what is said in the addition to Note B, on the word *πεπολιθης*.

birth to it; and, I trust, I shall be able to satisfy you that they are grounded upon very gross misconceptions of the true nature of the doctrine, or very hasty inferences from it. But if it were otherwise,—if my own reason suggested such apprehensions, ever so strongly, I certainly should not feel that they afforded any warrant or excuse for holding back or qualifying any doctrine so distinctly and so prominently revealed in God's word.

A fitter season, however, for enlarging on this question, will arrive when the truth of the doctrine shall have been established. And to the proofs by which it may, I think, be conclusively established, I should at once proceed to direct your attention, but that, for understanding its full import, it will be convenient to fix first the true sense of the important term JUSTIFICATION.

I omit, for the present, any notice of the different senses assigned to the word, by those who have set themselves to lower the doctrine with which it is connected. Some of these senses I shall have occasion to advert to as I proceed; and all (as in the case of the important term *faith*) will be best overthrown by establishing the true meaning of the word. Neglecting then, as in that case, the kindred and derived senses which, in common with every important word in every language, it has, *to justify* will, I think, be found to be, in its proper and usual meaning, *to declare judicially the innocence of the person justified*².

I do not mean to support this sense by any arguments from etymology. However useful etymology may be in fixing the general meaning of words, it rarely affords much assistance in determining their exact force; and scarcely ever gives any, where the question lies between kindred senses. Whatever aid, too, it might be fitted to give in the present case, this is no place to avail ourselves of. But the best and in all cases the final mode of establishing the meaning of a

² Note L.

word lies open to us even here. And a brief consideration of the *use* of the word in question in the sacred writings will, I hope, leave no reasonable ground for doubting that its meaning has been correctly stated. I must premise, however, that in looking for texts for this purpose we must have recourse to the Old rather than to the New Testament. The texts in the latter in which the word in question occurs are, for the most part, connected with controverted doctrine; and are, in fact, the very texts for the interpretation of which, we want to have the sense of the word determined. They cannot, therefore, be used for our immediate purpose. But in the Old Testament there are numerous texts against which no such objection lies;—texts wholly unconnected with doctrine, the interpretation of which is therefore open to no objection on controversial grounds; and which, moreover, are so framed as to make the sense in which this word is used in them perfectly clear. I shall proceed to give some examples of the texts to which I refer.

Thus, in warning against sin, God declares of Himself that “He will not *justify* the wicked¹,” which is explained, if it need explanation, by the corresponding declaration, that He “will by no means *clear* the guilty².” He commands the judges of His people, who were to decide between litigants, to *justify* the righteous and to *condemn* the wicked³. He expresses abhorrence alike of those who “*justify* the wicked” and of those who “*condemn* the just⁴.” And in other places in which His Word testifies against such unrighteous judgments, periphrases occur for the word in question which can leave no shadow of doubt as to its meaning. “It is not good to *accept the person* of the wicked, to *overthrow* the righteous in *judgment*⁵.” “He that saith unto the wicked, *Thou art righteous*, him shall the people curse; nations shall abhor him⁶.” And, “Woe unto them.....which *justify* the

¹ Ex. xxiii. 7.² Ex. xxxiv. 7.³ Deut. xxv. 1.⁴ Prov. xvii. 15.⁵ Prov. xviii. 5.⁶ Prov. xxiv. 24.

wicked for reward, and *take away the righteousness* of the righteous from him!"—"How," it is elsewhere asked, "can a man be *justified* with God?" and the exegetical clause is subjoined, "How can he be *clean* [i. e. *with God*] that is born of a woman?" Every day you hear an unequivocal use of the word in the same sense, in that humble petition of the Psalmist, which expresses so well the frame of mind that becomes a sinner drawing near to God, and which forms, therefore, so suitable an introduction to our daily prayer, "*Enter not into judgment* with thy servant, O Lord! for in thy sight shall no man living be *justified*." And, finally, the same forensic sense appears with equal distinctness in that passage in the sublime supplication of Solomon, "Hear thou in heaven, and do, and *judge* thy servants, *condemning* the wicked, to bring his way upon his head, and *justifying* the righteous, to give him according to his righteousness!"

I should hope that the foregoing texts must be felt to be abundantly sufficient to show that the sense in which the word is used in the Old Testament agrees with the definition which I have given of it. I have already explained why the New Testament cannot be made to furnish any considerable additions to them. It contains some, however, which do not involve any disputed doctrine, and which may, therefore, be used in the same way. The text, "By thy words thou shalt be *justified*, and by thy words thou shalt be *condemned*," and again, "Who shall *lay anything to the charge* of God's elect? It is God that *justifieth*," (or, "Is it God that *justifieth*?")—seem to be clear examples of this kind. Other texts equally unexceptionable might perhaps be found, but they are not numerous. When once the true doctrine of justification is established, indeed, copious confirmations of the correctness of the definition of the word may be drawn

⁷ Isai. v. 23.

⁸ Job xxv. 4.

⁹ Ps. cxliii. 2.

¹⁰ 1 Kings viii. 32.

¹¹ Matt. xii. 37.

¹² Rom. viii. 33.

from the New Testament; but the proofs of its correctness beforehand must be derived almost entirely from the Old Testament. Nor need we regard that which is the main point—that is, the sense in which the word is used in the New Testament—as, therefore, insufficiently or unsatisfactorily proved. For, not only is there no ground for supposing that it has different senses in the two great divisions of the Bible, but we have direct evidence that such is not the case; for important texts in the Old Testament in which the word occurs are referred to in the New Testament in such a way as to show very clearly that it is used in the same sense in both¹³.

I shall be content, therefore, with the texts which I have quoted from the earlier portion of the Sacred Volume. You will find no difficulty in adding to them. But they seem to be sufficiently numerous; and they are, I think, sufficiently clear. Whether you derive the meaning of the word from the clauses in which it stands, taken in their natural sense, or in the sense assigned to them by the clauses with which they are contrasted, or by the clauses by which they are explained, you will be led to the same result; and cannot, I think, reasonably doubt that it was used—and in the most unforced and familiar manner too—to express, as I before said, *a judicial act by which the innocence of the person justified is established or declared**.

And the proper sense of the word being once established, its derived meanings,—when it is used so as to include some of the consequences of such a declaration; or when it is employed to express a *mental* decision by a judge; or a similar decision by one who is not a judge; or in such phrases as a man *justifying himself*; his works, or anything else, *justifying him* (in the sense of pleading, or proving, or

¹³ See references in Rom. iv., and James ii.; to Gen. xv. 7; also in Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. x. 38; to Hab. ii. 6.

* Note M.

establishing, or constituting his innocence, so as to cause or merit such a declaration of it :—these or any such like derived meanings, I say, can hardly create any difficulty that requires distinct explanation.

It is evident, then, that in the Justification with which we have to do—in which man is the party and God the judge—we have only to look to the law to which man is amenable, to see what his *Justification* means—what this *declaration of his innocence* by his all-seeing Judge includes. And finding that that law contains clear precepts, to which exact obedience is required, no less than strict prohibitions enforced with equal rigour; finding that any failure in performing every part of all that it enjoins to be performed as effectually overthrows innocence, as the open commission of all that it forbids to be done¹⁴; we seem warranted and obliged to conclude, that the sinner's *justification* comprehends not only his acquittal from having violated the divine law, but his acceptance also, as though he had perfectly fulfilled it.

The various devices that have been resorted to, to evade the force of this fair inference, would be well worth a detailed consideration, on various grounds; but I can only afford now to advert to some of them, and very cursorily.

I presume, however, that it cannot be necessary to dwell long upon the one which it is natural first to notice—the view of those who deny that *justification* (in those places where we are most concerned in determining its signification) means a *judicial act* at all,—asserting that *justifying* a sinner is not *declaring him to be righteous*, but *making him so*. I do not advert here to the Romish view of the nature of justification, but to a kindred error which boasts the support of an eminent Protestant name*. Among Protestants, however, it ought hardly to be necessary to set about a

¹⁴ Deut. xxvii. 26, xxviii. 14 seqq.; Gal. iii. 10; James ii. 10.

* GROTIUS. See Note L, towards the end.

formal confutation of a view which confounds the *justification* of sinners with their *sanctification*. When even so flagrant a misrepresentation as this of God's plan for the redemption and restoration of fallen man obtains currency among those from whom the Holy Scriptures are withheld, one cannot be surprised. But that it should be received by any who have free access to the Bible is as wonderful as it is painful. I trust that this great error finds no place in the congregation which I now address. But if, unhappily, it should be otherwise, and that any among you have been beguiled into the adoption of it, I hope they will find a decisive refutation of it in the development of the divine plan of Redemption to which the progress of our course is soon to lead us. It will be seen, not only that *justification* and *sanctification* are distinct, and that the latter follows the former, as a matter of fact, but that this must be so by the connexion which the wisdom of God has established between them: that He has made the sinner's *justification* to such an extent the source of his *sanctification*, that the order by which the former process precedes is not accidental or arbitrary, but necessary and immutable. I will not, however, anticipate this proof any farther, but will proceed to glance at some other attempts which have been made to tamper with the meaning of this important word.

Many who feel the impossibility of denying that *justification* is an act of God, not as our *Sanctifier* but as our *Judge*, hold still that it ought to be applied to that final act of judgment, by which all Believers in Christ, who have been sanctified by the Spirit of God, and have kept a course of consistent obedience to the end, are at the last, for Christ's sake, accepted by the righteous Judge of all, and received into the kingdom prepared for the Lord's true followers.

Now you will remark that the question is not, Whether *justification* might be used to express this act; or even, Whether it is ever actually employed in Scripture to express

9. But Whether this is its signification in the great majority of passages in which it occurs; and these, too, the very passages, and the only passages, with which the argument is concerned. And I hope it cannot be necessary to spend time in convincing you that it is not. That Christians are spoken of in Scripture as *actually justified*, whatever *justification* means, and in *actual* enjoyment of its fruits, whatever they be, must be known to every reader of the Bible. "Being *now* justified....we shall be saved from wrath, through him"¹⁵—"Being justified, we *have* peace with God"¹⁶—"But ye *are* washed, but ye *are* sanctified, but ye *are* justified"¹⁷—which are among the first passages that must come to every mind, of themselves ought to leave no doubt on the subject.

And, accordingly, there are a large class of persons who cannot receive the whole testimony of the Bible upon this subject, who yet so far receive it as to reject both the former error, concerning the nature of justification, and this last-mentioned one, about the period at which it takes place. They, however, make a last struggle to retain for man a share in the work of his own redemption, which God's plan does not allow him, maintaining that *justification* is *pardon* for past sin, and no more; and that a man is not *accepted as righteous* until he becomes so.

This is to be found stated variously, and supported variously, in the writings of many divines, who, whatever may have been their claims to attention on other subjects, exhibit such gross misconceptions concerning the GOSPEL as must deprive their authority of all weight upon a point which is so bound up with right views of that gracious scheme. And their arguments for this restriction of the meaning of *justification* consist of little more than statements of such erroneous views about the principles of the Gospel as are irreconcilable with the true sense of the term.

¹⁵ Rom. v. 9.

¹⁶ Rom. v. 1.

¹⁷ 1 Cor. vi. 11.

To these erroneous views, I must hereafter call your attention; and in overthrowing them, which I hope to be able to do, the chief support, as I said, in the way of argument for this limited notion of justification, will be taken away. But as I believe that some loose and ill-considered analogies recommend this notion to many who embrace it, and as the same analogies lead often to inaccurate language, at least, in some of those who oppose it, I think I may be doing some service in directing your attention, before I pass from the subject, to the consideration of this fruitful source of error upon it.

First, then, let me remind you, that when we describe the sinner's *justification* as including, not only his acquittal from the charge of having violated the divine law, but his acceptance also as though he had fulfilled it; we are not to be understood to intimate that, with respect to that law, these are distinct acts, one of which is performed in any case without the other: but, on the contrary, to maintain, that, however distinct they are in conception, and however they are actually separated in the case of other laws, the nature of the Divine Law requires their union: that it provides for no distinct courses, by one of which a man may escape its punishments, and by the other, earn its rewards; and recognizes no intermediate state between the guilt of violating it and the merit of obeying it: that a failure in active obedience to any of *its* commands is sin, no less than positive disobedience of any of its prohibitions; and that, therefore, *innocence* with respect to the Divine Law requires a performance of all that it enjoins, no less than an avoidance of all that it forbids. So that, when we are charged with making distinctions which the Bible nowhere makes, we are actually engaged in an endeavour to prevent such distinctions from being made: by showing that, for such distinctions, there is really no place in the Bible. We are guarding against or combating errors that spring naturally

from our familiarity with prohibitory codes; under which, abstaining from forbidden acts constitutes *innocence*, and immunity from punishment is the proper result of innocence. And having shown that *justification* is a declaration of innocence with respect to a law, we are merely explaining what innocence must include, and what it must secure, in a law which must be allowed to be both prohibitory and mandatory, and which does not denounce punishment only, but also promises rewards.

But some do not merely limit unwarrantably the extent of *justification*, by this false analogy with human law; but by an analogy with human tribunals, they persuade themselves that there is a difficulty connected with the acceptance of a sinner as righteous, which does not belong to the pardon of his offences. And here I think they commit a mistake as to the true state of the case to which they refer, and I am sure they are wrong in supposing that any ground for the comparison exists.

The case seems to be this:—we are so accustomed to see the punishment of offenders lightened in every degree, down to the virtual remission of it, by those who, as judges, are charged with the administration of the law, that we are, not unreasonably, led to think that the power of thus modifying the punishment of the condemned, is nearly, if not altogether, as much a part of the judicial office as ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Whereas it appears to be, properly, no part of that office; or, if it should be thought that it is (and I have no intention of doing anything so idle as moving a question upon that subject here), it is so upon grounds which are manifestly wholly inapplicable to the judicial proceedings of God. For you must see, that, if human legislators could anticipate all modes and circumstances of crime, and comprehend all varieties of it under strict descriptions, there would be no reason for allowing the judge's office ever to exceed what at all times appears to

form his proper business,—that is, ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused according to law, and pronouncing its sentence. But men can exercise no such forecast; and, even if they could, it would be impossible to devise descriptions which would exactly designate the multiplied varieties of actions to which it would be necessary that they should extend. The most imperfect notion of the proper end of human law is enough to show that the character of human actions, as they are its objects, is so materially altered by circumstances, that punishing with the same degree of severity two actions comprehended under the same descriptions,—even where legal descriptions are best and most exact,—might be attended with the most opposite effects. Hence arises an obvious necessity, in every country governed by law, of reserving to the chief executive authority a power of mitigating the rigour of legal enactments; and a portion of this power is often, for convenience' sake, given to those who represent the executive in the judicial office. It does not, as I said, appear to belong to that office properly, or indeed to the executive either, but to the legislative. But that is a point of minor consequence; and, whatever be settled with respect to it, it must be allowed, for it is most manifest, that it is exercised by the judicial office among men, upon grounds which can find no place at all in the proceedings of the Deity. For what is establishing an analogy here, but representing God as discovering, when He comes to apply His law to individual cases,—that its provisions are not suited to man's frailty, and require relaxation,—that its sanctions are too severe to be enforced, and require mitigation?

‘But God is legislator as well as judge.’ Doubtless He is, and it is that very fact that renders the analogy so utterly baseless. For we have seen that the exercise of such power as it is supposed so easy for God to exercise as judge—

proves, because it springs from, want of perfect forecast in the legislator, and imperfection in his law.

It is true, that this gross error sometimes assumes a shape in which this confutation cannot in terms be applied to it. Some persons speak, and some, who would hardly venture to express such thoughts distinctly, allow themselves, it is to be feared, to think, as if the Deity denounced against sin severities which he never designed to execute, and demanded a degree of perfection which He never meant to exact; and that so HE stimulates to exertion and deters from crime by a device often employed among men to produce the same effect. This certainly does not charge the author of the Divine Law with want of foresight, and I ~~desire to avoid giving utterance to the charge that it seems to make against Him.~~ The impiety or indecency of such language may be explained away; and I have no intention of ascribing either, in design, to those who use it. But see, ~~independently of all objections of that kind,~~ how the scheme stands on the score of coherency.

It cannot be meant—I suppose it cannot be meant—that God has anywhere distinctly said, that this is the true purpose of the rigid requirements and the awful sanctions of His holy law. Not to speak of the total want of support for such an assertion, it would not be easy to see how His threats and commands, so explained, were to produce the effect that they are said to be designed to produce. And if He has not so said, but the knowledge that it is so is to be collected from principles laid down in His Word; or upon general principles of reasoning, and from the nature of the thing; or in whatever way it is to be attained by those who think they possess it;—is the absurdity at all lessened?—Does it not seem rather increased, when God is thus represented as concerned to conceal His purpose, and as designing to do so, and yet as so framing this important design that it is pene-

trated and baffled by the very beings upon whom it was intended that it should operate?

I do not know whether loose and irreverent talk of this kind, upon such a subject, deserves any reply; but I am sure that time would be miserably misspent in giving it a more detailed one. You, my brethren, are, I trust, but little likely to be affected by such crude and presumptuous schemes. You feel, I trust, the awful and certain truth, which we are all so concerned to feel, that when God established His righteous law, not the whole course of human conduct only, but all the springs of human action, lay open to His view: that the frailty of our nature, the snares of temptation, the tyranny of passion, the corrupting force of evil education, the seductions of evil example—all those palliations of crime which our perverted reason urges to tranquillize our inward monitor—all stood before His sight; and that, with this omniscient knowledge of every offence and every offender, He framed and consecrated His holy law; limiting, strictly limiting, its blessings to uniform and perfect obedience, and denouncing, no less expressly, a curse against every violation of it.

Well, it may be said, this *was* no doubt the case; but must it not be allowed to be a purpose of Christ's coming to annul this law, and to substitute one less rigorous in its room? As this misconception of Christ's real work with respect to the law,—which represents Him as promulgating a relaxed moral code,—lies at the bottom of so many errors concerning the Gospel, I ought, perhaps, to bestow some time in removing it. But I must confine myself to my immediate subject; and, for it, it is quite enough to inquire, what shadow of ground is there for this assertion in Scripture? When the Lord speaks of the law, we find Him continually endeavouring to show the carnal-minded people whom He addressed, how far they were from understanding its wide extent and true spiritual import; opening out its

distinct precepts; showing how much higher is their aim and how much larger their range than merely to restrain us from the few overt acts which they specify; and enforcing in various ways this larger sense upon the reason and conscience of His hearers.

But besides these labours in detail to restore to their proper limits those *exceeding broad commandments* which *try the heart and the reins*, we find Him solemnly republishing the whole law in that most beautiful but most awful form, in which the duty which comprehends all duties is pressed with such emphatic reiteration upon us,—that duty which the heart of every human being acknowledges to be of imperative obligation, while it testifies against him that he never has fulfilled it—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength¹⁸." Would it not appear, then, that with much more show of reason the Lord might be represented as having added to the strictness of the law, than as having detracted from it? And as to annulling it, as He is described to have done, does not His own impressive declaration seem framed to meet directly the vain imagination? "Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle of the law shall in no wise pass away till all be fulfilled¹⁹." And is it the LAW, first solemnly established by God, and then solemnly republished and declared immutable by His Son, which is represented, sometimes as thrust aside when it ought to be applied,—sometimes as modified in the application of it,—sometimes as altogether superseded by some unassigned and unassignable code,—according as the one statement or the other seems to be demanded by the exigencies of a bad argument?

¹⁸ Matt. xxii. 37; Mark xii. 30.

¹⁹ Matt. v. 17.

I have taken you very far in following out the exposure of those misconceived analogies with human law and human tribunals, which, as much as any other prejudice perhaps, impede the general admission of the full and proper sense of *justification*. But the time has not been ill-bestowed if it has served to remove from any mind this serious obstacle to just views upon this important subject.

But though this may remove some impediments to the admission of the true meaning of the word, it does nothing to soften the difficulties of the Doctrine. If the *justification* of man be indeed a *declaration of his innocence* with respect to the *Divine law*, how may sinful man be justified? We have seen what God's exceeding broad commandments require, and we all know how we have answered their demands. The sentence might be safely trusted even to our own corrupt hearts; but the express declarations of Holy Scripture spare us the necessity of the appeal. It declares that *whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all*²⁰; and it adds, what the least enlightened conscience must assuredly confirm, that—not in *one point* only, but—in *many things we all offend*²¹. How then can a man be justified with God?

This is the mystery of redemption, to which the Word of God enables us to reply,—We are “justified *freely* by God's grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus”²². He is *set forth as the PROPITIATION*²³, through which God *is just when He is the justifier of them who believe in CHRIST JESUS*,—of them *who believe on Him that justifieth the ungodly*²⁴, for *He died for the ungodly*²⁵. *All have sinned*²⁶, and *death is the wages of sin*²⁷; but He, *by the grace of God, hath tasted death for every man*²⁸. And now all who are found in

²⁰ James ii. 10.²¹ James iii. 2.²² Rom. iii. 24.²³ Rom. iii. 25.²⁴ Rom. iii. 25, 26; iv. 5.²⁵ Rom. v. 6.²⁶ Rom. iii. 23.²⁷ Rom. vi. 23.²⁸ Heb. ii. 9.

Him are JUSTIFIED. God doth not impute unto them the sin that they have committed²⁹, for CHRIST hath come to take away sin by the sacrifice of Himself³⁰; they are found in Him³¹, and His blood cleanseth from all sin³². God doth impute to them the righteousness which they have not³³, for they are found in Christ³⁴, accepted in the beloved³⁵, not having their own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness which is of God³⁶. To the Church which He has purchased with His blood, the Lord is joined by a bond that finds a faint image in the closest and tenderest of human ties³⁷; and we are *one with Him*, as members of that pure Church of which He is the spouse³⁸; *one with Him* as members of the spotless body of which He is the glorious head³⁹; *one with Him*, as members, in the Apostle's fervent language, of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones⁴⁰, yea, *one with Him* in a union so intimate that it is by Himself described as shadowing His own ineffable union with the Father⁴¹. Thus *ONE WITH HIM* we share in His exaltation, as He deigned to share in our abasement. Because we merited punishment, He ordered it; and because He, in His humiliation, earned the rewards of perfect obedience, we obtain them. Such, the Apostle tells us, is God's gracious appointment, who *for us made Him to be sin, that knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him*⁴².

In thus stating the *grounds* of the *justification* of sinners, and declaring them to be justified by imputed righteousness no less than by vicarious sufferings, we have something of the same task that we had to perform in guarding the statement of the *nature* of their justification. As then we

²⁹ Ps. xxxii. 2; Rom. iv. 8.

³¹ Phil. iii. 6.

³² Rom. iv. 6.

³³ Eph. i. 6.

³⁴ Eph. v. 22--32. ³⁵ Ibid.

Eph. iv. 13, 16.

³⁶ John xvii. 21.

³⁰ Heb. ix. 26.

³² 1 John i. 7.

³⁴ Phil. iii. 9.

³⁶ Phil. iii. 9.

³⁹ Rom. xii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13, 27;

⁴⁰ Eph. v. 30.

⁴² 2 Cor. v. 21.

had to point out that what was said was designed to prevent, not to institute, a separation between the acts of pardon and of acceptance; so here we have to explain (and the caution is rendered necessary by some modes of supporting, as well as by some of assailing the Doctrine) that we design no formal division of the Redeemer's reconciling work into sufferings and obedience, one kind of efficacy being strictly ascribed to the one part, and another kind to the other. The scheme, rightly understood, requires no such artificial divisions; though in speaking upon the subject, for distinctness' sake, and for an orderly consideration of it, language which may seem to countenance such a separation must sometimes be used. But this only results from the way in which our limited faculties oblige us to take in, and to present to others, every subject which is too wide and too deep for them. It occurs continually, in matters of religion: notably, in speaking of the atonement in reference to the persons of the Trinity; in which we often employ a mode of explaining their agency which seems, at first view, inconsistent with the orthodox belief that the whole scheme of mercy to our ruined race had its source in the love, no less than in the wisdom of the one eternal and indivisible Godhead. It is the same in this matter of *justification*. Above, when we were setting forth its *extent*, we were obliged, in entering into details, sometimes to speak in a way which made it necessary to explain that we did not mean that God pardons Believers first, and accepts them afterwards, or declares them free from guilt, and possessed of righteousness, by separate judicial acts. And now again, having stated the *grounds* of *justification*, there is the same necessity of explaining, that we do not mean to sever the blessed Redeemer's sufferings and His obedience, but to represent both as united in one mediatorial work. That this, beginning with His birth, in this world of sin and sorrow, and ending with His death upon the cross of shame,

was one work of obedience which His Father gave *Him to do*. That it comprised satisfaction for man's violations of the written law, and obedience to all the law's demands, and required both, but that it so transcended all finite suffering and all finite obedience, that by it all who are united to HIM are saved from punishment, secured from danger, freed from guilt, and fully accepted,—in Him pardoned, and in Him

righteous.⁸

It would be rash, and would show great ignorance of the subject, to say, that this mode of dealing with us does not involve great difficulties. Difficulties!—doubtless it does. Have we the thoughtless arrogance to demand that all the ways of the High and Holy One, who inhabiteth eternity, should be made plain to us? What *kings and prophets desired to see in vain*—what even the angels that surround God's throne *longed*, we are told, *to look into*—has been made manifest to us. And, amidst this bright manifestation of God's nature and His purposes, have we the perverseness and the folly, instead of rejoicing in the light, to repine that some darkness remains? We, to whom there is nothing so familiar that it does not contain much that is obscure,—who find in the meanest work of nature,—in the simplest movement of our own minds,—in everything within us and in everything around us—mysteries unfathomable,—are we wisely impatient that this law of our being is not suspended, just where beforehand we ought to expect to find it in its fullest strength? Do we require fairly, that in matters so high, and in these only, nothing should remain to remind us that *to know* everything but *in part* is the condition, if not of our finite capacities, certainly of their exercise, in this present imperfect state of being?

How far the difficulties alluded to are of this kind, how far they discourage, and to what extent they invite, investigation, no time remains to inquire, even if my immediate

* Note N.

purpose led naturally to the examination. But it does not. All that I am at present concerned to say on the subject may be said very briefly, and it is this: that the part of the doctrine of justification which is retained by all who make any profession of receiving the doctrine of the Atonement, is just as encumbered with difficulties, and with difficulties of the same kind, too, as that which so many reject. All who profess to receive that doctrine, in any form, hold the imputation of our sins to Christ strictly, and in a sense of His sufferings to us; and if He was *made sin who knew no sin*⁴³—if the appointed mode of *redeeming us from the curse of the law* was His being *made a curse for us*⁴⁴—if He *bore our sins in His own body upon the tree*⁴⁵, and the Lord *laid upon Him the iniquity of us all*⁴⁶, so that *with His stripes we are healed*, it does not appear easily how it can be represented as contrary to God's mode of dealing with man, that *by His obedience should many be made righteous*⁴⁷; that *to every one that believeth He should be the end of the law for righteousness*⁴⁸; that *we should be found in Him, not having our own righteousness, but the righteousness which is of God*⁴⁹.

For the present, I must stop here. When I am able to return to the consideration of the doctrine, you will, I think, find, that, in spending so much time in establishing the true nature and the true grounds of justification, I have not wandered so far from the subject proposed as you might at first imagine. For while right views upon both heads are essential to understanding fully, they will be found, I think, greatly to facilitate the proof of the doctrine of our Church which I proposed to establish and explain—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only*.

⁴³ 2 Cor. v. 21.

⁴⁵ 1 Pet. ii. 24.


⁴⁷ Rom. v. 19.

⁴⁴ Gal. iii. 13.

⁴⁶ Is. liii. 6.

⁴⁸ Rom. x. 4.

⁴⁹ Phil. iii. 9.



SERMON IV.

ON THE CONNEXION BETWEEN FAITH AND
JUSTIFICATION.

Nunc ostendimus quod fides justificet; ubi primum hoc monendi sunt
lectores quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri, *quod Christus sit Me-*
dicus, ita necesse sit defendere *quod fides justificet*.....

~~sed nonnulli dicuntur per hoc docere quod fides justificet~~ intelligunt de prin-
cipio, quod fides sit initium justificationis, seu preparatio ad justificationem;
ita ut non sit ipsa fides illud quo accepti sumus Deo, sed opera quæ
sequuntur. Et somniant fidem ideo valde laudari quia sit principium. Non
sic de fide sentimus. Sed hoc defendimus, quod proprie, ac vere, ipsa fide,
propter Christum, justi reputemur, seu accepti Deo simus.....APOLOGIA
AUGUSTANÆ CONFSSIONIS.

[*Quod sola Fides in Christum justificet.*]

SERMON IV.

ROMANS III. 28.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.

IN resuming, as I promised, the consideration of the important subject for which I have already more than once endeavoured to engage your attention, I find it necessary, my brethren, to begin by reminding you, that what has been done, or attempted, hitherto, has been, to fix from the Word of God the *nature* and the *source* of FAITH, and to explain the *nature* and the *grounds* of JUSTIFICATION.

With respect to the former, it was shown, that, in the Bible, *faith* in CHRIST is *trust* in Him, founded upon the knowledge of what He has done for us. The two extreme errors upon the subject,—the error of those who make it mean much more, and that of those who maintain that it means a good deal less,—were distinctly pointed out, and shown to be as really opposed to the authority of Scripture as they obviously are to the ordinary meaning of common language. And the true meaning of the phrase was established by direct examination of the Bible, at such length as to forbid recapitulation, and, I hope, to render it unnecessary. And finally, from this account of the *nature* of *faith*, some reasons, drawn from acknowledged principles concerning the constitution of the human mind, were offered in

support of the important truth, which, whether we succeed in accounting for it or not, is known to us by the sure testimony of sacred Scripture—namely, that *faith in CHRIST* is the gift of God, and that it requires a change of mind, which is the work of His Holy Spirit.

With respect to the *justification* of man, it was shown, by the same course of Scriptural proof, that it means *the judicial declaration of his innocence by God, the judge of all*—of his innocence with respect to that Divine law, to which he is amenable, and by which he is tried. Certain erroneous opinions upon this subject, too, were stated and exposed, and were found to rest chiefly upon ill-considered analogies. And I think it important to add even now, in the way of caution, that by such analogies we are here so surrounded, that almost every word which we use serves to introduce some of them.

Thus, though justified sinners are, in one view of their case, *pardoned*, and *acquitted* in another, we cannot, without danger of mistake, speak of their justification as *pardon* or *acquittal*. For both terms are calculated to conceal from us, though in different ways, the true grounds of the act, and both to mislead us as to its extent.

“Pardon,” in the cases in which we are familiar with the act, is the immediate result of commiseration, under no restraint except such as arises from a prudential regard for the interests of society, the security of which is the proper end of human law. The remission of the punishment due to our offences no less truly results from the tender compassion of the Most High. But, with respect to it, we learn (what *pardon* never suggests to us, and what yet it is most important that we should bear in mind) that this compassion could not, consistently with His other perfections, proceed as human mercy does; but that His law was to be satisfied, before mercy could be shown to those who had violated it; and that mercy has been thus reconciled to justice, by the

unimpeachable obedience and the bitter sufferings of the Son of God. When we speak, then, as with this caution we may, of our *justification* as *pardon*, and ascribe it, as we ought, to the free mercy of God as its true *source*, we are not to forget that the *grounds* of it are the merits of another, and the sufferings of another.

“Acquittal,” in like manner, sends us, by all our associations with the word, to a scheme of prohibitory enactments, some part of which a man is accused of having violated. Whereas a sinner’s justification has reference to the whole of God’s law—a law which is composed of commands, no less than of prohibitions—which professes to regulate, not the outward conduct merely, but the affections;—which, therefore, a man may disobey without performing any outward act, and which no course of outward acts will of itself satisfy.

Again, “pardon” not only presumes the establishment of the offender’s guilt, but it gives no intimation that his guilt has been taken away: while of all the consequences of his guilt, it only secures against the legal punishment to which he is exposed, and so leaves him to suffer others which are often still harder to be borne. Even “acquittal,”—as from the imperfection of human tribunals it so often arises from a failure of proof of guilt, where guilt really exists,—does not necessarily suggest the notion of *innocence*; and in fact often fails to restore us even to the outward advantages of innocence. So that both terms greatly and almost equally fail to convey to us the completeness of our reconciliation to offended authority,—the perfect restoration to our lost estate and all its high privileges,—and the entire recovery of the quiet confidence and inward peace of innocence,—which *justification* includes¹.

Whatever words, then, it may at any time be found convenient to substitute for *justification*, we are not to lose sight

¹ Rom. v. 1; viii. 1, 33, 34.

of its true force; but to bear in mind that the *justification* of sinners is a judicial act of Him who is a *just God and a Saviour*, by which, for the sake of what Christ has done and suffered for them, He remits the punishment due to their offences, and accepts them as *righteous*,—as though they had fulfilled the law which all have violated.

Having thus seen the nature of *faith* and of *justification*, we are now to show their connexion, by setting forth that which our Church truly styles “a wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort,”—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only*;—to show that, in the office of justifying the Believer, *faith* admits no fellowship—that none of his acts or qualities, none of his gifts or graces, none of his virtues or deservings, of whatever kind,—whether concomitants of *faith* or consequents of it,—share with it in this its office; but that it is by FAITH, and by it *only*, that we possess that efficacious interest in Christ’s sufferings, and that availing title to the fruits of His obedience, which shield us from the curse of the law, and secure to us its blessings and its rewards.

I hoped, as I believe I intimated, that explaining the nature of *justification* would prepare an easy admission for the Scripture account of the *grounds* of it. For if it be really a declaration of our innocence by an unerring judge, it would seem plain that it cannot be our own performance of the law which He contemplates. And I expected, also, that the establishment of the *grounds* of the act might remove the chief obstacles which bar the way against a reception of the Scripture account of the *mode* of the procedure. For if it be a proceeding, in its whole nature and principles, so entirely beyond our experience, and above our conceptions, it would seem a plain dictate of reason that it is our wisdom to receive the *whole* account of the matter from the Word of

God, without doubt or reservation. Nothing certainly but the power of His Spirit can effectually subdue that indolence of our proud and darkened reason, which is among the worst parts of our sad inheritance; and bring us, in child-like simplicity, in all things to submit to the teaching of the Most High. But, in the order of means, it would seem of no small efficacy towards securing due attention to a voice which addresses us upon an important subject, that we should be convinced that it is, upon that subject, our only source of information. And surely, if any where in religion, this conviction ought to be felt here. If we really believe that God forgives our sins,—that he views us as innocent,—that He accepts us as righteous,—because another has suffered punishment in our stead,—because another has fulfilled what we were bound to perform, and have not performed,—if we really believe this, surely we must feel that this is a proceeding too wonderful in its nature—too much beyond our reach and above our capacities—to make it wise or *rational* for us to assume to prejudge the mode in which it ought to be conducted. Surely we ought to feel that we are, henceforth as hitherto,—in what remains to be known, as well as in what we have already learned on this high and mysterious subject,—*wholly* dependent upon the information which God deigns to communicate to us in His Word.

And certainly, if a man be led to consult the Bible in this fair and humble spirit, I do not think he can long hesitate on this question. Objections to the doctrine, no doubt, there are, and difficulties about it,—objections and difficulties in abundance,—some of them old, and some new—some of them devised by ingenious men, and some by men of slender ingenuity—some springing, no doubt, from a real solicitude for moral purity, and some which it is not easy to ascribe to a source so commendable,—these all, in different ways and degrees, are calculated to affect the mind, and may

appear to have some real force, so long as men are kept from the Bible, and confined to such partial quotations from it as controversy loves to deal in. But all united will offer feeble opposition indeed to the mass of evidence for this doctrine, which a fair review of Scripture will bring out. With a provident solicitude, which is not more than proportioned to the importance of the doctrine, and to the hostility with which it is sure to be encountered, but which is in some degree foreign to the general style of the Bible, it is presented there in every variety of form in which such a truth could appear, and may, therefore, be supported by every kind of evidence by which such a truth could be sustained. It is asserted,—it is assumed,—it is defended,—it is explained;—formal statements are made of it in terms the most explicit, often rendered, if possible, still more unequivocal by embodying distinct negations of what may be styled the opposite doctrine;—incidental mention is continually made of it, often in a way which shows it to have been familiar to those whom the writer addresses as well as to himself, and precious to both:—it is supported by reasoning as well as authoritatively asserted;—objections are anticipated and answered to which it is apparently liable, but which by no possibility seem to apply to any doctrine that has ever been put forward in opposition to it, as a representation of the Apostle's meaning;—or abuses are guarded against to which also it appears exposed, but for which, as before, no opposing doctrine seems to furnish any occasion. Not only are there proofs fitted to satisfy all reasonable doubts, but it seems impossible for caprice to demand any kind or description of evidence, direct or indirect, which it is not in our power to supply, and in abundance too.

It is plain that almost any one division of these proofs, followed out into the detail that it would admit, and that, indeed, it might seem to require, would exceed the limits which I am obliged to prescribe to myself here. But, on the

other hand, to leave these strong statements without any kind of proof, would be to leave the doctrine itself in a much less advantageous position than I hope to place it in, even by such an outline of the proofs for it as my limits allow. I shall attempt in this hope to present such an outline; with the hope, also, that no one who hears me to whom the subject is at all new, will content himself with the imperfect review of the arguments for this important truth, to which I am necessarily confined.

As to express statements of the Doctrine, there would be no difficulty whatever in bringing forward many; but of all kinds of proofs for a doctrine, there seems least purpose in multiplying this kind. For a fair enquirer, one such unequivocal statement as that contained in my text would seem enough; and, on the other hand, the very devices by which one such statement is explained away would serve for a thousand. They who are able to find that when the Apostle says, "that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law²," he really means that a man is justified *partly by faith*, and *partly by the deeds of the law*, must possess some principles of interpretation which would enable them to dispose as easily of any other statement or any number of statements on this subject, or on any subject.

Hear, however, another brief statement, containing a comprehensive, exact, and even a minute account of the whole proceeding. "Now unto him that worketh is the reward reckoned, not of grace, but of debt; but unto him that worketh not, but believeth upon Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted unto him for righteousness³." This is language which I should feel myself idly employed in endeavouring to explain. It might be possible, doubtless, for human ingenuity to devise some form of expression more entirely free from ambiguity, but it would not

² Rom. iii. 28; Note O.

³ Rom. iv. 4.

I think be easy, and I am sure it could answer no useful end. I am sure, that, if any one now desired to convey the information, that it is the ungodly whom God justifies,—those who have violated His law, not those who have obeyed it,—and that His *mode* of proceeding is to count the faith which they have for the righteousness which they have not; and if for this purpose the language of the Apostle occurred to him, “but unto him that worketh not, but believeth upon Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted unto him for righteousness,”—I am sure, I say, that such a one would never reject this statement, or add to it, or abridge it, or in any respect alter it, under an apprehension that his meaning, when so expressed, could be mistaken by any fair mind.

And to attempt anything beyond this by any statement seems vain. To set about fabricating forms of expression that shall baffle the pernicious ingenuity with which we contrive to evade the natural force of plain language, when it conveys to us what we do not like to hear, betrays an ignorance alike of the imperfections of human language; and of the wiles of the human heart. The whole history of legislation shows sufficiently that no specifications, however curiously framed and laboriously multiplied, can anticipate a tithe of the subtleties with which men are supplied, when they search for them for such objects. And the Bible does not make the attempt. It denounces this unfairness of spirit, it warns us against it, and supplies abundant remedies for it: but it makes no provision for this warfare in detail against it;—a warfare so likely to be interminable, and so little likely to be profitable. When the Apostle preached through Christ “the forgiveness of sins,” and distinctly declared that, “by Him, ALL that believe are justified from *all things* from which they could not be justified by the law of Moses¹,” he probably knew,—the Being under

¹ Acts xiii. 39.

whose inspiration he was speaking certainly knew,—that almost every word in this plain sentence would afford an exercise to the perverted ingenuity of those who will not receive the message that it conveys, or *submit themselves to the righteousness of God*. But he does not therefore stop to explain these terms, and to guard them from perversion; which could only be done by other terms no less liable to be wrested from their natural meaning. He does not do this; but by a solemn warning he commends his simple publication of the Gospel to that honest consideration which renders such precautions superfluous, while the want of it renders all precautions unavailing—"Beware, therefore, lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the Prophets; Behold, ye despisers, and wonder, and perish: for I work a work in your days, a work which ye shall in nowise believe, though a man declare it unto you⁵."

Time would fail me if I were to go through the less formal statements of this truth, which are to be met with everywhere in the sacred volume. I must be satisfied with taking a few; and I shall select some that I think most likely to affect a fair mind, as occurring where the immediate object of the Apostle was not to communicate this doctrine, but where he pauses or turns aside to notice it in a way which, while it sufficiently conveys the truth, evinces clearly his sense of its importance, and the extent to which it occupied his thoughts.

Thus, explaining how the Gospel shows forth *the righteousness of God without the law*, he stops to mark the way in which that righteousness is communicated, "even the righteousness of God which is *by faith of Jesus Christ* unto all and upon all them that believe⁶." For the manifestation of this righteousness, Christ is set forth by God, he tells us, as a *propitiation*, but it is, he fails not to notice, *a propitiation*

⁵ Acts xiii. 40.

⁶ Rom. iii. 22.

*through faith in His blood**; and while he refers to this glorious offering as establishing the justice of God in freely justifying sinners, he takes occasion to specify who are the sinners that are the objects of this free pardon, "to declare, I say, at this time His righteousness, that He might be just, and the justifier of him *which believeth in Jesus*⁷." Is he magnifying God's free grace? He finds room to notice how it operates;—"By grace are ye saved, *through faith*⁸."—Or commemorating His eternal purposes in Christ concerning His Church? The very name of the Redeemer forces him, as it were, to glance at the benefits which we owe to Him, and at the way in which they have been secured to us: "According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord; in whom we have boldness and access with confidence, *by the faith of Him*⁹." He does not extol the great instrument of salvation, the sacred Scriptures, as able to give us heavenly wisdom unto salvation, without subjoining that they do this "*through faith which is in Christ Jesus*¹⁰." The Gentiles, he tells us, *attained unto righteousness*, while the Jews, with larger knowledge of God and of His will, failed to attain it; and the reason is given: "The Gentiles which followed not after righteousness have attained unto righteousness, even *the righteousness which is of faith*; but Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? *because they sought it not by faith*¹¹." Do Jews, however, as well as Gentiles, believe in the Saviour? They do so, he tells us, "knowing that a man is not justified by the deeds of the law, but *by faith of Jesus Christ*¹²." And this, too, was the conviction under which he himself, he informs us, embraced this despised profession, renounced all national privileges, and all personal distinctions, and cast from him all his trust in the

* Rom. iii. 25. Note P.

Eph. iii. 11.

⁷ Rom. iii. 26.

¹⁰ 2 Tim. iii. 15.

¹² Gal. ii. 16.

⁸ Eph. ii. 8.

¹¹ Rom. ix. 30.

righteousness of the law, which was so long his pride, treading all under foot, and *counting all but loss, that he might win CHRIST*, “and be found in Him,” he adds, “not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is *through faith in Christ*,”—“the righteousness,” he emphatically reiterates, “which is *of God by faith*¹³.”

The Divine authority under which the Apostle taught is the proper and ultimate proof of the truth of all his statements. But in his writings, as in other parts of Holy Writ, reasoning is often intermingled with authoritative declarations of doctrine; and in reasoning on this subject, he always treats God’s method of justifying sinners by faith as a scheme of free forgiveness. They who are *justified by faith* are *justified by God’s grace—justified freely by His grace*. Indeed, he distinctly states that one reason at least for appointing *faith* to be the channel of communicating the promised blessings was that they might be gratuitous,—“*therefore it is of faith*, that it might be by grace¹⁴.” In answer to some difficulties connected with this part of the subject, I shall speak more fully upon this point hereafter. I only notice it now, that you may perceive the application of some of his arguments of which I shall attempt to give you a brief abstract.

His arguments, indeed, in proof of this doctrine of free forgiveness, as opposed to the schemes in which works have a place in procuring it, are too various for anything beyond an abstract; sometimes they are taken from man’s nature and condition,—sometimes from the nature of the Law,—sometimes from the records to be found in Scripture of God’s past dealings with His servants,—and sometimes from the prophetic declarations there concerning His future plans.

Of the principal and most detailed of these arguments I have before spoken incidentally. It is that which forms the opening of his Epistle to the Romans, where, antecedently

¹³ Phil. iii. 9.

¹⁴ Rom. iv. 16.

to his publication of God's mode of redeeming man, he establishes universally man's guilt; shows that the whole world, Jew and Gentile, stood condemned before God—the Gentile, abusing the bounties of providence, blinding himself to the manifestation of God's character which He has stamped upon creation, and violating that law which He has written upon the hearts of all: the Jew, abusing more precious mercies, and sinning against brighter light; but both sinners, both guilty in the sight of God. This proof that Jew and Gentile are both *under sin* is the foundation which he lays for the publication which follows, of God's gracious mode of justifying both. If *all have sinned and come short of the glory of God*, it must be plain that *by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in His sight*; and so preparation is made for the declaration that all who are justified *are justified freely, by God's grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*; that *God is the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus, having set Him forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood*; and that so *all boasting is excluded*, for that, as is stated in my text, "*a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law*"¹⁵.

Elsewhere, indeed, he shows, what is sufficiently evident from the nature of the Law, that it could have no justifying efficacy for those who have offended against it. It leaves offenders as it finds them, or is the innocent cause of their becoming worse. God's Law is no doubt perfect; but it is perfect only in reference to its end. It is no disparagement to it to say, that it does not effect what it never was designed that it should effect. It is holy, and just, and good; an immutable standard of morals; a perfect rule of life. But its object is to require righteousness, not to bestow it. It has no provision to forgive the guilty, to sustain the weak, to restore the fallen. And for us, guilty, frail, and fallen, what can it do? For all such, its true end is answered when

¹⁵ Rom. iii. 28.

it convinces them of their sin, of their danger, and of their helplessness; and thus drives those who have fallen under its curse, to take refuge with Him who *was made a curse for them*; “the law,” saith he, “is a schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, *that we might be justified by faith*”¹⁶.”

That this was no new method of dealing with man, he proves, by the record which is found in the Book of Genesis, of God’s justification of the father of the faithful, from whom the Jews confessedly derived all their privileges. He dwells upon this case, and recurs to it, as exhibiting most strikingly that *justification by faith* which was the great subject of his own preaching. First he appeals to the language of the record,—*Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness*¹⁷,”—as wholly inconsistent with the supposition that he was *justified by works*, and as plainly declaring that *his faith was reckoned unto him for righteousness*¹⁸. And then he draws from the facts of the Patriarch’s history a full account of what his *faith* really was, he exhibits him to us as *against hope believing in hope, that he might be the father of many nations*; as being *not weak in faith*, nor moved to distrust by any of the circumstances which rendered the fulfilment of God’s promise so improbable; as *not staggering at the promise of God through unbelief*; as *strong in faith, giving the glory to God*, and being *fully persuaded* that what He had promised, He was also able to perform¹⁹. And after thus establishing the nature of Abraham’s *faith*, by showing the reality and the strength of his *trust* in God’s promises, the Apostle declares how it availed to his *justification*, “and *therefore* it was imputed to him for righteousness”²⁰.” And he then goes on to tell us, that the record of this procedure, which the Old Testament contains, was designed to insure to all Abraham’s true children,—that is, to all who share in

¹⁶ Gal. iii. 24.

¹⁷ Rom. iv. 3; Gen. xv. 6.

¹⁸ Rom. iv. 5, 9.

¹⁹ Rom. iv. 18—20.

²⁰ Rom. iv. 21.

his *faith*²¹,—that they shall also share in his *justification*. “Now it was not written for his sake only that it was imputed to him, but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, if we believe on Him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.”

He tells us that it was not unknown to God’s servants of old that this was their true dependence,—that He who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity should *impute* to them *righteousness without works*²²;—for that the man after God’s own heart describes this as man’s real happiness, saying, “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord doth not impute sin.” And that the instrumentality of *faith* in this merciful work was declared by His prophet when he said, “the just shall live by faith.” And finally he testifies that the Gospel which he was commissioned to preach is the fulfilment of the great promise of ancient prophecy, even the NEW COVENANT, in which God had engaged Himself to sway His people not by terror, but by gratitude and love; to graft in their hearts an unfailing principle of cheerful obedience; and to constrain them to a willing conformity to His will, by manifesting Himself unto them in His true character, as a God *ready to forgive*: “This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my laws into their minds, and will write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people. And they shall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for all shall know me from the least to the greatest; FOR I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities I will remember no more.”

²¹ Rom. iv. *passim*; Gal. iii. 7–9.

²² Rom. iv. 23.

²³ Rom. iv. 6.

²⁴ Ps. xxxii. 1.

²⁵ Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. x. 38; Hab. ii. 4.

²⁶ Heb. viii. 10; Jer. xxxi. 33; Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26.

Look now at the objections which he notices, and you must see, that they are plainly objections against this doctrine of the free forgiveness and unreserved acceptance of all sinners who come to God by *faith in CHRIST*. He expressly states that some slanderously reported that he said, (that is, probably, that his doctrine amounted to this), "Let us do evil that good may come"²⁷." And if you look at the question which conveys the same imputation upon the moral tendency of his doctrine, "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound"²⁸?" and read carefully the preceding passage,—which the Apostle supposes to give rise to it, as his mode of introducing it very clearly intimates,—you will see the meaning of this objection, in its connexion with the statements of the doctrines of grace which precede it. You will see that he supposes that it may be said, in the way of objection, If all sin, both before the law and since, has been met by new manifestations of God's mercy, which have not merely provided for the exigency, but have gone beyond its demands—have showered down upon sinners, who ought to have been looking for demonstrations of God's wrath, fresh and larger measures of His love; are we not laying a restraint upon this chosen attribute of God—are we not casting an obstacle in the way of a brighter display of His mercy,—when we depart from sin which is the occasion of its exercise—shall we not rather *continue in sin that grace may abound!*—If you take the objection, I say, in this connexion, it is easily understood. Unsound and wicked though it is, it is at least intelligible, when applied thus to the doctrines of free grace, and growing out of a statement of them. But it seems utterly without meaning, if it is regarded as urged against the doctrine which represents us as reconciled to God by that course of obedience which He has appointed for us. Weak objections against the truth are as likely to be made as strong ones; and may sometimes, in prudence, no less

²⁷ Rom. iii. 8.²⁸ Rom. vi. 1.

require an answer. But even the unfairest or dullest assailant of a doctrine would be unlikely to make use of objections which have no conceivable application to it; and if such objections were really put forward, no defender of the truth would think that they merited any reply: still less would he be likely himself to anticipate them for the purpose of answering them.

Again, would any sane man, who had preached, as by some the Apostle Paul is held to have preached,—that by faith we are admitted into the Christian Church; but that our acceptance with God is suspended upon obedience to his commandments, would, I say, any sane man, who had preached this doctrine, or any such doctrine, think himself bound to guard against the risk of its being abused to favour licentiousness, or of its being supposed to do so;—to guard against the risk of its conveying the false impression, either to friends or foes, that Believers were emancipated from all moral restraints? Would he think himself bound, as the Apostle plainly does, to anticipate and answer the question, “Shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace²⁹?”

How he answers this, or the former question, it is beside my present purpose to notice. My business with them at present is only to show, that the doctrine which he preached was actually assailed by such cavils, or that in his judgment it had reason to fear such, and that it therefore afforded some apparent or conceivable ground for them. To his answers I shall probably return; and if you, meanwhile, consult them, you will find that they do not, in the slightest particular, detract from the freeness and the fulness of his original statements of the doctrines of free grace.

Such is an imperfect sketch,—necessarily a very imperfect one,—of the Scripture authority upon which this doc-

²⁹ Rom. vi. 15.

trine rests. And the authority next in degree to Scriptural is no less express in its support. Whatever were the differences among the first Reformers upon other points, they were upon this agreed. All those venerable men to whom God assigned the glorious task of overthrowing false religion and establishing the true faith, have embodied this Doctrine in the Confessions of the Churches which they were the instruments of reforming; and by the prominence which they have given it therein, and by the zeal with which they maintained it in conferences, in debates, and in controversies, they sufficiently proved how deep their conviction was that, as the greatest of them emphatically declared, *if this Article be lost, all Christian Doctrine is lost*. So that it now stands distinctly in the Confession of Faith of every reformed church in Europe, unless it be expunged in some of those that have fallen from their first purity*.

We are, however, chiefly concerned with our own Church. And in it certainly pains every way remarkable have been taken to put the doctrine beyond the possibility of mistake, or, as far as human precautions can effect such an object, beyond the possibility of evasion. It is asserted, as you know, in simple and distinct terms in an Article appropriated to the subject³⁰. Still further to secure that it shall be thoroughly understood, reference is there made to one of the Homilies as containing a fuller statement of it³¹. In that Homily, in strict conformity with the mode adopted in the sacred Scripture, the doctrine is distinctly stated,—clearly explained,—supported by argument,—defended from cavils,—and guarded against abuse. And finally an additional precaution is taken, which must have secured the object

* Note Q.

³⁰ Art. XI.

³¹ The third Homily of the First Book. The full title is, “A Sermon of the Salvation of Mankind by only Christ our Saviour, from Sin and Death Everlasting,” but it is referred to in the Article as “the Homily of Justification.” See Note R.

if anything could have secured it: that no doubt might remain as to the sense in which we are said to be *justified by faith only*³²,—no doubt of the extent to which our own works are excluded from the office of justifying us before God,—another Article is added, in which it is expressly stated, that no works which we do are well pleasing in God's sight until after we be justified³³.

I know very well that a position established by such plenary proof has often to contend with a prejudice, springing from the very conclusiveness of the evidence by which it is supported. Persons are apt to say, 'This seems, no doubt, conclusive, but something must be kept back, or this doctrine could never have met the steady opposition that it has always encountered. Men who hold opposite views so resolutely must have some grounds for them, and this representation seems to leave them none.' Such reflexions are natural, and, perhaps, unavoidable; at least they cannot be complained of as unfair, except when they are used, as they so often are, not to lead the mind to investigation, but to keep it tolerably tranquil under unsettled views. If they should have arisen, in the case before us, in the minds of any of my hearers, they must, for the present, be satisfied by my purpose of reviewing the principal objections which this Doctrine has had to encounter since its first promulgation,—an examination in which I mean to engage, before I consider the proper effects of the Doctrine upon moral character. There is one difficulty, however, which I wish to notice briefly before I conclude, not merely because it is often heard, and seems to lie at the bottom of many others, but because what I shall say upon it is necessary to complete the view of the nature of *faith*, and of its connexion with *justification*, which I am anxious to leave upon your minds.

³² Art. XI.

³³ Art. XIII.

You will often hear it asked, what is the peculiar excellence of *faith*, which secures to it this pre-eminence over the other graces of the Believer, of being, to the exclusion of all of them, the sole instrument of his *justification*? And sometimes, doubtless, this question is proposed under a feeling of real embarrassment about the subject, and with a real desire for information upon it. But you will more frequently, I think, find it asked with a hostile purpose, and in a tone that seems to intimate, that it contains a weighty difficulty connected with this doctrine.

Now, I will not stop to enforce the obvious remark, that if you are satisfied of the direct evidence for this doctrine or any such doctrine, you ought not to be in any way affected by such a difficulty. You may find yourselves unable to answer satisfactorily many questions of this kind, but your inability should not, in the slightest degree, impair your confidence in the truth, if established by sufficient and proper proof. For there is no probability (to confine ourselves to the present case), not even the lowest probability, that, because we are certain that God has appointed *faith* to be the instrument of our *justification*, we should be able to tell also why He has done so. Yet you see that it is only upon the supposition that there is such a probability, that your inability to answer such a question can be converted into an argument or a presumption against the certainty of the doctrine.

Though I cannot avoid making this remark, I do not mean to dwell upon it; for the question, I think, in whatever spirit it be proposed, admits of an easy answer. And I trust there are many who hear me, who would be able and ready to reply to such an inquiry, that if by *peculiar excellence* be meant *peculiar merit, virtue, or deserving*, faith has none. It can neither under the law which God gave to his Jewish people, nor under that larger code which he has written on the hearts of all his intelligent creation, claim the

merit or the rewards of obedience; and in this sense it has no peculiar excellence, either natural or conventional; nor ought it to have any. If it had, the Apostle's distinction, between *justification by faith*, and *justification by works*, would seem to have no sufficient foundation; and boasting to be no more excluded by the *law of faith*, than by the *law of works*. The question has, in fact, in this sense, no application to any true statement of the doctrine; though to loose notions about it, or loose statements of it, it may seem to apply. For the true view of this doctrine does not, as the question supposes, represent that *faith* justifies us, as it is a grace or merit in ourselves, but as it unites us to Him who is the fountain of all grace and of all merit, and gives us, by God's appointment, title to what He has earned for us.

But if by *peculiar excellence* be meant, peculiar fitness for its office, then I think we can see in *faith*—what no doubt is in it, whether we can see it or not—a fitness for this office of justifying the Believer, which belongs to no other part of his character.—God having, in His infinite wisdom and mercy, appointed that we should be pardoned and accepted for the sufferings and for the merits of another, seems most fitly to have appointed too, that our voluntary and humble acceptance of this His mode of freely forgiving and receiving us, by putting our trust in Him through whom these blessings are to be bestowed upon us, should necessarily precede our full participation of all the benefits of this gracious scheme, and that nothing else should. I designedly, according to my plan, avoid speaking here of the effects of *faith* in forming the Believer's character. But, altogether independently of any reasons for the selection of it, which these may seem to offer, does not the fitness of the choice sufficiently appear from what I have said? If for our *justification* it be essential, and sufficient, that we be united to Christ,—one with Christ,—*found in Christ*,—does not the act whereby we take Him for our defence against that wrath

which we feel that we have earned,—the act whereby, abjuring all self-dependence, we cast ourselves unreservedly upon God's free mercies in the Redeemer, with a full sense of our guilt and our danger, but in a full reliance upon the efficacy of all that He has wrought and endured;—does not this act, whereby we cleave to Him, and, as far as in us lies, become one with Him, seem the fit act whereunto to annex the full enjoyment of all those inestimable benefits, which, however dearly purchased they were by Him who bought them, were designed to be, with respect to us upon whom they are bestowed, emphatically free?—With less than this, our part in the procedure could not have been—what it was manifestly designed to be—intelligent and voluntary. With more, it might seem to be meritorious. Whereas *faith* unites all the advantages that we ought to look for in the instrument whereby we were to lay hold on the blessings thus freely offered to us: it makes us voluntary recipients of them, and yet does not seem to leave, even to the deceitfulness of our own deceitful hearts, the power of ascribing to ourselves any meritorious share in procuring them*.

It is very true that it may be said, that it is not at all uncommon to find this latter object frustrated: that among those who are most zealous for this doctrine of *justification by faith only*, we find not a few, who are really resting their confidence upon their *faith*, and manifestly regarding it as a personal quality entitling them, by its proper worth, to their own approbation, and to the favour of God.


And this no doubt is the case. Among the various devices of human folly and pride, for making void the Cross of Christ, this strange one has certainly a place. But is this any objection to what has been stated? A drowning man rescued from destruction by the heroic self-devotion of a friend may claim a part of the merit of his own preservation, because he clung to the hand of his preserver. One

* Note S.

restored from a deadly distemper by the benevolence and skill of another, may urge, in abatement of the claims upon his gratitude, that had he obstinately rejected the remedies provided for him, no benevolence or skill could have availed to his recovery. There seem to be, absolutely, no limits whatever to the wayward perversions of the natural feelings of the human heart. But these feelings are, notwithstanding, real. It is upon them, and not upon the perversions of them, that we calculate in all our dealings with each other,—in our reasonings, in our threatenings, in our promises. In plans for the improvement of man, in laws to regulate his conduct, in every human system designed for human nature, common sense confines us to the sober aim of influencing profitably the natural principles of the human mind,—~~exciting or restraining its natural movements,~~—and forbids the ~~chimerical attempt of anticipating, providing for, and combating its monstrous anomalies.~~ Is it strange to find a ~~religion designed for man~~ framed upon the same rational and practical principles?

The question—Is *faith* the sole instrument of man's *justification*? is to be determined by the authority of Holy Scripture, and by it alone. Upon that authority it has been answered. The further question—Is it a fit instrument? if it should be considered at all, is to be determined, not by its liability to be abused—which it shares with everything else that could have been chosen for that purpose—but by its legitimate and natural effects. Now, that the act whereby, feeling and confessing that we deserve God's righteous indignation against sin, we renounce all merit of our own, and put our whole confidence in another's—that the act whereby we abjure all trust in ourselves, or in anything that we possess or can perform, and put our whole trust in another and in what he has done—that this act should, by a reflex operation of the mind, become itself a ground of dependence, to the exclusion of the true ground, or in partici-

pation with it,—this, I think, must be felt (however possible it be) to be about as natural and legitimate a result as that a man (which is plainly possible too) should be proud of his humility. And I do not fear to say, that upon a fair consideration it must appear, that to object to preaching the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, on the grounds that by this curious perversion, it may lead to a form of self-righteousness, is not a jot more reasonable than it would be to discountenance enforcing upon Believers the cultivation of the Christian grace of *humility*, under an apprehension that the possession of that virtue might engender *pride*. The more closely scrutinized the cases are, the more perfect, for all important purposes, will the analogy appear to be. But I have gone too far to dwell on the comparison, and of all the reflections that it suggests, I can add but one. That is, that as you would conclude that there was something hollow and false in a man's humility, if you found that while it forbade pride in any other virtue, or good quality, it allowed him to contemplate with self-complacency his lowliness of mind; even so, and with the same certainty, conclude against the genuineness of your own *faith*, if you find it allow you to put your trust in itself, or in anything but in CHRIST, and Him crucified.



SERMON V.

ON THE CORRUPTIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY.

Etsi autem in corruptelis hujus dicti, *fide justificamur*, alii aliter locuti sunt, tamen eadem causa erroris omnibus, et eandem falsam sententiam omnes astruunt. Omnes intelligunt *fide* tantum significari notitiam historiæ, et justum intelligunt philosophicè, habentem ipsas virtutes . . . Hoc modo cum de vocabulis errent, affingunt deinde alienas interpretationes, quæ tamen omnes in summa hoc volunt:—in hac propositione synecdochen esse, *fide* justificamur, id est, *fide et cæteris virtutibus* justificamur; seu fide præparamur ut postea aliis virtutibus justi simus. Monachi sic locuti sunt, fide formatâ, scilicet dilectione, justificamur, quod sic intellexerunt, propter dilectionem justi sumus. Alii sic interpretati sunt, fide, id est, operibus Deo mandatis justi sumus, non operibus traditionum humanarum. Alii hoc modo depravant, fide, id est interiore cultu non externis operibus justi sumus.

Hæ interpretationes omnes hoc volunt: homo est justus, id est, Deo acceptus ad vitam æternam, propter proprias virtutes et opera. Et hoc alii enarrant absurdius, alii quædam absurda omittunt.

MELANCTHON. *Arg. in Ep. ad Romanos.*

SERMON V.

ROMANS III. 28.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law.

YOU will remember, I trust, my brethren, that the main object of my last address to you from this place, was to establish that important doctrine which is so distinctly stated in my text—the doctrine of *justification by faith only*.

I showed you that when we receive, in their plain and natural signification, this passage and the parallel passages of the New Testament, we have unusual means of satisfying ourselves that we are assigning to them the exact import which the writer intended that they should bear. These means are not derived merely, or principally, from the number of distinct enunciations of this doctrine which these passages supply; all testifying to the same truth under some variety of form, and enabling us, by comparing them together, to fix with more certainty their common sense.

Great as this advantage is, we have in this case far greater advantages. For these texts are not detached propositions; the interpretation of which may often, from the imperfections of language, remain liable to some reasonable doubt, and which can never, be they ever so reiterated and express, be set beyond the possibility of unreasonable cavils. They are but condensed publications of a system which is

elsewhere set forth in full detail; and this system may be examined apart from these brief declarations of it, and compared with them. They are given sometimes as inferences from a train of reasoning; and the argument may be separately weighed, and its fair force employed, to ascertain the sense of these conclusions from it. They profess to reveal God's mode of reconciling sinners to Himself. Such a revelation, when first published, would be likely to be judged, as it is now, by the notions that men entertain of God's nature and their own, by their views of His designs concerning man, and of the best mode of carrying those designs into effect. And crude objections, founded on some discordance, real or imaginary, between such a revelation and these pre-conceptions, would be likely to be put forward then, as they are now. Such objections by their tone and quality would greatly aid us, if we possessed them, in ascertaining the true character of the doctrine which they impugned; and still more, if we were also furnished with the answer made to them by the first promulger of the doctrine. Now, such aids also we have in the present case; for the Apostle from whom these passages are chiefly taken, states and discusses such objections to the doctrine which he preached.

These several confirmations, for such we found them all to be, of the presumption which always lies in favour of the interpretation that receives language in its natural meaning branch out widely. And of the varied evidence hence arising for this doctrine, as a Scriptural truth, I then gave you the kind of abstract that my limits allowed.

I beside *stated*, what I certainly wanted nothing but time for *proving*, that this clear doctrine of the Bible is no less clearly the doctrine of all those reformed Churches, whose glory and strength it is that *the Bible is their religion*. And with respect to that pure Church to which it is our happiness to belong, and in whose principles we have, therefore, an especial interest, I showed you that we are assured

that she receives this truth simply as it is stated in her brief but explicit declaration of it ; in no qualified or deceptive sense of that statement ; but in the plain meaning and fullest force of the terms in which it is conceived. For that, both in her Articles and Homilies, further precautions are taken by her (of which I then gave you some account) which have manifestly for their object, to fix such a meaning of these terms, to establish the doctrine so explained, and to guard it from misconception, evasion, or abuse.

To say that these precautions have not always been completely successful, is but to vindicate the wisdom by which the necessity for precautions was foreseen. Doubtless, they have not always succeeded in securing this truth from neglect or perversion. No human means could effect this for a doctrine so unpalatable to man's natural heart ; nor has it, indeed, seemed fit to God to invest with such force any of truth's safeguards, whether human or divine. But these wise cares have been at no time wholly ineffectual. They preserved sound doctrine for a better day, and mainly contributed to hasten its coming. They have since supplied ample materials for the propagation and defence of the truth. And, even in the darkest season, there was doubtless *a remnant*, to whom they served to attest the pure principles which they were intended to guard.

I supposed, then, that the fair effect of this statement of the evidence for this important doctrine might be somewhat impeded by a reflexion, to which it is, no doubt, calculated to give rise. How, namely, is it, that among men interested about religion, and professing to take their views of it from God's Word, there have always been found many in determined opposition to a doctrine which seems so clearly and so prominently revealed there? How is it that a doctrine, so distinctly asserted by our Church in the most solemn declaration of her principles, and guarded by her with such multiplied precautions and such anxious care,

should have ever fallen into disrepute among her members; especially among those to whom she confides the maintenance of her doctrines, and from whom (previously to reposing in them so weighty a trust) she exacts an express declaration of strict accordance with the principles which they are engaged to teach and to defend?

To these inquiries I promised to return an answer. But, lest there should be some misconception concerning the extent of the engagement so formed, I think it right to premise that it is not my purpose to offer any solution of the difficulty proposed, but only to answer the objection which it is intended to convey. That is, I only mean to state the reasons which from time to time have been urged in support of the opposition which this doctrine has encountered, and to show their insufficiency: without speaking at all of the causes to which the opposition has owed its rise. I propose to consider it solely as it suggests an objection to the adoption of the conclusion to which I have been anxious to lead you. And if this mode of answering the questions referred to leaves untouched the difficulty which they directly present, it must be felt that that is a difficulty which I am not, so far as respects my present purpose, called upon to remove.

The difficulty, indeed, which I mean to answer, is also one that I might easily hold myself excused from considering. The only form in which such questions suggest any objection to what I have stated is this:—If the direct evidence to prove this to be a doctrine of Scripture and of our Church, be as conclusive as it is asserted to be, would it not have produced conviction more extensively than we see that it has done? In reply to this, we might, as it seems, content ourselves with denying that such a difficulty, whatever be its weight in other cases, is fairly urged here. If, in advocating any doctrine, a man were to content himself with asserting, that the position which he maintains is supported

by irrefragable proofs; it might seem fair enough to qualify or suspend our assent, by the consideration that the success which these proofs have had, seems hardly consistent with such high pretensions for them. But is the same a fair way of dealing with one who gives the argument on which he means to rely?

It would seem, in the present case, enough to say: 'The evidence for this truth has been laid before you; the sources from which it has been drawn are all within your reach; it is of a kind that you must be competent to examine: and you are, surely, deeply interested in examining it fairly. Will you rather avail yourself of a vague and precarious presumption against it, to dismiss it without examination? Surely a man who feels himself at liberty so to turn away from a fair consideration of proofs fairly laid before him, and pressed upon him, ought to feel that the effect which these proofs have produced upon the world at large is but an indifferent test of their real strength. It would not be a good mode of ascertaining their strength, or a mode that any independent mind would voluntarily adopt, even if it were certain that they had been brought fairly before every individual who had ever judged of them, and had been honestly and carefully weighed by him. But there appears a peculiar inconsistency in relying so confidently upon this test, at the very time that your own mode of deciding shows it to be of so little value—by showing clearly how probable it is, that these arguments have been often resolutely rejected by men who never troubled themselves to ascertain fairly whether they were strong or weak.'

This, I think, is as full an answer as such an objection could fairly claim. But I do not, of course, feel it right here to confine myself to such a reply as the strict rules of reasoning might adjudge to an adversary. To silence an objector is not necessarily to remove an objection anywhere, and least of all in religion. And to remove objections to the

truth which I have taught is here my business, and my desire. I shall, therefore, go on to give a more direct answer to these questions,—but still under the limitation of their bearing which I have already laid down.

Every reader of the Bible must know that it is there very distinctly declared, *that we are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*¹. And it is no less generally known, that our Church has adopted this doctrine in the equivalent assertion—that *we are justified by faith only*². The doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY must then be *in terms* received, by all who do not deny the authority of Scripture, or of our Church as an expounder of its sense. The only course, therefore, open to those who desire to oppose this truth, and who yet are not prepared to do so by such a denial, is to divert from its natural meaning some one of the leading words of such passages—to give some new sense to *works*, or to *faith*, or to *justification*. And, however easy it may be to account for it upon consideration, it appears, at first sight, remarkable, that upon every one of these terms, at some time or other, has this dangerous process been tried. Labourers have never been wanting to effect the main object of such changes; though the ways in which they endeavoured to promote it were often not only different but inconsistent with each other. When one mode, from any cause, lost its efficacy another has been tried. And so arguments have been supplied to restrict the meaning of *works*, or to extend the meaning of *faith*, or to show that *justification* has nearly no meaning whatever; according as the genius of the writer, or the temper of the times, or the good or ill success of the last effort in the same cause, seemed to give advantage to the one method or to the other.

One of the first attempts in the Reformed Churches to reconcile a verbal profession of this doctrine with a real

¹ Rom. iii. 28.

² Art. XI.

opposition to it, was by reviving the strange notion, first, I believe, promulged by Origen*, that the Apostle, in speaking of *works* here, and in the parallel passages of his Epistles, means the *works of the ceremonial law*. As we know that the father, from whom this exploded gloss was borrowed, was a sincere and eminently gifted, though certainly most erring divine, we must be content to regard it as one of the many instances in which a love of system does the worst work of ignorance or dishonesty. For to either, we should hardly hesitate to ascribe such a position, if we were unacquainted with its first author. Few would think it too much to say, that if so audacious a misrepresentation did not spring from gross ignorance of the Bible in him who made it, it, at least, relied upon finding those upon whom it was pressed but slenderly acquainted with the sacred volume.

Whether in some passages cited in support of this view, the Apostle is really speaking of the *ceremonial* part of the Mosaical code, exclusively of the *moral*, and how far these passages have any bearing upon the question, it is quite superfluous to inquire; because it is certain, and may be easily proved too, that to limit in this way the sense of *law*, in a variety of passages which undoubtedly do apply to the question, is impracticable.

When the Apostle speaks of *law*, in connexion with this subject, he sometimes means the whole *Jewish law*, both *ritual* and *moral*; sometimes, the moral part of it especially; sometimes, as in my text, all *divine law*, both natural and revealed. When he first introduces it, he treats it as corresponding to the law written by God upon the hearts of the Gentiles; which would of itself seem enough to fix its true character. He goes on, however, to give a long and black catalogue of offences against this law; all of which, without even a single exception, are *moral* delinquencies. He describes it as a law in which *he delighted according to the*

* Note T.

inner man—a law which the consciences, even of those who are violating it, are constrained to acknowledge as *holy, and just, and good*; as *the law by which we have the knowledge of sin*. And if all these characteristics of the law of which he speaks, could be reconciled to the belief that he means by it a system of ceremonial observances, he seems to take away the possibility of such a misconception, by a passage in which he speaks of this law as containing the commandment, *Thou shalt not covet*. “What shall we say then?—is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin but by the law. For I had not known lust, except the law had said unto me, *Thou shalt not covet*.”

This ought, I think, to be enough to show how grossly the sense of Scripture is misrepresented by such a restriction of the meaning of *the deeds of the law*: and that our Church has not fallen into this error, I should proceed to prove directly, but that this will appear incidentally under the next head: to which I think it more important to proceed, without dwelling further on a view which is too easily exposed to allow any defender of the truth to apprehend much danger from it.

The term *faith* has been subjected to similar violence, but in a much greater variety of forms. Sometimes it is settled that it stands for *piety*, which is itself a virtue, and no inconsiderable one too; and then there is no difficulty in the Scriptural statements—“God’s counting faith for righteousness, was not counting it instead of righteousness, but as being itself real righteousness;” or *faith* and *grace* are, by a figure easily understood, put for the Gospel, as by *law* and *works* are meant the Jewish religion; and then being justified by *grace, through faith*, will mean that we shall, through God’s favour, be accepted upon “the terms of the Gospel; namely, faith, including good works, without a compliance

⁴ Rom. vii. 7.

with the works of the Jewish law;" or *faith* being the beginning and the root of all evangelical righteousness, it is, by St Paul, put for the whole of evangelical obedience, "by a metonymy of the antecedent for the consequent, or rather of the efficient cause for the effect."

All these misrepresentations of the true signification of FAITH, and of its true place in the work of our justification—and if there be any other—I may regard myself as having sufficiently replied to already, in the proof which I gave you of the sense which the word bears in Scripture, in that use of it with which we are chiefly concerned to fix its meaning; and of the place in the justification of sinners which Scripture assigns to the principle for which the word there stands. I showed you in full detail, and in a way liable to no fair exception that I am aware of, that *faith in Christ* is like *faith in any other person*, or in any other thing—that it is *trust in Him*. And that the attempts of some to simplify the meaning of the term, by confining it to an assent of the understanding to evidence; and of others to complicate its meaning, by making it represent all Christian virtues, whether in disposition or act, are equally discountenanced by the Bible. And I showed you too, that to this FAITH, when genuine—to it, distinct from all graces that accompany it in the Believer's soul, and all the virtues which follow it and spring from it in his life—to it, and to it *only*, is the office of his *justification* assigned.

And may not all this be regarded as again proved in what I have established, a moment since, in opposition to the misrepresentation of the meaning of *law*? For if *law*, in my text, mean or include the *moral law*, and therefore *deeds of the law* be moral virtues, or comprehend them, does the assertion *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, mean anything more or less than what I have now stated?

If you ask, however, whether this is the real, as it is

doubtless the natural meaning of the assertion of our Church, *that we are justified by faith only*; you may see that in the Article which makes the assertion, *our works and deservings* are expressly excluded from a share in our *justification*. If it be said, as it is sometimes curiously said, that they are only excluded as its *meritorious* cause; I answer, that they are ~~are, doubtless,~~ excluded as its *meritorious* cause, when that is said to be, *only the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*; but that they are no less clearly excluded as its *instrumental* cause when that is said to be *faith only*.

But for removing all doubt upon that head (if any doubt remain), look to the larger statement in the Homily to which you are remitted in the Article, and you will see in what express terms the office of *justification* is limited to *faith*:—“And therefore St Paul here declareth, nothing upon the behalf of man concerning his justification, but only a true and lively faith.....And yet that faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, in every man that is justified, BUT IT SHUTTETH THEM OUT FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTIFYING. So that though they be all present together in him that is justified, yet they justify not altogether.”

This would seem abundantly clear. But, in fact, confining yourselves wholly to the Articles, you may arrive with equal certainty at the same conclusion. First appears an Article declaring expressly our *justification* to be *by faith only*⁴. To this succeeds another Article, assigning their true Scriptural place and character to *good works*, describing them as the *fruits of faith*, and as *following after justification*⁵. And finally, we have an Article expressly denying the character of *good works*, and ascribing a very different character to ALL WORKS *preceding justification*⁶.

This seems to leave nothing on the subject unprovided for—no inquiry concerning the principles of the Church

⁴ Art. XI.⁵ Art. XII.⁶ Art. XIII.

without an answer—no doubt unsatisfied. Does any one ask, Are we justified *for* our good works? Nay, replies the Eleventh Article, “not *for* our works or deservings, but only *for* the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, *by* FAITH.” Are we justified *by* our good works? Nay, again replies the same Article, “we are justified *by* *faith only*.” What then, should an objector to the doctrine subjoin the old interrogatory *ad invidiam*, What then, have good works no place in the doctrine? ‘They have,’ the following Article enables us to reply, ‘an essential place; but a place wholly irreconcilable with the office which you desire to assign them. They are commanded by God; and those whom He has freely justified, with glad and grateful hearts obey His commandments. Though unable to meet the severity of His judgment, they are, when performed by His children, well pleasing in His sight; and His reconciled children will delight to bring Him the offering. They are the necessary fruits of true *faith*, and, therefore, will necessarily appear in the lives of those whose faith is genuine. But they manifestly cannot combine with it in the work of our *justification*; for, springing from it, they *follow after justification*.’ And are there no other good works save these?—should one go on to ask. None, is the decisive testimony of the thirteenth Article. All man’s works which precede his *justification*, neither springing from the source nor possessing the qualities that secure God’s gracious acceptance of those which follow it, *are not pleasant in His sight, and we doubt not that they have the nature of sin*. Is not this an indissoluble chain? Even with the advantage of knowing all the devices that have been adopted to evade these precautions, I do not see how we could now suggest a reasonable addition to them*.

Some, however, when they can no longer deny the conclusiveness of this proof, contrive to render it useless to

* Note U.

themselves, and as far as they can to others, by undervaluing the importance of the point established. For if it can be shown that there is really no important difference between these different statements of God's mode of justifying man, we may of course adopt whichever seems upon any grounds most convenient or prudent. 'And is not the controversy,' it is sometimes said, 'is not the controversy when you take in the whole doctrine on both sides, something very like a verbal one? Does not, for example, your statement of the doctrine of the Church end, no less than that which it opposes, in establishing, that *works* are as essential to *justification* as *faith* is?'

If questions of this kind, which you hear so constantly, seem to have any force for their purpose, they owe it entirely to the ambiguous terms in which they are conceived. This ambiguity may sometimes, doubtless, be attributable to design; but it should oftener be ascribed to the confused apprehensions on this subject which great carelessness about the truth naturally generates. But, whatever be its cause, it is here easy to exhibit and to correct it.

Is it then, we may ask in turn, is it meant to inquire whether it has not been shown to be the doctrine of Scripture and of our Church, that *faith* and *works* bear the same relation to *justification*, or that it has the same dependence upon both? If this be meant, and less than this would hardly serve the purpose of the question, the simple answer is, that what has been established is the direct contrary of this. What has been established to be the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church is, that God has instituted such a connexion between *faith* and *justification*, that those upon whom He bestows *faith*, He also *justifies*; that He *justifies* them when He bestows faith upon them; that He justifies them *by faith, counting this faith for righteousness*,—that righteousness which is the proper legal ground of justification. The connexion of *good works* with *faith* and with

justification is no less distinctly laid down. Those who are so justified will certainly bring forth good works; for such obedience to God's will is the proper fruit of the principle by which they have been justified; while, before the change in their condition before God, and the change of mind by which faith has been given to them, they are incapable of any work well pleasing in God's sight. This, I say, which establishes so distinctly the connexion in nature, and the order too, of *faith*, *justification*, and *obedience*, has been proved to be the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church to which we belong. And does this allow the authority of either to be fairly pleaded, for any view which assigns the same place in the work of man's justification to *faith* and to *obedience*? Does it show that *justification* is suspended upon *good works*, as it is confessedly suspended upon *faith*? To answer this question it is enough to point to the Article which declares that no *good work* can be performed by the sinner until his *justification* be accomplished⁷.

This is a sufficient answer to the question—Are not *good works* and *faith* alike essential to *justification*? in the only sense in which it can be of any support to the views of those who ask it. It shows that to assert that we are justified before God *by good works*, in any sense, is to contradict the testimony of Scripture and of the Church, and to reverse the order of the proceeding which both have distinctly laid down. We have seen, at the same time, that both declare such works to be necessary fruits of justifying faith, and so essential marks of justified persons. And therefore, when these fruits are wanting, we may collect the absence of that internal principle which we can only discern in others by its proper effects; and collect too that the act of God, which is only performed when that principle is really possessed, has not been performed: and what may be a guide in the

⁷ Art. XIII.

case of others, answers the far more important end of a safeguard in our own. If, therefore, the meaning of the inquiry be, *As faith necessarily precedes justification, will not good works necessarily follow it?* the question, if this be what it means, though cast in a form fitted to disguise its real meaning and to convey a false one, is to be answered in the affirmative, and the affirmative to be strenuously maintained. But it is unnecessary to repeat how little, in this sense, it promotes the real purpose, or rather how directly it frustrates the real purpose of those who propose it.

‘What then,’ it is said, ‘is this after all the true use of moral virtues? Can no higher end be assigned for that obedience which we are commanded to render,—for those gifts and graces of the Spirit, which Christ died to secure and which God has promised to bestow? Has Christ left us in His life an example that we should follow His steps, and did He die that He might purify to Himself a peculiar people *zealous of good works*, merely that they themselves and others should be provided with evidence that theirs is a genuine faith?’

There is a sort of perverse sophistry, which, if it ever appear anywhere but in this controversy, it is certainly not often anywhere else thought necessary to answer. We are told that in the Acts of the Apostles, that, “there sat a certain man at Lystra, impotent in his feet, being a cripple from his mother’s womb, which never had walked. The same heard Paul speak, who steadfastly beholding him, and perceiving that he had faith to be healed, said with a loud voice, *Stand upright on thy feet; and he leaped and walked*.” Now, if there could be found any one who was disposed to maintain that the leaping and walking of this man preceded his restoration to strength; and that the recovery of his power over his limbs, depended upon these acts as the

* Acts xiv. 8—10.

instrument, means, or condition of that recovery; and were he to fortify his position by citing authorities to show the dependence of health, strength, and activity, upon exercise—or by any *argument* of any kind; his argument ought doubtless to be listened to patiently, and his error patiently exposed. But if,—upon your pointing out that not reason only, but the plain meaning of the narrative in the Bible, showed that this man's cure had been effected by preternatural power, before he was capable of thus exerting his limbs,—that these healthful acts could not have been performed, until health had been restored,—that they proved indeed the efficiency of the remedy, but in no sense wrought or contributed to the cure,—if he were then to cry, 'Can you speak thus coldly of the blessing of renovated health? Can you see a fellow-creature restored to the enjoyment of it, with so little feeling for his happiness? Do you think decrepitude of no further consequence than as it shows that a man has not yet been relieved effectually; and the activity bestowed on this impotent man of no higher value than as it demonstrated the completeness of his cure?'—would you think that such weak and aimless declamation required or merited a reply?

If, however, for the sake of others, an answer ought to be made, to what is said, though neither more wisely nor more fairly, upon the subject immediately before us, I presume it would be felt to be abundantly sufficient to say, that we have hitherto neither asserted nor intimated anything of the value of good works; that we have been endeavouring to rectify errors with respect to their proper cause and their proper effects; but that the view which we maintained was not derived from any disparagement of them,—that it would be equally true or false, whatever were their importance,—whether they were of great moment or of little,—whether they served to promote higher ends or were themselves an ultimate end; and that therefore all this talk

about their importance, is altogether beside any purpose of fair argument on the subject.

They who maintain that we are *justified by faith only*, and that to assert that we are justified by *faith and works* is a gross error, in which the period of justification is misstated, and the connexion between it and obedience misplaced, cannot be in any fairness represented as in this depreciating the value of good works. They, in this, assert nothing of their importance; they intimate nothing of their importance: they merely deny to them an office falsely assigned to them. They who say that such works are an evidence of *faith* or of *justification* which is by *faith*, when they speak thus of a legitimate use to be made of good works, cannot in any fairness be accused of asserting that these works serve no other. What their other uses are is to be hereafter shown. How far they are secured by this system is also a question for another time. And when that time arrives, I do not fear that I shall have much difficulty in showing, that the order established in Scripture is better fitted to secure good works, than that which human wisdom has always struggled to substitute for it: that God's humbling plan of forgiving man, to make him good, is not only more worthy of its Author, but founded upon sounder and larger views of human nature, and more effectual in securing obedience to the Divine will, than man's proud plan of becoming good, to obtain forgiveness.

Whether for the reasons that I have given, or for others, it matters little, but certain it is, that some, who are well affected to the objects proposed to be attained by tampering thus with the term *faith* have despaired of effecting them in this way, and have not scrupled to confess unequivocally,—“that the doctrine of St Paul is clear beyond a doubt; namely, that we are justified by faith, and that without works of any kind, even works of moral righteous-

ness.”—And is not this to concede the doctrine in question? By no means. The words are on the contrary quoted from one of its steady opponents. They make a large concession doubtless, but a larger qualification is appended. There is an effectual device in reserve, to nullify even this ample and express admission of the truth. For you will observe, that in this confession *justification* is spoken of simply. Now there are (we are told) “two sorts of justification spoken of by the Apostle, namely, a *first* and a *final justification*.”—“The first (and indeed that which is the chief subject of St Paul’s argument, when he treats of justification at all), is that by which the unconverted are admitted into the fellowship of Christ’s church, or made members of the Christian community: the *second*, whereby they, who are thus become Christians, shall after having duly qualified themselves for it, be put into possession of eternal life.” “The *first* is going on always; *now*, in this present time, as the Apostle expresses it. The *second* does not take place until the last day.”...“To the *first* nothing is necessary but faith without regard to works, even of morality...This is, therefore, the acceptance which is intended by St Paul, when he speaks so repeatedly as he does, of our *being justified by faith without the works of any law*. He means that *first* kind of justification or acceptance whereby converts, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether of his own or any succeeding times, should be admitted into the body of Christ’s visible church in this present world.”

Of all the strange perversions of Scripture to which this controversy has given birth, I am inclined to regard this representation of the *nature* and *extent* of *justification*, as the most extraordinary. I showed you in the proper place that *justification* means, generally, in Scripture, a *declaration of innocence* with respect to some law; and that God’s *justification* of sinners is His acknowledgment of *their innocence* with respect to His holy law: whence follow all the consequences

of innocence,—immunity from punishment, and full and unreserved acceptance. Now, if any one will call the solemn act of judgment by which, at the last day, God receives into their reward all who are then found in His Son, their *final justification*, there seems to be no impropriety in such a use of the term. I do not believe that that act is anywhere in Scripture so styled; but if it were felt convenient so to designate it, there could be no objection to doing so: except so far as the designation was made subservient to conveying a false notion of what is thus styled, their *first justification*—their *justification by faith in the REDEEMER*. That justification is,—as I have sufficiently established and often repeated,—the act of our Almighty Judge, whereby He accepts as righteous all whom faith in Christ hath made one with HIM. And when we detract, in any degree, from the completeness of this gracious act of amnesty and reconciliation, we are, however undesignedly, doing wrong to the infinite love which is its true source, and derogating from the all-sufficiency of that work which is its sole foundation. Every representation which ascribes to this justification any imperfections or reservations is, so far, an inadequate and a false one. But when it is proposed to reduce it to a participation in the outward privileges of Church communion, the misrepresentation amounts to a height that renders it hard to meet it seriously: it becomes so gross and flagrant as to make it matter of real amazement, how even the blindness of controversy could have been insensible to it. Why, *justification by faith* is spoken of perpetually in the New Testament; and whether you collect what it means from the demands of the law of God, which it satisfies⁹, or from the nature of that *justification by works*, to which it is equivalent^{*};—or from what is said of the change in the condition and feelings of those who are so justified¹⁰,—or from the

⁹ Rom. iii. 20, seqq.

^{*} See pp. 123, 124.

¹⁰ 1 Pet. i. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; Eph. ii. iii. 12; Heb. x. 19.

account given of God's mode of proceeding in justifying them¹¹—you will see how utterly without countenance from the Bible is any such limitation of its nature and extent.

I have been too large upon this subject already, and have too little time now remaining, to enter into the details which would be necessary to show, that all these modes of fixing the signification of this term, concur in establishing the meaning that I have so often already assigned to it. One of them, however, is so conclusive, and yet so brief,—so easily apprehended too, and retained,—that I cannot, even now, refrain from drawing your attention to it. It is that furnished by the way in which St Paul introduces my text, to which I have, for other purposes, before adverted. Having established the guilt both of Jew and Gentile, he infers that these violators of the divine law cannot be justified by it,—that “by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in His sight.” He goes on to show, however, that though sinners cannot be justified in this way, yet God's wisdom and goodness have devised another mode whereby they may be justified:—for that *the righteousness of God without the law is manifested—even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ, which is unto all and upon all them that believe*; and that thus, though *all have sinned*, yet are sinners *justified freely, by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus*. And after a further setting forth of this *free justification*, and of the *propitiation* which makes God *just*, when he thus *justifies the ungodly*, he expressly declares, “that a man is justified *by faith*, without the deeds of the law.”

The course of his reasoning is clear. But my concern here with the passage is this—that any one who looks at it must see, that, to give it coherency, it is absolutely necessary that we ascribe the same meaning to *justification* throughout.

¹¹ Rom. iv. 3–5.

JUSTIFICATION *by the deeds of the law*, and JUSTIFICATION *by faith*, are plainly in it, not two different things, but the same thing effected in two different ways. That innocence, therefore, which would be the result of a righteous fulfilment of God's law,—which man cannot possess, from his moral inability to render to the law its demands—that is precisely what becomes his under the Gospel, *by faith*;—*his iniquities are forgiven* (as the following passage distinctly declares), *his sin is imputed*; *righteousness is imputed to him without works, his faith being counted for righteousness*.

That this is the view of our Church, concerning the nature and extent of *justification by faith*, will appear to any one simply upon a fair consideration of the eleventh Article, and without going beyond it. The title of that article is, “Of the Justification of Man;” and in setting the doctrine forth, in the body of the Article, *we are counted righteous before God*, is used instead of, *we are justified*, and as synonymous with it. And whether you regard the interchange of phrases as the result of a design to convey distinctly the views of the Church upon the nature of *justification*; or as made unconsciously, from the equivalence of the forms of expression in the minds of the framers of the Articles; the effect of the substitution is the same in determining their views. And this is enough, without pressing any other proof of the same point which the next Articles supply.

In what a variety of forms this view of *justification* is set forth in the Homilies is too well known, even to the most cursory readers of that volume, to require any detailed citation. Take a single brief one—“So that Christ is now the righteousness of all them that do truly believe in Him. He for them paid their ransom by His death. He for them fulfilled the law in His life. So that in Him, and by Him, every true Christian man may be called a fulfiller of the law, inasmuch as what their infirmity lacked, Christ's justice [i. e. righteousness] supplied.”

Such is the language of the Reformers of the Church of England. And in her best and purest days, her sons did not shrink from maintaining the same precious truths, and in language no less strong and explicit. Hear, for example, the memorable words in which Richard Hooker has recorded his confession of this foundation of the Believer's hopes.

"Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in Him. In Him God findeth us, if we be faithful, for by faith we are incorporated into Christ. Then, although in ourselves we be altogether sinful and unrighteous; yet even the man which is impious in himself—full of iniquity, full of sin—him being found in Christ, through faith, and having his sin remitted through repentance, him God beholdeth with a gracious eye; putteth away his sin by not imputing it; taketh away the punishment due thereto by pardoning it; and accepteth him in Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous as if he had himself fulfilled all that was commanded him in the law. Shall I say, more perfectly righteous than if himself had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith, *God made Him which knew no sin to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him*. Such are we, in the sight of God the Father, as is the very Son of God himself*."

I have quoted this eloquent passage, not to derive authority from it, nor even as adopting it to the letter; but simply to show, what intrepid plainness of speech was then employed on this momentous subject; and what intense energy of expression was deemed not inappropriate to it, by one whose sobriety of judgment was not among the least of his high gifts. And I abstain from multiplying such citations, because I should be sorry to give any countenance to the supposition, that I desire to make this discussion a warfare of great names. To the Bible, in a question of Scrip-

* 'Discourse of Justification,' § 6.

tural truth—to the Articles, Homilies, and Liturgy, in any question concerning the principles of our Church—I desire to confine myself. I rarely wander from them to other authorities. And I should be very anxious to avoid referring to any other authorities, however high, in such a way as to countenance the mistake that they stand upon a level with those as the ultimate court of appeal upon all such questions.

Having now supported the direct proof which I gave of this important doctrine,—by showing that the statements of it which are found in the Bible, and those which are made by our Church admit of no other than the natural meaning—I should desire to pass to the consideration of *the moral effects of faith* which I have so long been obliged to postpone. But there are other difficulties connected with the doctrine first to be removed, and other objections of somewhat a different kind to be answered. And these I propose to consider, when I next have an opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON VI.

ON THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY.

Quamquam vero inuisa sit multis sententia *fide absque operibus*, vel *sola fide justificari credentes*, declarant multorum in nos non tam calumniosa quam impia scripta, nos autem nihilominus constanter asserimus *fide absque operibus* vel *sola fide* justificari credentes.....

BULLINGER. *De gratia Dei justificante nos propter Christum per solam fidem absque operibus bonis, fide interim exuberante in opera bona.*

SERMON VI.

ROMANS III. 28.

Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.

HAVING explained, from the Bible, the *nature* both of *faith* and of *justification*, I proceeded, you will remember, from the same source, to point out their *connexion*. I stated the true Scriptural Doctrine of *justification by faith only*, and gave you some account of the leading arguments upon which it rests. And finally, I confirmed the direct proof of the Doctrine which they supply, by showing the entire failure of the most important attempts that have ever been made to set up a different doctrine of *justification* in its place.

Having done so much, if this truth were one of common interest or of moderate importance, I should certainly hold, that enough had been done for its security; and I should not seek to engage attention further, for those minor assaults to which every truth is liable, and which no truth nearly affecting man's interests, here or hereafter, has ever been long before his unquiet mind without provoking. There is, on the one hand, some danger lest protracting a discussion of this kind, should exhaust the attention upon which its usefulness must mainly depend. And, on the other hand, it may be thought, that there is some reason to fear, that fixing the attention long upon an inquiry, which, from its

nature, must rather deal in the establishment of truth than the application of it, may have a tendency to lead us to regard the former as an ultimate end ;—that it may dispose the mind to acquiesce in the establishment of the truth as the final aim of religion, overlooking or thinking lightly, of those further ends to which truth itself is but subsidiary—the part that it has to perform, in the discipline and improvement of man—in expanding, raising, and regulating the affections—purifying the heart, and elevating our fallen nature.

I am not insensible to either of these dangers ; though I do not suffer either to deter me from proceeding to complete, in the best manner that I am able, the investigation which has occupied us so long. I cannot allow myself to fear that the interest which this momentous doctrine is fitted, upon the bare statement of it, to excite, it is not also able to sustain, through even a longer investigation than the present. It seems impossible that any mind, at all raised above the ~~plane of sense~~, can contemplate the Gospel plan of redemption, which this doctrine proclaims, without a measure of the interest which it may fairly claim, were it only as a matter of speculation. Even those who feel little concern for the undying interests which it secures, cannot regard it, one would think, merely as a wise contrivance for overcoming difficulties, without wonder. In the Gospel, God is shown forth as extending free forgiveness to sinners without impeachment of His truth, or of His purity ; without encouragement to sin, or tolerance of it. The Divine mercy and love to offenders are seen, not reconciled to justice merely, but ordained by it. All the attributes of the Most High are there,—those from which our sinful nature shrinks with aversion and fear, no less than those to which, at times, it turns in uncertain and transient hope—all alike are there,—without strife or opposition, without compromise or accommodation—but all alike—in full consent and unimpaired vigour,—harmonized in the salvation of guilty man ! It

would seem impossible that any one could hear of a plan which embraces such inexhaustible wonders, without feeling that it merits, even as a matter of speculative interest, all the labour that may be required to explain its nature and to establish its truth.

But there are, I trust, not a few among those who hear me, who feel that they have in this Doctrine a nearer and a deeper interest; who not only contemplate the Doctrine of the Cross of Christ, with amazement and awe, as *the wisdom of God* and *the power of God*; but with minds awake to its connexion with their own eternal happiness, and with hearts subdued to love by the ineffable love which it displays. Such hearers will take a more cordial concern than belongs to any speculative inquiry, in all investigations connected with this sure charter of the sinner's hopes; and more especially in those which have it for their object to restore it to scriptural simplicity—to free it from adulteration—and to defend it from the assaults of its enemies. To them, no means will appear superfluous which promise to conduce to the purity and the stability of a truth, to which all truth—even all revealed truth—must be felt to be subordinate in interest. For surely, until revelation has instructed a sinner how he may be reconciled to God, whom he has offended, all the knowledge that it brings, however high and wonderful it be, is but, at the best, matter of mournful curiosity to him.

As to the danger of fixing attention exclusively and long, upon what in itself forms but means to a higher end, that is certainly a danger, in some degree, inseparable from every detailed examination of the evidences for religious or moral truth. And it is likely too, I may add, to be greatest, just in the case in which the necessity for such an examination is the most imperative: where the truth is most assailed, or most corrupted, or most abused; where it is of such difficulty as to require minute investigation, and

of such importance as to deserve it. It would be but a bad use of this just reflection, and a bad mode of escaping this risk, however real, to abandon the defence of truth, or to neglect the exposure of error; and hardly, if at all, better, to perform either task cursorily and insufficiently. Suppose the danger real, there are ways of guarding against it. Suppose the injury actually incurred, there are means of remedying it. But there is no way of supplying the efficacy of divine truth by any human invention; nor are there any means of rendering man's corruptions of the truth innoxious in operation. We cannot hold, doubtless, that even Divine truth is of itself necessarily efficacious, without losing sight of that important part of it which declares the corruption of our nature, and the necessity of spiritual influences to dispose us to receive it, and of spiritual aid to enable us to act upon it. But on the other hand, to hold that its instrumentality can be dispensed with, or its place supplied, or even to think lightly of its intermixture with man's devices, is a sure indication, if not of absolute infidelity, at least of that insidious latitudinarianism which is less consistent, and hardly less presumptuous and destructive than infidelity itself.

Upon every view of the case, then, I feel far easier under some apprehensions, that I am dwelling too painfully and too long upon objections to this important Doctrine, than I should be, if I thought there was reason to fear, that I had dismissed any with insufficient notice. I had far rather commit the error of giving undue importance to feeble assaults upon this truth, than the opposite one, of neglecting to repel any which might, in the least, impair the cordial confidence with which it is embraced by a single Believer by whom I may be heard.

When this Doctrine is presented upon its proper evidence, it may be, and in fact it has been, assailed in the fol-

lowing easily distinguishable ways. The plain interpretation of the multiplied passages in which it seems to be so distinctly expressed, may be denied, and a different meaning assigned to them. Or, this sense which they are thus made to speak may be independently derived from other parts of Scripture. Or, lastly, without attempting either of these objects definitely, difficulties of more or less weight may be thrown out, which are supposed in some way to invalidate the doctrine to be impugned.

I have already intimated that I regard objections of the first of these classes, as in their nature far more important than the others. In fact, while the authority of the passages, which seem so unequivocally to declare the Doctrine of *justification by faith only*, is acknowledged, it appears fruitless to proceed a step in the attempt to overthrow that Doctrine, without first endeavouring to show that these passages will bear some meaning different from that which they seem so distinctly to speak. If this attempt be moderately successful, the other modes of proceeding may doubtless afford it strong confirmation. But if it wholly fail, the others united must be insufficient to overthrow a doctrine, which will then remain distinctly and authoritatively taught in the Word of God.

Now I think I am warranted in asserting, that such is the present position of this question. For, I think I established, in my last address to you from this place, the impossibility of assigning, with any show of reason, a new sense to any of the leading terms of the well-known enunciations of this truth. And if we have in Scripture distinct and reiterated publications of this Doctrine, we may rest assured that no other parts of Scripture can contradict these, however we may fail to reconcile them; and that no difficulties with which the doctrine may be pressed can be of any real weight, whatever apparent importance they may have in our eyes.

But it may be said, 'Is not this true of every clear doc-

rine of Holy Scripture? And if it can be shown that it is clearly taught in any part of the New Testament, that *works* and *faith* are alike concerned in man's *justification*, is not the principle equally availing to show, that the passages which appear to prove the doctrine of justification by *faith only* must have been erroneously interpreted? At least, will not the principle fully warrant all who desire to rest in a state of indecision upon this contested point, and to forbear from pronouncing decisively upon the one side or upon the other? Be it so. But then let it be remembered that it is necessary, in order to warrant this indecision, that whatever evidence we have for the interpretation of those texts from which the doctrine of *justification by faith only* is derived, the same, or something like the same evidence, we should have for the interpretation of those passages by which it is to be overthrown; the same evidence for the meaning assigned to them, if they are made to contradict it expressly; if to contradict it but inferentially, the same evidence for their application.

Now, when you think of the multiplied and varied evidence which we have had to prove that this Doctrine is contained in the Bible, you will hardly, I think, expect to find that those who maintain that the Bible contains the opposite Doctrine, can sustain their assertion by proofs equally conclusive. For you must recollect that this Doctrine is not merely founded upon explicit and repeated texts of Holy Writ; but that it has been shown that the natural and obvious meaning of these texts is the meaning required by the detailed expositions of the Gospel plan of redemption which are elsewhere given; by the arguments from which the texts are inferences; by the objections with which at its first promulgation the Doctrine was assailed; and by the answers made to these objections, by the writer whose meaning we want to ascertain. It can hardly be thought an unreasonable prejudice which will not allow those who have

examined and approved such a mass of evidence for any position, to expect to find the contrary position sustained by evidence equally satisfactory.

And, in fact, when we come to look at the passages which are put forward as furnishing such evidence, we find that they consist chiefly of texts which establish some truth, that, rightly understood, is in no respect inconsistent with this Doctrine.—Thus texts of Scripture are accumulated to prove the important truth, that in the solemn act of final judgment, which is to close this dispensation of mercy, every man shall be recompensed *according to his works*. With what design such passages are brought forward, it is not difficult to see; but what purpose they are fitted in fair reasoning to serve, it would not be so easy to show. Where lies the inconsistency between these two important truths? Between the truth which teaches that God forgives and accepts us freely, for the sake of the propitiation which He himself has provided;—that He does so when His Spirit has so convinced us of our sin, of our condemnation, and of our helplessness, that we lay hold with gratitude and joy of the way of escape freely offered to us; that His forgiveness and acceptance of us attend with certainty upon this our *faith*,—between this truth, I say, and the truth, that men are finally distinguished at the last day, according as they have rendered obedience to God's commands or withheld it, what inconsistency can be shown? If we knew these, upon the same authority, as separate truths, the right inference to draw from both would be, that God enables those upon whom He bestows *faith* to maintain the course of obedience which He has prescribed; and that those who do not possess that principle do not render obedience to His commandments.

But the truth, that genuine *faith* will produce genuine *obedience*; and that this free justification of sinners is itself through faith, efficacious in promoting *God's will concerning them, even their sanctification*,—this truth, I say, combines those other truths into one coherent scheme. And that this

is held and maintained by those who hold that we are justified *by faith only*, I need hardly assert here, where I have so often stated it. They hold, with the venerable framers of our Articles, that those whom God thus draws to His Son, "be justified freely; they be made sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of His only begotten Son Jesus Christ; they walk religiously in good works; and at length by God's mercy they attain everlasting felicity." Is there in this process any incongruity, which affords any colour for the representation that what Revelation teaches concerning the principles of God's righteous judgment at the last day, and the mode of conducting it, is in any respect opposed to the Doctrine of JUSTIFICATION *by faith only*?

But no false reasoning that relies upon the carelessness with which men hear, and the precipitancy with which they judge, in matters of religion, will be ever without a measure of success to justify the calculation. And this application of the common sophism, which establishes, with ostentatious pains, a position perfectly harmonious with the one that it is brought to overthrow, supplies a notable confirmation of the remark. When it is seen that such pains are taken by the opponents of this Doctrine, to establish a truth which is *already generally acknowledged*, it will be presumed by many that so much labour would not be expended, if the truth were not one of great importance to the argument. And then, if loose statements of either or both truths can exhibit any apparent discrepancy between them, it is enough. Careless hearers will gladly take it as real, and as amounting just to what the argument requires that it should amount to, rather than engage in the task of inquiring into its true value.

This is an unfair mode of warfare, which has been employed in this case to an extent that forms something like a parallel for the well-known use of it in the Socinian controversy. The class of arguments, which I have just now noticed are a sufficient illustration of it; but it appears still more offensively, and, if possible, more unfairly, when the

texts which enjoin a holy life and conversation upon Christians are urged in opposition to this Doctrine: intelligibly conveying, and being designed to do so, that, according to it, obedience to the will of God and conformity to the life of Christ are matters of little moment or none.

So far as this slander is directed against the professors of the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, it has received already the proper reply. They have lived it down. As far at least as it is reasonable to expect, that anything which has in itself the principle of life so strongly as slander has should perish from want of food, it has, I think, died out. And whenever and wherever it revives, it may be met fearlessly by a fair comparison of the actual effects of this doctrine and of the opposite doctrine, so far as they are cognizable by man. To God, the language, not of the lips only, but of the heart of every true Believer is, "Behold, I am vile, what shall I answer thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth¹." But to self-righteous opponents of His truth, who seek to wound it, by vilifying those who maintain it, I do not know that it is forbidden to us to say, that this Doctrine has no reason to fear the result of a fair comparison of what those who hold it have been enabled to do and to suffer in the cause of Christ, with any sacrifices or any labours which have been the fruits of any other view of His Gospel.

The calumny, however, is perhaps more frequently levelled directly at the Doctrine itself. And if it be meant that it does not *profess* to enforce and to secure obedience to God's will, a bare statement of the whole Doctrine is sufficient to show the groundlessness of the charge. If it be meant that it does not actually make a sufficient provision for this purpose, the assertion (so far as it does not refer to the matter of fact already noticed), is to be examined hereafter; when we come to the second division of the *effects*

¹ Job xl. 4.

of this principle of *faith*. All arguments, even against the best established truths, deserve serious and patient examination. But in general those who bring such charges against this truth seem to rely more upon other weapons than upon argument. The design seems to be to take advantage of the prejudice, springing often from a commendable source, which is excited by such charges, whether well or ill sustained. The reasoning to sustain them is often therefore a matter of secondary importance; and ends, upon examination, in something like this—‘If you do not assign the same place to good works, in your religious system, that they have in ours, it is plain that you can feel but little solicitude to establish their necessity.’ Or, ‘If your representation of the Scripture plan of salvation does not exact good works for the ends, and enforce them upon the motives, that ours does, it is plain that it makes no effectual provision for securing them.’ This reasoning is rather imperious than convincing. But the fit time for discussing it will be, as I said, when we come to the consideration of the moral effects of this doctrine. And as I have often before said, I do not fear ~~that, when that time arrives, I shall have much difficulty in~~ proving, from all that we know with most certainty of the constitution of our own minds, that the place which the wisdom of God has assigned to good works in His plan of redemption, is better fitted to secure their performance, than that to which human wisdom has always struggled to raise them.

But it is said, ‘Have we not at least the undoubted authority of St James for assigning to works this place in man’s *justification*? Does he not denounce expressly the error of describing a man as *justified by faith only*, and expressly assert that Abraham was *justified by works*?’

As the passage alluded to forms, doubtless, the Scrip-

tural strength of the opponents of the Doctrine of *justification by faith only*, it merits a careful consideration. I must first say, however, that, even if no probable meaning can be found for it, but that which makes it directly contradict that doctrine, it would seem to furnish but a very insufficient force for the overthrow of a principle collected from such various declarations of Holy Writ, and confirmed by proofs so multiplied and cogent. But, it may be asked, 'If we cannot assign any consistent meaning to this language which will reconcile it to the principles already established, what is to be done? Shall we imitate the rashness of that great Reformer, who cut the knot, by denying the inspiration of the Epistle of St James?' If this question be asked, I reply, that I do not admire the hardihood of that illustrious man, and that I should not follow it myself or recommend it to the imitation of others. But I should in the case supposed adopt a middle course. 'This, certainly,' I should say, 'this certainly cannot be the meaning of an inspired writer. Some cause which I cannot discern or remove prevents me from penetrating into his real sense: I will therefore leave the passage, as I am obliged to leave some others in the Bible, until God shall please to make manifest that which He now sees fit to conceal.'

I do not, however, think that we are in a position which renders this necessary; for if we first fix the circumstances under which St James was speaking, and then make a legitimate use of those circumstances in determining the force of what he has said, it will, I think, appear that his authority cannot be fairly cited against the doctrine of *justification by faith only*.

I need hardly remind you, I presume, how dependent we are upon a knowledge of the circumstances under which they were spoken, for qualifying or explaining some large and positive declarations in the Bible. A man ignorant of the true principles of religion might imagine that we have the

express authority of our Lord for ascribing to alms-giving a proper power of purifying the heart, in the words, "Give alms of that ye have, and behold, all things are clean unto you²:"—nay, that His command, "Sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven³," warrants us in assigning to such good deeds the power of securing to us eternal rewards: and this, in the case of the worldly and unbelieving, for to such He was in both instances addressing Himself.

One better taught would know that it was impossible that the Lord could thus contradict the doctrine distinctly preached by Himself, and the whole current of the Word of God; and would find in the circumstances under which He was speaking, a satisfactory mode of clearing up the difficulty. 'You are not,' he would say, 'to treat our Lord here as laying down any general principles concerning alms-giving. He is addressing a particular class in the one case, —a particular individual in the other. In all fairness, what He says is to be strictly limited to those to whom it is directly addressed. And not only so, but in interpreting its meaning, we ought, in prudence, to make use of all that we know of their circumstances and character.—Now, we know that they were both idolators of mammon. We know, upon His own testimony, that there was no length of oppression, violence, and wrong, to which the Pharisees (to whom the first exhortation was addressed) did not resort from the love of money: and the young ruler (to whom the other invitation was offered) showed soon by his mode of answering the appeal, how much more he was a *lover of riches than a lover of God*. Now that Christ should publish to these, that if they truly turned to God there was full forgiveness and full acceptance for them with Him, would be but to preach His Gospel of repentance and remission of sins; which we too may do, at all times, and to all. But that He,

² Luke xi. 41.

³ Mark x. 21.

a discerner of spirits, should see the condition of those whom He addressed, so as to know that they could only escape from the thralldom of this inordinate passion, in effectually turning to God,—that He, to whom all hearts were open, should know and name the particular outward acts which were sufficient to show their emancipation from its tyranny complete, and therefore their conversion accomplished,—this is plainly peculiar to Him and to them. It does not warrant us in proposing a similar test, in any case which we may conceive similar; much less, in deriving from His language any general principle applicable to all cases:—except that principle which is elsewhere so distinctly set forth,—that *him that cometh to Him, He will in nowise cast out*⁴.

This mode of fixing the meaning of the passages in question would, I think, strike any candid mind as the proper proceeding in this case, or any similar one. And I only desire that the principles of the process may be borne in mind, and fairly applied to the case before us.—It appears, then, easy to show, that the persons with whom St James had to do, were in error in believing that they possessed the principle of *faith*; that they were in error with respect to the true nature of that principle; and, in consequence, in error with respect to the true meaning of the Doctrine of Justification by faith which they were abusing.

That they were destitute of the principle of which they believed themselves, or professed to believe themselves, possessed, seems abundantly evident. For you may remark first, the language with which St James commences, “My brethren, what profiteth it, if a man *say* that he has faith, and have not works⁵?” No language can more distinctly intimate that the Apostle is dealing with a false profession of the principle than—“What profiteth it, if a man *say* that he has faith?” even if what follows, “and have not

⁴ John vi. 37.

⁵ James ii. 14.

works," did not afford a proof to all who know the truth, that the profession was a false one. He is made in our English Bible to go on to say, "Can faith save him?" And though I do not suppose there would be any danger of mistaking his meaning, even in this mode of expressing it; I think that upon looking at the original you will be of opinion, that his own language more exactly marks it, and that it would be better rendered,—“Can *this* faith save him?” or, “Can *his* faith save him?” And this would be enough to make us acquainted with the characters he was addressing.

But the matter is set in a still clearer light by two illustrations which he subjoins. The first is undoubtedly a case in which there is a false pretence to the principle of benevolence.—*If a brother or sister have need, &c.*—and this is to illustrate the pretence made to *faith* by those who *say* that they have it, and who have not works. And secondly, a parallel is intimated between the principle which they really possess, and the belief of devils, which is necessarily destitute of the characteristic of true *faith*, and inspires not confidence but terror.

Combine these circumstances, and give them only their fair weight, and I think you cannot doubt that the persons whom St James addressed were careless or immoral professors, who were destitute of *faith*, though they pretended to it; and who, in fact, mistook that speculative conviction of religious truths which may be arrived at by the natural exercise of the understanding, for that *trust* in the Redeemer, which is grounded upon such convictions, but which is the work of the Spirit upon the heart; and who, furthermore, thought of *faith*, that it was a principle which, not in the Believer's *justification*, only, but at every period of his course, stood *alone*, not leading to a desire to obey and supplying strength for obedience, but in all cases to be pleaded as a substitute for it. So that they who sought to be *justified* by

works, and they only, were bound by their principles to render obedience to God's commands; while, on the other hand, those who were *justified by faith* were by their principles exonerated from the obligation of obeying Him.

There was therefore, as I said, a two-fold error to be corrected; one with respect to the individual himself, and the other with respect to the Doctrine. The error, with respect to the individual, was that he possessed the principle of *faith*. The error, with respect to the Doctrine, was closely connected with this—it was a mistake of the true nature and certain effects of *faith*, and the true nature of *justification by faith*. St James addresses himself to the correction of these errors in the practical way, which is so common in the Bible; not laying down formally the exact doctrine upon the subject, but showing, by instances, the true nature of *justifying faith*, and the true nature of *justification by faith*, so far as it was necessary to correct this gross error upon the subject. And throughout, as is common in the Bible, he uses the language of those whose errors he was combating—calls the principle which they called “faith” by the same name; and adopts, too, their language concerning *justification by faith*, without a formal exposure of their misuse of terms. Read all that he says, remembering what has been just remarked, viz., that he employs throughout, the language of those whose errors he is seeking to remove; using *faith* to express their notion of it—not the true one; and, in the same way, suffering *justification by faith* to stand for their false view of the process,—read what he says, remembering this; and you will see that it really contains nothing which you might not expect to hear from St Paul, under the same circumstances.

Suppose that St Paul,—having preached the Doctrine of *justification by faith only*, in all the freeness and fulness in which I have represented him to have preached it,—saw some of those who professed to embrace it, dishonouring

it in their lives, and pleading their gross misconceptions of it in defence of the license which they allowed themselves, would you have any right to feel surprised at finding that he addressed them thus: 'What profit, my brethren, can there be in a profession of *faith* which is contradicted by a man's conduct? Can such *faith* save him? What would you collect concerning the benevolence of those whom you heard addressing a brother in distress with kindly talk, but carefully abstaining from affording that assistance which his wants required, which their circumstances allowed, and which true benevolence would certainly have bestowed? Doubtless, that their profession was a false one, and that the principle had no existence in their hearts. Even so conclude concerning what you call your *faith*, when you find that the acts to which *faith* naturally leads, when genuine, have no place in your conduct. And, in fact, if you examine the principle which you mistake for *faith*, you will find that it is no more than that speculative belief which devils have, and which but augments their terror; not that comfortable assurance of reconciliation with God, through the blood of His Son, by which those who are renewed in the spirit of their minds are enabled to serve him without fear.—But you refuse to show your *faith* by your works; and think that works are only to be required of those who are justified by works; that to be justified by faith only, is to be relieved from all obligation of rendering obedience to God's commandments. Nay, then, if that be so, every man who is justified, is justified by works, and no man by faith only. Abraham, the father of the faithful, was justified by works; for he was called on to obey, where obedience was hardest to flesh and blood, and he promptly obeyed the call. In this he was, in your view of justification, justified by works; but those who know the nature of genuine faith, know that in this he only proved the truth of the declaration in the Bible, that he was justified by faith,—that he "believed God, and it was counted unto

him for righteousness."—JUSTIFICATION *by faith only*, in your sense of the proceeding, has never taken place, and it is impossible that it ever should; for it could only take place if God were deceived in the principle by which he justifies a sinner. If to be required by God to obey Him, and to render obedience to Him, when He demands it,—if this be *to be justified by works*, then he that is not *justified by works* has never been *justified by faith*. The separation between *faith* and *works*, in the justification of a sinner before God, is *a wholesome doctrine*, as well as *very full of comfort*. The divorce which you make between them, in the life of the Believer, is a vain imagination, which but shows a corrupt heart, a stranger to genuine *faith*, and a dark mind, in utter ignorance of the doctrine of *justification by faith*.'

That such an address from St Paul would be in nowise inconsistent with the doctrine which I have represented him to have preached, every one would acknowledge: and I trust that you will see, on comparing it with what St James has actually said, that there is no real difference between them. I have been obliged to expand considerably a part of the Apostle's language, in order to exhibit the train of thought which, I think, was in his mind. But this proceeding is, I hope, fully explained and vindicated, by what I first established concerning those whom he addressed, and by what I remarked of the mode in which he pursues his object. And to those who think these preliminary remarks well grounded, the paraphrase which I have given will, I trust, upon a little reflection, appear to be a fair representation of the Apostle's meaning, and to do no violence to his language. And, under this view of it, it is plain that this often-cited passage contains no objection of any kind to the Doctrine which some sanguine opponents have regarded it as overthrowing*.

* Note V.

This takes away all force from the second class of objections. And the two first classes being thus removed, the third remains rather a matter of curiosity than of any real importance. I should not propose to you, or to myself, such an employment,—even had we more time for it,—as a detailed examination of all the difficulties connected with this doctrine which perverted ingenuity, violent prejudice, or gross misconceptions of its nature, have from time to time, devised and propounded. This is not the best mode of confirming the convictions of its friends, or disarming the hostility of its enemies. Clear statements of the Doctrine are, for either end, far more efficacious and more practicable means. And under this impression, I shall only glance at a few difficulties which spring from confused views upon the subject, or which have a tendency to lead to them.

Some think that they have discovered that as we are *justified by faith*, and as *faith* is an act of the mind, we are really justified by *a work*, in such a sense as to render the dispute concerning *justification by faith*, and *justification by works*, purely a verbal one; while others, more alarmed by this reasoning than seems necessary, have hastened to obviate it, by concluding that as we are certainly not justified by *works*, and as *acts* are *works*, the *faith* by which we are justified is not an *act* of the mind. And the jealousy for the freeness of the Gospel, which has led to this questionable position in metaphysics, seems to be carried to its utmost length by a recent writer, who holds, that that freeness is as much impaired by making *faith* whatever it be, whether act, quality, or state of the mind, the instrument of *justification*, as by making a man justified by any or by all *the deeds of the law*; and who, therefore, infers, that with *justification*, properly speaking, *faith* has no connexion, as condition, preliminary, proportion, or qualification! And while this amiable and pious writer (for such, notwithstanding this extravagant refinement, every one must regard him) rejects this doctrine, as

requiring *too much* for justification, there are, I need not tell you, abundance of grave authorities who oppose it as exacting *too little*; and who, though not agreeing perfectly in the amount of the addition, or the rule by which it is to be determined, agree all in thinking that *some* addition is absolutely essential.

How far the medley of inconsistent objections which this doctrine has encountered, coming from extremes which seldom unite except when it is to be weakened or assailed, ought to have a tendency to confirm it, I will not stop to inquire. Doubtless, whether considered in their origin or their quality, it would seem that they ought to have this tendency in some degree; but in what degree, I will not attempt to fix; for I hope that what I have already said is sufficient to show that none of them is of any real weight.

Thus, as to the two first difficulties,—what I said of the part which *faith* really performs in a sinner's justification, (in reply to the question, *what is the peculiar excellence of faith?*) rightly considered, will be seen to afford materials for a satisfactory answer to both. I showed you then, that when Believers are justified *by faith, their faith being counted for righteousness*, their *faith* does not justify them as a part, small or great, of their righteousness; but as the appointed means of uniting them to Him who has chosen, as the name whereby He is to be called, the LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS⁶. And I attempted further to show that this is a fit appointment, even according to what we can see of it; for that if we are to be justified altogether by the merits of the Redeemer, and not in any degree by our own, then, cordial trust in Him, and a hearty renunciation of all trust in ourselves would seem to be the precise state of mind to which an efficacious interest in His merits ought to be annexed*. Now whether this be an *act* of the mind or not, would not seem of much importance; so long as it is so clearly fitted for its office in

⁶ Jer. xxiii. 6, xxxiii. 16.

* Sermon IV.

the free justification of sinners, and so clearly distinguished from those acts—"our own works and deservings"—whereby justification is obtained, *not of grace, but of debt*. For it is plain that, in all that St Paul says to exclude *works* from a share in our justification, he does not speak of works in general, but of those works which, being enjoined by God's law, natural or revealed, have a proper tendency to justify man.—No one who reads what he has written on this subject, with any tolerable candour, can imagine that he had in view a distinction so little to his purpose as one between active and passive states of mind or body. It never seems to have occurred to him that by such miserable refinements a question could be raised, as to whether Believers receive justification *freely*, when they receive it by their *faith*. And he leaves the case to the common sense and natural feelings of those to whom he wrote, without engaging their attention, or his own, in any artificial difficulties. God had established a particular covenant with the Jewish people, by express revelation; and a more general one with the whole human race, by bestowing upon all men a nature capable of appreciating the moral differences of actions—a faculty which, anticipating or expressing His righteous judgment, approves or disapproves of human conduct. Under both covenants there was the notion of duty and sin, of reward and punishment, of merit and demerit; but under neither could such *faith* pretend to merit or claim reward. Neither from the constitution of human nature, nor from the provisions of God's express law, could those be regarded as meritorious who confessedly had failed to perform their duty, and who confessedly had incurred the penalties of disobedience. Their trust in the obedience of another and in the sufferings of another, might become, by another revelation, at once a clear duty, and effectual means of deliverance. But that, even then, this acknowledgment, which adds to an abjuration of *all merit* in ourselves, an ascription of *all merit* to another, left a reserve of *some merit*

to the acknowledgment itself, seems never to have crossed the Apostle's mind. He seems satisfied, that all who knew either the Jewish law, or the law of nature, would see that God, in annexing *justification* to *faith*, was justifying *gratuitously*; that He was not paying wages, but making a free donation. This is enough for his purpose; and this is surely equally true, whether *faith* be or be not an *act* of the mind—a question with which he seems never to have been disturbed, nor need we. It is a question which belongs to metaphysicians, and which may be safely left to them: for St Paul's purpose at least, it is plainly a matter of perfect indifference how they determine it*.

The third difficulty opposes this doctrine as impairing the *freeness* of the Gospel; and proposes, therefore, to regard all as justified, whether they believe or disbelieve. The difference is, that those who believe undergo by *faith* a moral change, which is essential to fit them for happiness, and that being thus prepared for happiness they are admitted to the enjoyment of it: while they who do not believe undergo no such change; they remain unfitted for happiness, and are therefore excluded from it.

I have no intention of exposing all the inconsistencies with himself and with divine truth into which the support of this strange scheme leads its author. And as to the scheme itself, the arguments which I have employed to prove the instrumentality of *faith* in *justification*, bear so directly upon it, that they may excuse me from the task of reviewing it formally now. While as regards the fear, lest this instrumentality should impair the freeness of the Gospel, to which this extreme theory appears to owe its origin, I have already, I hope, said enough, to show that it is a fear by which the Apostle Paul seems to have been but little affected. He, without any such apprehension, distinctly declares the Doc-

* Note W.

trine, in the very form in which the objection seems most obviously to apply to it; describing God as *counting faith for righteousness*; and after having informed us that Abraham's faith was *reckoned for righteousness*⁷, he describes the same instrumentality of faith in the case of all his children, not merely as consistent with the perfect freeness which is the characteristic of the Gospel, but as unquestionably securing that freeness, "therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace⁸." And to take another instance out of many,—in the Epistle to the Galatians, in which the freeness of justification is *unanimously asserted*, he describes the knowledge of this dependence of justification upon faith as a motive for embracing the faith, in terms that seem to allow of no evasion: "We who are Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, *knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, THAT we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law*⁹."

But those who have accompanied me so far in this investigation cannot be at a loss for arguments either against the reasoning of the writer or the conclusion to which it leads. And I have adverted to an objection which seems so little likely to mislead many, chiefly as it affords so signal and instructive an example of the danger of looking for novelty in the fundamentals of religion. Minds of a tender and elevated cast are peculiarly liable to the danger of being sent in search of something new, from that impatience of common notions in theology, which such minds are more than others under the temptation of indulging. But it is a perilous and most unprofitable pursuit. It is looking for novelty where little new is to be had that is not also erroneous, and where we run grievous risk of losing in the chase what is of real value. Indeed, at the very outset of

⁷ Rom. iv. 3.⁸ Rom. iv. 16.⁹ Gal. ii. 15.

such a quest, we put out of sight the land-marks which modesty and prudence alike enjoin us to keep in view in religious inquiries, and so are liable to wander widely without any means of being reminded how far we have strayed. This scheme, which proposes to limit *the effects of faith* to its moral influence upon the human mind, has really nothing in the way of reasoning to support it, of a higher order than the arguments by which the Socinian is able to show the absurdity of ascribing to the sacrifice, which is *the object of faith*, any other than the same moral efficacy. It is a scheme opposed throughout by God's Word, and only to be maintained by doing the most open violence to the plain sense of numberless passages in the Bible; yet it is embraced with good faith, and strenuously maintained, by a man whose writings exhibit everywhere deep reverence for the Word of God, a careful study of it, and extensive acquaintance with it*. This contains an important lesson, and is fruitful in matter for profitable reflection to you, my brethren; and it is therefore that I have occupied you with it so long.

The last, the oldest, and the most popular objection against this Doctrine has already been fully answered, so far as it proposes to substitute the doctrine of justification *by faith and works*, for this doctrine of justification *by faith only*. It has a place here, therefore, only so far as it arraigns the moral tendency of the latter doctrine,—asserting that it weakens or removes all moral restraint, and so leaves man to indulge in that licentiousness which is so natural to his carnal heart. This objection I defer considering now, partly because I have already noticed incidentally some of the mistakes upon which it is grounded; but chiefly because I think it will find the best reply in the examination, upon which I now mean to enter, of *the moral effects of faith upon character and conduct*.

* Note X.

No one can have formed right apprehensions of the difficulty and extent of that part of my subject, and at the same time entertain hopes of treating it worthily. I certainly cherish no such vain expectation. But I do hope that I shall then be able to show that *we do not make void the law through faith, but establish the law:*¹⁰ that the system which I have endeavoured to explain and support supplies motives to obedience which no legal system could supply; that it calls into exercise, develops, and perfects, principles over which law did not exert any power; that, while it ensures, to all to whom it gives the spirit of adoption, *an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled and that fadeth not away, eternal in the heavens*, it is exercising upon them a moral agency, which is fitting them to enjoy it: that it is the great instrument in the hands of the Spirit of God to effect the renovation of our fallen nature, which, if it be not the only intelligible end of revelation, is doubtless, with respect to us, its highest and most important end.

¹⁰ Rom. iii. 31.

SERMON VII.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH.

Conspiciuntur in hac victimâ justitia et ira Dei adversus peccatum, et immensa misericordia erga nos, et amor in Filio erga genus humanum. Tanta est justitiæ severitas, ut non sit facta reconciliatio, nisi pœna persolveretur. Tanta est iræ magnitudo ut æternus Pater non sit placatus, nisi deprecatione et morte Filii. Tanta misericordia, ut Filius pro nobis datus sit. Tantus amor in Filio erga nos, ut hanc veram et ingentem iram in se derivaverit. Harum maximarum et arcanarum rerum considerationem in pectoribus accendito tu, FILI DEI, Spiritu tuo Sancto, ut vere expavescamus agnitione iræ, et rursus vera consolatione erigamur, et te in omni æternitate celebremus.

CONF. SAXON. [*De rem. Pecc. et Just.*]

SERMON VII.

I JOHN V. 4.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

WHEN I was passing from an account of the *nature of faith* to the consideration of its *effects*, I proposed, you will remember, to adopt, in treating of them, the simple and obvious division, of its *effects* upon the sinner's *state before God*, and its *effects* upon his *character*. Upon the former of these I have already said all that I think it important at present to say. I have shown from Scripture the true nature and extent of *justification*; have stated the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, in the simplicity and distinctness in which it stands in the Word of God, and in the formularies of our Church; and, finally, have supported this statement by proof, in as much detail as I thought it necessary or useful to adduce proof here. I proceed now, therefore, to the second head of this branch of my subject, the only part that according to my original plan remains to be considered: and I propose to inquire briefly, how far we can discover in this principle, a provision for promoting God's further designs concerning those upon whom he bestows it; how far we can find in it means to secure their conformity to His will, to regulate their conduct and mould their affections according to the standard of duty which He has assigned them—that pure rule of life by which He leads

them, from grace to grace, and from strength to strength, through the successive stages of moral advancement which His wisdom has appointed, to fit them for the immortality of which His mercy has made them heirs.

If the doctrine of spiritual influences were less full and precise than it is—if the work of the sanctification of Believers were only referred in some loose and general way to the operation of the Spirit of God,—it would be needless to stop to point out the entire consistency of such an inquiry as this, with a humble and hearty conviction of the truth of that important doctrine. Such general statements would appear to be sufficiently satisfied, by the distinct recognition already made, of the Spirit's agency in implanting the principle of *faith* in the heart; and would seem to leave us at liberty to trace to the natural operation of that principle all the good that is performed by the Believer, or wrought in him. But the true doctrine of Spiritual influences goes much further. The Bible is express in referring the sanctification, which it promises to those whom God justifies, to the direct exercise of the power of His everlasting Spirit continued to the very end of their mortal career; distinctly ascribing every advance in holiness which Believers make—every act of obedience that they perform—every Christian grace that they acquire—all *holy desires* by which they are animated—all *good counsels* by which they are directed—all *good works* that they bring forth—ALL to the continued exercise of the same power by which it has been first given to them to believe in the Redeemer. And they who feel His first work upon their hearts ought, with humble confidence, to look for the fulfilment of His further promises, however imperfectly they were able to trace the manner of His operation in fulfilling them, or though they were unable to trace it at all.

But when we are told, as we are distinctly told, that the Spirit employs, in the gracious work in which He is engaged,

the instrumentality of this principle which He has wrought in us, we seem not merely warranted to undertake such an inquiry as I have proposed, but naturally led to it. In examining *faith* for some means of operating upon man, according to the ordinary mode of moving his feelings and influencing his conduct, it would seem that we are only looking for what we may feel assured that it contains. For some natural fitness for the work in which it is employed seems included in the very notion of an instrument; though the very highest degree of suitableness to its purpose, is perfectly consistent with the belief, that it owes its efficacy to the hand that wields it, and that it would be powerless in any other. And under this view you will see that this inquiry is so far from being discountenanced by the Scripture doctrine of the influence of the Holy Spirit, that, on the contrary, we are led to it by a part of that doctrine which is as clearly revealed as any other part of it.

And while this fully justifies the inquiry, it points out sufficiently what are its proper objects. For our actions are subject to no external constraint; and, even if we hold that the will is irresistibly controlled by the influences of the Holy Spirit, we must see, that the force which He exercises upon it cannot be rendered palpable, or be subjected to examination. All, therefore, that such an inquiry can propose is to discover, in the instrument which He employs, *motives* to act or feel in a particular way,—motives addressing themselves to known principles of our nature, and operating upon them in known ways;—soliciting to activity those, the active agency of which, religion requires,—imposing restraints upon those which she seeks to control,—and tending to bring the whole man,—all his thoughts, propensities, and faculties,—all under her sure guidance and wholesome restraint.

Upon the *tendency* of these motives it is not likely that much difference of opinion will exist; but very different views may be taken of their *force* by those who are agreed

about their *tendency*. And if we are to consider that question, it is peculiarly necessary that we should bear in mind the narrow limits of our faculties, and not absolutely to conclude that the instrument by which the Spirit acts upon us contains no other forces to effect its end but those which our dim perceptions are able to discern in it. But still more should we remember, that if we had good grounds for believing the instrument to be defective, the Omnipotent Agent who wields it can—not merely remove all obstacles to its operations, but—abundantly supply all its defects. For I cannot help thinking that we speak rashly, and without any Scripture warrant, when we assert that the Almighty Being, upon whom our spiritual life depends, draws supplies for its support only from the springs of life which are made manifest to us; as though, beyond the forces supplied by revealed truth, and by the principle whereby we effectually receive the truth, there were, in His secret workings with the human heart, no others brought into action, to raise its affections, to cleanse its corruptions, to restrain, to soften, and to subdue it.

But enough has, probably, been said, not only to show the fitness of this inquiry, but to suggest its proper objects and limits, and to regulate the anticipations with which we engage in it. And a moment will now serve to bring back to your recollection what we have established concerning the nature of the principle, the moral effects of which we seek to ascertain.

Faith is *trust*:—reliance upon a promise—confidence in means to secure some desirable end—trust in some being from whom, or through whom, some benefit is expected—all are fitly expressed by FAITH in that which inspires confidence, whatever it be. The particular exercise of the principle with which we have to do, is that which the Bible calls *indifferently faith in CHRIST, or faith in God through CHRIST*. It is *trust in CHRIST* as the author of salvation, grounded

upon God's testimony in His Word concerning Him; or *trust in God* as the giver of salvation for Christ's sake. And it is scarcely necessary to repeat, that the state of mind expressed by the phrase, is not merely belief in a truth, together with the emotion of hope which our view of our own relation to the truth adds to belief in it, but that it includes also the notion of a particular being as the source of the benefits for which we hope, and leads naturally to other emotions, which connect themselves with that being.

To judge, however, of these feelings, that is, to determine the probable effect of this *trust in CHRIST*,—it will be necessary to consider briefly, the nature and quality of the truths upon the belief of which it is grounded. It may be thought that this is to complicate the inquiry unnecessarily, or perhaps unfairly, and that the moral effects of the principle ought to be derived from a consideration of its own nature, and not of anything extraneous to it. A moment's reflexion, however, will show such an impression to be a hasty one. The effects of *confidence* or *trust* so depend upon its foundation—upon the relation that we bear to the being in whom we confide—upon the objects for which we hope—upon the other principles of our nature with which it is combined—that without some consideration of its origin, end, and other concomitant circumstances, no one could venture to predict anything of the moral quality of its consequences, or indeed anything definitely of its consequences in any way.

Consider, for a moment, how totally the external conduct to which trust or confidence leads is changed by a bare change in the relation of the person confiding to him in whom he trusts. In war, for example, a general relying upon the valour and discipline of his troops—a soldier, upon the skill of his leader—a citizen, upon both—are all under the influence of the same principle. But, from the circumstances of the parties, in the one, this confidence naturally leads to a fearless exercise of authority; in the other, to unhesitating

submission to command; while in the last, perhaps, it produces nothing beyond tranquillity of mind—a sense of security, allowing him who enjoys it to pursue his ordinary course of life undisturbed. You may see enough of the firmness and fidelity of a friend to *trust* in him, as a valuable auxiliary in the difficulties of a benevolent undertaking: an observation of firmness and fidelity may as manifestly give rise to *trust* in their possessor, as a useful accomplice in dangerous crime. The confidence felt, regarded in itself, is the same state of mind in both cases; but no one can think that the moral state of the person feeling it is the same, or its moral consequences likely to be the same, in both.

But it would be trifling to accumulate instances to establish a position so obvious. The state of a man under the fullest fulfulness of this principle of *trust* in another may obviously be either virtuous or vicious; and the moral effects of the principle itself salutary, pernicious, or neutral; so that, by neglecting at the outset all its concomitants, we should only arrive at misty abstractions of no practical application; and can only expect to learn its effects, in any useful form, by considering its source and objects; by inquiring how we are led to trust in Christ, upon what this trust is grounded, for what end it is entertained, and so forth.

Indeed, even if such considerations could not be thus shown to be formally included in an inquiry into the *nature* and *effects* of *faith*, they have, at least, such a connexion with it as would make it unfit to pass them entirely over. For it is to be remembered, that the real importance of this inquiry lies in its serving to ascertain the moral forces in actual exercise upon the mind of the Believer. And, when this is recollected, it must be felt that it would be but a weak affectation of exactness to hold ourselves excluded from considering what, if it do not form properly a part of the proposed subject of the inquiry, is so manifestly fitted to secure its end.

From what I have said of *faith in the LORD*, it must be

manifest that it involves necessarily *a belief* of all that God has revealed to us of our nature, condition, and prospects. Right apprehensions upon all these subjects are essential to render the Scripture notion of a Redeemer intelligible; and upon firm convictions of the truth of the humbling and abasing representations of Scripture concerning them, must *trust in the Redeemer* be grounded.

Revelation then gives distinctness and certainty to all those momentous truths of natural religion, which, even in the way in which reason makes them known to us, are so fitted to lead the thoughts beyond the visible and the present; and it gives new force and vividness to them all. It enlarges our knowledge of our duty, and, in the same measure, adds to our knowledge of our guilt; it confirms and increases all our apprehensions of God as a righteous governor of the world; and raises all our anticipations of the severity of the judgment that awaits us at His hands.

Solemnly reminding us of the neglected truth, *that it is appointed unto men once to die*, it proves to us the still more momentous truth, *that after death is the judgment*¹;—it proves to us, in the way in which such things can be proved, that after death *we shall all stand at the judgment-seat* of Him who made us, and render there an account of all our acts, and words, and thoughts. Is there not enough in this conviction to tame levity, and to make the most careless sinner grave? Barely to think, that after a few years of the same course of unsatisfying enjoyments, of frivolous amusements, or of grovelling cares, all must come to an end, and be as though it had never been, is very saddening; and the thought, as often as it recurs, will embitter enjoyment, and force a momentary seriousness upon minds least disposed to serious reflection,—sometimes even in the midst of pursuits with which reflection harmonizes but ill. But how much more solemnizing and saddening is it to know, that all

¹ Heb. ix. 27.

is to end thus,—to have the conviction forced upon us, that we shall be set face to face before Him whom we have been neglecting and offending; and to know too the awful character of the account which He will exact of our heedless course of folly and crime,—that not only every vicious act that we have committed, and every good act that we have neglected to perform, but that every idle word that we have spoken—every uncharitable feeling that we have cherished—every angry emotion that we have indulged—every impure thought that we have harboured,—all are written in His book!—To know, further, that He has, by a formal law, demanded of us that homage of the heart which is His undoubted right; that He has commanded us to love Him *with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and with all our strength*; to know this, and to feel (who is there that does not feel?) that, of our love, much has been lavished upon objects with which it would be blasphemy to speak of God as holding a divided empire; that even in its most legitimate exercise, the whole energy and warmth of our affections have been expended upon His gifts, with no recollection at all of the higher claims of the giver, or, what seems worse, but a casual, cold, or formal recognition of them;—to feel all this, and to know that *for all this, He will bring us to judgment*; that our corrupt and alienated hearts, no less than our vicious lives, are to abide the scrutiny of Him who *chargeth His angels with folly, and the heavens are unclean in His sight*!—What, upon the commonest principles, should be the effect of the belief of such truths as these? Let the conviction be wrought in any man that this fiery trial awaits him, and that, while unending happiness and unending misery rest upon its issue, he is altogether unprepared to meet it,—and what is likely to be the effect?

Why, the natural effect of such truths upon the mind of a being capable of conceiving, in any measure, what

eternal happiness and eternal misery are, is easily told. But their full effect is not in general likely to be produced, for there are well-known causes in operation to diminish it. It is well known, for example, that there is a striking analogy between our visual and mental perceptions,—that distance in time produces in the latter all the illusions which are the familiar effects of distance in space in the former,—confounding or inverting the true proportions of things near and remote, and causing us to be affected rather by the proximity of objects than by their importance. This illusion, so far as it lies in the understanding, is doubtless corrected, as we know better and believe more firmly the testimony of Revelation concerning the future and the unseen. But as regards the feelings, it is one which, from our very nature, can never be wholly removed. Again, there is hardly any one, however ignorant he may be of the true way of escape, who yet has not some surmise that there is a way. And this is another impediment to the full effect of such convictions, however strong. But though, in this way, a real belief in these awful truths may not, and probably will not, produce those wild agonies of despair which would be its natural effects, is it too much to say, that it must cause lively, anxious, painful solicitude concerning the great realities of the unseen state, to supply the place of the strange indifference with which we habitually regard them?

But if Revelation stopped here—if it merely awakened us from the spiritual lethargy in which we are sunk, and forced us to contemplate the hopeless ruin in which sin has plunged us,—it would have but slender claims upon our gratitude. It would seem but vain wisdom to expose the folly of those devices, by which we were contriving to escape the pangs of anticipated misery, and to soothe, even for a little, the remediless diseases of our nature. But Revelation does not merely awaken this sense of guilt and danger, it publishes too the way of escape. It not only unfolds the

depths of human corruption, the enormity of our guilt, and the appalling destiny to which that guilt has consigned us; but it discloses also the stupendous means for our restoration and security, which the infinite mercy of the Most High has provided. It tells upon this a truth which is so wonderful and mysterious as to require all the evidence by which Revelation is verified, to render it credible; and which, notwithstanding all that evidence, has been ever, and will ever be, a *stumblingblock*, and *foolishness* to our moral and our intellectual pride. It tells us that when no other means of deliverance could be found for our lost race, our Almighty Creator himself descended from His throne of glory, and took upon Him the form of a servant—that He assumed the nature which we had polluted, obeyed the law which we had violated, suffered punishment which we had incurred—that, despised and rejected, persecuted and betrayed, and crowning at the last His mysterious humiliation by a death of ignominy and pain, He offered “a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world;” a sacrifice which reconciles God’s free mercy to sinners, to His truth in denouncing vengeance against sin—peace and good-will to guilty man, to His spotless righteousness; a sacrifice which is the eternal bond of that mysterious union under which Jehovah delights to reveal Himself, of a *just* GOD, and yet a SAVIOUR.

It publishes that by the life and death of the Redeemer, a way is now opened for ALL to be reconciled unto God; and for ALL the same way. That there is no continuance in sin, however obstinate and prolonged—no degree of guilt, however black and enormous,—that excludes the sinner from the offered pardon, or even modifies—in the slightest particular modifies—the offer of *free pardon* in the REDEEMER which the Gospel makes alike to ALL. That to ALL—who hearing the call, turn to God, casting away all other grounds of dependence, and trusting entirely and

unreservedly in this alone, receiving salvation simply as the work of the Redeemer, and as His gift,—unreserved pardon, full acceptance, are freely promised in His name.

This is, in brief, that revelation of mercy, upon which *faith* rests; upon an abiding conviction of these glorious truths it is, that confidence in the Redeemer is grounded: they who believe in Him *know in whom they trust*, and that *they that trust in Him shall never be ashamed*. The grounds of confidence cannot be laid broader or deeper: *The Lord is my light and my salvation*, saith the Psalmist, *whom then can I fear? The Lord is the strength of my life, of whom then shall I be afraid*²? What can they fear who are confiding in a crucified and risen Saviour? Which of the natural objects of dread can affright them? He in whom they trust has *abolished death*³. *The sting of death is sin*⁴, and *He hath put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself*⁵. *The strength of sin is the law*⁶, and *He has blotted out the hand-writing of ordinances which was against us, which was contrary to us, nailing it to his cross*⁷. *He that had the power of death is the Devil*, but him the Lord has, THROUGH DEATH, *destroyed*⁸; *He has spoiled the principalities and powers of darkness, making a show of them openly*⁹. What remains for them to fear who trust in HIM? What, indeed, as the apostle persuasively argues,—what, or whom, can Believers fear? Do they dread an accusation from God whom they have offended? It is He who has justified them.—Do they dread condemnation from Him into whose hands all judgment is committed by the Father, and who shall judge quick and dead at the last day? They know that He lived for them, died for them, and rose again for them; that He even now sitteth at the right hand of the Father to plead for them; they trust

² Psalm xxvii. 1.³ 2 Tim. i. 10.⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 56.⁵ Heb. ix. 26.⁶ 1 Cor. xv. 56.⁷ Col. ii. 14.⁸ Heb. ii. 14.⁹ Col. ii. 15.

in Him as a spotless representative, as a sufficient surety, as a prevailing intercessor;—what or whom can they

What are the natural consequences upon the Believer's heart and in his life of a sense of his new relation to God, and of the way in which it has been established, I cannot hope to present in detail without weakening the effect of this simple statement of the whole. But details are necessary for my purpose: I proceed therefore to consider, in some detail, the *natural effects* of *faith*: at first chiefly considering its operation as a *restraining* principle; and I shall inquire briefly how, in this way,—in the way of restraint,—the views on which it rests of God and of ourselves are likely to act upon us.

With respect to ourselves: no one can have read the Bible so cursorily, as not to have carried away some impressions of the extent to which it labours to enforce upon us, the guilt and danger of pride; and those who know it best, know how many of the severest denunciations and most solemn warnings of the Sacred Volume are directed against this besetting sin of our fallen nature—how strikingly its folly and unreasonableness are exposed—how impressively the vices, of which it is the parent, are exhibited;—above all—how distinctly is declared God's determination to subdue it in those who obey Him, and to punish it in those who resist Him. Every nearer approach that we by any means make to a knowledge of our true relation to God, of our nature and His, has doubtless a tendency to abate this vice; but *faith* in the REDEEMER is founded upon its overthrow, and makes a provision for its extirpation. It is founded upon the ruins of human pride, for it only exists in the degree in which self-dependence is vanquished; and it grows, and advances, and strengthens, as

the subjugation is completed. It is not only founded upon the knowledge of what the Bible communicates to us of our nature and condition—of our guilt, degradation, weakness, and wants—of the sufficiency of that provision of mercy by which we are freed from guilt and secured from danger, by which our weakness is to be supported and our wants supplied; but the principle requires that this conviction should be so complete and intimate as to vanquish all dependence upon ourselves, or on anything in ourselves, and to lead us to rest our eternal welfare upon the work of the Redeemer, and upon it alone. Its very essence consists in this abjuration from the heart of all merit in ourselves, and this unfeigned ascription of all glory to Him.

What obstinate resistance this master-vice makes before it surrenders, and how often it renews the struggle, none can require to be reminded who have ever sustained the conflict. Even where the criminality of our conduct is too clear to be denied, every one knows how continually we look for some consolatory palliations of it; some peculiarity in our constitution, or circumstances, or in the temptations to which we have been exposed, which, though it cannot take away entirely our sense of guilt, may abate in some degree the severity of our self-condemnation. But if we reluctantly condemn our known vices, how much more slowly and reluctantly do we yield to the conviction, that the very acts upon which we most pride ourselves partake of the same ungodly character; that, far from being able to secure forgiveness for our acknowledged offences, they need pardon themselves at the hands of our All-seeing Judge! And even after we are convinced that if we would stand before Jehovah, it must be in the merits of another, not our own; that we must, before HIM, withdraw all plea of merit for our *works*; how often are we found preposterously substituting for this, the merit of our *faith*! And, driven from this more absurd form of pride, still clinging

to the notion of some merit in the *humility* with which we renounce all merit, both of faith and works! while, even when we discern the folly of all such pretensions clearly, we are far from being secure from a worse form of self-dependence, a reliance upon the clearness of our religious views, and the soundness of our religious principles:—whatever place our language may give to the Redeemer, still in our inmost thoughts recurring to ourselves—still looking for something in ourselves which may be united to the merits of our blessed Lord,—something to be joined to that which we are ready in words to confess to be above all fellowship in the work of a sinner's justification! Inso-much that you will often find men who have passed a great part of their lives in maintaining the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY, as much strangers to this simple exclusive trust in the Redeemer's work, as those who have been all their life-long opposing it. Men are, from various natural causes, brought to take up, to maintain, and defend the Doctrine in terms; but a cordial acquiescence in God's humbling plan, of saving us by the obedience and sufferings of His only begotten Son, is only to be wrought by the Spirit whom He sends. It is only through that Spirit, that a man is ever brought to come to Christ simply as a blind and needy sinner; to cast down himself and all that he prides himself upon—his works, his faith, his humility, his knowledge—all at the foot of the cross of the Redeemer—glorifying only in it, desiring in life, and death, and judgment, to be found in Him that suffered upon it, and in Him to find everything—*wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption*¹¹.

Now this, and nothing short of this, is *faith* in the Redeemer; and if you only consider what a fruitful source of error, since the beginning of the world, self-dependence has been; and what the natural consequence of substituting

¹¹ 1 Cor. i. 30.

for it this sense of dependence upon God must be, you cannot, I think, fail to see in *faith* a powerful *restraining* principle.

It must be apparent, I think, that this frame of mind,—this lowly estimate of ourselves, and just sense of the extent of our dependence upon God,—is not merely right and suitable in itself, but that it must be most salutary also in its effects; that its direct tendency is not merely under every perplexity to turn us to the true source of wisdom for direction, and in every difficulty to lead us to the true source of strength for support, but to regulate steadily the ordinary course of our lives by the rule of conduct which He has given us; and that while it does so, this healthful state of mind is, from our mental constitution, itself nurtured, strengthened, and perfected by exercise; and our hearts elevated and purified by the free communion with God which it warrants and promotes. And all this in the way of natural consequence.

Nor can it be said that these salutary effects are likely to be lessened by a belief in the free and unreserved forgiveness of our offences, which is the foundation of this reconciliation,—that it is calculated to weaken the principle of obedience, to diminish the awe with which we regard God, and the dread with which we should view sin. This I say, however often it is maintained, cannot be maintained fairly. I of course do not mean that scheme of free forgiveness must necessarily be secure from such consequences. On the contrary, though lenity to sinners could never, under any circumstances, have the effect that seems sometimes ascribed to it, of *producing* a spirit of disaffection and disobedience; and though its natural tendency is to excite feelings which should promote a conformity to God's will; yet it must be admitted, that it might be so administered as to take away some of the most powerful restraints upon human corruption, by lowering our natural

apprehensions of the guilt of sin, and of the holiness of God. This is certainly to be admitted. But to say that God's mercy in His Son, through which we trust in Him as a reconciled Father, does not do this, is to say nothing. It not only does not impair our apprehensions of the purity of God's nature, and of the strictness of His law, but raises them to a height to which nothing else can raise them, and makes inexhaustible provision for continued augmentation of them.

This is not the language of common-place exaggeration, but of truth and soberness. There are some subjects, no doubt, upon which the liveliness of our emotions far outstrips the strength of our convictions; but this is one of those on which we can generally reason much farther than we can feel. We can see,—to whatever extent we are ourselves affected by the humiliation and death of the Redeemer,—we can see, that they furnish a measure of the enormity of sin, and evidence of the essential opposition of the divine nature to sin, which are fitted to raise our apprehensions of both to a height constantly increasing with renewed contemplation of this unfathomable mystery; and that this increase ought to be progressive, not to the last hour of our mortal existence merely, but through the countless ages of eternity!

Those, I say, who feel ever so inadequately, can see clearly, that this is but a plain statement of a fair collection of our reason. For when we learn that to reconcile the Most High to sinners, the humiliation and the sufferings of His only begotten Son were essential; that for this Atonement it was essential that HE who *was in the beginning*, who was *with* GOD, and who *was* GOD¹²—GOD *over all, blessed for ever*¹³—should come in the likeness of sinful flesh¹⁴, should humble Himself, and be obedient to

¹² John i. 1, 2.¹³ Rom. ix. 5.¹⁴ Rom. viii. 3.

death, even the death of the Cross¹⁵; when we learn that THIS CUP *could not* pass from HIM unless He drank it¹⁶; do we not learn that nothing short of an INFINITE SACRIFICE for sin is an adequate declaration of the infinite abhorrence with which sin is regarded by a Being of infinite purity; of which all former demonstrations of His wrath against it were but comparatively faint indications? And if this be so, is it not plain, that our conceptions of God's abhorrence of sin—which are so impeded by our slow hearts and blunted moral sensibilities here, and which will, doubtless, be quickened and enlarged when this body of sin is laid down—must be continually advancing, as our knowledge of the worth and dignity of the sacrifice in which His hatred of sin was embodied is augmented; and that this knowledge—the whole *height, and length, and breadth, and depth* of which passes all finite capacity—must be receiving unceasing additions through the progress of the infinite duration that awaits us?

This must be so. Nor can we doubt that those higher spirits who stand before God's throne, and enjoy that vision which is promised to *the pure in heart*; who have lived in the light of God's purity since the first dawn of created being, and have witnessed or executed all the awful manifestations of His wrath against sin, since it first appeared among the works of His hands,—we cannot doubt, I say, that *they* find in His last judgment against sin,—when He *awoke the sword against the man that is His fellow*¹⁷, and *was pleased to bruise and to put to grief* the Son of His love¹⁸,—new evidence of the holiness before which they veil their faces, while they adore it¹⁹; that they turn from all other monuments of His hatred of sin—from the burning cities of the plain—from a deluged world—from the

¹⁵ Phil. ii. 8.¹⁶ Matt. xxvi. 39, 42, 44; Mark xiv. 35, 36, 37, 39.¹⁷ Zech. xiii. 7.¹⁸ Is. liii. 10.¹⁹ Is. vi. 2, 3.

inmitigable and unending torments of rebellious angels—to CALVARY,—to the spectacle of their Creator,—the Creator of all worlds, visible and invisible,—in mortal agony for sin; and find in the contemplation matter to deepen all their apprehensions of the infinite malignity of sin, of God's holy abhorrence of it, and His righteous determination to punish it.

This seems but the legitimate and natural effect of a contemplation of this surpassing mystery, when all obstacles to its effects are done away. And it is only necessary to remember, that upon this mystery is our *faith* grounded,—that this stupendous sacrifice for sin is itself the foundation of the sinner's trust,—to see in some measure the wisdom of that scheme, which, while it rests our hopes upon the Rock of Ages, gives just the same stability to the enlarged and elevated apprehensions which it supplies, of the holiness of the God in whom we confide. Now it is only in the light of the divine purity that our own vileness truly appears. Our perceptions of both necessarily advance together. “I have heard of thee,” saith Job, “with the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee, *wherefore* I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes²⁰.” This deeper prostration of spirit is the sure effect of every nearer view of the ineffable holiness of the Most High: and thus the renewed contemplations of the foundation of our faith in Him which are necessary, not merely for its increase, but for its maintenance, while they exalt and strengthen the Believer's faith, confirm and deepen his humility.

But the effects of the view of God's character which the atoning work of Christ presents to the Believer do not end here. In fact, when you consider how much of religion is actually formed by our views of the Being whom we adore, and how extensively these views must influence

²⁰ Job xlii. 6.

everything in it that they do not actually constitute, you will see that we cannot ascribe much to religion in regulating man's conduct, and forming his character, without tracing some most important effects to the views of God, upon which it is grounded. But I have gone too far to pursue the subject upon the present occasion; and must reserve what I have further to say upon it for my next opportunity of addressing you.

SERMON VIII.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH—

Continued.

Hæc fides erigit sustentat et vivificat contritos juxta illud, *justificati ex fide pacem habemus*. Hæc fides consequitur remissionem peccatorum, hæc fides justificat coram Deo.....Nec prius dilectio adest quam sit facta fide reconciliatio. Lex enim non fit sine Christo, juxta illud *per Christum habemus accessum ad Deum*. Et hæc fides paulatim crescit, et per omnem vitam luctatur cum peccato, ut vincat peccatum et mortem. Cæterum fidem sequitur dilectio, ut supra diximus. Et sic clare definiri potest filialis timor: talis pavor qui cum fide conjunctus est, hoc est, ubi fides consolatur et sustentat pavidum cor. Servilis timor, ubi fides non sustentat pavidum cor.

APOLOGIA AUGUSTANÆ CONFSSIONIS.

[*De Christo in quo promittitur gratis remissio peccatorum.*]

SERMON VIII.

I JOHN v. 4.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

OF the many surprising inconsistencies that we contrive to combine in ourselves, the steadiness with which we pursue all temporal advantages, while we obstinately turn away from all consideration of our eternal interests, is doubtless the most astonishing. A being framed to shun danger, and provident against future evil, exercising no forecast for eternity, except *to lay up for himself wrath against the day of wrath*;—a being framed to desire and to pursue happiness, rejecting the only real and permanent good, the only good that can fill the capacities, and quiet the strivings of his spirit, which was formed for immortality,—turning away from this supreme good, though placed within his reach, and pressed upon his acceptance, and persevering from the cradle to the grave in seeking the felicity, which by the necessity of his constitution he continues to seek, in objects worthless, unsatisfying, and insecure; and in pursuits on which the world's sad experience and his own have fixed the impress of *vanity, and vexation, and sorrow*:—this is a spectacle, which, in spite of the deadening force of habit, moves astonishment, whenever calm attention can be commanded for it for a moment.

Some, it is true, easily dispel such wonder, by saying that it is man's nature;—that he is naturally engrossed by the objects that surround him, and are acting upon him at the moment;—that his attention is filled and occupied by these, so as to leave little solicitude for remote prospects, whether of good or evil. If this were true, to the extent to which it ought to be, in order to furnish any solution of the difficulty, it would no doubt make all wonder at this particular manifestation of our nature unreasonable; though we should assuredly have abundant cause for amazement, at finding ourselves endowed with a nature which would seem to suit us for all the highest purposes of our being. But it is hardly necessary to say that it is not true to any such extent. On the contrary, whatever colour the representation may receive from the general fact that a part of our nature inclines us to this disregard of the future; or from particular instances in which this part may have obtained the mastery of the entire; it is so far from being true, as a general description of mankind, that the very opposite one would seem to approach the truth more nearly.

To satisfy ourselves of this, there is no need that we should resort to cases that we only know at a distance, or read of in history,—the heroes, and legislators, and sages, who have been sustained through toil, and privation, and danger: who, *fallen on evil days and evil tongues*, have found ample recompense for the neglect, or obloquy, or persecution of their own times, in the uncertain promise of a reward so remote and unsubstantial as posthumous renown. There is no occasion, I say, to have recourse to what might perhaps be regarded as extreme cases, or to go beyond the exhibition of our nature which meets us in the commonest forms of every-day life, to be satisfied how much such a statement misrepresents it. We see, everywhere around us, men voluntarily engaged in framing and executing laborious projects, which always bear a reference to some future period,

and often look far beyond the limits of their own existence. And indeed, if we recal the acts and thoughts of the most ordinary day of our own lives, how much of both shall we find expended upon the future and the remote! How often during the day have plans of future happiness employed us; hopes of distant happiness stimulated and cheered us; and how much more frequently has our uneasiness sprung from foreboded than from actual suffering! So that, however strong may be the part of our mental constitution which disposes us to regard only the present, it is, in fact, kept in control by some more powerful part of our nature; and a real solicitude about the future is, in spite of it, a leading principle of human conduct. Why then, it may be asked, does it cease to exert any power, just where reason would seem to assign to it the greatest force?

Some seem to think that a sufficient cause for every anomaly in human conduct is assigned, when the strength of human passions is alleged. And, no doubt, this disturbing force accounts sufficiently for many of our rash acts, and many of our rash judgments too. But it must be felt to give but a very partial answer to the question under consideration. For our passions, blindly pursuing their proper objects, are equally at war with all prudential consideration of the future, that opposes their present gratification. Yet, in spite of their utmost force, how firm and persevering do we find men in the pursuit of earthly and perishable objects; how resolute are they in repressing all the propensities that would impede or embarrass their progress there! How steadily do they go on, controlling their strongest passions, repressing their most importunate appetites, denying their warmest affections, while they are labouring for the attainment of something remote, uncertain, and *perishing in the using*; and only deaf to the voice of prudence, when she solicits for some regard for treasures in Heaven, *incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fade not away!*

Besides,—and for our purpose it deserves carefully to be remarked,—whenever passion does mislead us in the conduct of our *temporal* affairs, reason in some degree makes compensation by the correctness of her more deliberate judgments. But, in our *spiritual* concerns, reason is constantly as dark as passion is misguiding; and by its decisions, when removed altogether from the influence of passion (as in our judgments concerning the conduct of others), shows how deep the cause of this difference lies, and how widely it affects our entire nature. For while almost any measure of exertion or endurance to secure something mean and transitory,—not worth obtaining, or lost as soon as obtained,—is esteemed manly and *heroic*, how constantly does the most enlightened reason regard the same patience, resolution, and self-denial, when *directed* about the only worthy objects of anxious thought and earnest pursuit, as wild enthusiasm, infallible marks of a poor and feeble mind!

Were we to look at our affections with the same reference, we should only find fresh anomalies of the same kind: we should see even this better part of our nature rendered torpid and inert, barely by connecting the interests of eternity with the objects that are fitted to draw them forth. So that we, who are prompt to answer minor calls for gratitude, are *then* insensible to the highest benefits:—we, who are ready to yield affection to the various objects around us, which are in different degrees fitted to attract it, and to return it even to those that have no other attraction except that they feel it for us, *then* withhold it from the most varied and exalted excellences, and from love the most generous, and tender, and warm:—*we, who have a natural sympathy with everything elevated and tender in our nature; who never see, or can see, the shadows of what is noble and excellent, which cross our path in real life, without a glow of admiration; who melt and kindle at every portraiture, even in fictitious narra-*

tive, of suffering, and magnanimity, and self-devotion,—are able to read and hear with little emotion, or with entire apathy, the story of the loftiest heroism, the most patient constancy, and the most generous self-abandonment, amidst the most overwhelming afflictions, and the most fiery trials: merely, as it would seem, because these sufferings, endured for our sake, have a connexion with our eternal interests!

This might be pursued farther; but enough has been said to show how unsatisfactory must any solution of this difficulty be, that proposes to refer this part of our conduct to any of our common principles of action;—and to show, at the same time, how deeply interwoven with the whole tissue of our intellectual and moral nature is the cause, whatever it be, of this strange indifference with which we regard things so momentous and so ascertained, as death, and judgment, and eternity.

Revelation alone supplies anything that approaches to a full account of this great difficulty. It does not take the difficulty wholly away,—far from it,—but it removes an important part of it, when it tells us that we are a fallen race: that man did not come from the hands of his Creator, thus curiously framed, to frustrate all His highest designs concerning him; but that the whole constitution of his nature has undergone a violent and most calamitous change,—a change, under which conscience is robbed of her natural supremacy, the reason darkened, the will perverted, and the passions inflamed. It is something to know, that it is not in a state of nature properly, but in a state of disorder and ruin, that the mastery is habitually exercised by the lower parts of our constitution, so that the mind is only acted on, with certainty and force, by objects earthly, gross, and palpable:—that man has fallen from his first estate, and so has been unfitted for his high destiny, before he thus renounces it without a struggle; and has been rendered conformable to the dust

on which he is treading, before he thinks *it is good to be here*. We cannot wonder that degraded, and bearing about him a sense of degradation, however inadequate,—guilty, and bearing in his breast a sentence of condemnation, however obscured,—we cannot wonder that he shuns, with instinctive aversion and fear, all those contemplations of eternity, and those only, which in conception confront him with a just and holy God. We read, indeed, that the first effect of the fall was to rob man's breast of all filial confidence and affection towards his Maker, and to implant there, instead, a sense of enmity and fear. This painful consciousness, of being at enmity with God, it was that drove fallen man to hide *from the presence of the Lord* God amongst the trees of the garden. It has ever since manifested itself in the various devices of idle and of active life by which we contrive, with destructive ingenuity, to rid ourselves of the intolerable sense of God's presence now, and to banish all consideration of the hour when we can escape it no longer. And even in that hour, the same principle is to be still more awfully manifested: when He who is our Creator and our Redeemer shall come to be our Judge, some will be seen still vainly striving to shrink from beholding Him; and in the wild agonies of hopeless terror, *calling on the rocks to fall on them, and the mountains to cover them, to hide them from the face of Him that sitteth upon the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb*¹!

A state of enmity, indeed, with the Being who has formed and who governs the world, is fitted to overwhelm the mind with dismay. And it is not surprising that we should so anxiously seek to escape the sense of utter destitution, which the consciousness of this hostility brings with it. We are so framed that we can, if we will, keep off such thoughts for a long time by various contrivances;

¹ Luke xxiii. 30; Rev. vi. 15-17. In both places it is not the final judgment which is spoken of, but certain great judgments which foreshadow it.

and by various palliatives mitigate their terrors, when they force themselves upon us. But there is but one way of rendering judgment and eternity chosen subjects of contemplation; and that is, such a new view of our relation to God as may banish our natural fear of Him, and supply its place by cheerful confidence in Him.

How effectually this is done in the Gospel we have already seen. But what we have been now remarking enables us more clearly to discern the wisdom of that scheme, as contrasted with every corruption of it. Its characteristic, in contrast with all of them, is, that it publishes *at once* frank and full forgiveness for *all* sin, through the blood of Christ—offers unreserved acceptance to *all* sinners who come to God in Him—presents to them God as a reconciled father, and solicits in His name *all* His rebellious children to be reconciled to Him. Designing that Believers should walk *by faith and not by sight*², *looking not at the things that are seen, but the things that are not seen*³—it seeks at once, and from the first, to take away our natural aversion to contemplate the world to come: designing to bring us under the influence of the character of God, that we should live, realizing the sense of His presence, *as seeing Him who is invisible*⁴—it sets at once about removing the main cause why we shrink from beholding Him.

And the mode in which this wise and gracious end is effected is no less deserving of remark. We saw that, though this aversion springs from a sense of our own impurity and of God's holiness—from an apprehension of the strictness of His law, and the knowledge that we have never complied with its requirements,—the principle by which it is extirpated is one which deepens this sense of our own vileness, and exalts our apprehensions of His purity; which enlarges our view of the wide range of His exceeding broad

² 2 Cor. v. 7.

³ 2 Cor. iv. 18.

⁴ Heb. xi. 27.

commandments, and in the same measure adds to our convictions that we have utterly failed to fulfil them; while, in the very nature of the foundation upon which it rests, a provision exists by which, just in the degree in which the principle advances, it must raise still more our apprehensions of His holiness, and still more deepen our self-abasement before Him.

This would of itself vindicate the Divine origin of this plan. Every human invention to set us at peace with God, did so by lowering Him or unduly exalting ourselves; and every human corruption of Divine truth is marked by the same decided characters. Whether with the Socinian we deny a sacrifice for sin; or seek to lower the infinite worth of that sacrifice, with the Arian; or labour, with other corruptors of the truth, to diminish the extent to which the blotting out of man's trespasses, and his acceptance with God are due to Christ's work,—by ascribing any part of either to any work of our own,—combining in any measure our own merits with His in reconciling us to God,—in whichever of these ways we are labouring to adulterate the Gospel, we are but exhibiting under different forms the same principle, and with similar effects. We are lowering our apprehensions of the strictness of God's law, and raising our imaginations of our own moral power of fulfilling it; we are weakening our impression of the infinite malignity of sin, and of the irreconcilable opposition of the divine nature to it: and this, because we find comfort in a law that makes a provision for partial obedience, and admits some compromise with sin; because we desire a God whom sinners may approach upon some lower footing than through an infinite sacrifice and perfect righteousness; and because we shrink from the contemplation of the holiness with which His own plan for forgiving and accepting us invests the character of the Most High.

But without pursuing the contrast farther, you must see

in this operation of genuine *faith*, so far as it has been explained, the source of most salutary influences upon the heart and life. It would seem, as I said, a waste of words to attempt to prove that not only is the humility upon which it is grounded a fitting state of mind for being so corrupt and guilty, so frail and ignorant as man, but that it must be a great safeguard to him too. And as we saw how much just views of God's holiness, which are also a part of its foundation, are calculated to confirm and deepen this humble frame, it is plain that they thus indirectly contribute in the same measure to our security.

But this is not their only wholesome effect upon the mind. *Faith*, it must be remembered, is not merely grounded at the first upon these exalted views of the holiness of God, but at all times draws life and strength from them; and including,—it may be almost said, being—a cheerful sense of our entire dependence upon Him, under these views of His nature, it obviously, in every exercise of it, brings the mind under the direct influence of His character, as exhibited in the Atonement; making Him present to Believers, in that manifestation of His infinite perfections, which even in Heaven, His dwelling-place, the angels desire earnestly to look into⁵. And can it be doubted, that minds habitually directed to such a Being, in a spirit of firm reliance upon Him,—of cheerful confidence in Him,—must be raised and refined by the contemplation?

It requires, indeed, but little reflexion upon the way in which we become assimilated to those, who, near to our affections, and high in our esteem, are our continual companions, and the most familiar objects of our thoughts, to see, that when Jehovah thus becomes to us a subject of delightful contemplation, as the source of peace and joy, the spring of our highest happiness, and of all our hopes, we must be transformed gradually into His likeness; that in the way of

⁵ 1 Pet. i. 12.

natural consequence, "we all with open face, beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."⁶ "Can two walk together unless they be agreed?" is a question which may be left to any one to answer. And, necessarily, the impressive sentence of the Bible against the founders and worshippers of false deities, "They that make them are like unto them, and so are all they that put their trust in them," only expresses a truth which is of wide application, as well as of the deepest importance:—that our notions of the Being to whom we offer religious reverence, and in whom we habitually confide, are not more surely an indication of our moral character, than they are, by a necessary reaction, a powerful instrument in forming it.

But to whatever extent you may discern *transforming* influences in this operation of genuine *faith* by which God's presence is realized to Believers, you must at least recognise in it a powerful *restraint*. The old philosopher but spoke honestly the natural feeling of every natural heart, when he said that realizing the continual presence of a being to whom all our secret thoughts lay open, was but providing an unceasing source of terror and anxiety. And in accordance with this, we find in the Bible that sin owes all the peace that it enjoys to some mode of keeping Him out of view, or of hiding from ourselves His true character,—to the refuge into which this apprehension drove the Epicurean,—or to the sorer refuge of Atheism,—or to the more common device of either banishing God altogether from our minds, or forming such views of Him as may alleviate the terrors with which a sinner naturally regards Him. The wicked man, who is so often in the Bible with emphatic severity styled *the fool*, is described there as saying in his heart, *There is no God*, and as becoming *corrupt and abominable* under this

⁶ 2 Cor. iii. 18.⁷ Amos iii. 3.⁸ Psalm cxv. 8.

debasement delusion⁹;—or as dissipating the apprehensions which a conviction of God's existence is fitted to awaken, by a denial of His moral government: *Tush! God doth not regard it, He hideth his face, He will never see it*¹⁰;—or his perseverance in iniquity is accounted for by the fact, that he *has not God in all his thoughts*¹¹; or, finally, that thinking of Him, he thinks *that He is altogether such an one as himself*¹². And there appears to be no other way by which sin and peace of mind can exist together. To have exalted impressions of God's purity, and an abiding sense of His presence, and not to feel our corruption chastised and restrained by it, seems impossible. It seems, therefore, that in this operation of *faith*, all must recognise a powerful safeguard; under which, if no more be done, sin at least is rebuked and restrained, whether in act or thought, and purity of life and character naturally promoted.

Nor can it be fairly thought that there is in our sense of reconciliation with God, anything calculated to impair the restraining influence of a sense of His presence. We have, doubtless, *boldness and access with confidence through the faith of Christ*¹³; but no one who considers the foundation of that faith, can fairly apprehend that our confidence should ever assume a form incompatible with *reverence and godly fear*¹⁴. To suppose, indeed, that the fullest confidence in a father's love destroys or lessens the reverence with which we regard him; or that, when fear of punishment at his hands is taken away, no salutary fear of displeasing him can remain, would be to belie our experience of our own nature, corrupt as it is. And the Word of God expressly describes a sense of His compassion and loving-kindness, not as hostile to this filial fear of Him, but as its proper source: "There is forgiveness with Thee, *that Thou mayest be feared*¹⁵." And how this filial fear, which is the natural result of such fatherly

⁹ Psalm xiv. 1.¹⁰ Psalm x. 11.¹¹ Psalm x. 4.¹² Psalm l. 21.¹³ Eph. iii. 12.¹⁴ Heb. xii. 28.¹⁵ Psalm cxxx. 4.

compassion, must be heightened by the way in which God's mercy to sinners was shown, it cannot be necessary for me now to point out. I have before said enough to show with what awful holiness that dispensation of mercy invests the character of the Most High; and how little likely it is that *sin can be thought a light thing* by those whose trust in Him is grounded upon the most appalling manifestation of His abhorrence of sin ever made in earth or heaven. I shall not repeat what I then said; I only desire to remind you that *faith is not merely grounded upon such impressions of God's character, but that to suppose these impressions weakened, is to suppose faith impaired; to suppose them obliterated, is to suppose faith overthrown; for that no confidence in God, except confidence in Him through the atoning work of the Redeemer, is, in anything connected with the doctrine of justification, intended to be styled faith in Him.* When you remember this, you will see that in the *restraining* influences ascribed to this operation of *faith*, too much is not attributed to it: that it brings into action and keeps alive motives, which have plainly a natural tendency to make us dread sin, shun it, and lay hold on all the means which God has provided to secure us from its snares, and effectually redeem us from its power. And you will recollect that the discovery of such motives in or from this principle, was the object proposed by this examination of it.

But it may be said that we have a plain interest in the further inquiry: Are these motives strong enough to regulate conduct, to control passion, to resist temptation? This is, no doubt, an interesting question; and so far as it is a fair one, I think it admits of a satisfactory answer. If it be meant to ask, whether such motives can be made to act so strongly and so constantly upon the mind, as to restrain passion, and to govern conduct,—it is to be replied, Doubtless they can. Nor will any one think that in saying this, too much is ascribed to them, when he reviews them, and

considers what motives experience shows to be able to exert such influences ; to impose very strong restraints upon our strongest passions ; and to secure, in spite of them, great outward decency of conduct.

I will not ask you to imagine what would be the effect upon a man's conduct, if a virtuous friend, whom he revered and loved, were made his constant companion, the observer of all his actions ; and what would be the probable influence of such companionship upon his inmost thoughts and feelings, if he knew that they all lay open to the eye of this associate. I prefer referring to your experience, though the parallel which it furnishes is weaker, and less exact. Take, then, what may seem a slight case, but which is not on that account unsuited to our purpose. Consider only what the fear of man can do in this way ; apart from all apprehension, I mean, of violence or injury from him. Consider only what influence is exercised upon us continually by a regard for the decencies of common life ; for those proprieties of conduct and demeanour which common use has established in society. This is a force which seems made up of feeble elements ; it does literally nothing to amend the heart ; yet to what an extent does it act upon us ! If you desire to know to what an extent it is constantly influencing us, controlling self-love, and restraining other inordinate passions, you have only to consider how these show themselves when it ceases to operate ; to compare, for example, the license and violence of the manners of savage life, with the decorum and forbearance of civilized society. Now, whatever be the forces which this form of the fear of man brings to bear upon the mind,—whether a sense of shame, respect for others, regard for their good opinion, and the fear of losing it, the apprehension of disturbing relations with them, under which we feel peace and enjoyment, or the like,—that the fear of God, in the form in which it exists in the Believer's mind, has all these at

command, and in a degree immeasurably greater, cannot, I suppose, be doubted.

It may be said, it is true, that in exercising upon us an influence which at first sight might seem so disproportioned to any forces at its command, this respect for the forms of society avails itself of the powerful aid of habit; and that it derives, besides, obvious advantages from the fact that it is so continually in operation upon the mind: that this, not only serves to confirm the habit of forbearance and self-restraint, but leaves it nothing in general to do, but to struggle with the passions that it seeks to control, at their commencement: which everyone knows may be done successfully, by a force that would be quite incapable of coping with them in a state of full excitement.

This is, no doubt, true; but, rightly considered, it would not be found to render the illustration (for it is no more) at all less exact. If the nature of human life plainly calls into exercise continually the *fear of man*, it must be evident, on the other hand, that the very nature of religion provides for an exercise no less unceasing of the *fear of God*. The influence which religion claims to exercise over us, extends to every moment of our existence, and embraces all our acts, and all our thoughts. So that it is plain that occasions are perpetually arising for the exertion of the principle, whatever it be, by which the influence of religion is to be maintained. *The fear of God*, if it be in the mind, will, from the very nature of religion, have unceasing opportunities of exercising itself. And enough has been said to show that if *faith* be there, *the fear of God* cannot be absent.

But what is there to keep *faith* there?—it may be said. I might answer, that that is beside the subject of this inquiry; which only proposes to ascertain what influence *faith* exerts, or ensures shall be exerted, while it is in the mind. Or, as the question is certainly an important one,

whether it belong fairly to this inquiry or not, I might in answer attempt to show, in the nature of the principle itself, and in the condition of mind which it supposes and requires, much that seems to give some security for its permanence. But I should feel it to be trifling with a most serious subject, to give any answer short of the full one, to such a question. And if it be asked, What is there to keep faith in the mind? I answer, The Holy Spirit who has wrought it there.

Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the answer, to go into any inquiry into the nature or extent of His operation upon the mind. Every one must see that the bare notion of such an agency is enough to remove the difficulty conveyed in the question, and all kindred difficulties. I have been showing the *natural effects of faith*, by showing what motives it brings to bear upon the mind; and affording some means of judging of the probable effects of these motives, by pointing to effects actually produced by motives similar in nature, but vastly inferior in strength. It may be replied that the actual effects of motives, and their possible effects, are widely different. That the same motives so vary in strength, not merely in different individuals, but in the same individual at different times, that the strength of which they are capable is a very uncertain proof of their actual effects. That if you considered, for example, only the effect which a dread of eternal punishment, or the hope of eternal reward, is *capable* of exerting upon a rational nature, you would pronounce it an overmatch for any temptation, however strong. If you could see the degree of force which it is *actually* exerting upon many minds, in which it still holds some place, you would see why it is that there is no temptation so feeble by which it is not actually overcome. If this be said, I answer, that all this is true and important; but that the bare fact, that these motives are applied to the mind by a spiritual agent, of

infinite power and wisdom, is a full security that they shall be applied at the proper seasons, and with the proper force; and that their actual effects shall be the highest which they are capable of producing.

Still it may be said that their influence, whatever it be, is met by opposite motives, of the strength of which, unhappily, no question can be entertained; and that in the conflict that must ensue, the frailty of our nature, the insidious approaches which sin makes to our hearts, and the ally that it finds there in indwelling corruption, all afford reasonable grounds for very gloomy forebodings. How are these to be dispelled? All that you have said but shows a provision for maintaining the conflict, but falls far short of establishing with certainty its final result.—The real point at issue, the important meaning of the question asked, is, *Will these motives actually exert such force upon the mind of the Believer, as to overcome the temptations by which he is sure to be assailed?* If this be said, I answer, that to the question, in this meaning of it, I never intended to return a reply by reasoning. What degree of probability the affirmative might receive from reasoning, is another point, upon which what we have been saying has an evident bearing; and in the discussion of which, I have no disposition further to engage you. But I readily admit, that neither in this way, nor in any other way of reasoning, can we hope for certainty upon it. We might go on for a long time, balancing these motives against the passions and evil propensities with which they have to contend; and much unprofitable ingenuity might be expended in comparing and fixing their relative strength, without advancing nearer to certainty than we have already arrived; while we should run much risk of mistaking the proper limits of reasoning upon this subject, and its proper object.

Upon this point, I was anxious to speak distinctly at the outset of this investigation; but it is so important, that

I will not be prevented from saying something upon it now, by the fear of falling into repetition.

I never proposed so false an object for this examination of *the effects of faith*, as to establish by it the certainty of the sanctification of Believers. The assurance with which we hold this truth is not built upon human reasoning, but upon multiplied and unequivocal promises of God. By His Prophets of old He had promised, that He would make *an everlasting covenant with His people, to put His fear into their hearts, that they should not depart from Him*¹⁶; that He would *put a new spirit within them*, that He would *put His own Spirit*, and *cause them to walk in His judgments and to do them*¹⁷. And when the time arrived for the fulfilment of the promise, it was renewed by the Lord in the expressive figure, “Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water which I shall give him shall be in him a well of water, springing up unto everlasting life¹⁸.” Nor while we are so distinctly informed of the unfailing efficacy of the principle implanted, are we left in any doubt about the subjects of the operation; for when this figure is elsewhere repeated, it is subjoined, that “He spake this of the Spirit, which *they that believe on Him* should receive¹⁹.”—But I do not mean to detail the accumulated evidence for this important truth. It is familiar to all readers of Scripture, and forms the proper and sufficient ground of the Believer’s hope, that he shall be sustained in the course prescribed to him, and transformed into the image of his Master.

I attach some importance to the inquiry in which I have attempted to engage you; but I should be sorry to be supposed to exaggerate its importance so weakly as to regard the result of it as capable of affecting this position in either way,—either in the way of invalidating it or of establishing it. I rest my hopes of the sanctification of

¹⁶ Jer. xxxii. 40.

¹⁸ John iv. 14.

¹⁷ Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26.

¹⁹ John vii. 39.

Believers, not on my success in investigating the uncertain operation of second causes, but upon my conviction of the power and the truth of the First Cause. I look for it with unshaken confidence, not because I am able to satisfy myself of the force of the instrument employed, but because I am sure of the omnipotence of Him who wields it—because He who has given His blood to cleanse their guilt, has promised His Spirit to subdue their iniquities—and because *He is faithful who has promised, who also will do it.*

Neither did I mean to establish by reasoning the instrumentality of *faith*, in this restraining, cleansing, and transforming work of the Spirit. That also rests upon higher grounds. The same sure testimony on which we learn the *justifying* efficacy of *faith*, has also revealed to us its sanctifying power. They to whom God's Spirit is imparted are described in His Word as “kept by the power of God, *through faith*, unto salvation²⁰,”—through faith, which the same Word represents as *overcoming the world*²¹, *purifying the heart*²², and *quenching all the fiery darts of the wicked one*²³. Neither here, then, was there any room for reasoning, nor any design of applying it.

Where, then, it may be asked, has reasoning a place in the doctrine? Its place, as I have attempted before to show, is well defined. It is this:—being informed that the instrumentality of *faith* is employed by an Almighty Sanctifier, in His gracious work upon our hearts, it seems plainly to belong to reason to show, from an examination of the nature of the principle, how far it is *naturally* fitted to produce the effects which He brings about by means of it. We are to recollect that it is not natural in its production—it is His gift; that it is not natural, strictly speaking, in its operation—it is only efficacious so far as He applies it. But still, so far as it is at all *instrumental*, it must be so by some *natural* fitness to move or to restrain us; by presenting to us some *natural* motive to act or to

²⁰ 1 Pet. i. 5.²¹ 1 John v. 4.²² Acts xv. 9.²³ Eph. vi. 16.

abstain from acting; by offering objects to fear or hope, or some other influential principle of our nature, which stimulates these emotions by some known fitness to excite them. To discover and exhibit such forces in operation upon the Believer's mind, so far as they form part of this principle of faith, or naturally result from it, is plainly the office of reason. I have attempted, accordingly, to show that *faith in CHRIST*—in the views of God and of ourselves upon which it is grounded, and which it keeps alive and confirms—provides a real *restraining force*, capable of exerting a real and powerful influence on the mind, upon natural principles, and in a natural way of operating upon it. If I have succeeded in this, I have, so far as I have gone, attained the only object that I proposed.

But whether I have succeeded or not, I trust I have guarded against the preposterous mistake of the true objects of the inquiry, which would convert ill success in it, real or imaginary, into an argument against truths, that rest not upon the uncertain collections of human reasoning, but on the unerring testimony of the Word of God. We are so constituted as to receive high satisfaction from being able to trace to any extent the process by which any results in which we are deeply interested are brought about. And God has, in gracious accommodation to this part of our constitution, enabled us to do this in a certain degree, even with respect to the most mysterious of His ways. This, which ministers highly to our gratification, is also in no small degree profitable to us; and when we avail ourselves humbly of any means within our reach, to enlarge our knowledge of any part of His works, in nature or in grace, we are sure that we are acting suitably to our condition, and conformably to His will. But to regulate our confidence in any of His promises, not by the certainty that He has made it, but by our power of following Him in the performance of it—this is so manifest a perversion of legitimate inquiry,—

such plain presumption and folly,—as not to require or admit of any exposure beyond a simple statement of it.

But it may be said, ‘Supposing all this to be as it is stated, still, in an inquiry into *the natural effects of faith*, it can hardly be thought to be other than a serious difficulty to find, that its first *natural* effect is to take away the strongest *natural* support of virtue—the support which it derives from a sense of its influence upon our interests in a future life. Whatever be the change wrought in us in *bestowing faith* upon us, it must be admitted, that in many important respects man remains as before; that his whole *bodyly constitution*, with its long train of wants and desires, *remains unaltered*: that evil habits cannot be at once eradicated, or good ones at once formed. And under the manifold temptations which are inseparable from such a state, is it not a startling thing to find *faith*, at the very outset, casting away the powerful aid which *self-love* is able to render; removing restraints upon conduct of acknowledged force, and clear in their mode of operating upon us; and supplying their place by motives, the operation of which is hardly so intelligible, and to which, at least, it is not easy upon any common principles to ascribe equal strength?’

If all that is assumed in this plausible difficulty were strictly true, still the answer ought to be as before—that these forces are applied to the mind by a Being of infinite wisdom and infinite power, who can discern their weakness and effectually supply it: or can, altogether independently of them, effect such a change in the subject of His operations, as to make it susceptible of gentler influences than those which are required to move or to restrain unconverted man. But, in truth, the objection conveys a grossly overcharged statement of the facts of the case, as I hope, in part, appears from what I have already said upon the subject; and as I shall endeavour more fully to establish upon some future occasion.

SERMON IX.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH—

Continued.

Placet igitur huius obedientia non quia legi satisfacit, sed quia persona est in Christo reconciliata fide, et credit sibi reliquias peccati condonari. Semper igitur sentiendum est nos consequi remissionem peccatorum, et personam pronunciari justam, id est acceptari, gratis, propter Christum, per fidem. Postea vero etiam hanc obedientiam erga legem, et reputari quandam iustitiam, et mereri premia.

CONFESS. AUG. 1540. (Art. 6.)

SERMON IX.

I JOHN V. 4.

And this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.

THEY take a narrow and very erroneous view of man's nature, who regard him as necessarily and uniformly governed by self-love. A fairer consideration of the human mind would show that a love of others forms an essential part of it, no less than a love of ourselves. It contains, besides, a number of subordinate propensities, clearly distinct from either principle, and having appropriate objects altogether different from the interest of others or our own. And in action, this concern for our own happiness sometimes combines with, sometimes opposes, our desire for the happiness of others; while each of these principles, at times, finds itself aided, and, at times, resisted, by some of those other propensities of our nature; is sometimes overmastered by them, sometimes overcomes them. So that the whole man is, at times, governed by a combination of his desires, and, at times, by some single one—by self-love or benevolence; or by some passion or appetite, which, ruling him at the moment, hurries him in the pursuit of its proper object, not merely with the same injury, eventually, to his own interest, as to his neighbour's, but with the same disregard, at the moment, for both.

The coarse system, in fact, which derives all human con-

duct directly from self-love, is too palpably false to require refutation. And the more artificial scheme, which proposes to refer all our actions ultimately to that principle, by treating all our desires and affections as so many modifications of a love of ourselves, rests upon sophistry, which has been often and well exposed. Still, after every proper abatement from those ~~gross~~ exaggerations of its importance, self-love retains an important place in the human character. It exists in all minds, and in considerable strength. It is often, indeed, too weak to resist the sudden violence of passion; and it sometimes gives way even to the milder impulses of benevolence: but it is sure soon to regain its influence. And not requiring to be excited by outward circumstances, but coming back naturally after every temporary displacement with the same steady force, it exerts upon most minds, on the whole, more power than other principles of our nature, which, though capable of higher energies, are subject to wider fluctuations, depending more upon what is external for stimulus and support. So that while self-love could not with truth be asserted to have ruled, with uninterrupted sway, the most frigid and unfeeling of mankind, it would be found, upon a review of their entire lives, to have exercised a powerful influence upon the most impetuous and the most tender-hearted.

Accordingly, among the numerous objections with which the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH *only* has been from time to time assailed, the most popular has always been that which charges it with robbing religion of the aid of this active principle of our nature. The fear of punishment, it is said, is an intelligible restraint upon human conduct: but what restraint is there upon him from whom this fear is wholly taken away? The hope of obtaining the divine favour is an intelligible incentive to exertion: but what is there to give activity to one who believes himself fully accepted for what another has done?

An answer to the first objection is given in the attempt which I have already made to show the *restraining* forces which *faith* substitutes for those which it takes away. From Believers, indeed, the *fear of punishment* is taken away; for it not only is not the principle by which God designs to govern them, but is wholly incompatible with that principle, as I hope will afterwards more fully appear. But I think it has been shown that the restraints which *faith* brings to bear upon the mind, are neither few nor inconsiderable. And I only desire to remind you, that they are not merely consistent with the freeness and the fulness of God's plan of forgiveness, but that they are derived from these characteristics of the Gospel, and that they derive from them their best efficacy.

It is thus that, as we saw, the several elements of which this restraining force is composed are maintained in full strength, and in that mutual action by which each is so wisely calculated to aid the direct effects of the other, so far as they are salutary, and to restrain them, when they would be likely to become injurious.

Thus we saw that the Believer's humility rests upon his sense of his guilt and corruption; and that this is based upon just views of the holiness of Jehovah and the strictness of His law; and that these again confirm and receive strength from the view of the Atonement, which represents the sacrifice of the everlasting Son of God as essential to the forgiveness of offenders, as well as all-sufficient for it. In this last is also the true foundation of such confidence in God as effectually prevents our self-abasement from bringing back that alienation from Him, and that fear of Him, which of itself it has an obvious tendency to renew. While, on the other hand, this self-abasement no less effectually guards against the danger, that the confidence in Him which springs from the Doctrine of the Atonement should degenerate into presumption and pride.

Again, such a view of the character of the Most High, as the Doctrine of the Atonement gives adds powerfully to the natural effects which an abiding sense of His presence is fitted to produce; and such a sense, *faith* has obviously a natural tendency to maintain. But we saw that from this consciousness of the presence of God, even under far less awful views of His nature, the human mind naturally shrinks with aversion and fear; and that, therefore, any provision for operating upon us by right views of the character of God would be ineffectual, unless accompanied by such an assurance of reconciliation with Him as may vanquish our repugnance to contemplate Him.—But this whole investigation is too recent to render it necessary to review it minutely; and to the answer to this objection, which it has drawn directly from the Doctrine, I have no desire to add anything of my own.

For various reasons, however, I do desire to bring to your minds the animated reply made by the great Apostle of the Gentiles, to difficulties of the same kind, connected with these fundamental principles of *his* Gospel. When, in magnifying the free mercy of the Most High, he has described it as meeting every variety and every multiplication of human crime; as growing (as it were) with the growth of our iniquity, and finally going beyond its possible limits, by a provision of mercy which must be more than adequate to any finite demand upon it, he anticipates that this glowing representation of God's unbounded compassions, which ought to vanquish all hostility against Him in the human heart, may only furnish occasion to some new display of it; may stimulate man's iniquity to some corrupt perversion of this consolatory truth, or prompt his self-righteousness and pride to some profane cavil against it; and that in either spirit a man may say, *Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?* "God forbid!" is his earnest reply. "How shall we, that are dead

¹ Rom. vi. 1, 2.

to sin, live any longer therein?" As if he said, "The thought can only pass through a mind, not merely experimentally a stranger to the influence of Christian principle, but wilfully blind to the manifest force of the rite by which men become members of the Christian Church." For the initiatory rite of Christianity (as he goes on to explain it) symbolizes death and the resurrection, and specially the death and resurrection of the blessed Lord. So that, by the very force of the figure, all who are baptized declare, that,—as He died to this world of sin, and rose again that He might dwell where sin has no place,—their profession, in becoming His followers, is a death unto sin, which is by nature, and, in the strength purchased for them, a rising again to holiness, which is by grace. The rite is thus but a symbolical declaration of the real change that takes place in every true Believer. And thus, at the very threshold of the Christian Church, the true nature of the Christian profession is so emphatically and distinctly set forth, as to stamp dishonesty on the abuse or cavil, whichever it be, that the Apostle is considering.

Again, his statement, that Christ has borne the curse of the law for Believers, and that they dread it no longer,—*that they are no longer under the law, but under grace*²,—may, he supposes, in the same manner, move the thought, "What, then, shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace?" To this, whatever it be, whether scoff, cavil, misconception, or abuse,—his answer is as before, "God forbid!" He reminds those to whom it may occur, that the service into which Believers have entered, and the service of sin, are interests so essentially opposite and irreconcilable, that we cannot put on the outward profession of the Gospel without the solemn renunciation of sin, to which he has before adverted; and that this is but a figure of the real change which true Believers undergo;—that it is only of true Be-

² Rom. vi. 14.

lievers that it can be said that they are *not under the law, but under grace*;—and that, therefore, if we have passed *under grace*, it is by receiving into our hearts a principle, which, though it may not, and does not, prevent the assaults of sin, has effectually rescued us from the debasing thralldom to sin in which we were held,—though it has not entirely destroyed sin's force, has certainly overthrown its tyranny. And on this statement, he leaves the question confidently to common sense,—appealing boldly to the commonest principles of common life for its decision. ‘If one were to profess that he had cast off the authority of his former master, and entered into the service of another, while his whole conduct and way of life remained unchanged;—if he continued to obey the commands of the former, and neglected or disobeyed those of the latter, what would you conclude? Would you not conclude that the professed change was a deceit, whatever were the motives to the deception? Apply these simple principles to the case before us: and if you find that with you the tyranny of sin is unbroken, be assured that you are deceiving yourselves in imagining that you have changed masters. That you should have obeyed the commands of sin formerly, when you were professedly sin's servants, was natural: it was but according to the nature of all servitude. But if you are doing so still, the same principles oblige us to conclude that your master is still the same.’

This is the answer of the Apostle to such objections: and you see how little it qualifies his large statement of God's free forgiveness of sin, which gave rise to the first; or his statement that we are not under the *law*, but under *grace*, which seems to furnish occasion to the second. He derives his answer to both, from the true nature of the Christian profession, which the Word of God so distinctly sets forth. By this he is enabled to show, not that Believers are under the law, but that they who are under sin are not Believers;—not that Believers in Christ are not freely for-

given, and fully accepted in Him, but that they who see in this, motives or encouragement to disobedience, are strangers to the very elements of the Christian profession.

‘Be it so,’ it may be said, ‘Let the Apostle’s answer be taken as establishing that it professes to establish; but must it not be felt that, however suited to his purpose it might have been, it is a very insufficient answer to the whole objection as stated above; that it in fact leaves the second part of the objection, certainly not an unimportant part, wholly without an answer? We are looking for the *natural* operation of *faith*, and may for the present set everything else out of view. And we deny that, however successful it may be in *restraining* from sin, it does anything to promote our advancement in holiness, or to stimulate us to exertion in the service of God. Admit that the distinctness with which the Bible presents to us the life and character of the Believer, sufficiently guards a man from imagining himself reconciled to God by faith in the blood of His Son while he continues to pursue a course which the Bible unequivocally declares to be inconsistent with that state of reconciliation. Let it be admitted, too, that the restraint which it provides, is operative as far as it is reasonable to suppose that it can operate; that it keeps Believers not only from all flagrant violations of God’s law, but from many lesser derelictions of duty;—from any systematic neglect of express commandments—from any clear opposition to the Scripture character of followers of Christ, which might awaken in them alarm and doubt, whether they really belonged to that class or not. Admit that all this is done, and how much is left undone! How much remains to complete the Christian character! And in all of this great work that remains, does not *faith in Christ*,—trust in His obedience and His death for everything,—rather impede us than help us on,—by taking away the connexion between our exertions here,

and our destiny hereafter, which is, after all, the great incentive to active virtue?’

I do not know that the objection, upon this principle, to the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, admits of being put in a subtler or a stronger form than this. If I did, I should be careful to choose that form for it. It certainly, in the form in which I have stated it, deserves an answer; and I shall endeavour to answer it. But to avoid misapprehension, I may at the outset say, that I agree fully in the view of religion which makes *any restraining* force insufficient for its purposes. Religion certainly does not consist wholly, or even chiefly, in abstinence from what is forbidden—it lies much more in the performance of what is commanded; but most of all, in the reception and cultivation of new principles of action—new desires—new affections: in that inward and thorough change which can render *our reasonable service to God*³, *a service of perfect freedom*⁴; which can, according to His own gracious word of promise, make the Lord's yoke *easy* and His burden *light*⁵. I think it requires nothing but a fair examination of the nature of *faith* to show in it a powerful provision for effecting this entire change of human character, which is, no doubt, as regards us, the ultimate end of religion. But, in the present Discourse, I must confine myself to the more limited object of showing that this objection against the moral effects of this Doctrine is a groundless one.

Though I hold the objection to be deserving of an answer, I should be sorry to be understood to admit, that, if it were established, it would be conclusive as to the actual effects of the religious views which it assails. For it professedly speaks but of their *natural* effects. It says nothing of the secret operation of the Spirit which accompanies them, and applies them to the mind and heart of the Be-

³ Rom. xii. 1.

⁴ The Collect for Peace.

⁵ Matt. xi. 30.

liever—by which, if they had deficiencies, all their deficiencies might be abundantly supplied—by which, even their injurious tendencies, if they had such tendencies, might be effectually counteracted. Still it would be a startling thing to find that the instrument wielded by this Omnipotent Agent in the work of our sanctification, was, in truth, so defective, or worse than defective, as the objection represents it. We should be combating for the truth to a disadvantage, if we were obliged to confess, that, so far as we can discern its natural tendency, the more thoroughly that we know, and the more firmly that we believe the truth, the less likely are we to be active in the service of God!

The defenders of Gospel truth, however, are in no such unfavourable position. The objection is neither well grounded in what it asserts nor in what it assumes. *Faith* does not dissolve all connexion between our conduct and our destiny; nor is *self-love* the most effective principle in securing active obedience. The latter part of this reply is connected with matter which renders it by far the more important part; but, in the present Discourse, I must confine myself to the former.

It is, doubtless, true, as the objection supposes, that all who believe the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION *by faith only* do hold that the Word of God distinctly teaches us to regard ourselves as pardoned by God, and restored to His favour, freely,—for the sake of a work in which we had not, nor could have had any share: that it not only gives us no encouragement to do anything in order to procure that pardon or to obtain that favour, but denounces and stigmatizes all such attempts, as derogating from the sufficiency of the Redeemer's work, and, for ourselves, and in our measure, making the cross of Christ *of none effect*. So far, the foundation of this objection is doubtless true. But they hold also that the same Word no less distinctly teaches, that in thus uniting ourselves to the Lord, we are not terminating our

course of discipline, but commencing it. That by *faith* we become *disciples* of Christ; that we then but enter the school where we are to be formed for eternity; by instructions and chastenings, by trials and blessings, by the outward dispensations of His providence, by the inward leadings of His Spirit, *to be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light*⁶.

And surely if the case stood here, it would seem that enough had been done to vindicate the Doctrine from this objection. For assuredly there ought to be enough to secure anxious interest in the progress of this Divine teaching, in the bare knowledge that it is going on. They who feel that they are in God's hands, and for such a purpose, can hardly be unconcerned about the progress that they are making,—insensible to the pain of retrograding, to the pleasure of advancing, in this heavenward course. The Apostle certainly seems to find in this—in the bare consciousness that a power so wonderful is exercised upon us, and within us,—motives the most persuasive to activity and assiduity, no less than to humility and awe. “Work out your own salvation,” saith he, “with fear and trembling; *for* it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure⁷.”

But if we go on a little further, we shall see still more clearly that, in teaching us to regard life as a state of discipline—a state, that is, in which character is formed by conduct—Revelation virtually establishes a connection between our conduct here and our destiny hereafter, which seems well fitted to keep a concern for our own interests in continual exercise.

We cannot look upon the diversities of moral character that surround us, whether among believers or unbelievers, without feeling sure that individuals of each class pass through

⁶ Col. i. 12.

⁷ Phil. ii. 12.

life very differently improved or injured by its teaching, and arrive at its close in very different moral states. If the authority of Scripture were needed to establish a truth so obvious to common observation, the Lord expressly tells us, that of those who do bring forth good fruit, *some bring forth an hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty*⁸; and that, on the other hand, a return to the thralldom of sin after a temporary escape from its yoke, can make *the last state of a man worse than the first*⁹; and that some are *twofold more children of hell* than others¹⁰.

But if this difference exist at the close of life, it is surely impossible to avoid believing that it continues after life is ended. Unless we suppose that God places us here for the formation of character; provides potent means to effect its formation; employs the events of life, the revelation of His will, the operation of His Spirit, to promote this design; brings all these means, internal and external, natural and preternatural, to bear upon man to effect this end; and then, when life is over, interferes by an act of power to undo all that this elaborate system of forces had effected,—unless, I say, we are prepared to adopt this unreasonable and wild supposition, we must believe that men enter the next world—both the great divisions of it—as they leave this,—in widely different degrees of moral advancement and of moral degradation.

Now, this, fairly considered, is equivalent to asserting that they enjoy there very different degrees of happiness, and suffer there very different degrees of misery. For under every reasonable notion of the happiness of the future state, much of it must be supposed to consist in the exercise of those principles, and in the indulgence of those affections, which it is the business of moral discipline here to invigorate and to purify. A more advanced state of moral improve-

⁸ Matt. xiii. 23.

⁹ Matt. xii. 45.

¹⁰ Matt. xxiii. 15.

ment is, therefore, but another name for a higher capacity for this kind of happiness. And, surely, with Him *in whose presence is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore*¹¹—the highest capacity for happiness must be the highest enjoyment of it. So that you see, that unless we suppose an express provision in heaven for excluding men from degrees of happiness of which they have been by God's appointment rendered capable upon earth, we must suppose a wise distinction in the enjoyments of saints in the *habitation of glory*. And, I may add, though it is not directly connected with our argument, that if we only think how much of the misery of the realms of darkness must consist in the natural working of the evil principles, which the discipline of life, when perverted from its true purpose, serves to foster and aggravate, we must see that there is the same necessity for inferring different degrees of suffering there.

Thus, important differences in the condition of men hereafter would be the natural result of the differences of their moral state in leaving life: and this would be enough for my purpose. But we appear to have good authority for referring some differences in their future lot to what we should call a more direct appointment of God:—as express authority as it would be reasonable to expect to have upon a subject, on which the Scriptures always manifest remarkable reserve. The notions of the eternal world, which are usually entertained, are well expressed by an eloquent writer, when he calls it, *an ocean of spirits without bottom and without shore*. But such vague notions of the world to come are not Scriptural. The Bible, without supplying much food for curiosity, gives us much more definite information concerning the state that awaits us. We know from the Word of God that there exist now among the inhabitants of heaven wide distinctions. We are told of differences in Angelic natures,—as angel, and archangel, seraphs, and cherubs,—which we must suppose

¹¹ Psalm xvi. 11.

real and important, but of which (though their existence is distinctly declared to us) we can form no very clear ideas. But, besides these, we read of distinctions among the Angelic host, of which we can form better conceptions, distinctions of rank and authority, *thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers*¹². And the glimpses which we are given of the state of saints hereafter, seem to hold out very clearly the existence and maintenance among them of the like distinctions. We have the Apostles *sitting upon thrones with Christ, judging the twelve tribes of Israel*¹³. We have the place of highest dignity *on His right hand, and on His left hand, in His kingdom*, reserved for those *for whom it is prepared by the Father*¹⁴. We have *the undefiled following the Lamb, whithersoever He goeth*¹⁵. While those whom He has brought out of great tribulation, *serve Him day and night in His temple*¹⁶. And other intimations will, probably, of themselves come to your minds, tending to establish the same fact — that though, in the spiritual world, *they that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever*¹⁷; yet it shall be there as in the natural world, where *one star differeth from another star in glory*¹⁸.

But in addition to all such intimations of permanent distinctions in the condition of the blessed hereafter, it is to be remarked, that the plain aim of some parabolical representations of the final judgment seems to be to convey to us, that, in that righteous award, the precise station shall be assigned to each for which he has been fitted by the discipline of life. The servant whose pound had gained ten pounds, it set over ten cities; he who gained five, over five¹⁹. And, I may add, — though, as before, it only bears upon my immediate purpose

¹² Col. i. 16; Eph. i. 21; 1 Pet. iii. 22.

¹³ Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30.

¹⁴ Matt. xx. 23.

¹⁵ Rev. xiv. 4.

¹⁶ Rev. vii. 14, 15.

¹⁷ Dan. xii. 3.

¹⁸ 1 Cor. xv. 41.

¹⁹ Luke xix. 17.

as showing how entirely the principle pervades God's government,—that we are informed distinctly, that in awarding punishments in that hour, the like measure of their severity shall be employed. That ignorance of God's will, for example, which, though it does not take away the guilt of sin, certainly lessens its heinousness, shall also mitigate its punishment; and that so, while *the servant who knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; the servant who knew not his master's will, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes*²⁰. So that on the whole, besides those differences in the future happiness of moral agents, which, as we saw, are the necessary result of the difference of their moral state, it appears that we have good reasons to look for distinctions in their condition hereafter, depending also upon these moral differences, not, however, like the former, resulting naturally from them, but from a direct appointment grounded upon them.

To pursue the matter further, is for our purpose needless. Indeed, as I intimated, it was not necessary for me to have gone so far. In simply stating what is so distinctly stated in God's Word, and what is too reasonable, and too much in unison with the general principles of His government, to require a detailed proof,—that while the conduct of a Believer is forming his character, his character must materially affect his happiness in the world to come,—we should seem to have done enough to answer the objection. The objection supposes that Believers, according to their principles, are living under a system which separates wholly their present conduct and their future interests. Assuredly enough is said in reply when we show, that according to their principles they are really living under a system which establishes a close and most important connexion between their course upon earth and their condition in the unseen world: a system which as-

²⁰ Luke xii. 47.

signs a sure and never-ending reward to every act of genuine obedience to God's will,—which suffers not one to fall to the ground without bringing forth fruit eternal: which assures the Believer that nothing that is done or suffered in his Master's service shall be left unrecompensed,—that from the blood of martyrdom shed in defence of His truth, to a *cup of cold water given to a disciple in His name*—not a single act of duty and love shall go *without its reward*. And all this, without in the slightest particular impairing the perfect freedom of that grace in which he stands, and desires to stand for ever!

Indeed, so far is *reward*, under this view of it, from being opposed to the freeness of Divine grace, that in the writings which set forth God's free grace most distinctly, there is continually no less distinct reference to this provision of recompense. Thus, it is true that the certain conjunction of present suffering and future glory is often spoken of simply, and without any explanation: "Our hope of you is stedfast, knowing that as ye are partakers of the sufferings of Christ, so shall ye be also of the consolation²¹." "If we suffer, we shall also reign with him²²." "For which cause, we faint not; for though our outward man perish, our inward man is renewed, day by day: for our light affliction, which is but for a moment, *worketh for us* a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory²³." But at other times we are told how this union is brought about,—that it is by the moral effect of such sufferings upon our character. God's design in *chastening* His children, is, we are expressly told, to effect in them this moral change,—to *make them partakers of His holiness*²⁴. And hence the trials which He sends are not merely to be endured with patience, but received with gratitude and joy: "We glory in tribulation also, *knowing* that tribulation *worketh* patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh

²¹ 2 Cor. i. 7.

²³ 2 Cor. iv. 16.

²² 2 Tim. ii. 12.

²⁴ Heb. xii. 10.

not ashamed²⁶." And again, the startling command *to rejoice in temptations*, is accompanied by a satisfactory explanation derived from this effect in strengthening and perfecting the moral character of the sufferer: "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations, *knowing this*, that the trying of your faith worketh patience. But let patience have her perfect work, that ye may be perfect and entire, wanting nothing²⁷."

This is a full explanation of the connexion which is elsewhere only stated or implied. And we need to bear this explanation in memory at times, when, in declaring this certainty of recompense, in perfect confidence that he could not be misunderstood, a strength of language is employed by the Apostle: which it requires this help to enable us to follow, as, "God is not *unrighteous* to forget your work, and labour of love²⁸."—And again, "Seeing it is a *righteous* thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with His mighty angels²⁹." No one will suppose that the great Apostle here means to put the two things of which he speaks,—God's righteous punishment of vice, and His gracious reward of virtue,—upon the same footing of natural equity; or, so to contradict himself and the truth, as to assert that the poor returns of love, which Believers are enabled to render, for the *exceeding love wherewith He first loved them*, ever leave God their debtor—or that the afflictions of the present life give to any one a just claim for compensation in another. None of these things were in the Apostle's mind. But, speaking to those to whom he had explained fully the principles of the Gospel, he speaks fearlessly. He apprehends no misconception when he speaks thus strongly of a part of that gracious scheme, as, though,

Rom. v. 3.

²⁷ Heb. vi. 10.

²⁶ James i. 2.

²⁸ 2 Thess. i. 6, 7.

like all the rest of it, springing altogether from God's free grace, yet so fixed and consecrated, that He could not depart from it without departing from His faithfulness.

But to return to the objection. What view of this life is there that presents so elevated an aim to exertion, applies such powerful incentives to activity, or makes them operate so unceasingly, as this—which represents every moment as of real value; every act, every thought, as capable of exercising an intelligible influence upon eternal interests? This not only imparts a dignity and importance to life's meanest incidents, which its weightiest concerns want when separated from such a connexion, but it does so upon principles which all can understand and appreciate. For you see that this is but applying to the acknowledged facts of our condition, a known law of our nature: that well-known law under which conduct is exercising an unceasing influence upon character. Every one must see how, under this law, the unheeded events of every day, and every hour, may be doing something to form for eternity the character of every human being,—calling into exercise some moral principle,—developing some propensity,—renewing that strife between conscience and passion, which tends to the advancement or degradation of our moral nature, according to its conduct and issue,—strengthening some vice, or confirming some virtue. What hour, in fact, of our waking existence, carefully reviewed, even by ourselves, at its close, would not be seen to have brought with it some intelligible demand upon temperance, or fortitude, or self-denial; upon forbearance, or benevolence, or active exertion; upon zeal for God, or love for man? And as these claims are answered or not, as conscience and that Spirit which strives with our spirit prevail over evil dispositions and indolence, or yield to them, are we not plainly advancing or retrograding in the moral course in which we are treading; and, in either event becoming fitted for some

station in the world that we are hereafter to inhabit, for the society with which we shall dwell for ever? Now, with this view of the connexion of this life with the life that is to come, is there any one that will compare, in their probable operation upon the mind, the notions usually entertained of that connexion,—a vague dread of punishment, banished by some notion of the mercy of God, no less vague; or presumptuous hopes of reward, betraying ignorance alike of God and of ourselves*?

But it may be said, However true and important this view may be, what connexion has it with the principle of faith in the Redeemer? Why, you are to remember that what has been said was designed to answer an objection which charges that principle with depriving those who are under its influence, of all intelligible motives to activity in the service of God: every degree of activity, at least, beyond the very moderate degree required to keep down alarm about our condition. And for the purpose of answering this objection what has been said seems abundantly sufficient. It seems quite enough for this purpose to show, that in the form in which a connexion between our present conduct and our future interest seems best calculated to excite and to sustain exertion, *faith* does nothing to dissolve that connexion. So far, on the contrary, as it may rest upon the direct testimony of God's Word, *faith* includes a belief in it. So far as it has for its support fair reasoning upon that testimony, *faith* does nothing to discountenance it. For answering such an objection, this would appear abundantly sufficient.

But in fact, *faith* has a much more important part to perform in the matter. It is required, first, to lay a satisfactory foundation for the Doctrine, as I have endeavoured to explain it; and then, to aid and to regulate its practical operation.

* Note Y.

And first, it is evident that it is only in the new relation which faith establishes between God and man, that man can be the proper subject of *reward* at God's hand.

That *rewards* can only be consistently bestowed upon those who, being reconciled to God through Christ, have all their offences blotted out by His blood, and are accepted in Him as dear children, I have already established, if I have established the fundamental principles of the Gospel in opposition to erroneous views of it. The very notion of *reward*, indeed, involves insuperable difficulties, and is glaringly preposterous, when we regard it as administered by a righteous Judge, trying those who are bound to render obedience to a law, and who have all confessedly failed to obey it. But it involves no such difficulties, when we consider that trial as past, and the Judge as a reconciled Father. That our tender Father should look with complacency even upon the feeblest attempts of His "dear children" to serve and to obey Him; that He should see with satisfaction the needful transformation of their character going on under such a course of obedience; that He should stimulate and cheer their progress by a sense of His approbation, or by the hope of *reward*;—this cannot appear, to any one who fairly considers it, a strange or a startling thing. I will therefore not dwell upon this operation of *faith*, as if it involved any difficulty which required to be removed, but will pass to the others.

FAITH alone, then, as we have seen, takes away the obstinate reluctance to contemplate the world to come, which we all naturally feel. For at the bottom of that reluctance lies a sense of hostility to God, and in *faith* we behold Him reconciled. But it does not stop here. It tends to carry our contemplations continually to the scene to which we are hastening: not merely reminding us, generally, that we are pilgrims and sojourners here, but, in the toils of our pilgrimage, directing our eyes to our true home, where *a rest*

remaineth for the people of God²⁹. In the perils of our warfare, sustaining us by the sure promise, that, for all who fight the good fight, *there is laid up a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give at His appearing³⁰*. In the calamities of life, calling to our remembrance, that *the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed³¹*. In suffering, and sorrow, and bereavement, carrying us in hope to the world where there is neither pain, nor grief, nor separation,—where *sorrow and sighing shall flee away³²*.—Nor in our happier hours is it less solicitous to remind us how transient and perishable are the objects upon which we are lavishing our best affections; making here, as before, the great realities of futurity familiar objects of our thoughts; teaching us here, as before, to look *not at the things that are seen, but at the things that are not seen*; by pressing upon us the momentous difference between them—that *the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal³³*.

Now, how all this must aid the views of life which we have been considering, must be evident. For, without pursuing the matter into detail, it must be plain that such views as we have been considering can operate strongly upon a man, only in the degree in which the objects of the unseen state hold their true place in his mind, and have truly engaged his affections: and this is too plain to require a detailed proof.

But if *faith* be thus useful in aiding the operation of such views, it is absolutely essential in regulating it. It is essential to supply resolution, and to restrain presumption; to prevent failures in this course from restoring the spirit of slavish fear from which we have been delivered, and to prevent success in it from generating pride. How it effects all this, it can hardly be necessary, after all that has

²⁹ Heb. iv. 9.³⁰ 2 Tim. iv. 8.³¹ Rom. viii. 18.³² 1 Cor. iv. 18.³³ 2 Cor. iv. 18.

been said upon its nature, to employ much time in pointing out. It must be manifest to every one, that the principle of simple unreserved *trust* in another, at all times, and for everything, is fitted to abate pride from whatever source ; and that the fact that this Being is the Everlasting God is fitted to sustain hope under every trial.

When we look at the contest in which we are to engage, as one in which every moment is of importance ; in which every act, and every negligence, produces real and enduring effects : when we consider the momentous interests that hang upon this struggle, and the powerful enemies with whom we have to contend—and then look at ourselves, we naturally shrink back with dismay. “Who is sufficient for these things³⁴?” must be the desponding language of every heart. But *faith* replies that *our sufficiency is of God*³⁵; that *His grace is sufficient for us* ; that *His strength is made perfect in weakness*³⁶. It reminds us that His omnipotence is engaged in the work : that the same everlasting Spirit who has opened our minds to discern Divine truth, and our hearts to feel it,—that it is He who heals our infirmities, supports our weakness, supplies our wants ; furnishes us with arms for our spiritual warfare, and aids us in the conflict ; gives us the desire to pray, and directs our petitions ; guides us in drawing from the events of life,—from all God’s outward dealings with us, whether trials or blessings,—the improvement which all were alike designed to supply ; and exercises upon us, within, those transforming influences by which *the world becomes crucified unto us, and we unto the world*³⁷. Is not this enough ? In much weakness, and amidst many fears ; amidst all the painful and often recurring proofs that we carry *this treasure in earthen vessels*³⁸ ; in sorrow and shame for dull ingratitude, and barren carelessness ; in bitter remorse for wanderings and back-

³⁴ 2 Cor. ii. 16.³⁵ 2 Cor. iii. 5.³⁶ 2 Cor. xii. 9.³⁷ Gal. vi. 14.³⁸ 2 Cor. iv. 7.

all things; is there not here enough, and more than enough, to support and to cheer the weakest Believer?

Doubtless there is. And the same source supplies abundant materials to repress the pride which is so ready to spring up in our carnal hearts, under a sense that our course is advancing. The answer which *faith* supplies, indeed, to the sober question, "*Who made thee to differ?*" ought effectually to extinguish all presumption in our Christian graces, real or imaginary. FAITH, which has brought us to the Cross of the Redeemer for pardon for sin, directs us to the efficacy of the same stupendous sacrifice, for all protection from sin's snares, and all cleansing from its pollution. So far as we are to be restored to the purity of our lost estate here, *faith* directs us to look for this restoration, not to any visionary spring of renovation in our corrupt and fallen nature, but to the same *fountain open for sin and for uncleanness*³⁹;—to the *gifts purchased for the rebellious*⁴⁰ by Him who died for them: and gladly and gratefully acknowledges, therefore, that if we do bring forth any fruit in righteousness, it is not ours, but His. But *faith* rests upon views of God's demands upon us, which will not allow us easily to think highly of such fruit. It brings our lives to a standard of duty, by which our best actions show too poorly to minister much to spiritual pride. It makes familiar to every believing heart the humble confession, "the little fruit that we have in holiness, it is, God knoweth, corrupt and unsound"⁴¹. And by the views of God upon which it is grounded, and which by exercise it deepens and confirms, it effectually keeps down the vain imagination, that in the most advanced state to which His grace ever brings us we can challenge or sustain His scrutiny. And while it keeps alive continually the sense that we only stand in His sight, as

³⁹ 1 Cor. iv. 7.

⁴⁰ Zech. xiii. 1.

⁴¹ Psalm lxxviii. 18; Eph. iv. 8.

⁴² Hooker, 'Discourse of Justification,' § 7.

seen and accepted in Him who is the LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS⁴³; it prompts unceasingly the Apostle's fervent aspiration, that *we may be found in HIM, not having our own righteousness, but the righteousness which is of God*⁴⁴! So that *faith* is not less powerful to keep alive humility, than it is absolute to banish despair.

And, on the whole, you must see how groundless is this objection,—how groundless any objection must be, that charges *faith* with robbing religion of the support of that universal and operative principle of human nature, a concern for our own well-being. On the contrary, you see that, so far as this is a legitimate principle of action, *faith* only interferes to add to its force, and to regulate its operation. So that if *self-love* be, as it is said to be, the surest spring of obedience, here it is, enlightened fully, and fully awakened, stimulated to activity, sustained in exercise, directed to its true ends, and restrained within its proper limits, and acting—that is, having a tendency to act—upon the Believer, at every moment of his existence, to secure his active obedience to the will of God!

But it is to mistake our nature,—fallen as we are,—it is to mistake our nature greatly, to regard *self-love* as the most effective principle in securing obedience; and it is grossly to mistake the nature of our religion to suppose that it is on the efficacy of *self-love* that it mainly relies. Christianity certainly does not design to place us under the dominion of *self-love*, however well-informed or wisely regulated it be. She seeks to raise us to a higher principle of action, which is at the same time a surer principle of obedience. What this is, and what part *faith* has to perform in exciting or supporting it, I shall endeavour to point out in my next discourse upon this subject.

⁴³ Jer. xxiii. 6.

⁴⁴ Phil. iii. 9. Note Z.

SERMON X.

UPON THE MORAL EFFECTS OF FAITH—

Concluded.

Scimus quidem quod fides nunquam est sola, sed affert secum charitatem et alia multiplicia dona. Qui enim in Deum credit et certus est quod faveat nobis, siquidem et filium dedit et cum filio spem æternæ vitæ, quomodo hic non amaret ex toto corde Deum? Quomodo eum non revereretur? Quomodo non studeret declarare pro tantis beneficiis gratum animum? Quomodo non probaret Deo obedientiam in adversis perferendis?

Sic fides eorum pulcherrimarum virtutum secum ducit: neque unquam sola est. Sed non ideo confundendæ res, et quod solius fidei est, aliis virtutibus tribuendum.

LUTHER, IN GEN.—*Cap. 15.*

SERMON X.

I JOHN IV. 19.

We love Him because He first loved us.

THE Gospel is professedly designed for man in the low estate to which sin has brought him; and if it contained nothing bearing a reference to a part of our fallen nature so widely diffused, and so operative, as *self-love* is, it would be an indication that it did not come from Him who made us, and who *knows of what we are made*. The omission doubtless might admit of a satisfactory account; but it would plainly present a difficulty requiring to be accounted for.

We have seen, however, my brethren, that, in fact, no such difficulty exists; that not only do the representations of Revelation concerning man's condition and prospects contain matter to alarm this principle and to stimulate it to activity at the first, but that, after, impelled by fear and hope, we have, *by faith*, embraced the offers of Divine mercy in Christ, *self-love* is not left without matter to exercise itself upon. For that, though the faith of a Believer teaches him to look exclusively to the merits and the sufferings of his Master for pardon and acceptance with God, and, in that reconciling work, forbids him to ascribe to himself any part, original or supplementary,—it teaches him also, that the further promises of God, of making him like to Him

in whom he trusts, and so rendering him meet for the inheritance purchased and prepared for him, shall be effected through the gradual teaching of His everlasting Spirit. And that this omnipotent agent employs, in promoting God's gracious *will concerning us, even our sanctification*, the influence of the *faith* which He has bestowed, of the Word which He has dictated, of the outward events of life which He ordains : until it seem fit to Divine wisdom to terminate the earthly course of the subject of His teaching. And, lastly, we saw that a right view of such a course of discipline discovers in it a provision for engaging the Believer's concern for his own well-being, from the beginning to the end of his career. For that, independently of all other cause for sorrow at finding himself retarded or retrograding in this moral course, and independently of all other motives which would make him desire to advance in it, and take pleasure in a sense of advancement, there is this particular motive, addressing itself directly to the principle of *self-love*, namely, that such an advancement in holiness must be an augmentation of eternal happiness. And of this connexion between the present life and the life to come, of the Scriptural grounds upon which it rests, and of the part which *faith* has to act in maintaining it, I gave you, when I last addressed you, a sufficiently detailed account.

I did not then think it necessary, nor do I now, to say much to obviate the misapprehension,—to which, nevertheless, I should be sorry to give occasion,—that, in establishing such a connexion I am *building again the things which I destroyed*¹. Any one who is willing to give fair attention to the subject, must, I think, see that this representation attributes no good effect to human conduct, except as it emanates from, and is governed by, *faith*; and no *reward* to it, even then, as of *debt*, but all of *grace*; and nothing whatever to it, at any time, or under any view of it, which was before

¹ Gal. ii. 18.

ascribed to *faith*, or to its object, exclusively of conduct. I should, I trust, shrink from all *philosophy* as from *evil* *deceit*, if it led to anything calculated to mar the simplicity or impair the freeness of the Gospel of Christ. But I am satisfied that this view, rightly considered, has no tendency to do either: that it only requires to consider it apart from prejudice, in order to see, that it gives a satisfactory account of many embarrassing appearances in life; and an intelligible and worthy account of the whole end of life itself, which, unless viewed in some such connexion, presents such an afflicting and perplexing scene: that it gives an easy and consistent meaning to multiplied passages of Holy Writ, which are usually explained, on the one hand, so as to do great violence to the natural force of the plainest language, and, on the other, so as to contradict the plainest and best established principles of the Gospel: and, lastly, what is most important, that it is sustained, as I then briefly showed, by as strong direct Scriptural evidence, as in such a case it would be reasonable to expect to find. And being thus sure of its soundness, its importance, and its truth, I should be sorry to decline putting it forward, under an apprehension, that, notwithstanding every fair precaution to obviate misconception, it may still by some be misconceived.

A being under the direction of *self-love*, thus informed, regulated, and restrained, is no doubt in a very advanced moral state, when compared with one who is governed by more confined or less correct views of his real interests, or by the passion or appetite that happens to be at the moment most inflamed. But it is an error to suppose that he is in the state to which the Gospel designs and has the power to raise man. And Christian moralists, who have been content to regard this as the ultimate end of Divine teaching, have prejudiced and dishonoured Christianity, by a repre-

—entation which takes for it a lower aim than that of ancient philosophy. For it was only the worst part of that philosophy (as you know) which professed to regard prudence as the highest human virtue, and to make an enlightened self-love the ruling principle of human conduct. The better part failed too,—failed, perhaps, hardly less signally,—to regulate life and to purify the heart. But it failed in a higher and nobler effort,—in the attempt to place man under the dominion of the love of virtue.

This failure may, in part, perhaps, be ascribed to the abuse of means within the reach of philosophy, but it is, doubtless, chiefly due to causes far beyond her control. To whichever it be ascribed, however, it is only with loose thinkers that it can have the effect—which it seems so often to have—of stamping the character of *visionary* upon the design itself. That design certainly deserves to be very differently regarded. The mode of prosecuting it may be open to much just animadversion; and it was found united with the grossest vices in practice, and with many speculative views both false and chimerical. But the design was not more elevated than sound. The design of freeing man from the thralldom of sense, and from the tyranny of appetite, by restoring to the higher powers of his nature the supremacy which these meaner parts had wrested from them, must be regarded with admiration by every one who is not incapacitated from viewing it in its true light by obstinate prejudice, or a cold heart, or a limited understanding. It was one of those aspirations after his *first estate*, which, even in the disorder and degradation of the fall, from time to time, vindicated man's high origin. And the grievous errors with which it was accompanied, and the utter failure in which it issued, furnish no reasonable presumption against the soundness of the design: they are but melancholy demonstrations of the depth of our fall.

Religion finds man, as philosophy did, in a state in which

conscience is far too feeble of itself to govern passion, and in which it has *self-love* perpetually arrayed against it, through false views of our real happiness; or, at best, dormant, under imperfect information concerning it. The attempts of philosophy to obtain for conscience the aid of this important principle were, of necessity, attended with indifferent success. For however clearly it may be shown—and I think it can be shown, and has often been shown most clearly—that virtue promotes the *temporal* happiness of the *race*; it must, I think, in all candour be allowed, that there are many conceivable and actual cases in which it is doubtful whether a strict observance of the rules of virtue always secures the happiness of an *individual*, in this life—doubtful to such a degree, as to render it impossible to interest self-love *always* on the side of virtue, without taking into consideration a future state of existence. And to everyone who has looked at the matter, it must be plain, that unaided reason had arrived at no views of a future life which were fitted to render conscience any effectual and steady support.

But Revelation supplies abundantly this defect—when it publishes and proves to us that God *hath appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness*²—and *will render to every man according to his works; to those who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, honour, and immortality,—eternal life. But to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness,—indignation and wrath*³.

From the moment that Revelation establishes that *tribulation and anguish* shall for ever rest upon *every soul of man that doeth evil*⁴, it becomes plainly impossible to interest self-love on the side of vice. And that there are further provisions to engage its active co-operation in the cause of virtue, I showed you before. Revelation certainly designs

² Acts xvii. 31.

³ Rom. ii. 6, 7.

⁴ Rom. ii. 8.

to effect this alliance. It is obviously an end of great importance. It is indeed the one to which Revelation first addresses itself; and the means which are employed to secure it have naturally a prominent place in the Bible,—so prominent as to render it easy to understand how its true place in religion has been misconceived. That it has been misconceived can, I think, be easily shown. That the principle is designed to be strictly subordinate and occasional,—that the means employed to engage it on the side of *conscience* are but among the elementary means of religion, and among its first operations,—and that the end itself is but subsidiary to a higher end,—the end of raising man to a condition in which he may be acted upon by the higher parts of his nature, and ultimately brought under the dominion of the *love of God*,—all this is easily proved from the Word of God: and, I think, indeed, it can hardly fail to make itself evident to any one who examines patiently and fairly the system which that Word presents.

The point might be established, perhaps, in various ways. I choose, as peculiarly fitted to my limits and design, a proof which, to a fair mind, cannot, I think, fail of being perfectly satisfactory, and which is, besides, one easily stated and understood. I mean that which is furnished by the contrast between the motives employed in the Apostolic addresses to Believers,—whether to restrain or to excite them—and the considerations which are used to move the impenitent and unbelieving,—to invite them, plead with them, threaten, and warn them.

In the addresses to Believers, for example, how sparingly do you find the *terror of the Lord*⁵, which is wielded so powerfully against the world! The prospect of *eternal happiness* is doubtless often put forward in such addresses, and

⁵ 2 Cor. v. 11.

with a clear purpose of influencing the Believer's mind. But you are to remember, that I do not mean to deny the legitimacy of such motives in their proper place. I only mean to ascertain what that is,—what is the place that they are designed to hold in religion. And I may also remark, that though *fear*—the fear of punishment—is plainly unfit to be the animating motive of our lives, or to have a prominent place among such motives (so plainly, indeed, as to make it wonderful that it should have ever been thought of for such a purpose), yet the same objections do not apply to the constant exercise of *hope*. *Fear*, even when it does not mount to such a height as to paralyse all the active principles of our nature, seems effectually to deaden all its generous emotions. But *hope* has no such effects. On the contrary, while it has a plain tendency to call into activity some of the most stirring qualities of the human mind, it offers no obstacle to the exercise of any of its tenderest and kindest sympathies. Moreover, in the particular case that we are considering, while the nature of future happiness is of a character to elevate and purify the mind that contemplates it as an object of desire, the contemplation of it can hardly be so separated from the true grounds upon which it becomes an object of *hope*, as not to excite strongly and to sustain the feelings of gratitude and love.

So that if it were the design of the Bible to imprint gratitude to God, and the love of Him, upon the human heart, it would be plainly promoting powerfully such a design by calling us, as it does so often, to contemplate the happiness which He has in store for His children. But, you will remark, that this effect is not left to the natural tendencies of this *hope*, however strong they are; but that such references to the joys of heaven are continually, almost uniformly, so made as to direct the mind expressly to the consideration of the source of these unspeakable benefits,—to the mercy of the Father,—to the sacrifice of

the Son,—to the work of the Spirit upon the heart: so as to secure an effect beyond the bare exercise of *hope*, and to indicate a purpose lying beyond the excitement of that emotion.

But as *the love of God* is undoubtedly a duty both of natural and revealed religion, no one will be disposed to question that it must be the purpose of the Christian revelation to implant that principle in the minds of Believers. The only question is, what place it was designed to hold there. And if that question be not decided by the nature of the principle, as compared with all others, it may, I think, be satisfactorily settled by considering—first, that in the portraiture of the Christian character given in the Apostolic writings, it sufficiently appears as the ruling principle. And secondly,—what I wish to secure attention particularly for, as in my apprehension establishing the point even more conclusively, though less directly,—that throughout the Epistles, where the purpose is plainly a practical one,—where the manifest design of the writer is to urge those whom he addresses to painful sacrifices,—to sustain them under severe trials,—or to animate them to arduous duties,—he directly and fearlessly appeals to gratitude and love,—not only as real and influential principles of action, but as the proper motives to unrepining submission to God's appointments, cheerful obedience to His will, and active zeal in His service.

With reference to the first, look at the life and ministry of the Apostles themselves. Look at the course of generous self-devotion of the Apostle of whose life we know most, from the moment that in humility and sincerity he asked "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do⁶?" till he is disappearing from the scene, *ready to be offered, and the time of his departure at hand*⁷. See him encountering danger fear-

⁶ Acts ix. 6.

⁷ 2 Tim. iv. 6.

lessly; patiently sustaining toil, and privation, and suffering; *taking pleasure, as he describes himself, in infirmities, in reproaches, in persecutions, in distresses, for Christ's sake*⁸; *ready, not to be bound only, but also to die for the name of the Lord Jesus*⁹. And not only animated with these devoted feelings upon great and spirit-stirring occasions, but—what everyone knows to be so much harder—regulating by the same principles the common course of his daily life;—*giving none offence in anything, that the ministry be not blamed*¹⁰;—renouncing the clearest rights, when the assertion of them might impede the success of his preaching¹¹; and ready to forego the most legitimate indulgences, when they threatened to prejudice the spiritual welfare of the weakest soul that he had won¹². If you ask how he was quickened and sustained in this arduous course of exertion, and endurance, and forbearance, you will find that it was not merely by looking to the recompense of reward, in the sure and steadfast hope of that *crown of glory which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give him at His appearing*¹³; but that it was under the resistless influence of real, fervent, grateful love to Him to whose love he owed everything—all his peace, and joy, all his privileges, and his hopes:—“the love of Christ,” saith he, “*constraineth us*¹⁴.”

Nor are you to suppose that in this he differed in any respect, except in degree, from the less distinguished followers of the Lord. For them, he prays for this gift, as the consummation of God's mercies to them; *that Christ might dwell in their hearts* BY FAITH, *that they, being rooted and grounded in love, might understand, with ALL SAINTS, what is the breadth, and length, and height, and to know the LOVE of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that they might be*

⁸ 2 Cor. xii. 10.⁹ Acts xxi. 13.¹⁰ 2 Cor. vi. 5.¹¹ 1 Cor. ix.; 2 Cor. xi.; 1 Thess. ii. 6; 2 Thess. iii. 9.¹² 1 Cor. viii. 13.¹³ 2 Tim. iv. 8.¹⁴ 2 Cor. v. 14.

*filled with all the fulness of God*¹⁵;—that their love might abound more and more, in knowledge, and in all judgment¹⁶. Nor only so; but he describes them as actually partaking of the principle, as having “the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which He had given them¹⁷,” and even more strikingly conveys what a certain and leading characteristic of the Christian profession it is, by limiting his choicest salutation to “all them that love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity¹⁸,” or by denouncing, as accursed,—devoted to destruction,—all in whom the principle is not found: “If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be anathema¹⁹.”

But, as I said, what is most striking and convincing is, the confidence with which, in practical cases, an appeal is made, not to an invigorated conscience only, but to renovated affections, to a jealous zeal for God's honour, to a real solicitude for the propagation of His truth;—to some form or result of gratitude and love, rather than to a dread of punishment, or the hope of reward. Here, for example, is the way in which an exhortation to the observance of the most arduous Christian duties, and to the cultivation of the highest Christian graces, is introduced: “I beseech you, therefore, brethren, *by the mercies of God*, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service²⁰.” And again, “I therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you that ye walk *worthy of the vocation wherewith ye are called*²¹. And again, “Be ye imitators of God, *as dear children*, and walk in love, *as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given Himself for us*²²”;—or, “Put on, therefore, *as the elect of God, holy and beloved*, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and

¹⁵ Eph. iii. 17, &c.¹⁶ Phil. i. 9.¹⁷ Rom. v. 5.¹⁸ Eph. vi. 24.¹⁹ 1 Cor. xvi. 22.²⁰ Rom. xii. 1.²¹ Eph. iv. 1.²² Ibid. v. 1.

forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, *even as God for Christ's sake hath also forgiven you, so also do ye*²³." And we have evidence that the personal teaching of the writer was not only directed to the same high ends, but grounded upon the same pure and elevated motives: "Ye know how we exhorted, and comforted, and charged every one of you, as a father doth his children, that ye would walk *worthy of God who hath called you to His kingdom and glory*²⁴."

But I omit any further citation of passages. The few that I have given will bring others of the same kind in abundance to your minds; or at least suggest the line of reading that will supply them in abundance. Look to the whole course of the Apostolic teaching; you will see that, however much it deals in general principles, it descends upon proper occasions to the most minute directions for the conduct of Believers; for the regulation of their own hearts and lives, and for their demeanour to all, both within and without the Church. And you will see throughout, that, however other motives are intermingled, this is the leading one relied upon,—that whether the writers seek to promote personal purity, patience, humility, and self-denial; or to engage a benevolent concern for those who are still enemies to the truth,—to secure for them the forbearance, tenderness, and compassion, which their awful condition calls for; or whether they are asking for the warmer and more peculiar affection with which *they* are to be regarded, who, serving the same Master, governed by the same laws, and sharing the same hopes, are journeying to the same home,—they still appeal to the same principles,—make every sacrifice that they call for, and every virtue that they enjoin, rest upon the grateful love which should fill and animate the Believer's heart.

²³ Col. iii. 12, 13.

²⁴ 1 Thess. ii. 11.

And surely, no one can look at human nature, or human life, fairly, without seeing the wisdom of this,—without seeing, that in choosing, out of all the principles of the human character, LOVE to bear the burden, the one is chosen which is best able to bear it. Even those who deny the applicability of the principle to religion, or who deride such a use of it—even they must, I think, acknowledge, that *if* our hearts were really filled with the LOVE OF GOD, our lives would be regulated by a principle more effective in securing obedience to His will, than any that the more selfish part of our nature can supply: a principle more wakeful, more active, more circumspect, more self-denying, more studious to please, and more vigilant to avoid offending,—setting aside all its superiority in nature over the expectation of reward, or the dread of punishment, and looking merely to its effects.—a principle more prompt and more enduring than either; more powerfully stimulating to exertion, and stronger to sustain under suffering, those upon whom it exerts its real power.

For evidence of this, I might send you—and fairly too—to the very strongest forms under which human love ever manifests itself: because it is plain, that what we are concerned in ascertaining is the strength of which the principle is capable. But as, in some of its strongest forms, it is mingled with other parts of our nature—appetites or instincts—from which it would be necessary for exactness here to separate it; and as I have no time for subtle distinctions, and no disposition to engage you in them, I prefer referring you to a case which requires none, and against which no exception lies. Of all the diversified forms, then, under which love is cheering and gladdening this troubled scene of existence, consider only the one to which the subject naturally leads us. Think only of all that it is doing everywhere around us, in the filial relation, to assuage sorrow, and to heighten joy. Think only of the power of genuine *filial love*; of its cheerful

sacrifices to promote the comfort of parents, of its tender attentions to mitigate their sufferings; how it can tame down the buoyant spirits of the young, repress their ardour, abate their levity, and control all their natural love of enjoyment, that they may cheer the decline of those who watched over their helpless infancy,—how it can often make giddy and headstrong youth sedate, thoughtful, and patient, that it may minister to unconscious imbecility, to revolting disease, to peevish and querulous age:—Think only of this, I say, by no means the strongest form of human love, and such scenes must come to your minds, as I desire to bring back to them,—for such scenes, all have witnessed, or shared in. Set beside them, fairly, any effects of the same kind that you have ever seen springing from *fear* or *hope*, and you must be satisfied of the superiority of *love* over both. I do not mean satisfied of its superiority, as in itself more elevated and generous: and as exercised more in conjunction with all that is lofty and tender in human nature, and giving strength and kindness to all;—for of that superiority no one can doubt, and with it I am not now directly concerned;—but I mean this, that, estimated simply in its power of producing a conformity of our conduct to the will of another, it is, in every form in which it exerts itself strongly upon man, the most effective of all the principles of his nature.

So that you see that, if we were at liberty to consider the matter exclusively in this way,—if we were to consider principles merely in reference to their influence upon outward conduct, and if obedience to God were made up of the performance of outward acts, or abstinence from them,—this principle would have a claim to the very highest place: and obedience would be more effectually provided for by implanting *it* in the heart, than any other whatever. But this is plainly a false view of the subject. We are not to regard the *love of God* as one out of several principles producing obedience to His will, which might be exchanged for any other, if

any other equally efficacious could be found, but as itself an essential part of obedience, and an essential element of every act of obedience.

Without spending time, then, in proving what has already sufficiently appeared,—that *love* is not only an essential part of the Believer's character, but its ruling principle, and its crowning grace,—I shall proceed, according to my plan, to consider how *faith* is concerned in producing it. I shall look, as before, only for the *natural* means which *faith* brings to bear upon the Believer's heart, to awaken there the *love* of God:—not intending thereby to intimate, that the Omnipotent Agent to whom these means owe all their efficacy cannot, or that He does not, operate beyond and independently of them, as well as in them, and by them. And I need spend but little time in the investigation, as I have, in my former examination of the principle of *faith*, anticipated a good deal of what is necessary to be stated upon this head.

And, at the outset, you must see what a clear superiority in *feasibility* (so to speak), this attempt of religion has over the one of philosophy with which we compared it. This appears at once, even from the single circumstance that it is for a person, and not for abstract notions of our own creation, that our love is demanded. To be an effective principle of action, *love* requires some support in reciprocal affection,—some personal qualities to form the foundation of attachment,—a being at least as its object, who can be interested, offended, or pleased. To anyone who considers our nature, it cannot appear surprising that all attempts to fix human affections on the cold abstractions of philosophy should have so signally failed. The beauty of virtue, the deformity of vice, are not unreal—far from it,—but the emotions which they excite, compared with our love of the virtuous or hatred of the vicious, are languid and ineffective; they are weak in all minds, compared with the feelings that are raised by the personal qualities from which they are derived, and they are

weakest in those minds in which they would have most to resist, and most to subdue.

But though this advantage is essential to the attainment of the end, it obviously is not enough, of itself, to secure it. On the contrary, the effect produced must depend, ultimately, upon the qualities of the being for whom our love is required. God, it is true, commands us to love Him, and we know that upon obedience to His commands our eternal well-being depends. But powerful a motive as this is to sway the will, it has no direct influence over the affections, nor does its power over the will secure it any. We can no more determine our minds to *love* or *hate*, under a conviction that it is our interest to feel the emotion, than we could, by resolving to do so, *hear* or *see* without having our bodily organs affected. Some object, naturally fitted to excite the feeling, must be offered to our apprehension,—an object endowed with the qualities which, by the constitution of our nature, are fitted to move the affection,—or we should labour in vain.

This is so obvious, and so well known, that a proof would be misspent upon it. I suppose, in fact, that the most untutored person—one who had never passed a moment of his life in reflecting upon his own mind—if he were satisfied that his interest required that he should feel real affection for any object, and if, accordingly, he desired earnestly to do so,—I suppose that he would instinctively feel where the limits of this sense of interest lay,—that he would turn instinctively from a contemplation of himself and his own interests to a contemplation of the object; and would endeavour to bring his mind under the influence of everything in it which was fitted to draw forth affection; to set its attractive qualities in the clearest and strongest light, and to keep out of view everything in it that was calculated to offend or repel: and this, as I said, not from any theory of the mind, true or false, but instinctively.

So far as the love of God is produced by natural means,

it is plain that it too must depend upon the form under which He is present to our conceptions. But it would seem as if this were one which rendered the feeling irresistible. It would seem, that when our love was asked for Him who, while He concentrates in Himself every excellence of which we can form any imagination, and possesses all in a degree infinitely transcending our highest imaginings, *is not far from every one of us*; whom everything that we behold or think of, all that we suffer or enjoy, is fitted to recal to our minds and everything, rightly considered, with new evidence of His goodness; on whom we depend at every moment, and to whom we owe everything—every object that ministers happiness to us, and even the constitution of mind that enables us to find in it a source of enjoyment;—it would seem, I say, that upon every principle of our nature the human affections would flow naturally to such a Being, as to the centre that attracts them all.

And such, we cannot doubt, was the effect, upon unfallen man, of the manifestation which God at the first made of Himself. Such, even now, to a certain extent, would be the effect of His exhibition of Himself in the course of His providence—in which, notwithstanding many awful demonstrations of wrath, benevolence so clearly predominates—if it were suffered to produce its natural effect upon the heart.

But we have seen that, though too far fallen to have right apprehensions of our guilt and corruption, we have such apprehensions of them as make us seek our happiness in averting our thoughts from our Creator. Viewing Him as a righteous governor, we look upon Him with aversion and dismay. And it is not more certain that love, when genuine, *casteth out all fear that hath torment*, than that this tormenting fear, where it has the mastery, effectually casteth out love. Nor is it possible that *love to God* should be *naturally* produced in the human heart, until this fear is dispelled, and that alienation vanquished which prevents us from coming

fairly under the operation of the qualities in the Divine character which are fitted to secure our love.

How the Gospel effects this, I need not now point out in detail. In it, as we have sufficiently shown, God only convinces us of our danger, to show us His own provisions for our security; He but proves to us our guilt, to take it away; establishes that we are His debtors, and that *we have nothing to pay*, only that He may *frankly forgive us all!*

If the Gospel did no more than thus remove the obstacles, which sin has reared up, to a free contemplation of God's character, even as it is made known in His works, it would be doing, as we have seen, a great deal to secure our love for Him. But, in fact, it can be easily shown that the mode of doing this presents Him to us in a light which adds infinitely to any power of attracting our affection that the perfections of His character could of themselves exercise. If it be doubted whether our hearts are so formed as to be unable to love strongly, except where we are strongly loved, it must be at least felt that the power of bounty, and even of mercy, to draw forth our affection depends greatly, if not altogether, upon the degree in which they are a proof and measure of affection:—that no amount of careless bounty or mercy can do much more than raise transient feelings of gratitude. And Revelation accordingly does not leave us in any perplexity, as to the source from which God's bounty and His mercy spring. It is careful to inform us that we owe it to His LOVE; that it was to HIS LOVE, while *we were yet sinners,—enemies*,—that His highest gift and His greatest mercy to us were due²⁵; that His love for the work of His hands survived all human ingratitude, rebellion, and crime; but that, in the perfections of the Divine nature, and in the principles of the Divine government, there existed obstacles to the manifestation of this love, until the law was satisfied, and sin expiated; and that to accomplish this work of *obedience unto death*, He

²⁵ Rom. v. 8, 10.

gave *His only begotten Son*,—spared *Him* not, but delivered *Him* up for us all²⁵!

What a measure of the severity of the Divine justice this stupendous offering for sin furnishes, I have on another occasion called on you to consider; and it is plain that, in exactly the same degree, it supplies a measure of the strength of the Divine love. But what I most desire attention for now is the provision for moving us strongly and permanently, which the Gospel makes in its mode of presenting this evidence of God's love. The Ancient Scriptures abound with the most affecting assurances of His love. He descends there to borrow images from the strongest animal instincts²⁶—from the liveliest and warmest human feelings—from the strength of a husband²⁷ or of a father's²⁸ affection—even from the tenderness of a mother's love²⁹ to convey to His people such impressions as they are capable of receiving of that *love which passeth knowledge*³¹. And when we consider from whom all these assurances proceed, it is plain that nothing can add to their force as evidence of this truth addressed to our *reason*.

But to bring this evidence home to the heart with full effect, something more is needed; and, in the way in which the great love of God to man is presented to us in the Gospel, all that is needed is abundantly supplied. Unless our affections can be connected with a person, as their object, they are, as I said before, languid and wavering. And it not only is hard for us to find such an object in the infinite Jehovah, but, in struggling with the natural difficulties of the subject, we are continually adding artificial ones, by a tendency to magnify His physical and intellectual attributes, at the expense of those moral qualities which are more natural objects of our love. Now this want of our nature is fully provided

²⁵ John iii. 16; Rom. viii. 32.

²⁶ Exod. xix. 4; Deut. xxxii. 11.

²⁷ Is. liv. 5, 6; Jer. ii. 2, iii. 14; Ezek. xvi. 8.

²⁸ Psalm ciii. 13; Jer. xxxi. 9.

³⁰ Is. xlix. 15.

³¹ Eph. iii. 19.

for, and this tendency effectually guarded against, in the history of redemption, on which *faith* is grounded.—That history which presents to us GOD IN CHRIST, *reconciling the world to Himself*,—the glory of the everlasting God, veiled in our frail nature, submitting to all its wants, enduring its distresses, and sustaining even its temptations,—is not merely to be regarded as supplying evidence the most conclusive of the Divine love, but as presenting it in the way which is fitted to produce the most impressive conviction of it;—furnishing the imagination with as distinct an object as any in the history of mankind, in the person of HIM who so long deigned Himself to bear the weaknesses, the necessities, the appetites of our nature; to share for so long in the common occupations, the common troubles and sorrows of man's daily life. The more you look at this provision, and at the nature for which it was designed, the more will you see its efficacy—that it is on a level with every capacity—and that it supplies to all, proofs, which all can feel and understand, that we are objects, not merely of God's mercy, nor of His bounty merely, but of HIS LOVE; while it brings back this evidence to the mind continually in the most persuasive form,—a single incident in the life of the blessed Lord often doing more, I am sure, to dissipate passing distrust in the Divine Love, than the most laboured arguments or the strongest assurances could. Believers cannot doubt of the wakeful care, of the tender sympathy, and of the fervent love of Him, who, though in nature infinitely raised above us, has descended to furnish us with evidence so affecting, that He is not thereby raised above a participation in all that concerns us. They cannot doubt that *the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief*³², feels for human afflictions, that He is touched with a *feeling of infirmities* that He Himself has felt, of temptations by which He has been Himself assailed—that He will give to those whom

³² Is. liii. 3.

He deigns to call *His brethren*, strength proportioned to every emergency, and suffer no trial to exceed their means of resistance³².

It is in this last and highest effect of *faith*, that the superiority of the Gospel of Christ, above every false representation of it, most conspicuously appears. If God's design were to govern outward conduct merely, with an indifference to the principles by which it was regulated, then any of these false systems—all of which, under minor differences, serve in presenting reconciliation with Him, and acceptance with Him, as a prize to human exertion—might in some measure serve to promote his design: though even that object, as we have seen, is more effectually secured by the true scheme. But it is when you regard it as the ultimate purpose of the Gospel to implant in man's heart the *love of God*, and to make that the ruling principle of his life, that the utter impotence of these degrading misrepresentations of the Gospel is fully felt. No measure of reward thus offered as a price for human love could procure it. The heart recoils from such a barter of its affections. *If a man*, said the wise king,—whose knowledge of human nature was derived from Him who made man, and who knew what was in him,—*if a man would give all the wealth of his house for love, it would utterly be contemned*³⁴.

I have already tried these systems, in another and a more regular way. I have shown them to be opposed to the direct testimony of God's Word; and I have confirmed this refutation of them by showing them to fail in the representations which they make of the holiness of His nature, and the inviolability of His law. But I should be myself convinced of their falsehood, and should be satisfied, with

³² Heb. ii. 17, 18, iv. 15, 16; 1 Cor. x. 13.

³⁴ Cant. viii. 7.

any fair mind, to rest the proof of their falsehood, upon the ignorance which they exhibit of the nature for which they are professedly designed, and upon their consequent inefficacy to promote that which is the highest and ultimate end of all God's dealings with man.

Strange however as it may sound, I believe it is to this inefficacy that they owe their origin and their currency. I believe that the uncompromising hostility with which the Gospel has always been assailed, and of which these schemes are but so many manifestations, is mainly to be ascribed to its uncompromising purity. It is different from our own mode of dealing with our enemies; and we believe reluctantly in a measure of magnanimity so far above our own. It is at war with all pride; and our proud nature struggles strenuously against it. We find it hard to cast off our intellectual pride, and to receive it in the humility of little children. And we find it harder still to cast off our moral pride, and to receive it in the self-abasement of polluted sinners. But its hardest quality to the natural mind is, I am sure, its irreconcilableness with sin. We are never so degraded as not to feel, that coming thus to Christ for everything infers the surrender of ourselves to Him in everything. We cannot acknowledge that *we are bought*, and with a price so costly, without feeling that *we are not our own, but His*³⁵.—And *we will not have this man to reign over us*³⁶. Any scheme that secures us from His pure dominion will be preferred to that which consigns us to it. It is a comfortable thing to have the prospect of being reconciled to God, at the close of our career; and no hard thing to think of rendering to Him a full measure of gratitude and love in a future state of being; and of walking close to Him there, where, if there be temptations to wander from Him, they are such as we can frame no distinct notions of. But to

³⁵ 1 Cor. vi. 19.

³⁶ Luke xix. 14.

be reconciled to Him *now*, that we may *now* walk with Him *as dear children*²⁷, is comfortable only to those to whom His Spirit has made it so.

This subject might be dwelt on much longer. Besides manifold imperfections in the mode of handling those parts which have been most fully treated, many interesting points have been but glanced at, and many not adverted to at all. But much time has been already spent in this course; and more, though it might supply some defects and repair some faults, would leave still much to be corrected, and much to be supplied. And as my proposed design ends naturally with this last and highest effect of *faith in Christ*, I will end this protracted inquiry here.

For practical applications, I have left but little space. But the wonderful work of Redemption, however it has been brought before you, can hardly fail itself to have prompted some solemn and profitable reflexions;—and the simple appeal which a contemplation of that great mystery suggests to the Apostle, asks but little time, and it assuredly could not be made more impressive by any additions,—“How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?” If this stupendous manifestation of God’s boundless love fail to move us, what can turn us to Him? And if we remain alienated from Him, what can save us? The sacrifice of the blessed Lord does not declare God’s goodness only, but *His severity* too. That He *spared not his own Son*, is indeed a sure foundation of the Believer’s hope, *that with Him He will also freely give us all things*²⁸. But, rightly considered, is it not also an assurance to impenitent sinners of the certainty of His wrath? Does it not tell of the terrors of His anger?

²⁷ Eph. v. 1.²⁸ Heb. ii. 3.²⁹ Rom. viii. 32.

Does it not publish that *it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God*³⁹;—that *our God is a consuming fire*⁴¹?

To those who have embraced the hopes of the Gospel, and have *by faith* fled to the sure refuge which it holds forth to sinners, all the manifestations of the mercy which they have received, and of the love of which they are the objects, are prevailing motives to genuine obedience—because they are the sure source of that genuine love which is the surest spring of obedience. They will seek to *purify themselves, even as He who is the author and finisher of their faith is pure*⁴²; they love Him, and will keep his commandments⁴³; they will cultivate the graces that He enjoins, and shun the vices that He abhors: feeling that upon them devolves the momentous duty of *adorning the Gospel of God their Saviour in all things*, they will be circumspect and active; and above all, under a just sense of their weakness, they will seek for strength where it may be found.

Every congregation may be supposed to contain some of each of the two classes, to whom, upon such an occasion as the present, such reflexions may be fitly suggested. But there is, in the congregation which I now address, another class of hearers, to whom a few words, in addition, seem to be due, before I conclude. Many of those who hear me now, design themselves for the ministry of the Gospel. And to them, therefore, it will belong, not only to obey their Master's commands, and to recommend his doctrine by their outward walk, but faithfully to teach it to the souls committed to their charge. To teach it faithfully, you must learn it faithfully; you must seek it in the Word, which is its only pure depository, and seek it there in humility, in sincerity, in patience, and in prayer.

It is in such an inquiry as this that I have desired to

³⁹ Heb. x. 31.

⁴¹ Heb. xii. 29.

⁴² 1 John iii. 3; Heb. xii. 2.

⁴³ John xiv. 21, 23.

engage you. I have endeavoured to present to you the *fundamental doctrine of the Gospel of Christ*, in Scriptural simplicity; to expose some of the misrepresentations of it, on which you will have to decide for others and for yourselves; and to show that they are distinctly denounced in God's Word, and in the sound Confession of Faith which our Church has derived from that Word. And if I deceive myself in imagining that I have succeeded in attaining these objects, I am at least sure that I have presented the subject in a form which must clearly establish the duty of patiently investigating it. If I have not done so much as I should have desired to aid or to abridge such investigations, I shall think that I have done what is still more important, if I have effectually promoted them.

And to those whom such inquiries shall, under God's blessing, conduct to a knowledge of His truth,—to those I would earnestly recommend, as above all other ministerial duties, the simple and faithful publication of it. I do not mean to dissuade from corruptions of the truth, which spring from party feelings or personal considerations; for I will not suppose any whom I address, at once so daring and so degraded, as to pollute his high calling by subserviency to such unworthy views. I speak only of those reserves and qualifications, which, whatever be their source, rest professedly upon some calculation of human wisdom, concerning the moral effects of the great truths of the Gospel when simply and distinctly preached. I have, I think, shown that such apprehensions are groundless; that they really spring from loose views of the nature of the Doctrine, from false views of human nature, or from the prejudice, pride, and corruption of our hearts. But the duty of faithfulness in preaching the Gospel, rests upon higher grounds than our ability to show, or to see, that such apprehensions are unfounded. It is a message from God, which you undertake to deliver. And even they whose *gods were*

no gods felt, that the bearer of a Divine message should not dare to alter it. It is a remedy prepared by the wisdom of God for the deadly diseases of our fallen nature, which you voluntarily engage to administer. Is not the folly of the empiricism that would prompt you to adulterate it lost in its awful presumption?

Combat strenuously Antinomian abuses of the Gospel of Christ, if you shall encounter such in your ministry. Combat no less strenuously Pharisaical cavils against it, which you undoubtedly will encounter. Above all, struggle with, mourn over, pray against, the Antinomianism and the Pharisaism which you will find cleaving to your own slow hearts;—but *let no man take your crown*. Let neither the abuses of the Gospel which you witness, nor the cavils, nor the scoffs, nor the calumnies against it, which you hear, nor the vain reasonings of your own unquiet minds, nor the sad experience of your own corrupt hearts, seduce or drive you to the presumptuous and perilous faithlessness of qualifying God's message of mercy, or adulterating His remedy!

Trials are the lot of human life; and to the course that you have chosen for yourselves, peculiar trials are assigned: trials in which you will be made to feel that God's servants must *cease from man*, and rest upon their Master alone for comfort and for strength. And assuredly you must feel that you can enjoy this cheering sense of His guidance and support, only so long as you are preaching, not your own cunning devices, but His simple truth.—In death, when you recall the manifold imperfections of your stewardship, you will need all consolation. Do not voluntarily rob yourselves of the sure consolation, that, however weakly you have discharged your important trust, you have in this discharged it honestly.—The trials of life and the pains of death, whatever they be, will soon pass away. But there is an awful hour of trial to follow, for which life and death are both designed to prepare. In that awful hour, you will stand at

the judgment-seat of Christ, and render there an account—not of your own souls only—but of the souls of the flock *over the which the Holy Ghost shall make you overseers.* As you would render your account *with joy and not with grief,*—as you would stand before Christ's throne *pure from the blood of all men,*—do not shun to declare unto them ALL THE COUNSEL OF GOD!

NOTES.

NOTES.

NOTE A. PAGE 10.

Upon the Correspondence between the Romish and Sandemanian Notions of Faith.

THE Council of Trent (Sess. 6. Can. 12) anathematizes all who assert “fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divine misericordiæ peccata remittentis propter Christum.” It makes confidence in the Divine mercy, in some sense, a part of *the preparation for Justification*, cap. 6; but it is not easy to determine positively, whether this confidence is to be regarded as a part of *justifying faith* or not: as whatever materials for collecting the views of the Romish Church upon *the nature of faith* may be supplied by the Decree and Canons of this Session (which are designed to declare the Catholic Doctrine of Justification, “quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque receperit, justificari non poterit”), no explicit definition of *faith* is to be found in either. Bellarmin, however, supplies the defect, and I suppose may be received as sufficient authority on the subject. This is his account of the teaching of their divines: “fidem historicam, et miraculorum, et promissionum, unam et eandem esse docent; atque illam unam non esse proprie notitiam aut fiduciam, sed assensum certum atque firmissimum, ob auctoritatem primæ veritatis, et hanc unam esse fidem justificantem.” *De Just.* l. 1, cap. 4.

It was a long time, I believe, before this view of *faith* was adopted by any Protestant Divines. When they erred about the nature of the principle, it was naturally in the opposite direction. In fact, as the Romanists denied in terms, that *we are justified by*

faith only, they had a manifest interest in robbing *faith* of everything moral in its nature, as among the modes of vindicating their rejection of this truth. But a Protestant who ceased to hold the doctrine, in the sense of the early Reformers, was still, probably, bound to their assertion of it in express terms, by the Confession of the Church to which he belonged, and lay, therefore, under an obvious temptation to add to the meaning of *faith*, until it stood for all that he conceived to be essential to justification. Hence we are told, “*fidem cui justificatio a Paulo tribuitur, pro unica ac simpliciter virtute nequaquam sumendum esse, sed integram Fœderis Evangelici conditionem denotare, h. e. suo ambitu omnia Christiane pietatis opera amplecti.*” *Bull, Harm. Apost. Diss. Post. cap. 4. § 4.*—Or it was said, that *faith*, “in the New Testament, stand generally for the complex of Christianity, in opposition to the Law, which stands as generally for the complex of the whole Mosaic dispensation.”—*Burnet, XXXIX. Artt., Art. XI.*—And again, that “our faith, which includes our hope, our love, our repentance, and our obedience, is the condition that makes us capable of receiving this redemption and free grace,” &c.—*Ib.* And such a view of the nature of *faith* became a very common one among Protestants, both in England and upon the Continent.

How far the palpable unfairness of this mode of neutralizing the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only* contributed, by a reaction easily understood, to give rise to the opposite error concerning the nature of *faith*, it would not be easy or important to decide. It seems likely, indeed, that the error originated in this way: though those who have most signalized themselves in the support of it are far from setting any high value on the doctrine, and some of them, as we shall see, absolutely reject it.

This view of the nature of faith was supported with much acuteness by Sandeman, and was taken up, not only by his professed followers, but by some other small religious bodies; agreeing with them for the most part in doctrine, but separated from them by differences upon questions of discipline. Beyond these limits, it seems to have made but little way, though it from time to time has been adopted and defended by individuals of our own Church, and of almost all other religious communions. The one specially referred to in the Sermon is Mr Erskine, who has adopted and maintained this view of the nature of *faith* in his ‘Internal Evidences,’ and his ‘Essay on Faith;’ and if he does not support the

view more ably than its earlier advocates, he certainly recommends it more strongly by manifesting everywhere marks of a catholic, cordial, and tender spirit, which is very advantageously contrasted with the narrowness and bitterness that distinguish all the writers of the Sandemanian school with whom I have any acquaintance. And accordingly the view seems to have obtained some additional currency under his advocacy. He has been very well answered by the Rev. Mr Carlile, in his ‘Old Doctrine of Faith,’ in which students will find, in addition to a satisfactory refutation of Mr Erskine, a great deal of important matter in support of the sounder doctrine.

NOTE B. PAGE 15.

Upon the Proof of the Scriptural Meaning of Faith.

No one can, I think, reasonably doubt that *faith* means in the Bible, as it does elsewhere, *a state of mind*; and it seems evident that the real question to be determined here is this:—when we are declared to be *justified before God by faith*, does that term stand simply for the state of mind in which *we believe* the truths contained in the Word of God; or does it include, in addition, the *trust* or *confidence* in Him which such *belief* ought to produce?

It will be seen that the mode of deciding this question in the Sermon is, to show:—that when the Lord reproves the want of *faith* of those whom He addresses, He means (as appears from the circumstances of the case) to reprove their want of *trust*; of *trust* or *confidence* in the Father or in Himself; and that when He commends their *faith*, He means, as appears in the same way, to commend their *trust*. And it would seem reasonable, if the matter ended here, to assume, that when his Apostles labour to produce *faith*—blame its weakness,—pray for its increase—extol the benefits of it,—they really mean by *faith* the same thing, unless they distinctly declare, or very clearly intimate, that they mean something different. And this fair presumption appears to receive all the confirmation which in a preliminary treatise it is capable of receiving, when it is shown, finally, p. 20—23, that the only Apostle who is led to give anything like an explanation of the meaning of

the term, gives such a one as proves him to have used it in the sense in which it was used by the Lord.

This account is introduced by an exhortation which would of itself seem sufficiently to establish the true meaning of the word. The Apostle exhorts those to whom he is writing, having *boldness* to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, to draw near with a true heart *in full assurance of faith.....to hold fast* the profession of *their hope* [E. V. *faith*] *without wavering* (for He is faithful that promised)...not to cast away *their confidence*, which hath great recompense of reward: and, after more to the same purpose, he proceeds to give an account of the principle which he has so earnestly exhorted them to retain and exhibit, according to which, under every explanation of his words, the predominant element in the principle appears to be, the expectation of future good. And he goes on to illustrate this account, by referring to well-known manifestations of *faith*, in which *trust in God*—in His goodness generally, or in some special mark of it which He had promised—is plainly the prominent feature.

This seems a reasonable mode of setting about the determination of the question; nor am I aware that the way of conducting it is exposed to any objection of real weight. It may possibly occur to some, as an objection, that it only professes to fix the meaning of the term *faith*; leaving without examination the more common and not less important phrases—*to believe: to believe in, on, or upon,—the Lord, His name, God, &c.* I was aware that this might occur to my hearers as an objection; but I thought the answer to it was also likely to occur to them at once; or at least that it would, upon consideration, present itself so easily, that I might avoid embarrassing myself, or them, by interrupting the course of my argument to supply it. No one, in fact, who is willing to take the reasonable trouble of comparing a few of the corresponding passages in which these different phrases are employed, or who considers the free interchange of the phrases in the course of the same passage, can doubt, that in all the cases where it is most important to fix the sense of the forms in which the *verb* is used, it is fixed by determining the sense of the *noun*: that *to believe* is, in such cases, *to have faith—to believe in, is to have or put faith in, &c.*

This connexion of these phrases will be at once apparent to those who are acquainted with the original, as the noun and verb

have the same root in Greek. But it is somewhat obscured to English readers, because though our language has separate nouns, viz. *belief* and *faith*, to express the simpler and the more complex state of mind (being in this richer than the Greek), yet it has only one verb for both, and that (*to believe*) connected etymologically with the former noun. The more complex state is therefore necessarily expressed in our version by a verb and a noun of different roots. But the true connexion between them will appear even to English readers upon such a comparison of passages as I have indicated above.

Thus a man finds, Matt. xxi. 22: "And all things whatsoever ye ask in prayer, *believing*, ye shall receive." If he desire to know what is here meant by *believing*, let him turn to the corresponding text, Mark xi. 24, where he will see, "What things soever ye desire when ye pray, *believe that ye have them*, and ye shall have them." So much for the sense of the phrase; and its connexion with the other form appears in the corresponding exhortation, James i. 6: "But let him ask *in faith*, nothing wavering." And if he allow himself to be referred, further, to 1 John v. 13, 14, he will find this firm expectation of the fulfilment of our prayers connected with its true foundation, in a way that, rightly considered, explains at once this form, and the other, of *believing on*: "These things have I written unto you that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may *believe on the name of the Son of God*: and this is *the confidence that we have in Him* (or towards Him), that if we ask any thing according to His will He heareth us."

Indeed, both the meaning of *believing*, and its connexion with *faith*, would be sufficiently apparent from the introduction to the passages cited from the Gospels. "Verily I say unto you, if ye have *faith*, and *doubt not*, ye shall not only do this," &c.—Matt. xxi. 21; and Mark xi. 22, 23:—"Have *faith in God*. For verily I say unto you, that whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed," &c., "and *shall not doubt in his heart*, but shall *believe*," &c.

But it happens that we are able to fix the sense of all these phrases, not only thus generally, but in the most important use of them, by the same process. Let any fair man only read, with this view, from Rom. iii. 20 to the end of chap. iv., and when he sees throughout, *believing in Jesus Christ, faith in His blood*,

believing in Jesus, faith, believing God [quoted from Gen. xv. 6, where he will find it *believing in God*], *believing on Him* that justifieth the ungodly; *believing on Him* that raised up our Lord *Jesus Christ from the dead*; when he sees, I say, all these phrases freely interchanged, he can hardly doubt their connexion. And I may add, as I have remarked, Sermon IV. pp. 91, 92, that when we find in the same passage the nature of Abraham's *faith* conveyed to us, by our being informed, that *he against hope believed in hope*, that *being not weak in faith, he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief*; but that *he was strong in faith, giving the glory to God*; *being fully persuaded that what He had promised, He was also able to perform*; when we find, I say, the nature of Abraham's *faith* thus distinctly and fully set forth, we can hardly doubt what *it* was; and when we are told that believers share in the blessings promised to Abraham and to his seed, by sharing in *his faith*, we can have but little doubt what *their faith* is also.

It cannot be thought that the force of this argument is impaired by the circumstance, that it is altogether adapted to our *translation*: for it manifestly depends on the *sense* of the passages to such an extent as to be little affected by the medium in which that sense is conveyed. Where the meaning of a word is employed to fix the sense of a passage, everything of course depends upon the language; but very little, where the sense of the passage is used to fix the meaning of the word. No conclusions arrived at in any tongue, but the original, can be relied on safely in the former case; but in the latter, it is obviously of little consequence whether we employ the original or a translation, unless the translation misrepresent the general sense of the passages in which the word is found.

This applies directly to the entire of the preceding part of this Note, and to the part of the first Sermon of which it is a continuation and explanation: that part, namely, in which the meaning of *faith* is attempted to be established, from a direct examination of Scripture. This is, doubtless, the most important part of the entire, and is complete, as a proof, without the preliminary remarks (pp. 12—14) on the phrases *faith—faith in a person or thing*. These remarks are only applicable upon the supposition that “*faith*” is a proper rendering of the Greek word for which it stands. English readers will, probably, in general.

be satisfied that it is, from the fact that the translation has, in that particular, never been impugned;—but they may, without any assumption, connect the proof and the remarks together in this way:—the examination of the texts shows, that, where “faith” is used in the translation, the general sense of the passage requires some word expressing *trust* or *confidence*; the preliminary remarks show, therefore, *faith* to be a fit word for the place that it occupies, and throw some light on its force and use. Those who know the Bible only in our translation have thus, on the whole, I think, the point satisfactorily proved, and sufficiently elucidated; and do not lose much by being unable to apprehend the few remarks upon the original terms, which, for the sake of others, I think it necessary to subjoin.

The meaning of the original terms is treated of incidentally in the works of all the first Reformers; most regularly and fully, perhaps, in those of Bucer and Melancthon. It forms the subject of a distinct treatise (and a very able one) by the well-known Flacius Illyricus, entitled “*De Re et Voce Fidei*,” and is handled also in his tract “*De Justificatione*,” and his “*Clavis*.” The excellent article on the subject in Melancthon’s *Loci Theologici*, is enlarged and confirmed in Chemnitz’s valuable commentary. And finally, in Gerhard’s *Loci Theologici* may be found a learned and satisfactory discussion of the point in full detail. It has lately been investigated very carefully and judiciously by Mr Carlile, in his Essay already spoken of (Note A); and in an Appendix to a volume of sermons, to which the essay refers. I should, perhaps, be content with pointing out these sources of information, upon a subject on which, it is needless to add, I can hardly hope to say much that is not contained in them: but I have, upon consideration, thought it more satisfactory to subjoin a brief digest of what is most important in these, and other writers that I have consulted on the point, than to send my readers to glean it for themselves; premising, however, that what follows is not intended to supersede their own investigations, but in some degree to aid and direct them.

Πιστεύω and πίστις are the terms to be explained; and though our chief concern is with their signification in the New Testa-

ment, yet as that is in no small degree illustrated by the Greek version of the Old Testament, it may be convenient to begin with some remarks upon it.

The meaning of נָסַח (to which in the version of the LXX. πασκάλω corresponds) seems very satisfactorily fixed. It is a verb in *Hiphil*, the sense of which in *Kal* is known partly from the use of its particples (in which only it occurs in that conjugation in the Bible), and partly from its meaning in the other conjugations in which it is found, *Niphal* and *Hiphil*. In *Benoni* it means *nursing, rearing, or bringing up, a nursing father*, Numbers xi. 12; Isaiah xlix. 23; *a nurse*, Ruth iv. 16; 2 Sam. iv. 4; 2 Kings x. 1—5. In *Pahul*, *nursed, or brought up*, Lam. iv. 5; *faithful*, 1st Sam. xii. 2, xxxi. 24; so that the meaning of נָסַח would be directly fixed to be, *to nurse, to rear, or bring up, to be faithful*. And from its derivatives, and from its use in *Niphal*, other meanings of it may be added, *to support, to prop, to be firm*.

In *Niphal* it means, from the first sense of *Kal*, given above, *to be carried in the arms, or to be nursed*, Isaiah lx. 4. [This is the only passage, I believe, in which it is supposed to be used in that meaning, and some difference of opinion exists, as to whether that is really its signification there. Gesenius, I perceive, thinks it is: as did Buxtorf, Calvin, our translators, and others. Simonis gives *stabilientur*; De Dieu has *permanebunt*; and other interpretations have been given, and even other readings proposed (vide Lowth in loc.); but it must be seen that such variations do not at all affect the main point.]—*To be firmly founded*, 2 Sam. vii. 16; *to be permanent*, Deut. xxviii. 59; *to be faithful*, Ps. lxxviii. 8, 37; *to be or to be proved true*, Gen. xlii. 20; Hosea v. 9.

From these senses, that of *Hiphil* follows easily. When *Kal* and *Niphal* are used to describe one as *possessing* certain qualities, *doing or suffering* certain things, *Hiphil* not only expresses the *act of bestowing on him* (causing him to possess) *these qualities; causing him to do or to suffer these things*; but also, at times, the *mental act of ascribing to him the qualities, or the action or the passion*. And, in the present case, it is plain that the notion of ascribing to an object *firmness, stability, permanence, faithfulness, truth*, would easily yield the sense of the verb in *Hiphil*, *to lean upon* (literally or figuratively), *to trust, to believe*. Accordingly, the instances of its use, both in the senses of *trusting*

and believing, are too numerous to render any quotations necessary. The common rule, that it means *to trust*, when it is followed by ב ; *to believe*, when followed by ל , seems sufficiently exact for a general rule. It is used absolutely in both senses. Once, in the sense of *trusting*, the object is in the accusative case (Judg. xi. 20); and *the thing believed* is often expressed as a proposition introduced by the conjunction כ , or in the equivalent form, in which the infinitive mood is employed without the conjunction; to both of which there are forms corresponding in the Greek.

This seems all that it is necessary to say of the Hebrew verb. It is admitted by all commentators and lexicographers, so far as I am acquainted with them, to express properly both *trust* and *belief*; the general rule given above, for determining, by the form of expression, in which of these meanings it is used, is found in most of them, and will almost always serve; but that point is, of course, ultimately best determined by the sense of the passage in each case.

The Alexandrian interpreters having to render this verb, chose naturally to express it by $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, which it is well known had, in classical Greek, both significations. πιστεύομαι was used for *Niphal* in the senses *to be verified* or *to be credited*; $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ for *Hiphil*, in the senses *to believe*, *to trust*; the person or thing *believed* or *trusted*, being used in the dative. This was in accordance with the established usage of the language: and the additional forms which they introduced, apparently from the Hebrew, $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ ἐν τινί , ἐπὶ τινί , or τινα , and which occur so commonly in the New Testament, they employed very sparingly. Other strange forms are found so rarely as to require scarcely any notice, as $\pi.$ κατά τινος ; Job iv. 18; and xv. 15: $\pi.$ τοῦ ἰδεῖν , Ps. xxvi. (xxvii. Heb.) 13: they do not occur at all in the New Testament; nor do the compounds ἐμπιστεύω or καταπιστεύω , which are used occasionally in the same sense by the LXX.

It has sometimes been attempted to be argued, that $\pi.$ cannot properly signify *to trust*, as it is never used to render בטח or הכה , of which, undoubtedly, *to trust* is the proper signification. The answer to this is, that the word was unquestionably em-

ployed familiarly by profane authors, both before and after the date of this translation, to express *trust*; and that it is undoubtedly used by the LXX. to express *trust*, as any one may satisfy himself who will examine such passages as Deut. i. 32; Job iv. 18, xxxix. 12; Ps. lxxvii. 22, 32; Isaiah xxviii. 16, &c. Their avoiding to employ it in rendering the words above mentioned, is certainly very marked; thus for **נָחַם** we find ἐλπίζω, ἐπελπίζω, ἔχω τὴν ἐλπίδα, πέποιθα, πεποιθώς εἰμι, ἐπιτείθεμαι, θαρρῶ: for **הִסֵּךְ**, most of these words, and, in addition, σκεπάζομαι, ὑποδέω, ἐφίστημι, &c., but not πιστεύω. This is, no doubt, very marked; but, whether we can account for it or not, it does not in the least affect the fitness of πιστεύω, to express *trust* as well as *believe*,—which is established by the clearest instances of its use in that sense by profane writers, or overthrow the evidence which their own use of it supplies, that the LXX. interpreters understood it to have both senses.

I do not think it necessary to subjoin passages to prove that in classical Greek π. bore the sense *to trust*, as well as *to believe*, both before and after the date of this translation; as it is a point not only well established, but very generally known. It seems also needless to say much, in addition, of the word in the New Testament. As the verb is shown to bear the meanings of *trusting* and *believing*, it would be necessary to determine, by an examination of any particular passage, which sense it bore in it; but the mode of examination would be, of course, the same as that pursued above for the translation; and, as the very same passages would serve for the purpose, it seems hardly necessary to go through it again.

This would be perhaps as far as we could go, if the verb occurred in the New Testament only in its classical construction. But it seems worth remarking that those Biblical forms which we mentioned as rare in the LXX. are here very common, and seem much less (if at all in the New Testament) subject to the same ambiguity. Πιστεύω τινί, means indifferently, *I believe one*, or *I trust him*; but the proper sense of those other phrases π. ἐπὶ or ἐν τινί, ἐπὶ or εἰς τινα, seems to be, *I trust a person*, *I put faith in him*. This can only be established by an examination of the passages in which this form occurs. But, as such an examination can be carried out by any one who will use a Concordance and Testament, I will not extend this long Note by such

an addition as the necessary adduction and examination of texts would lead to; but, leaving it to my readers to pursue the investigation for themselves, I shall content myself with subjoining one or two remarks, to which I do not indeed attach much importance, but which I think may serve as a confirmation of the conclusion to which, I am confident, a fair examination will conduct them.

I. The variation of the phrase, in the same passage, confirms this conclusion, as it occurs just where, upon these principles, it ought: while the apparent sense is *I believe*, the classical form is used, and when it becomes naturally *I trust*, the Biblical form is substituted; not that the former is not fit to convey that meaning also, but that the latter does so more properly and decisively. Thus John xiv. 11: "*Believe me* (πιστεύετε μοι) that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. And if not, *believe me* (π. μοι) for my works' sake [i. e. if my words do not secure this *belief* for themselves, let my works obtain it for them]. Verily, verily I say unto you, Whosoever *believeth in me* (πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ), the works which I do," &c.—i. e. 'when the *trust in me* which is the proper result of the *belief of this truth* concerning me, is produced, then shall follow all that is promised to *faith*.'—Thus too the Samaritans are said to *believe in Christ*: where it cannot be meant that they *believed Him*, for they had neither seen nor heard Him; but, upon the representation of the woman that Christ had *told her every thing that she had ever done*, they believe with her that He is the Messiah, in whom they expected (as it appears) the Saviour of the world. John iv. 39: ἐκ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης πολλοὶ ἐπίστευσαν εἰς αὐτὸν τῶν Σαμαρειτῶν διὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς γυναικὸς, &c.; and then they came and induced the Lord to go into their city; and there, we are told, many more became believers (ἐπίστευσαν), on account or by means of His own word. John iv. 41.

II. Inanimate things may either be employed to attest some assertion, or from some physical qualities may be objects of trust themselves, and therefore may fitly denote any objects of trust. In the former case, when they are *believed*, the classical form is used; in the latter, when they are *objects of confidence*, the Biblical. "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not [when I say that I am the Son of God]; but if I do, though ye believe not me, *believe the works*" (τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύσατε). John x. 37, 38. While ye have light *believe in the light* (π. εἰς τὸ φῶς). John xii.

36. "Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, elect, precious: and he that *believeth on Him* [or *it*] (ὁ π. ἐπ' αὐτῷ) shall not be ashamed." 1 Pet. ii. 6; Rom. ix. 33.

III. We find these forms of expression sometimes supplied by phrases, about the signification of which no doubt can be entertained. Thus the promise that the Gentiles should *believe in* the Lord is expressed, Rom. xv. 12, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔθνη ἐλπιοῦσιν; and Matt. xii. 21, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἔθνη ἐλπιοῦσιν. Thus the *faith* of the women of old *in God*, is expressed by Peter—Αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, 1 Pet. iii. 5. And that of such a widow as Paul recommends to Timothy, to be selected to receive support from the Church—ἡλπίκεν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, 1 Tim. v. 5. And the *faith in God*, by which he was himself supported under persecution—ὅτι ἡλπίκαμεν ἐπὶ Θεῷ ζῶντι, 1 Tim. iv. 10. And, lastly, Eph. i. 12, 13, seems to furnish a striking instance of the same kind: "That we should be to the praise of His glory, *who first trusted* (or hoped) in Christ. In whom ye also [trusted], after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation: *in whom also, after that ye believed*, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise." The second *trusted* is supplied by our translators, as required by the sense; and their view of the construction of the passage appears to me the easiest and most probable: and under this view, or indeed under any view of its construction, the equivalence of the phrases *to trust in*, and *to believe in*, is apparent. The reader may look at the original—εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς εἰς ἔπαυσιν τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, τοὺς προηλπικότας ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ. ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούσασαί τε τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἀγίῳ.

IV. I do not know whether it will be considered a fanciful addition to the foregoing observations, but I think there are traces of a purpose in the writers of the New Testament to preserve this phrase (in which the verb or noun is followed by the dative or accusative, with a preposition), to express this particular state of mind—the *confidence in God*, or *in Christ*, by which we are reconciled to God, or which reconciled sinners feel. For when *confidence* in any created person or thing is to be expressed, or *confidence* in God for something else, the phrase is usually varied. Thus the confidence of the Jews in Moses is expressed by *Moses in whom ye trust*—εἰς ὃν ὑμεῖς ἡλπίκατε, John v. 45; the confi-

dence of the followers of Theudas in him, πάντες ὅσα ἐποίθητο αὐτῷ, Acts v. 36 ; again, vi. 37. *Trusting in riches*, τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν, Mark x. 24. μηδὲ ἡλπικέναι ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδολότητι, 1 Tim. vi. 17. Paul *trusts in the Lord Jesus*, that he shall soon send Timothy to the Philippians, and expresses it by ἐλπίζω δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ—and that he shall soon come himself, πέποιθα δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ, Phil. ii. 19, 24. This, however, is only what would be natural without system or design. The phrase which was used to express so important a notion, and one so often recurring, would not unnaturally become so appropriated to that notion, that, without any fixed rule, men would rather avoid employing it in other cases, for which in its strict and proper meaning it was perfectly fit.

I do not know that the noun πίστις requires any additional remarks. It is never used, so far as I know, to express *belief* simply, unless 2 Thess. ii. 13, be esteemed an instance, which is not worth discussing. The object in which we *trust* is often in the genitive case [*gen. obj.* the meaning being the same as in the different forms of expressing the object, π. ἐν τινι, &c.], as πίστις Θεοῦ, π. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ; sometimes the thing hoped for is also in the genitive, ὅτι πιστὶν ἔχει τοῦ σωθῆναι, Acts xiv. 9 ; the other forms are, ἡ π. or π. ἡ ἐν τινι, εἰς, ἐπὶ, or πρὸς τινα [the last two forms very rare], which, after what has been said of similar forms with the verb, can require no particular observation. It is very often used absolutely, as is the verb sometimes ; but the sense of both, when employed in this way, is of course to be derived from that which they have when the object is expressed, and may frequently be determined by some passage in immediate connexion, in which the object appears. Πιστεύω often, in this use, means, *to believe in Christ* ; but sometimes only *to profess such belief*, or *to become his disciple*, or *follower* ; whereas πίστις always expresses real faith, unless the passage (as in James ii. 14 : and I should add, there only, so far as I know) intimate the contrary. When the article is used with the noun, its force is to be determined generally by the rules for interpreting the Greek article ; but sometimes ἡ πίστις, used absolutely, seems to have the peculiar signification of the body of truths which is believed—the Gospel itself,—in which sense we use *the faith* at times in English.

My readers will, I hope, remark that the proof of the main point is independent of all these latter remarks, and is contained in the examination of the passages of Scripture, in which the word occurs, given in the Sermon and in the former part of this Note. If any thing else in the Note, therefore, should seem to any one not well founded, he is to remember that the proper proof of the main point remains unaffected, and he is requested to re-examine that proof, and extend it for himself.

Bishop Pearson is sometimes spoken of as opposed to the view maintained in the foregoing Note of the meaning of *πιστεύω εἰς πάντα*, and of the equivalent Biblical forms referred to there. This is not one of the questions which are to be decided by authority: but, unless a man is very deficient in modesty, he will revise with some anxiety the reasoning upon any question which has brought him into opposition to so weighty an authority as the illustrious author of the "Exposition of the Creed:" and if he find himself, after all, obliged to abide by his first conclusion, he will differ very reluctantly from one so wise and learned.

This is the position in which I find myself. But though I cannot, upon the fullest consideration, change my view of the meaning of this important phrase, and though I fear I cannot count the Bishop upon my side, yet it is some satisfaction to me to be able to say, that he neither proves nor asserts anything which is inconsistent with what I have laid down and attempted to prove. But, to understand the actual state of the case, it will be necessary to look at what he has said upon the point.

"Now these words, *I believe in God*, will require a double consideration: one, of the phrase or manner of speech; another, of the thing or nature of the truth in that manner expressed. For to *believe* with the addition of the preposition *in*, is a phrase or expression ordinarily conceived fit to be given to none but to God himself, as always implying, beside a bare act of faith, an addition of hope, love, and assiance. An observation, as I conceive, prevailing especially in the Latin Church, grounded principally upon the authority of St. Augustin. Whereas among the Greeks, in whose language the New Testament was penned, I perceive no such constant distinction in their deliveries of the

CREED; and in the Hebrew language of the Old, from which the Jewish and Christian Greeks receive that phrase of *believing in*, it hath no such peculiar and accumulative signification: for it is sometimes attributed to God, the Author and original cause; sometimes to the prophets, the immediate revealers of the faith; sometimes it is spoken of miracles, the motives to believe; sometimes of the law of God, the material object of our faith. Among all which varieties of that phrase of speech, it is sufficiently apparent that in this Confession of Faith it is most proper to admit it in the last acceptation, by which it is attributed to the material object of belief. For the CREED being nothing else but a brief comprehension of the most necessary matter of faith, whatsoever is contained in it beside the first word *I believe*, by which we make confession of our faith, can be nothing else but part of those verities to be believed, and the act of belief in respect to them nothing but an assent unto them as divinely credible and infallible truths. Neither can we conceive that the ancient Greek Fathers of the Church could have any farther meaning in it, who make the whole body of the CREED to be of the same nature, as so many truths to be believed, acknowledged, and confessed; insomuch as sometimes they use not *believing in*, neither for the Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost; sometimes using it as to them, they continue the same to the following articles of *the Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, &c.*, and generally speak of the CREED as nothing but mere matter of faith, without any intimation of hope, love, or any such notion included in it, so that *believing in*, by virtue of the phrase or manner of speech, whether we look upon the original use of it in the Hebrew, or the derivative in the Greek, or the sense of it in the first Christians in the Latin Church, can be of no farther real importance in the CREED in respect of God, who immediately follows, than to acknowledge and assert his being or existence. Nor ought this to be imagined a slender notion or small part of the first article of our faith, when it really is the foundation of this and all the rest; that as the CREED is fundamental in respect of other truths, this is the foundation even of the fundamentals: 'for he that cometh to God must believe that He is' (Heb. xi. 6), and this I take for a sufficient explanation of the phrase, *I believe in God*, that is, *I believe that God is.*"

It is evident that the question considered in this paragraph

is a different one from that which I have endeavoured to settle in the foregoing Note and the Sermon with which it is connected. The question before Pearson was, whether, *in the Creed*, the words, πιστεύω εἰς Θεόν, "I believe in God," were used to express simply "I believe that God is," or *in addition*, "I hope in Him, love Him, and place affiance in Him." The question which I had to determine was, whether, when these words occur in the Bible, and especially in the New Testament, they mean *I believe God's testimony*, or *I trust in God*. I do not mean to make any addition to the reasons which I have given to show that the latter is its meaning. Nor do I pretend to review what Pearson says, with any design of overthrowing the conclusion at which he arrives, but merely for the purpose of showing that neither his conclusion (supposing it to be perfectly established), nor any of his reasons in support of it, does anything to disturb the conclusion to which I have come.

I. As to his conclusion.—It will be plain, on consideration, that it is in no wise inconsistent with mine. However certain it were, that πιστεύειν εἰς τινα meant in Scripture *to trust in one*, it would not follow that it was used strictly in that sense by ecclesiastical writers afterwards. And supposing, with Pearson, that what the first framers of the Creed wanted to express was, *I believe that God is*, it is very intelligible that they may have felt that, of all the combinations in which the verb is used in Scripture, there was none more suited to their purpose than the one that they have chosen. The form in Heb. xi. 6, πιστεύω τῷ Θεῷ ὅτι ἐστίν, or any equivalent form, would no doubt have expressed the sense directly and unequivocally. But one could not wonder that it was not adopted. Most persons, I think, will feel that if they were drawing up a brief profession of *faith*, they would look for a more condensed and emphatic form of expression, and still more for one which presented God Himself, rather than a proposition about Him, as the object of belief. But rejecting this form, none of the others would express the required meaning, without some deviation from the sense in which it is used in the New Testament; and if we can give no decisive reason why the framers of the Creed preferred the one which appears in it to the others, we should have been in the same position if any of the others had been chosen. It is by no means certain, indeed, that they thought that they were using the form in the

sense in which it is used in the New Testament. But, whatever they may have thought upon that point, it is very certain that they were not: nor can any instance be found in the New Testament, I believe, of any use of the words in the sense in which according to Pearson they are used in the Creed. I do not want to convert this into an argument against his interpretation of the words as they are found in *the Creed*. I do not think that it would be fair to do so. But such a process would certainly seem much fairer than the opposite one, of drawing from the use of the words *in the Creed*, an argument against the meaning which I have shown them to have in the New Testament.

II. Nor is the proof which I have given of their Scriptural sense at all touched by his arguments. The positions which he assails are—

1. That the phrase πιστεύειν εἰς, *to believe in*, can only be used of God Himself; 2. That it always implies, besides a bare act of faith, an addition of hope, love, and affiance.

Now I need hardly say that I do not hold either of these positions. 1. I am so far from holding that πιστεύω εἰς, in the sense of *trust in*, is only to be used in relation to God, that I hold and have stated that it is used, and may properly be used, of any person or thing upon which we firmly rely as the agent or instrument in procuring for us, or bestowing upon us, any good which we desire, temporal or spiritual. Indeed, the fact that in common life the phrase is used familiarly both of men and things, and that such is its acknowledged meaning, is part of my proof of the sense in which it is used in the higher application in which, chiefly, we find it in the Bible; and therefore the fact upon which Pearson relies, and which he proves in a learned note, viz. that in the Hebrew Scriptures the phrase is applied to various objects besides God Himself, however pertinent or conclusive it may be for the purpose for which he puts it forward, does nothing to shake my view of the meaning of the phrase. I hold that *I believe in* is generally equivalent to *I have faith in*, and that this is equivalent to *I trust in*. The state of mind is the same *in kind*, whatever be the object which *I trust in*, and whatever be the thing *for* which *I trust*. But what *I trust for*, as well as the grounds on which *I trust in* the particular object, must be inferred from its nature and my relation to it. 2. As to the other position, I might

truly say not only that I do not hold it, but that I do hold that the words *I believe in* express "a bare act of faith," and nothing more. But this latter statement, though true in words, would be in substance delusive, because by *faith*, Pearson means simply *belief*, while I understand *trust* as the leading part of the notion for which the word stands. I therefore do hold that the words express something in addition to what Pearson calls *faith*. But those who have read what I have said in the Sermons, or in the foregoing Note, do not need to be informed that I do not hold that addition to be "hope, love, and assiance." If *assiance* mean *trust*, then, as I have before explained, I understand the words to include the addition of *assiance* to *belief*. But if it be meant, as it often seems to be, to express *some high degree of trust*, then I should avoid using the word; for while *trust* is an essential part of true *faith*, all that is required is that it be *real*. The strength of *faith* will vary with the strength of *trust*; but to render faith *real*, nothing more is needed than that the *trust* which forms an essential and leading part of the notion should be *real*. *Hope*, that is some measure of it, seems to be included in *trust*; and in the same measure it is to be regarded, not as an addition to *faith*, but as a part of it. But *love* is to be regarded as an *effect* of *faith*, not a constituent of it. And so, if it be implied in the words *I believe in*, it is not as a part of their meaning, but as a consequence of the state of mind which they properly express.

It is plain, I hope, from what I have said, how very little concerned I am in defending the interpretation of these words which Pearson rejects. But I cannot avoid adding that he seems to have underrated the amount of support that it has in antiquity, when he speaks of it as *prevailing chiefly in the Latin Church, grounded principally upon the authority of St Augustin*. Any of my readers who feel any curiosity upon the subject, will find in Suicer *in voc.* the materials for forming a more correct view of the actual state of the authorities on the point, than they could derive from Pearson. Suicer acknowledges, not only that the forms πιστεύω τι, and εἰς τι, π. τινί, and εἰς τινα are frequently used as equivalent by the Greek Fathers, but that the Latin Fathers sometimes use in the same way the corresponding forms in their own tongue, of which he gives some examples. But he maintains, with regard to both, that this is only when they speak *latius et*

liberius; and that, when they express themselves *distinctius et magis propriè*, they deny that we are to believe *in man*, or *in the Church*, or *in anything* but God. For the Latin Fathers, besides express passages from St Augustin, which are well known, and which need not be repeated here, he gives, from the *Expos. Symboli* (which is published in Cyprian's Works), an extract in which the author (Ruffinus) treats of the use and omission of the preposition in the Creed as designed, and as decisive of the meaning of the article; and ends thus: "Hac itaque præpositionis syllabâ Creator a creaturis secernitur, et divina separantur ab humanis." He then gives quotations from the Greek Fathers, beginning with Origen, which fully support this statement as regards them. One or two of these extracts are particularly remarkable, in which the fact that the Arians retain this form in their Creed is converted into an argument against them; for if *we believe in Christ*, how can He be a creature? Thus Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, Orat. 3, *Διὰ τί ἡ πίστις καθ' ὑμᾶς εἰς κτιστὴν καὶ εἰς κτίσμα παραδίδοται*; and Cyrill. Alex., Dial. iv., *De S. Trin.*, Ἄρ' οὐκ εἰς πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἡ πίστις; οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἀκλινῇ καὶ ἀνυπαίτιον διασώσεσθαι προτεθυμημένοι, πιστεύσειαν ἂν εἰς γε Θεὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ κτίριν; Ἄραρεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ εἰς υἱὸν ἡ πίστις ὡς εἰς Θεὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἀληθινόν.

Suicer also remarks that, though the Romanists maintain that the Church is not only to be *believed*, whatever it declares or teaches, but to be *believed in*, yet in reciting the Nicene Creed at the Council of Trent the preposition was omitted before *the Holy Catholic Church*. And in the Catechism 'Ad Parochos,' published by the command of Pius V. according to the Decree of the Council, not only are the words *Credo Sanctam Ecclesiam*, but a reason for the form is subjoined, which agrees in substance with that which is given by Ruffinus.

As I have referred to Suicer, I may remark that what that learned writer says upon *faith* seems chargeable with some confusion and inconsistency. He lays down that *faith* consists of three parts, *knowledge*, *assent*, and *confidence* or *trust*. But though he states this distinctly, he endeavours to prove that *trust* is rather an effect of *faith* than *faith* itself. If it be meant that the two things are not identical, it would be easily granted: for not only is it certain that a part (however prominent and important a part it be) is not identical with the whole, but in this particular case the part in question may exist without the other constituents of *faith*.

and it is therefore important to make the true distinction between them understood. But on the other hand, if it be really a *part of faith*, it cannot with propriety be made one of its effects.

His proof is that there are in Scripture distinct words to express the two things: **פֶּסַח** and **פֶּסַח** for *faith*, **בְּטָחָה** and **πεποιθῆναι** for *trust*. And he says that reason teaches the soundness of the distinction. We *trust* in God because we are firmly persuaded of His goodness and His power. Now this persuasion is *faith*, therefore *trust* follows *faith*. Besides *trust* is a kind of *hope*, and hope is distinguished from faith and follows it. That *trust* is *hope* he proves from Hesychius, who gives **πέποιθας, θαρρῆναι; πεποιθῆναι, ἐλπίζειν; πεποιθῆναι, ἐλπίζειν, προσδοκῆναι; πεποιθὼς, ἐλπὼς, πιστεύειν**.

I may remark, in passing, that whatever truth there may be in the position, this seems a curious proof of it. It is, of course, intended that we are to collect that Hesychius regarded these several groups as synonymous, or nearly so. We have his authority, therefore, for regarding **πεποιθῆναι** as synonymous with **ἐλπίζειν, θαρρῆναι, προσδοκῆναι**. But then it would in just the same way appear that he thought that **πιστεύειν** is synonymous with **ἐλπίζειν** and **πεποιθῆναι**, for they form his last group. The truth, however, is that the words in the different groups respectively are all akin in meaning, but in none of them, identical.

But in the fact that there is a word in use in Scripture to express *trust*, there is nothing which is at all inconsistent with the supposition that the word which we translate *faith* includes *trust*. *Trust* stands for a certain state of mind, independently of its foundation and accompaniments. But while *trust* is an essential part of the meaning of *faith* (in the use of it in which we have been explaining and proving its meaning, that is, *justifying faith*), it is equally essential that this *trust* be built upon the promises of God. And this seems to require, or at least to render it very convenient, that there should be a word to express the state of mind which we call *trust*, when it would not be so proper to use *faith* to express it. And I may remark also that, while the degree of trust which *faith* includes is not absolutely determined, **πεποιθῆναι** (which is the same as **πεποιθῆναι** in Hesychius) seems to be properly used of a high degree of confidence,—strong assurance.

But Suicer refers to Eph. iii. 12, apparently as not only an example of the distinctive use of the words, but as expressing the

relation between them for which he contends, viz., of cause and effect: and Beza, he says, in his Commentary, takes this view of the meaning of the text.

Let us look at the text: ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐν πεποιθήσει, διὰ τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ. Now it does not appear to me that this at all bears upon the point which it is intended to establish. The *access* here spoken of is *to the Father*, as is proved, if proof were needed, by ii. 18. The text then declares that *in Christ we have boldness and access (i. e. to the Father) with confidence through faith in Him (i. e. Christ)*. Is there anything here inconsistent with the supposition that *faith in Christ* includes *trust* in Him (as a Redeemer, propitiator, advocate, &c.); or rather is not such *trust* a proper, or the proper, ground of confidence in approaching the Father?

There are five other passages in the New Testament in which *πεποίθησις* occurs. *Πεποίθησιν δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχομεν διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, 2 Cor. iii. 4, hardly requires any remark in the present connexion: what was said on the last instance may be repeated here. That there should be another word expressing *trust* or *confidence*, and that it should be used to express the state of feeling in which Christ has enabled us to approach the Father, can hardly be regarded as any evidence that faith in Christ or in God does not include *trust* in Him. The other passages have no reference to God or the Lord: they are 2 Cor. i. 15, viii. 22; x. 2, Phil. iii. 4, and do not seem to require any particular remark. The word is used in all to express the *strong confidence* that Paul felt either in the affection and good will of those to whom he was writing, or in his own apostolic authority; or, in the last passage, that which he might have felt, but did not feel, in certain outward advantages which he possessed. Such examples of the use of the word can offer no objection to our explanation of *πίστις*. For supposing *πίστις* εἰς τινα, or ἐν τινι, to include trust, confidence, hope, there would still be room and need for such a word as *πεποίθησις*. This is enough to say on the point: nor need I say much upon *πέποιθα*, the part of the verb from which the noun is derived. It is used in the various forms in which *πιστεύω* is found. We have *πέποιθά τινι*, *ἐν τινι*, *ἐπὶ τινα* or *εἰς τινα*, *π. ὅτι...*, or the equivalent form of the accusative and infinitive mood, and finally it appears with an accusative as its object, Phil. i. 6, 25. And in all these cases, *to be fully assured of*, or *to have full confidence in*, according

to the form of construction, would seem to be the meaning. And all that has been said of the noun—as expressing not simply *trust*, but a *high degree of trust*, and moreover as not confined to the case in which God or Christ is the object of faith—seems to apply to the verb.

NOTE C. PAGE 21.

Upon the Meaning of ὑπόστασις, Heb. xi. 1.

It will be seen that I do not think it of very much consequence in the argument, whether ὑπόστασις be translated *substance* or *confident expectation*, in Heb. xi. 1. For the figurative sense in which *substance* must be taken, would make the passage serve my purpose in bringing it forward nearly as well, though not so directly, as it does when the word is rendered by *confidence* or *confident expectation*. One of the oldest and best known explanations of the passage, under the former view of the meaning of the word, exhibits this so clearly, that, often as it has been cited, I will subjoin it here. It is from Chrysostom, Hom. 21, in *Ep. ad Hebr.* ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τὰ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἀνυπόστατα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡ πίστις ὑποστάτων αὐτοῖς χαρίζεται. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ χαρίζεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν οὐσία αὐτῶν. οὖν, ἡ ἀνάστασις οὐ παραγέγονεν οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ὑποστάσει, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐλπίς ἐφίστησιν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ ψυχῇ. τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις πραγμάτων ἐλπιζομένων. If we translate ὑπόστασις *substance*, no better explanation of the passage can be desired.

Theodoret must be regarded as understanding the word in the same way. Ἔστι δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑποστάσις πραγμάτων, ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων. Τὰ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρώμενα διὰ ταύτης ὁρώμεν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλπιζομένων θεωρίαν ὀφθαλμῶς ἡμῖν γίνεται, καὶ δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑφεστῶτα τὰ μηδέπω γεγενημένα. Τῶν νεκρῶν ἀπάντων ἐν τοῖς τάφοις ἐτι κείμενοι, ἡ πίστις ἡμῖν προζωγραφεῖ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ τῆς κόρυς τῶν σωμάτων τὴν ἀθανασίαν παρασκευάζει φατέλῃ.

* In iii. 14, both the Fathers make τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως equivalent to τὴν οὐσίαν; but the explanation which they subjoin seems to show that there too, they regarded it as *substance*. Thus Theodoret: ταύτῃ [τῇ πίστει] τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως κέκληκε· οἱ ἐκείνης γὰρ ἐνευερρηθῆσαν καὶ ἐνευερρῶσαν τῇ Δοξῇ τῇ Χριστῷ. And so Chrysostom: τὴν πίστιν λέγει, δι' ἧς ἐπέστημεν, καὶ γεγενήμεθα, καὶ συνοσιώσθημεν, ὡς ἂν τις εἴποι.

That the word, however, is also used to express *confident expectation* cannot be doubted; and I believe that Paul intended that it should bear this sense in the passage before us. But as I have little to add, in support of this view, to the arguments which I find in the treatise of Flacius, *De Re et Fide Fidei*, of which I have spoken in a former Note, I may give his reasoning in his own words.

“Apostolus ad Heb. xi. clare affirmat fidem esse *expectationem rerum sperandarum*; expectare autem bona a Deo est idem quod fidere eo. Nam quod vox ὑπόστασις, quæ ibi est, significet *expectationem*, potest ex tertio capite ejusdem epistolæ probari: ubi etiam hortatur Paulus ad fidendum Deo, et a diffidentia dehortatur.....Bis enim eandem rem diversis verbis exponit; cum enim dicat nos esse *participes Christi*, addit conditionem, *si modo in inchoata fide aut fiducia perseveremus*.—Græcè sic. μέτοχοι γάρ γεγόναμεν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἕανπερ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατέσχωμεν. Heb. iii. 14. Eandem sententiam in eodem cap. repetit, dicens, nos esse domum aut familiam Christi si modo fiduciam et gloriationem Dei usque ad finem retineamus (v. 6). Χριστοῦ οἶκός ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς ἕανπερ τὴν παρρησίαν, καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατέσχωμεν. Jam confer hasce duas sententias, reperies easdem prorsus res iisdem pene verbis Apostolum repetere, et tantum pro voce, ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, *inchoata fiducia*, παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος, ponere: quæ proprie *ingentem* aut *ardentem quandam fiduciam*, et veluti *audaciam* accedendi et aggrediendi aliquem indicat.....Sic et 2 Cor. ix. et xi. dicit, ne si diversum deprehensum fuerit pudetiamus in hac ὑποστάσει, id est *fiducia* seu *audacia gloriationis*, quod videlicet audebat gloriari de Corinthiorum promptitudine in conferenda eleemosyna. Testantur igitur et hæc exempla vocem ὑπόστασις significare fiduciam vel audaciam aliquid agendi conative. Probatur quoque eadem hujus vocis significatio ex Psalmo xxxix. [xxxviii. in LXX.] ubi LXX. pro תוהלת quod *spem* et *expectationem* significat, voce ὑπόστασις utuntur. Quanquam et Polybius, probatus auctor Græcæ linguæ, vocem hanc pro *confidentia* accipit cum scribit Hetruscos *confidentia* et *audacia* Coelitis esse percussos. Sunt autem hæc inter se conjunctissima, certo expectare aliquod bonum et illo fidere. Potest etiam ex ipsius verbi ὑπόστημι etymologia hæc significatio perpulchre erui. Videtur autem proprie et primarie significare audere sub gravi

aliquo pondere stare, aut irruentem in te molem audere humeris excipere et expectare: ut Plutarchus in Dem. inquit, Nemine leuitum ἐφορῶντα expectante, sed fugientibus et desertentibus civitates. Et alioqui Græci ἐποστάτην eum militem nominant qui audet irruentem impetum expectare et in se excipere..... Eadem significationis origine et Græcum ἐπομένω est compositum (quod etiam sæpe *confidenter expecto* significat, veluti si dicas *audere minere sub advenienti pondere*) ac sæpe admodum ἐπομονή pro spe et expectatione in Bibliis ponitur ut Ps. xxxviii. ubi in eodem versu tanquam idem significans eum ἐποστάσει conjungitur, Καὶ νῦν τίς ἢ ἐπομονή μου; οὐχὶ ὁ Κύριος; καὶ ἡ ἐπόστασίς μου παρὰ σοὶ ἐστίν. v. 7*."

This seems to me sufficient: having once the sense of a *resolute abiding* or *awaiting*, the transition to *confident expectation*, or to *confidence* generally, is too easy to render it necessary to vindicate it, even if the authorities for it were less express. But they are, in fact, direct and conclusive: for, besides the quotation from the LXX. given above, in which ἐ. stands for תַּחֲלוּת, it is found in their translation for תַּקוּה, Ruth i. 12, and Ezek. xix. 5. And I think Flacius further shows conclusively that, in the other passage in this epistle (iii. 14), to which he refers, the word is actually used in this sense of *hope* or *expectation*. In the remaining passages (from 2 Cor. ix and xi.) it is not employed in precisely the same sense, but in one so far connected with it as to make the quotations pertinent to his purpose,—in the sense of *confidence* generally; in the first passage, *confidence* in the liberality of the Corinthians; in the second, *confidence* in the justice of the claims which the Apostle felt obliged to put forward on his own behalf.

On the whole, I feel little doubt of the soundness of the interpretation; and I think the preponderance of authorities is in favour of it, though some eminent names are found among the dissentients. As I said before, I felt it to be of no great importance to my purpose to settle the question, and my own mind was convinced by the reasoning which I have given from Flacius: but I was led, as a matter of curiosity, to look after other opinions

* The reader will observe the correspondence between the process by which the meaning of ἐ. for which Flacius contends is derived from the literal meaning of ἐφοστῆται, and that by which in the preceding Note, p. 319, the senso of תַּחֲלוּת is derived from that of תַּקוּה.

pretty extensively, and I shall give my readers a part of the result of the inquiry, which, if it be of no other service to them, may spare them the trouble of consulting the same authorities. They are to remember, throughout what follows, that the texts in which the word occurs, are Heb. xi. 1, Heb. iii. 14, 2 Cor. ix. 4, and 2 Cor. xi. 17*.

LUTHER varies in his translation of the word in these passages, agreeing however with Flacius in the most important one, Heb. xi. 1. "Es ist aber der Glaube eine gewisse Zuversicht [*firm assurance*] dess das man hoffet." Heb. iii. 14, he renders τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως by "angefangene Wesen," *the original or first substance*. 2 Cor. ix. 4, is translated, "mit solchem Rühmen," *by such boasting*, leaving it doubtful what meaning he attaches to εἰ. And there is the same uncertainty in his translation of xi. 17: "dieweil wir in das Rühmen gekommen sind," *since we have come to boasting*.

MELANCTHON is very decided as to the signification of the word, in the most important passage: "Postremo definitio fidei in Epistola ad Hebræos testatur fidem significare fiduciam; cum inquit, fides est ὑπόστασις rerum sperandarum: constat enim iis quibus phrasis nota est ὑπόστασιν significare *expectationem* hoc est *fiduciam expectantem*."—*Loci Theolog. de Voce Fidei*. And again, in his *Prolegomena in Ep. ad Rom.* "Descriptio fidei ad Ebræos xi. ostendit et ibi fide significari *fiduciam*; quia inquit fides est ὑπόστασις, id est, *expectatio* rerum sperandarum. Hæc est vere grammatica vocis enarratio ut omnes eruditi norunt."

BUER, on the other hand (Enar. in Matt. cap. 8, De Fide), renders it "earum rerum quæ sperantur *substantia*, argumentum eorum quæ non videntur est fides." And his explanation is: "Utique quæ a Domino speramus, liberationem ab omni malo et vitam æternam, hac ipsa de qua agimus persuasione Spiritus Dei qua verbis ipsius credimus, nititur et subsistit: idque ideo quod eas ipsas res quas speramus, atque ideo non videmus, qualibet ratione et experimento certius animo ostendit ac præsentis statuit."

ZUNGE, in Ep. ad Heb. cap. xi., translates it by *substantia*, and explains it by *fiducia*. "Fidem hic Paulus ὑπόστασιν, *substantiam* vel *subsistentiam* dicit, hoc est, vividam, certam, inconcus-

* It occurs also in Heb. i. 3. But, however important that text is for other purposes, it is not necessary for mine to consider it.

sam, indubiam et minime trepidantem *fiduciam* earum rerum quæ sperantur jugiter, ac minime videntur."

CALVIN, like Luther, wavers in his translation of the word in the different places in which it occurs. Heb. xi. he translates *rerum sperandarum substantia*, and in his commentary on the passage: "Fides, inquit, est hypostasis, hoc est, *fultura* vel *possessio* in qua pedem figimus. Sed quarum rerum? Absentium, quæ adeo pedibus nostris non subjacent, ut longo superent ingenii nostri caput. Eadem est ratio secundi membri," &c. In his Institutes, lib. 3, c. 2, § 41, he says, referring to the same text, "Nam per ἐπόστασιν, quo vocabulo utitur, quasi *fulcrum* intelligit cui pia mens innitatur, et incumbat; ac si diceret fidem ipsam *certam quandam esse et securam possessionem* eorum quæ nobis a Deo promissa sunt, nisi quis ἔ. pro *fiducia* accipere malit, quod non displicet: quanquam illud quod receptius est amplector."

Heb. iii. 14, he translates, "Si quidem initium *fiducie* [marg. vel *subsistentia*], ad finem usque firmum tenuerimus." And in his note: "quum hypostasis, *fiduciam* interdum significet, posset hic in eo sensu accipi. Non tamen displicet nomen *substantia*, quod alii reddiderunt, quanquam paulo secus interpreter. Illi enim sic dici fidem putant, quia totum esse hominis absque ea nihil aliud sit quam vanitas. Ego autem quia *in ea recumbamus*: sicuti nulla est alia *fultura* in qua possimus stare."

Upon the remaining passages he is quite positive. 2 Cor. ix. 4, *In hac fiducia gloriationis*. Note: Quum Græce sit ἔ. Vetus interpres *substantiam* transtulerat. Erasmus *argumentum*. Sed neutrum convenit. And xi. 17. *In hac audacia gloriationis*. Note: *Argumentum* certe aut *substantia* hic minime quadrant.

BEZA renders Heb. xi. 1. *Illud quo subsistunt quæ sperantur*. And in his note he says, "Tantum dicam Græcum scholiastem mihi paucis videri rem omnem felicissime exposuisse. Πίστις ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἢ ἐπόστασις καὶ οὐσία τῶν ἐπιζομένων πραγμάτων· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰ ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν, ὡς τίως μὴ παρόντα, ἢ πίστις οὐσία τις αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπόστασις γίνεται, εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ παρῆναι τρόπον τινα παρασκευάζουσα, διὰ τοῦ πιστεῖν εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ ἢ πίστις ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀποδείξις τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων. ἀποδείκνυσι δὲ ὁρατὰ τὰ ἀόρατα ἢ πίστις· πῶς; τῷ ῥῷ καὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ὁρώσα τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα." [This occurs in the Commentaries of Beumenius, on the Acts and Epistles. The work is, for the most part at least, a compilation, and this particular note is borrowed in part from the passage already

given from Chrysostom. It is, like the comment from which it is taken, a clear and excellent explanation of the text when the word *ὑπόστασις* is rendered by *substance*.]

Heb. iii. 14. *Principium illud quo sustentamur*. Note: *Vel principium illud fiduciæ; sive inchoatum illud in nobis quo fulcimur*.

2 Cor. ix. 4. *In hoc fundamento gloriationis*. There is added in the text, in Italics, *in præfidente ista gloriatione*, which was the translation of the first edition of his Testament. And in the note, he says, "Id est *in quo nititur* hæc mea de vobis gloriatio, nempe illa insigni in conferendis eleemosynis alacritate et animi promptitudine, quam ut mirificam apostolus apud alias ecclesias prædicaret, &c. Vulgata *in hac substantia*, prætermisso quoque *gloriationis* nomine, ut vix ullus hinc possit sensus elici. [N. B. Though this translation yields no intelligible meaning, yet it seems to have been made from the true text; for the authority for omitting *τῆς καυχήσεως* in the passage appears nearly conclusive; which, however, is only a further proof of the proper meaning of *ὑ*. there.] Erasmus, *in hoc argumento gloriationis*, non multo melius. Doctissimus autem interpres *ὑ*. maluit *fiduciam* interpretari, quod interdum hac voce significatur animi præsentia in periculis minime dejecti sed subsistentis. Hoc olim secutus verti hunc locum et alterum infra xi. 17. *in præfidenti ista gloriatione*, sed nunc attentius hunc locum consideranti, etsi istud non displicet, tamen longius petitum videtur."

Grotius in 2 Cor. ix. 4. *In hoc fundamento meæ jactationis* xi. 17. *in hoc firmamento gaudii mei*, Heb. iii. 14; dixit *ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως* [*initium substantiæ*] *per ὑπαλλαγὴν* [Immutationem] nostris his libris non infrequentem, pro *τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, spem illam quam ab initio habuimus*.

Grotius gives, however, Heb. xi. 1. *Rerum sperandarum firma quædam expectatio*. And Gerhard and Chemnitz defend the same sense, in the essays upon *faith* in their *Loci Theologici*, in which this text comes naturally under discussion.

Our own translations vary in the same way between the primitive and derived meanings of the word. Coverdale's (Zurich, 1535) "being faithfully and truly translated out of *Douche* and *Latyu* into English," of course, follows Luther. Heb. xi.: A sure

confidence of things which are hoped for, and a certaynte of things which are not sene.

Heb. iii. The beginnyng of the *substance*.

2 Cor. ix. *Presumeion* of boastinge.

2 Cor. xi. We are now come to boastinge.

Matthew's, London, 1537 (2nd Ed.). Heb. xi. A sure *confidence* of things which are hoped for, and a certayntie of things which are not sene.

Heb. iii. 14. The first *substance*.

2 Cor. ix. The boost that I made in this *matter*.

2 Cor. xi. 17. While we are now come to bostyng.

Crammer's, 1540, agrees in Heb. xi. 1, with both the preceeding. And in iii. 14, gives, with Coverdale, the begynnyng of the *substance*. But in both the passages in 2 Cor. has, *this matter* of bostyng.

Parker, 1572. Heb. xi. 1. *The ground* [marg. *expectation*] of things hoped for, the evidence, &c.

Heb. iii. 14. The beginning of the *substance*.

2 Cor. ix. and xi. This *boldnesse* of boastyng.

Geneva Bible, 1583, Heb. xi. 1. *The ground* of things which are hoped for, and the evidence of, &c.

Heb. iii. 14. The beginning *wherewith we are upholden*. [marg. the foundation of our *assurance*.]

2 Cor. ix. In this my constant *boasting*.

2 Cor. xi. In this my great *boasting*.

Hammond's correction of our translation of Heb. xi. 1, is, "Now faith is the *confident expectation* of things hoped for, the *conviction* of things not seen." And the note in which he supports it appears to contain a good deal of what is to be said upon that side of the question; though Clericus takes exception to parts of it.

More modern Commentators have brought much learning to bear on the passage, without throwing any additional light upon it; and they admit variations in the same way, without materially affecting the sense. I looked at all within my reach, and subjoin the principal ones; more, as before, with the hope of sparing my readers trouble, than of supplying them with any important information.

Carpzovius, Sacrae Exercitatio. in Ep. ad Heb. græcæ, Fides ejus ὁ δίκαιος ζήσεται, i. e. salvifica, est eorum quæ futura spectamus proposita in antecessum quasi *præsentia* atque *certitudo*; et rerum quæ oculis cernuntur nullis, cognitio demonstrata et longe verissima.

And his account of the matter is that ὁ is *vox ontologica*, meaning,—1. *Actual existence* as contrasted with *apparent, imaginary, or in conception*; as he proves from Philo, Artemidorus, and Aristotle. 2. *Actual existence* as contrasted with *past or future*. Quicquid autem existit, quia rerum nature aut nobis præsens est, philosophi *præsentia* dicunt ἐν ὁ. εἶναι. So Lactantius, de Orig. Erroris, l. 2. "Præteriti est origo, PRÆSENTIS SUBSTANTIA, futuri dissolutio." And Philo, speaking of the knowledge of God, describes all things as in the Divine conception ἀχρόως γινόμενα καὶ ὑφ'εστηκότα. When *faith*, then, is called ὁ, it intimates *present existence*. Isaac Casaubon, he tells us, regards it as expressing *real existence*; and he allows that they are not in error who receive it *de constanti ac certa fiducia*; and that Symmachus may be right in translating the corresponding Hebrew word by אַמִּוּנָה; and Aquila, when he renders it καρδοκία; Jerome, *præstolatio*; his own view, however, is somewhat distinct from all, but the reader must take it in his own words: "Mallem tamen inherere notioni metaphysicæ quatenus enti fulcitur aliquid ac innititur. Chrysostomus οὐσίαν interpretatur. Essentiam ne an existentiam? Utrumque scias jungendum. Pro quo alii eadem significatione *substantiam*."

Ἐλεγχος, he says, lexicographers explain of *undoubted conviction*. Aristotle applies it to *mathematical* demonstration, Theophylact to the *manifestation* of what is hidden, Prosper, *conviction*; but *Carpzovius* himself understands it of *demonstrative knowledge*, by which, however, it would seem that he cannot mean anything more than a firm assurance.

His final explanation is this: The object of *faith* is *things hoped for*; but these are ordinarily *things not seen*, and are therefore in the passage so styled; but, weighing the reasons for believing their existence, we find that they are ἐν λόγῳ, and cannot be otherwise, that they must be, and this renders them as if they had ὑπόστασιν.

Ernesti, *Lectiones Academicæ in Ep. ad Heb.* Est autem fides rerum promissarum *expectatio* et *spes* rerum absentium et futu-

rarum. This is very express; and in a note, not equally clear, his translation of ἐπόστασις, *expectation*, is justified principally by the authority of the LXX. The text Heb. iii. 14, he renders: Si quoniam ab initio habuistis fidem perpetuo retineamus seu retineamus.

Dindorf, his editor, traces the sense of the word, through the literal meaning of *foundation* or *base*, to the figurative sense, *stability, firmness, resolution*, and quotes Diodorus Siculus and Polybius for this use of it; but prefers the sense which Heinrichs, one of the continuators of Koppe's New Testament, proposes, in commenting upon the passage, and which agrees pretty nearly with the meaning given by Beza's Greek Scholiast.

Heinrichs, to whom Dindorf refers, says, ἐπόστασις, quod vere et ἔστος subsistit, *est reelle Substantz*, oppos. ἐπιζόμενα quæ nondum existunt sed in phantasia tantummodo nostra sita sunt. Est ergo ἐ. τῶν ἐπιζόμενων, illud quod eis quæ nondum apparent, quorum non nisi umbram videmus, verum corpus indit. But on chap. iii. 14, he thinks that a better meaning (for this place) than the common one, may be deduced from the sense of ἐφάρταται, to *engage, undertake, promise*; whence ἐπόστασις would mean, first, *confession* or *profession*, and then, by an easy metonymy, the thing *confessed* or *professed*,—the Christian faith. Dindorf is highly pleased with this mode of interpreting the word, which, he says, *mira se facilitate commendat*.

Elsner, Observatt. Sacræ in Nov. Fæd. libros, ἐπόστασις, hic est vera errorisque expers *judicia*, cui res sperate quasi præsentia assistantur, quæ spe sua non excedit, quæ a proposito suo scopoque non dimovetur. This seems to be taking more than one meaning of the word; and, accordingly, he gives quotations for at least two very different senses of it. The first, from Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* l. xviii. c. 2 [c. 1.], who, speaking of the immovable *resolution* with which the followers of Judas, the Galilaean, met tortures and death, uses the phrase, τὸ ἀμετάλλακτον τῆς ἐποστάσεως. Then Artemidorus, *Oneirocrit.* cap. xiv. lib. 1, ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν ἔχειν πλουτοῦ, ἐπόστασιν δὲ μὴ. Where it means *real existence*, as contrasted with *imaginary*. And, lastly, he gives the often cited passage from Polybius, Οἱ δὲ Ῥόδιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν Βυζαντίων ἐπόστασιν, where it means *resolution* again.

Kypke's objections to interpreting ἐπόστασις (in 2 Cor. ix. 4, and xi. 17), by *confidence*, are very curious. "Quod ἔ. multi

h. l. ut et infra c. xi. 17, *per firmam fiduciam, confidentiam* explicant, neutro loco nexus satis ferre videtur: h. l. apostolus *metuebat* ne inanis redderetur sua gloriatio, et ne id sibi *puerum* adferret; c. xi. 17, vero gloriatio apostoli quanquam laud inanis non tamen cum *fiducia* juncta erat, cum perquam *inuitus* ad gloriandum se conferret." By which strange reasoning it would seem, that when a man boasts of others, he may be shown not to have boasted *confidently*, if it appear that *at some subsequent period* he feels doubts whether his boast would be justified by their conduct: and that, when he boasts of himself, it may in like manner be proved that he cannot state his own merits *confidently*, provided it appears that he has been driven into this vindication of himself, by the unfairness or ignorance of others! I observe, by the way, that in Mr Bloomfield's laborious and useful *Synopsis*, Kypke is represented as agreeing in Beza's view of the meaning of *ὑπόστασις*. He does not, however; he mentions it as admissible, but gives his own as preferable: "Vertere igitur potes cum Beza: *In hoc fundamento gloriationis*. Hoc sensu vocem habet Themistius, *Orat. 9, ad Valentin*. Aut quod magis placet verte: *in hac materia sc. negotio ludis*. Vide-tur enim phrasis *ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ταύτῃ τῆς καυχήσεως*, idem significare ac illa: *ἡ καύχησις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει*, vers. 3." He understands by it therefore, "in this matter or *affair* of the praise which I bestowed upon you." Grotius does not distinctly explain the sense in which he uses the words; but Beza (as he explains himself) means by it, the *foundation* of this praise, namely, the prompt liberality of the Corinthians, which Paul describes himself as having so confidently extolled. I must add, though I have said quite too much on this singular note of Kypke already, that I am perfectly at a loss to discover what there is in it that induces Mr B. to qualify it as *a learned annotation*. It is certainly safer to praise the learning than the reasoning of it; but it seems too indulgent to commend either. Of the three quotations which it contains, the first, from *Themistius*, is really, as Kypke himself states, in support of Beza's translation: the second, from *Artemidorus*, is, as Kypke also states, taken from *Elsner*; and the third, from *Aristotle*, is given in Budæus and Stephens *in verb.*; and when it is added, that neither of these last has any more application to Kypke's purpose than the first, the extent of Mr Bloomfield's liberality will be better appreciated

The passage from Artemidorus is given above, under the head of *Elsner*; that from Aristotle is, τῶν ἐν ἀέρι φαντασμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατ' ἔμφασιν τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑπόστασιν; in both the meaning of ὑπόστασις is pretty nearly the same, *reality*, *real existence*, or perhaps *substance*. The translation which Kypke gives of the latter passage seems to have misled him into thinking that the quotation bore upon his view of the meaning of the word: "quæ in ære apparent, quædam specie tenus existunt, quædam vero è materia quadam consistunt;" but it is unnecessary to remark that, supposing Aristotle to say, as this translation makes him, that "some of these atmospheric phenomena are composed of a kind of *matter*;" still it would be no *proof* that, because ὑπόστασις stands for *matter* in this sense, it might also be used for *matter* in the sense of *business* or *affair*.

Leun, one of the continuators of Koppe's New Testament, furnishes even a more extraordinary example of this rage for authorities, which leads commentators of a certain class rather to borrow or steal the most indirect ones than want the proper number. He explains 2 Cor. ix. 4, by "*cum absque omni dubitatione, tam firmâ fiducia*, vestros laudavimus apparatus;" and, in his note on the passage, he says, that ὑπόστασις, which is, literally, a *prop* (from the sense of ἐπίστασθαι, to *bear*, or *support*), means metaphorically, *firm confidence and certain hope*. And he supports this sense by quotations from Polybius, often given before, but pertinent; but he then subjoins two quotations from Philo-Judaus, which most persons will, I think, find it very hard to connect with his translation. The first is from *De Confusione Linguarum*, p. 348, A. (Frankfort edition, 1691), τὰ μὲν ῥητὰ τῶν χρησμῶν σκιὰς τινὰς ὥσαντι σωματίων εἶναι τὰς δ' ἐμφανόμενας διαίμας τὰ ὑφ' ἐστῶτα [ὑφ' ἐστῶτα] ἀληθείᾳ πράγματα. Where I suppose the meaning of the participle is *existing* or *being*, and combined with ἀληθείᾳ, *actual*, *real*, *really existing*, or something to that effect. The second is from *De Josepho*, p. 544. Philo is speaking of Joseph's sudden elevation, and says that such things have happened, and will again, when God pleases, μόνον ἔν τι ὑφαντάθη καλοκαγαθίας ἐμπόρευμα ταῖς ψυχαῖς, where the verb may be used in the rare sense of *to lie hid* (which Stephens notices as given by Budæus, without any example, referring himself to Tho. Magister for examples from Lucian); *to exist*, simply, would give sufficient meaning to the passage; but what bearing this or the

other has upon Leun's own view of the meaning of the word, or his mode of arriving at it, would not be easy to guess. How he came by them is more easily told. He found them in *Loesner* (*Obs. in Nov. T. à Philone Alex.*), as appears not only by his copying *ὑφεστώτα*, as it is misprinted in Loesner, but by the mode in which he introduces the quotations.

LEUN.

Auctor Ep. ad Hebræos cap. xi. 1, fiduciam in constanti et immota rerum sperandarum expectatione cerni contendit.....Philo de Conf. Ling. p. 348, A. ubi monet in oraculis divinis putari debere τὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ.

LOESNER.

Cernitur autem fiducia in constanti et immota rerum sperandarum expectatione, Heb.xi. 1. Quod si ὅ. ad *certitudinem* referas præsidium habebis loci de Conf. Ling. p. 348, A. ubi monet auctor in interpretandis oraculis divinis putari debere τὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Loesner makes some preparation for the quotations, and in translating the passage from *De Confus. Ling.*, renders τὰ ὑφεστώτα ἀληθείᾳ πράγματα by *res certissimas*, so as to supply some reason for citing it in the connexion, but it is apparent that the quotations are nearly as much out of place in him as in Leun. One can account for his adducing the first passage as an example of ὅ. used to express *certainty*, though it would not be easy to justify it. But as *reality* is a fit foundation for *certainty*,—a passage in which the word seems used to express the former emphatically, when a man was looking for authorities for the latter use, might doubtless appear to him something like one; and that it is only in this indirect way that it serves Loesner's purpose, appears elsewhere to be his own judgment, for when he comes to Heb. xi. 1 (which he translates, *rerum sperandarum fiducia*), he says, in the note ὑπόστασις ab ἐπίστασθαι ducitur, quod verbum sensu philosophico et ontologico significat id quod *naturam ac essentiam rei ingreditur*; and, as an example of this sense, gives the very passage from *De Confus. Ling.*, which he had made serve before as an example of a sense not easily understood, but of which *certainty* is meant to be the distinguishing part. But how he could conceive that the passage from *De Josepho* gives any support to the meaning, is not easy to understand.

I have been led a little out of my way by these more remarkable cases, and shall now give briefly a few more authorities, which ought to have appeared earlier.

Abresch's Paraph. et Annotatt. in Ep. ad. Heb. Specimen does not

extend to chap. xi. (at least I have never seen beyond the 6th), but upon iii. 14, he renders ε. by *speciem, firmam expectationem, fiduciam*.

Rosenmüller, 2 Cor. ix. *Ob confidentem illam gloriationem, nam ἐπόστασις est fiducia.*

2 Cor. xi. 17. *Quoniam nunc cum tanta confidentia incipio me laudare.*

Heb. iii. 14. *Si quem cepimus professioni Christianæ dare assensum, ad finem firmum tenemus.....ἐπόστασις hic est quæ supra, v. 6, ἐλπίς dicitur, spes firma, fiducia.*

Heb. xi. 1. Est autem fides rerum sperandarum, *firma quædam expectatio*, convictio indubitata de existentia rerum quæ sub aspectu non cadunt.

Semler, *Paraph. Epistol. ad Corinthios*. 2 Cor. ix. 4. Cum inde a tanto jam tempore *confidentissime glorietur* sim de vestra liberalitate. His notæ is ε. apud LXX. sæpius occurrit ea notione ut sit *fiducia* sicut et Heb. xi. 1. Non male *Beta* reddiderat *in proficiente* ista gloriatione quod postea quasi exprobravit.

This note has swelled to a very unreasonable size; but I hope that it may interest those for whom chiefly I write, or at least for whom chiefly I annotate; and that it may spare them some unprofitable labour. They will see, I think, upon a review of the authorities, earlier and more recent, that the preponderance in learning and reasoning lies decidedly on the side of that interpretation of the Apostle's meaning which I have ventured to adopt.

Kninoel, the Giessen Professor, whose work on the Gospels and Acts is so well known in his country, wrote, some years later, a Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. It was published some time before this volume appeared, but I did not see it until a good while afterwards. He seems worth quoting here (at least more so than some that I have quoted), and it will be seen that the weight of his authority is to be added to the side of those who render ἐπόστασις by *confident expectation*.

“Per τὴν πίστιν h. l. non significatur fiducia in Christi morte posita, nec religionis Christianæ professio, sed latiori significatu hoc verbum sumitur, ita ut indicet firmam et stabilem persuasumem, veri esse, quæ Deus docuerit, monuerit, minatus sit, pro

miserit, qualis fides tempore V. T. locum habuit. Imprimis autem, ut exempla proposita docent, spectatur fides respectu rerum futurarum, fides promissis divinis habita, et lacta eorum, quæ Deus nos sperare jubet, expectatio; de his autem potissimum sermo est, quia spes Christianorum præcipua erat reditus Christi ad regni sui inaugurationem. Particula δὲ h. l. ut supra 10, 38, vim habet transeundi et copulandi. ἔστι δὲ ἡ πίστις, ἐλπίζόμενον ὑπόστασις κ. τ. λ. est autem fides, firma expectatio rerum quæ speramus, et certa persuasio de rebus quæ non cernuntur, ὑπόστασις nonnulli vertunt: *fundamentum*, v. not. ad 3, 14. Plerique cum Vulgato interprete, Chrysostomo et Theodoretō, *substantia*, *essentia*, id quod vere existit, *eine reelle Substanz*, *das Wirkliche*, *das Wesen*, vid. ad 1, 3. Atque adeo ὑπόστασις τῶν ἐλπίζόμενων dicitur illud, quod iis, quæ nondum apparent, quorum non nisi umbram videmus, corpus indit; sive ut alii verba explanant, fides ideo dicitur substantia rerum sperandarum, quia quamvis res speratæ nondum existant, tamen earum existentiam fides quodammodo in nobis efficit et gignit, et nobis illas præsentēs exhibet, dum adeo certos nos de illis facit, ac si re ipsa jam præstitæ essent. Arguta interpretatio, nec a simplicitate commendabilis. Adhibuit Epistolæ auctor h. l. nomen ὑπόστασις eodem significatu quo 3, 14, positum comparet, ita nimirum, ut *firmam expectationem* rerum quæ speramus indicet, τὰ ἐλπίζόμενα quæ speramus, sunt ea, quæ nondum evenerunt, sed futura sunt. τὰ οὐ βλεπόμενα quæ non in sensus incurrunt sive jam evenerint, sive futura sint. πίστις respectu eorum quæ evenerunt est, cum quis testimoniis fidem habet; respectu eorum quæ futura sunt, cum quis promissionibus fidem habet. Post πραγμάτων Böhmīus comma ponendum causat, cum facilius hoc nomen ad posterius participium, quam ad prius subaudiatur, sed vulgaris interpunctio retinenda. Nam non necesse est ut subintelligatur πραγμάτων v. Hermannus et Viger, p. 871, seq. Vocabulum ἔλεγχος declarat *demonstrationem* ut ap. Diōd. Sic. p. 146, B. Philo. Lib. de Josepho, p. 541. ult. πρὸς ἔλεγχον βεβαιώτερας πίστεως. V. Münthius et Carpzovius ad h. l. de demonstratione mathematica hoc nomen posuit Aristot. Rhet. c. 14. Significat vero etiam *argumentum* ut ap. Acl. II. V. 7, 19. Glossæ: *probatio* ἔλεγχος Theophylactus explicat, *δείξις καὶ φανέρωσις ἀδήλων πραγμάτων demonstratio et manifestatio rerum quæ non sunt conspicuæ*. Œcumenius ἀπόδειξις. Horum auctoritatem secuti sunt plures interpretum recentiorum, et ἔλεγχος reddiderunt de-

monstratio, alii explicuerunt demonstrata cognitio. Alii, argumentum rerum quæ non videntur, argumentatio. Rectius h. l. mea sententia exprimitur persuasio firma, quæ ex argumentis oritur, illoque nititur. de rerum quæ sensibus non percipiuntur veritate. Loquitur enim scriptor de certa animi affectione."

NOTE D. PAGE 23.

Upon the Examples in Heb. xi. 8.

To avoid misconception, I think it necessary to remind my readers that there is here no question raised, whether the persons commemorated in Heb. xi. were all Believers in Christ; and no attempt made to settle, if they were, in what way, or to what extent, they were so; but that the inquiry merely respects the particular incidents in their lives to which the Apostle refers. And when this is recollected, and these incidents are carefully considered, it will be felt, I trust, that the question is rightly answered.

I do not know that these examples, generally, require any observations, for my purpose, beyond those already made upon them in the Sermon. Upon one of them, however, I must say something, as it may perhaps be thought to furnish some objection to the explanation which I have given of the first verse. Our belief of the revealed account of the origin of the world is alleged, v. 3, as an exercise of *faith*; and this may be thought not to accommodate itself easily, either to my general account of the principle, or to my representation of the meaning of the particular passage.

I do not think that the instance, fairly considered, will be found in any way inconsistent with either. It will be remembered that I have maintained that the design of the Apostle, in the opening statement, is to convey to us a notion of the principle *in general*; and, in the examples, to acquaint us further with its *general* nature, by exhibiting it to us in actual operation, in different ways and under different circumstances. As to the account which he gives, I may add, by the way, that I agree with Erasmus

and Calvin, in thinking it unreasonable to treat it as a formal and complete definition of *faith*; and in regarding it rather as designed to give essential parts of that principle—leading and prominent characteristics of it. The two characteristics of *faith* which he selects, as suited to his purpose, are, *confident expectation of good*, and the *firm conviction of the reality of what is unseen* [when we are assured of it by Him in whom we put faith]: and every instance of either would of course be pertinent to his main design. The general character of the examples which he brings sufficiently shows that by *the unseen things*, of which he describes *faith* as assuring us, he meant, *principally, the things hoped for*, which we firmly expect. But as the reliance upon God, which he designed to illustrate, leads necessarily to an assurance of all that He declares to us,—since one confiding not only in His power, and His goodness, but also in His truth must firmly believe all that He reveals concerning what is unseen, whether past, present, or future,—it is not strange that the Apostle should take occasion to intimate this more comprehensive range of *faith*, though it did not suit his purpose to dwell upon it. He therefore gives a single and well-chosen instance of this operation of *faith*, in which reliance upon God's truth emancipates Believers as remarkably from the thralldom of sense, concerning the *past*, as it does concerning the *future* in all the other examples which he gives,—where, in the midst of sufferings and trials, it assures them of some happy change for them in this world, or of the glory which shall be revealed in the world which is to come*.

* The following is the comment of Kuinoel (see note C, at the end) on the verse, so far as the point considered above is concerned:—"E creatione mundi probat epistole conditor πίστιν spectare etiam res præteritas, quæ non in sensus incurraunt. τὰ μὴ βλεπούμενα, canique esse certissimam persuasionem de veritate eorum quæ in libris sacris consignata, et e Dei quasi ore profecta legantur. A creatione autem exorditur, morem Judæorum secutus, qui cum de gentis suæ et beneficiis a Deo ei exhibitis loquebantur, a primordiis mundi et generis humani inchoare solebant, v. Ps. cxxxvi., Sir. xliii, xliv. Accedit alia ratio, de fide generatim dicta fidei Christianæ accommodare volebat. Qui autem credebant, ut *Heinrichsius* et *Stolzius* periti morantur, mundum Dei polynia esse creatum, eo facilius credere poterant Deum Christianos probos et constantes a calamitatibus propter religionem Christianam perferendis liberaturum, eosque præmiis amplissimis ornaturum esse. Ipsa creatio, inquit, nullos spectatores habuit; neque nos neque τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, sed fidem habentes scimus mundum Dei voluntate conditum esse, ita, ut quæ conspiciuntur non condita sint ex iis quæ jam existerent."

It may be alleged, it is true, that this belief in the origin of all things is not necessarily a result of *faith in God*; for that a man may be convinced, upon principles of natural reason, that the world is not eternal, and that the course of natural reproduction, by which the existence of all that it contains is now continued, cannot have gone on always; but that both it and they must have had their origin ultimately in some act of the power of its ruler, essentially different from any that we now witness, and so forth; and that, therefore, this *may* be a result of rational conviction in one who disbelieves revelation, or a result of such a belief of the truth of revelation as I make distinct from *faith*—from the *faith* intended to be explained and exemplified by the Apostle. This is, no doubt, true. But it is true of every example given by the Apostle as well as this one, and makes as much against every account of the meaning of *faith* as against mine. There is no act which the Apostle refers to, as a result of faith, which *might* not have been the result of some other principle. I mean of some principle distinct from *faith*, under every notion of its nature. But they are also natural and striking results of *faith*: and so is this. When they are known to be the effects of *faith*, they serve to throw light upon its nature: and so does this. No doubt a belief in the true account of the creation *might be* but an example of the force of reason: but in the same way, Abraham's offering of his son Isaac *might be* an example of the awful delusion under which some *reeds their children to pass through the fire, and offered their sons and their daughters to devils*. When we know, however, that it was in Abraham the result of *faith in God*, we recognize in it a striking example of the effects of this principle. In like manner, though this belief of the real origin of all things *might be* the result of reasoning upon the phenomena; yet, when we know that it is, in Believers, the result of their *faith* in Him who has revealed it, we see in it an exemplification of one of the leading characteristics of the principle. And this seems enough.

The occurrence of the instance seems, therefore, sufficiently accounted for: while the fact that it is but a single instance, and the very different character of the remaining ones, furnish a strong confirmation of the account already given of the meaning of the Apostle in this remarkable passage.

NOTE E. PAGE 25.

Upon the Declarations of the Nature of Justifying Faith in the Confessions of Protestant Churches, and the Writings of the earliest Protestant Divines.

The declarations of the nature of faith in the Sermon are from the third Homily, *Of the Salvation of Mankind*, and from the first part of the following Homily, intitled, *A Short Declaration of the true, lively and Christian Faith*. They are, I suppose, sufficient to establish the views of our Church upon this point; but, if the reader should desire further evidence or explanation of these views, he will find both in abundance in the Homilies referred to.

The assertion, that equally express declarations of the same views are to be found in the public acts of all Protestant Churches, and in the writings of all the early Protestant Divines of real weight*, may be, I think, satisfactorily established. And the point is one of so much importance, that I hope my readers will not decline the trouble of reading and weighing the quotations by which I proceed to prove it. Numerous as they are, I think they will be found not to have been multiplied inconsiderately.

The general accordance of the Reformers upon the question is, indeed, stated strongly by Bellarmin: "*Nam fidem Lutherani fere omnes non tam notitiam, vel assensum, quam fiduciam esse definiunt. Atque eam demum fiduciam specialis misericordie fidem justificantem esse docent.*" *De Just.* lib. 1. cap. 4. But even if no better evidence of their agreement were required, it would be desirable to allow them to explain their principles for themselves, as there is, in Bellarmin's account of them, some direct misrepresentation, and something which, without amounting to actual misstatement, is no less likely to mislead. The *confidence* upon which the Reformers insisted was not, as the reader will see, independent of *knowledge* and *assent*, but founded upon them. And as to the statement, that they regarded justifying faith as confidence in

* *Bucer* and *Beza* may seem exceptions to the general concurrence of the eminent Reformers upon this point. Both certainly speak of *fiducia* as distinct from *fides*, and properly its effect; but the reader will see, by the statement of their views given below, that their difference from the rest is rather verbal than real: at all events, he will have the means of judging for himself of its amount.

special mercy, it is so far true, that they taught that the *faith* of the Believer was his *trust* in God through Christ; his *confidence* in God as a reconciled Father, and his *hope* of all good things at His hands; and that they denied that any general belief in God's purpose of saving Believers in Christ, of rewarding the good, &c., was *faith in Him*. But, on the other hand, they neither taught nor countenanced, under the name of *faith*, any fanatical impressions of peculiar personal favour; nor did they allow, as *faith*, any confidence towards God which was not grounded upon a believing and intelligent application to *operations* of the offices of mercy which His Word makes alike *to all*. But I am well satisfied upon this to suffer them to speak for themselves. And I shall begin with the public documents.

CONFESSIO AUGUSTANA, 1530. Art. *De Bonis Operibus*.

Admonentur etiam homines quod hic nomen *fidei* non significet tantum historie notitiam, qualis est in impiis et diabolo, sed significet fidei, que credit non tantum historiam, sed etiam effectum historie, videlicet, hunc articulum, remissionem peccatorum, quod videlicet per Christum habeamus gratiam, justitiam, et remissionem peccatorum . . . Augustinus etiam de *fidei* nomine hoc modo admonet doctorem, et docet, in scripturis nomen *fidei* accipi, non pro *notitia*, qualis est in impiis, sed *fiducia* quæ consolatur et erigit perterrefactas mentes.

CONFESSIO AUGUSTANA, 1540. *De Fide*.

Sed fide hoc beneficium accipiendum est, quia credere nos oportet quod propter Christum donetur remissio peccatorum, et justificatio . . . Verum hæc misericordia non potest accipi nisi fide; et fides hic non tantum historie notitiam significat, sed significat credere promissioni misericordie quæ nobis propter mediatorem Christum contingit. Et cum hoc modo fides intelligitur de fiducia misericordie non dissentiant inter se Jacobus et Paulus. Quod enim inquit Jacobus, *Demonæ credunt et contremiscunt*, intelligit fidem de notitia historie; hæc non justificat. Norunt enim historiam etiam impii ac diaboli. Paulus vero, cum inquit, *fides reputatur ad justitiam*, &c. loquitur de fiducia misericordie promissæ propter Christum.

APOLOGIA CONFSSIONIS AUGUSTANÆ.

Sed illa fides quæ justificat non est tantum notitia historie, sed est assentiri promissioni Dei, in qua gratis propter Christum offertur remissio peccatorum et justificatio. Et ne quis

suspicetur tantum notitiam esse, addimus amplius est velle et accipere oblatam promissionem remissionis peccatorum et justificationis.

CONFESSIO SAXONICA. 1551. *De Rem. Pecc. et Just.*

Sunt autem nota vocabula. Fides significat non tantum historie notitiam qualis et in diabolis est, de quibus dicitur *damones credunt et contremiscunt*: sed significat amplecti omnes articulos fidei et in his hunc articulum, *credo remissionem peccatorum*. Nec tantum aliis eam dari credo, sed mihi quoque.

Hæc fides simul est fiducia acquiescens in mediatore, juxta illud: *justificati ex fide pacem habemus*. Ita loquitur Paulus de fide, quæ adsentiens omnibus articulis fidei, promissionem intuetur et amplectitur, copulat enim fidem et promissionem. Rom. iv. *Ideo ex fine, ut sit firma promissio*.

CONFESSIO HELVETICA. 1566.

Fides enim Christiana, non est opinio ac humana persuasio, sed firmissima fiducia et evidens ac constans animi assensus, denique certissima comprehensio veritatis Dei propositæ in scripturis et symbolo apostolico, atque adeo Dei ipsius summi boni, et præcipue promissionis divinæ, et Christi, qui omnium promissionum est colophon.

CONFESSIO BELGICA. Gallicè, 1561. Latinè, 1581. Art. XXII.

Credimus Spiritum Sanctum in cordibus nostris habitantem veram nobis fidem impartiri, ut hujus tanti mysterii veram cognitionem adipiscamur. Quæ fides Jesum Christum eam omnibus suis meritis amplectitur, illumque sibi eum proprium effectum vindicat, nihilque deinceps extra illum querit.

CONFESSIO BOHEMICA, 1538. Latinè auctior, 1572.

Atque hæc fides proprie est cordis prompti assensio erga universam in Evangelio annunciatam veritatem, qua homo mente et animo illustratur, et Deum suum et Dominum Jesum Christum rectè agnoscat, et pro unico salvatore suo accipiat, supraque hunc, ut veram petram suam prorsus salutem collocat, eum diligat et sequatur ipsoque fruatur, omnemque spem et fiduciam in eo reponat, et se hac erigat et animosa fiducia confidat quod propter ipsum et solum meritum ipsius propitium placidum et benignum Deum habeat, atque etiam in ipso et per eum certo vitam æternam habeat, et in æternum habiturus sit. secundum veram promissionem ipsius quam jurejurando confirmavit, &c.

CATECHESIS HEIDELBERGENSIS, 1563.

21. *Quid est fides?* Est non tantum notitia qua firmiter assentior omnibus quæ Deus nobis in verbo suo patefacit, sed etiam certa fiducia a Spiritu Sancto per evangelium in corde meo accensa, qua in Deo acquiesco, certo statuens non solum aliis sed mihi quoque remissionem peccatorum, æternam justitiam, et vitam donatam esse, idque gratis ex Dei misericordia, propter unius Christi meritum.

It may be needless to add any evidence of the views of the earliest Continental Reformers, as these Confessions were drawn up by the most eminent of them, and approved by all. I shall subjoin a few, however.

LUTHER. *Disputationes*, 1555.

Fides acquisita seu sophistarum de Christo dicit, *Credo filium Dei passum et resuscitatum*: atque hic desinit. Sed vera fides dicit, credo quidem filium Dei passum et resuscitatum, sed hoc totum pro me pro peccatis meis, de quo certus sum. Est enim pro totius mundi peccatis mortuus." At certissimum est me esse partem aliquam mundi, ergo certissimum est pro meis quoque peccatis mortuum esse.

In Genesin, cap. 15.

Hic aperte dic quid faciat sola fides, non cum quibus virtutibus conjuncta sit. Sola autem fides apprehendit promissionem, credit promittenti Deo, Deo porrigenti aliquid, admovet manum et id accipit. Hoc proprium solius fidei opus est; charitas, spes, patientia habent alias materias circa quas versantur, habent alios limites intra quos consistunt. Non enim amplectuntur promissionem sed mandata exequuntur. Retinenda igitur distinctio hæc est, quod fides quæ agit cum Deo promittente et ejus promissiones accipit, hæc sola justificat.

In Ep. ad Galatas (1536, the enlarged commentary).

Quando fide in verbum Dei edoctus apprehendo Christum, et tota fiducia cordis (quod tamen sine voluntate fieri non potest) credo in eum, hac notitia justus sum.

MELANCTHON.

As it is known that the Augsburg and Saxon Confessions, and the Apology, were drawn up by Melancthon, it seems needless to give any proof of his views beyond the quotations already made from these documents. I shall give but two brief ones from his last revisions of two of his works.

Loci Theologici, 1543. De Gratia et de Justificatione.

De remissione peccatorum vociferantur [Monachi] non recte doceri quod fide gratis propter Christum accipiatur remissio peccatorum; nec admittunt fide significari fiduciam misericordiae Dei. Quare cum dicit [Paulus] *fide justificamur*, vult te intueri Filium Dei sedentem ad dextram Patris, mediatorem interpellantem pro nobis; et statuere quod tibi remittantur peccata, quod justus, id est acceptus, reputeris seu pronuntieris propter illum ipsum Filium Dei qui fuit victima. Ut igitur vocabulum fides monstrat illum mediatorem, et nobis applicet, significat fides non tantum historiae notitiam, sed fiduciam misericordiae promissae propter Filium Dei.

Enarratio Symboli Nicensi Ultima, 1557.

Fides est assentiri universo verbo Dei, atque ita et promissioni gratiae; et est fiducia acquiescens in Deo propter mediatorem, accedens ad eum, vere invocans eum, et clamans Abba Pater.

BUCER. *Disputatio de Fide* (Explanatio Fam. in Psal. viii. Genevæ, 1554).

Proinde fidem in Deum recte definiemus, si dicamus indubitam esse persuasionem, Deum esse, et omnium rerum authorem, bonorumque fontem, ita et nostrum conditorem, servatorem, aeternumque beatorem: sic fidem Christi certam persuasionem cum nostrum esse redemptorem ac instauratorem.

Enarratio in Mathæum, cap. vii. v. 10.

Ex his jam abunde liquere existimo, quidnam sit virtus ista vere divina, quæ Hebraeis **אמונה**, Grecis *πίστις*, Latinis *persuasio*, vulgo *fides* dicitur; est enim constans firmaque animi per Spiritum Sanctum de Dei bonitate atque promissis persuasio; qua is, ut verbis ejus certam fidem habet, ita et de ejus erga se bonitate omnia sibi indubitato pollicetur, tum demerendo quoslibet tam ipsi gratificari quam referre hoc bonitatis studio impensisime studet.

De Justificatione et Locis Evangelicæ Doctrinæ Disputat. Ratisbonæ habitæ.

Nos autem in articulo nostro [Art. 4, Conf. Aug.] loquimur de ea fide de qua Apostolus et Dominus ipse in locis jam adductis..... Quæ fides ut docemur, 2 Cor. iv., et aliis in locis, utque ecclesia semper credidit, donum est et testimonium Spiritus Sancti, quod largitur et præbet spiritui nostro, ut certum et indubitatum præbeamus assensum Evangelio et firmiter credamus

Deum nobis peccata condonare, et habere nos filiorum loco propter Christum filium suum, ita ut sine hæsitatione invocemus eum patrem, et sciamus quod quæ ab eo in nomine filii sui petemus, daturus est nobis.

[I have given such copious citations from Bucer, for various reasons; but chiefly because he sometimes, as in the Strasburg Confession and elsewhere, appears to make *confidence* a result of faith, and not a part of it; which, to any one that reads the foregoing accounts of faith by him, may appear strange, but cannot appear very important.]

BULLINGER. *De Gratia Dei*, 1553.

Dico fidem esse certam veritatis cognitionem atque adeo constantem ac firmam fiduciam, et indubitatum ex Spiritu Sancto mentis humanæ assensum verbo Dei, omnem veritatem credendam, imprimis autem Dei promissiones, ac in his, ipsum Christum, in quo est omnis plenitudo vitæ et salutis, proponenti.

CALVIN. *Inst. lib. 3, cap. 2, § 7.*

Nunc justa fidei definitio nobis constabit, si dicamus, esse divinæ erga nos benevolentiae firmam certamque cognitionem, quæ gratuite in Christo promissionis veritati fundata, per Spiritum Sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris et cordibus obsignatur.

Sextæ Sessionis Conc. Trid. Antidoton, in Can. 12.

Non placet venerandis patribus *fidem justificantem* esse *fiduciam*, quæ misericordiam Dei propter Christum peccata remittentis amplectimur. At placet Spiritui Sancto qui per os Pauli sic loquitur nos gratis justificatos esse Dei gratia per redemptionem quæ est in Christo, &c. Rom. iii. 24.

BEZA, as I mentioned above, dissents from this general view of the Reformers, but so, it will be seen, as to make a *belief in the promises of God, with a personal application of them*, an essential part of justifying faith.—In Ephes. iii. 12. Ex hoc autem loco apparet manifestè, *πεποιθῆσθαι*, id est, *fiduciam*, a *fide*, nempe ut effectum a causa, differre: ac proinde a nonnullis perperam Fide substitui Fiducie nomen, quamvis ista duo semper cohereant, quum de vera illa fide agitur. Vide 2 Cor. iv. 16.—His own definition of justifying faith is given in Rom. i. 17. Fidem igitur de qua hic queritur, esse definimus firmam illam et constantem animi *πληροφορίαν*, id est, certiorationem qua certus est apud se unusquisque fidelium non modo verum ac firmum esse omne verbum Dei, ac præsertim promissiones Dei de gratuita

per Christum reconciliatione : sed etiam istas per predicationem et Sacramenta sibi oblatas credit ad se proprie ac peculiariter pertinere : qua, inquam, illam promissionem vitæ æternæ per sanguinem Christi quibusvis credentibus acquiritur, sigillatim applicatur, ac sibi ipsi applicat.

I may be more sparing of quotations to establish the views of the early English Reformers, because evidence of their principles has been lately placed within the reach of every one, by a republication of their most important works, in the series of the "British Reformers," just completed, by the Religious Tract Society. I should be glad to believe that this timely and valuable publication was in the hands of all my readers : it is not too much to hope, at least, that those who design themselves for the office of Ministers of the Church of England will thankfully avail themselves of the opportunity which is thus afforded to all, of becoming acquainted with the true principles of her immediate reformers and their predecessors*. Though it would plainly be improper to multiply citations to the extent for which I had made preparation, I cannot omit them altogether ; and I shall begin with him of whom Fox speaks as that "true servant and martyr of God, William Tyndall, who for his notable pains and travail may well be called the Apostle of England, in this our latter age." I have already prefixed to this Sermon his view of the nature of faith, with the passage from Luther from which it seems taken. I had noted other passages in his writings, which it might have been useful to give, had they continued locked up in what must have been rather a scarce book, the Works of Tyndall, Frith, and Barnes, published by Fox, 1573. But I rejoice to find that the most important parts of that very important collection form one number of the series before-mentioned ; and I willingly refer my readers to that admirable volume, for a declaration of the principles of the earliest maintainers of the truth in England, not surpassed, in fervency, soundness, and plainness of speech, by anything with which I am acquainted in the writings of their most illustrious successors. "For albeit increasing of learning of tongues and sciences, wyth quicknes of wit, in youth and

* I have retained what I said of this most useful publication, though a still more important series which has been sent out by the PARKER SOCIETY since this volume was published has superseded it for not a few readers, yet there will always be a great number to whom its moderate extent and price will make it more suitable.

others, doth marvailously shut up, as is to be scene, to the sufficient furnishing of Christes church : yet so it happeneth, I can not tell how, the further I look backe into those former tymes of Tyndall, Frith, and others lyke, more simpliciteie, wyth true zeale and humble modestie, I see, wyth lesse corruption of affections in them. And yet wyth these dayes of ours I finde no fault."—*Fox's Preface*. Such is the testimony of one, who was himself largely endowed with the qualities which he commends, and who wrote when such gifts were more common than they are in these days of ours. I trust, however, that the causes, whatever they be, which have made such excellencies rare among us, have not in the same measure disabled us from discerning and admiring them.

TYNDALL. *Prologues made upon the Five Bookes of Moses*. Gen.

Fayth is the beleuying of God's promises, and a sure trust in the goodness and truth of God : which fayth justified Abraham, Gen. xv., and was the mother of all his good workes.

Answers unto Mr. More's 4th Booke.

Note now the order : 1st. God giveth me light to see the goodnesse and rightousnesse of the law, and myne own sinne and unrightousnesse. Out of whiche knowledge spryngeth repentance. Now repentance teacheth me not that the law is good, and I evill, but a light* that the Spirit of God hath given me,

* Misprinted in the Society's edition, "but is a light," which plainly misrepresents Tyndall's meaning. He intends to say, that we owe our perception of the goodness of the Law and of our own vileness, not to repentance, but to a light bestowed by the Spirit of God, distinct from repentance, and properly its cause. As I am upon the subject of mistakes, I may notice another in a note in the same volume, at p. 118 of *Barnes's Treatise of Justification*.—B., in maintaining the truth against "the lies" by which it was assailed, says, "But such a lie must St Paul needs suffer, when he had proved that faith only did justify. Then came your overthwart fathers, and said, 'Therefore thou destroyest the law,' &c.—Here, by a strange inadvertence, a note is given, explaining "your overthwart fathers" by "the fathers of the church who contradict you." Whereas it manifestly means your *perverse predecessors* in this work of gainsaying, and misrepresenting the truth; the cavillers of St Paul's days, whom Barnes styles *the fathers* of the cavillers of his own days. [Soon after these Sermons first appeared, I received a letter from a gentleman who had a large share, I believe, in the publication referred to, informing me that the mistakes that I had noticed were to be corrected by cancelling the pages in which they occurred. I presume that this has been done, but I have never had an opportunity of seeing a copy of the volume so corrected.]

out of which light repentance spryngeth. Then the same Spirit woorketh in myne harte trust and confidence to beleve the mercy of God, and his truth, that he will do as hee hath promised, which belesse saveth me. And immediately out of that trust spryngeth love toward the law of God agayne.

CRANMER. *Catechismus*, 1548.

This [the Apostles' Creed] is the summe of our Christian faith, wherein God hath shewed unto us what he is, and how great benefites he hath gyven, and daily doth gyve, unto us, to the intent that we should cast the anchore of our faith upon him, and take sure hold of his mercie and goodnes, and comfort ourselves with the same both in our life time, and also at our death. *Gen. Preface to the Crede.*

Where note, good children, that this word (I beleve) signifieth as much, in this place, as I trust: so that this sentence,—I believe in God the Father, is as much to saye as I trust in God the Father, and loke assuredly to receave all good thinges at his hande. . . . Therefore we ought to put our trust in God only, sticke fast to him, hang upon him, and to loke for all good thinges at his hande. . . . And this is the fatherly love which he bereth towarde us, to do all goodnes towarde us, without oure merites or deservinges. Wherefore we ought to trust in him, yelde ourselves holly into his protection, to loke for all good thynges at his handes, and with a mery harte and constant faythe to cleave to his goodnes in all thynges.—*First Sermon.*

Therefore, when we beleve in Christ, and stedfastly cleuyng to the worde of God, suerly perswade ourselves in oure hartes that we be thus redeemed by Christ, then God is no more angry or displeased with us for our synnes, but freely and mercifully he forgyveth us all our offences for the death and passion of his Son. . . . Wherefore, good children, beleve ye with all your harte in thys Jesus Christ, the onlye Sonne of God, oure Lord, and doubte not but that he hath suffered for our synnes and contented the justice of his Father for the same, and hath brought us again into his favour, and made us his wel beloved children and heyres of hys kingdome.—*Second Sermon.*

[I quote from the reprint of this Ed., Oxford, 1829; having never seen the original. As the object for which I make the quotations is to show the leading notion attached to *faith* by

Cranmer at this time, the book would equally serve my purpose whether it were believed to have been actually translated by himself from the Latin of Jonas, or by his orders, and under his inspection. I cannot avoid adding, however, that I consider the reasons put forward by Dr Burton (in his preface to this reprint), for disbelieving this translation to have been executed by the archbishop himself, in the highest degree unsatisfactory. They seem to amount, so far as I can collect them, to the following:—that Gardiner, in attacking this catechism, speaks of it as *set forth in Cranmer's name*, as *set forth in the archbishoppe of Cantorburies name*, as *translate into English in this auctor's name*, and so forth: that he says, that *one in communication would have made him* [Gardiner] *believe that this translation had been his* [Cranmer's] *mannes doynge and not his*. And, what is more important, that Rowland Taylor in his examination, when asked by Mayster Secretary Bournes, whether he would stick to the religion *set forth in a catechisme by my Lord of Canterbury*, answers: “My Lord of Canterbury made a catechisme to be translated into English, which booke *was not of his owne making*; yet he set it foorth in his own name, and, truly, that booke, for the time, did much good.”

These seem the entire grounds upon which Dr Burton pronounces that “Upon the whole, it seems evident that Cranmer was not himself the translator, though the work may have been ‘overseen and corrected’ by him.” I hardly think, however, that this will be regarded as evident, when it is stated on the opposite side:—that Cranmer, as Gardiner mentions, *confessed the translation of the catechisme*;—that, in his Answer to Gardiner, he speaks of it repeatedly as *my catechisme*; as “a catechisme *by me translated* and set forth;” as “the catechisme of Germany *by me translated* into English:”—and that, when Gardiner founds an argument upon a print in the Latin, which did not appear in the English, Cranmer complains of this unfairness, that “would gather my mynd, and make an argument here of a picture neyther put *in my booke* nor by me devised, but invented by some fond paynter or carver, which paynt and grave whatsoever theyr idle heades can fansy. You should rather have gathered your argument upon the other side; that I mislike the matter, because *I left out of my booke* the picture that was in the original before. And I mervayle you be not ashamed to alleadge so vayne a matter

against me, which indeed is not *in my booke*, and if it were, yet were it nothing to the purpose. And in that catechisme *I teach not*," &c. And in his answer to Smith's confutation of his defence, "But this I confesse of myself, that not long before *I wrot* this sayd catechisme." And finally, that in his examination at Oxford, 1556, when Martin asks, "Did you not translate Justus Jonas booke?" he replied, "*I did so* *."

Now, after all, Cranmer may not have been the translator of this catechism; but I certainly greatly misconceive the state of the case, if it do not establish that he was, by as strong direct proof as such a point admits of. The only evidence of any weight on the opposite side is Taylor's, which may therefore deserve to be looked at a little more closely. The words that the book was not of *his own making*, may very easily be understood to mean only that Cranmer was not *the author* of it. But when he says that *he made it to be translated into English*, it is most natural to understand him as meaning that Cranmer was not himself *the translator* of it. Indeed it would be very hard to assign any other meaning to these words, if we were at liberty to suppose that the fact, that the catechism was a translation, was generally understood. But this does not appear to have been the case: the title-page seemed to present it as an original *work* of Cranmer's†, and Mr Secretary Bourne speaks of it as a *cate-*

* This express admission re-appears in this form in the Notary's Report of the Interrogatories. Answer to Inter. 7:—"Whereunto, when the names of the books were repeated unto him, he denied not such books which he was the author of. As touching the treatise of Peter Martyr upon the Sacrament, he denied that he ever saw it before it was abroad, yet did approve and well like of the same. As for *the Catechisme*, the Booke of Articles, with the other booke against Winchester, he granted the same to be his doings."—Fox.

† The reader ought to be informed, or reminded, that the fact that the Catechism was not an original work, was one not to be collected from the book itself. No intimation that it was a translation was given either in the title-page, or in the body of the work; or even in the prefatory dedication to King Edward, in which Cranmer speaks of the nature and design of the *lytle treatys* and the motives that led to his undertaking it, in a way which does not suggest that he was only the translator of it, but which, I cannot help adding, seems wholly irreconcilable with the notion that he had not even that share in it: "I knowyng myself as a subiecte greatly bounden and much the more by reason of my vocation to set forward the same the king's plans of reformation, &c.] am perswaded that thys my smal travayll in thys behalfe taken shall not a lytle helpe the sooner to brynge to passe your godly purpose."

chism by my lord of Canterbury, which is not the style in which a translation by him would naturally be spoken of. Taylor, who is only able to give it the qualified praise, that *it for the time did much good*, is anxious to make it clear that Cranmer was not the author of the book. And when a man is intent upon an object of this kind he often does not very carefully weigh the exact force of his language, being chiefly solicitous to make it strong enough. So that though it would be very dangerous and unjustifiable to adopt it as a general rule of interpretation, yet in some cases it is really safer to collect a man's meaning from the purpose that he has in view, than from the words which he employs. If we insist on taking Taylor's testimony literally, it stands in opposition to all the proofs which we have been looking at, all of which, as we have seen, point this way. But there is no difficulty in bringing it into harmony with all of them, or at least of taking away all opposition to them, if we interpret it on the principle just suggested, and suppose that in his anxiety to disconnect the Archbishop from the work he said somewhat more than he intended, and that all that he really meant was that he (Cranmer) was *not the author of the work*, and that he was only concerned in the translation, without meaning to deny that he was the translator, or to assert anything on that particular point. This seems to me a reasonable mode of dealing with his testimony. I must add, however, if it were otherwise, and if I were obliged to understand by his words, that he meant to deny the Archbishop to be the translator of it, I should find it infinitely easier to suppose him mistaken, than to disbelieve Cranmer's own reiterated admissions and avowals of the fact, and, above all, his express assertion of it (just cited) in answer to a direct question when on his examination before the commissioners.

But, as I said, I am equally at liberty to use the citations that I have made from the book, however this question about it be settled; and, even if I were not, a single passage which I am about to give from an undoubted work of Cranmer's, would make me independent of them. The passage is taken from a very interesting MS. still preserved in the library of C. C. College, Cambridge. It is in Cranmer's hand, and must be regarded as containing his deliberate and corrected opinions on the important subjects on which it treats; as it is a detailed revision of *The Necessary Erudition of a Christian Man*, commonly called 'The

King's Book. Parts of this MS. were published by Strype in his Appendix to 'Memorials of Cranmer;' and the most important parts are given in the Tract Society's publication before referred to. The entire is to be found in Richmond's 'Fathers of the English Church.' It seems to afford an easy way of determining some questions that have been raised, with respect to the share of Cranmer in the doctrinal part of the King's Book; or, at least, of settling—what is the point of real importance in that discussion—the views finally held by him upon the doctrine of Justification.]

MS. Notes upon the King's Book.

87. *Having assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy, willing to enter into the perfect faith.*

He that hath assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy hath already entered into a perfect faith, and not only hath a will to enter into it. For perfect faith is nothing else but assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy: and after it followeth, *That he shall enter into perfect faith by undoubted trust in God, in his words and promises* which also be both one thing: for these three be all one, *perfect faith,—assured hope and confidence in Christ's mercy,—and, undoubted trust in God, in his words and promises.*

BECON. *The Demands of Holy Scripture.* [Tract Society's Ed.]

What is faith? It is a full and perfect confidence and trust in God through Christ, engendered in our hearts by hearing the word of God: and as Paul defines faith,—Faith is a sure confidence of things which we look for, and the certainty of promises. Rom. x.; Heb. xi.

HOOPER. *An Hundred Articles according to the Order of the Apostles' Creed.* [Tract Society's Ed.]

Art. XC. I believe that this justifying faith is a mere and singular gift of God, which is commonly given by the hearing of God's Word; whereupon alone it is built, and not upon the doctrines and traditions of men. I call a justifying faith, a certain assurance and earnest persuasion of the good will, love, grace, bounteousness, and mercy of God towards us, whereby we are assured, and verily persuaded in our hearts, of the mercy, favour, and good will of God the Father; that he is on our side, and for us, against all that are against us; and that he will be a merciful Father unto us, pardoning our sins; and will give us his grace, make us his children by adoption, and admit us for heirs unto

eternal life; and all this freely in his Son, and by his only Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, and not for our merits or good works....

It would be very easy to add to these passages many such testimonies, both from the same writers and others. But I should hope that a fair consideration of those given will show them to be abundantly sufficient to establish the point which they are intended to establish; namely, that the meaning of *faith*—of *justifying faith*—which the Continental and British Reformers held and maintained agrees with that assigned to the term in the Sermon: that they held it to be *trust in Christ*, or *in God through Christ*, grounded upon a belief of God's testimony in His Word concerning Christ, and wrought by His Spirit in the hearts of those whom that Spirit had convinced of sin, of danger, and of helplessness; and, through such convictions, had brought to take refuge in HIM, in whom sinners find innocence, security, and strength.

NOTE F. PAGE 30.

Upon the Difference between Faith and Hope.

The Reformers were often pressed by their opponents with the difficulty: Scripture plainly distinguishes *faith* and *hope*, but your account of the former confounds them. Luther treats this point as a very serious one; and gives a regular answer to it. His mode of introducing the subject is highly characteristic (Ep. ad Gal. cap. v.): "Hic quæstio oritur, quid intersit inter Fidem et Spem? Hac in re valde sudaverunt sophistæ, sed nil certi ostendere potuerunt. Nobis, qui tamen diligentissime versamur in sacris libris, at longe majori celsit verbi invili) spiritu et intelligentia illas tractamus, difficile est aliquod discrimen invenire. Tantam enim cognationem inter se habent fides et spes, ut hæc ab illa divelli non possit." He attempts, however, to show that they differ in five respects, 1. in subjecto; 2. in officio; 3. in objecto; 4. in ordine; 5. a contrariis; but his answer, though it is so elaborate, does not seem to deserve to be quoted at length. Melancthon

touches upon the subject with more effect in his *Examen eorum qui audiuntur ante ritum publicæ ordinationis Wittenbergæ*, 1554—“Et est [fides] fiducia acquiescens in Deo propter mediatorem, accedens ad Deum et accendens invocationem, et clamans Abba Pater. Et quia fides in præsentia accipit remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, est fiducia præsentis beneficii: sed spes est certa expectatio.” The same view of the difference is more fully stated in Davenant’s *Determinationes Questionum*, *Quæst.* 37, *Fides justificans est fiducia in Christo Mediatore*; in the course of which he explains that *faith* is not confounded with *hope* in the Protestant doctrine, but distinguished from it in this:—That *faith* does not tend to its object as a future, but as a present good. It conceives and apprehends the Mediator, as now present to the sinner, and reconciling him to God the Father. It cleaves to the truth of the Gospel promises, not as an expectant, but a possessor, according to the word of the Saviour, “He that believeth on the Son *hath* everlasting life.”

The most important distinction between these states of mind is certainly given in these answers of Melanethon and Davenant, which are substantially the same. But they seem to require some explanation, lest it should be supposed that the agreement of the two states of mind is overlooked or denied. He who simply hopes for a fulfilment of Gospel promises (of which assuredly a most important part is happiness in a future life) is not more an expectant, or less a possessor, with respect to this part of the promises, than he who trusts in Christ for the fulfilment of them. They both have the present enjoyment which such hope is fitted to supply, and both have equally to wait for the perfect fruition of it. But the difference between the two states of mind is intelligible and important, though they have so much in common. That *faith* includes feelings, with respect to the Being whose sufferings secured the benefits of redemption to us, and to the Being whose mercy will bestow them, which do not enter into a mere *hope* of the blessings themselves, is, as I have remarked, p. 14, immediately apparent from the true account of the nature of *faith*. And here, what the Bishop says, of *faith* *conceiving and apprehending the Mediator*, &c., and what Melanethon says of the *present benefit* which is its object, must be felt to be well grounded and most important. So that it may be seen—and it seems to be a sufficient answer to the difficulty, though, perhaps, not a perfect account of

the whole difference—that *faith* has objects which *hope* has not; and that though *faith* in Christ cannot exist without some degree of *hope*, it does not depend for its life and energy upon the same causes, and may be strong and cordial, while our hopes are not powerfully raised, for want of the distinct knowledge which is essential to their liveliness; and, moreover, that the liveliest hopes may exist without any such faith.

But it may be said, though this distinction is well founded in the abstract, what application can it have to the particular case for which it is intended? For, assuredly, the *hope* of which the Scriptures speak is that, and that only, which Believers in the Lord feel. I answer, that the distinction holds not less in the particular case than in the abstract. For, though the Believer entertains no hopes which are not founded on the Redeemer's work, this does not hinder that, at certain seasons, the objects of his hopes may be present to his mind, apart from their true foundation. He may form vivid pictures of future happiness, may indulge ardent longings for it, and enjoy a lively expectation of it, without adverting, at the moment, to what forms the sole foundation of such hopes. Nor does he, by so doing, cease to be a Believer, but he is not at the time exercising *faith*. On the other hand, he may, while he meditates upon joys in store for him, think even more of Him to whom he owes them, and think of Him in assurance that through Him he shall obtain them: he is, in the former state, hoping; in the latter, confiding—exercising *faith* in the *God of hope*, and in Christ, *who is our hope*.

NOTE G. PAGE 30.

Upon Desire, as an Element of Faith.

The importance of insisting upon a desire of the blessings of salvation, as an essential part of faith, was felt by Melancthon, when he writes, in the *Apology*, “Et ne quis suspicetur tantum cognitione esse [fidem], addimus amplius, est *velle* et accipere oblatam promissionem.” And the peculiar necessity, hence arising, for divine influences to produce faith, is very well explained in an anonymous *Essay on the Extent of Human and Divine Agency in the Production of Saving Faith*. Edinburgh, 1828.

NOTE H. PAGE 32.

An Objection obviated.

Some persons will be ready to think that all this may be retorted; and that it may as reasonably be said—That faith in its full meaning includes Christian obedience, but that the term is sometimes, according to these principles, used for a part of its entire signification, to express *trust*; and that sometimes, perhaps, *trust* may be used for *it*, reversing the synecdoche; and that really the appearance of conclusiveness, in the arguments of those who hold it to mean *trust*, arises from their error being *in defect*: and so forth. It is very likely that all this may be said; but there are important and decisive differences in the two cases, which will show that, however specious the objection may be, it is altogether unsound. In the first place, it is not true that *faith*, either in its common or its Scriptural sense, includes *obedience*, and it is true that it does include *trust*. Both these points, I think, I have established in the investigation of its meaning, in Sermon I. and Note B. And this, surely, must be felt to be an important distinction between the cases. But, secondly, though *faith* does not include *obedience* in its proper meaning, yet, as obedience is a result of the principle, and is so described in the Bible, I readily grant that *faith* might be employed, according to a very common use of language, to express both the principle and its effects. But that it is not so used in the Scripture statements of the doctrine of Justification (and this is the only point at issue) is, I think, fully proved, when it is shown, as it is hereafter, that this obedience *follows after justification*: that it is only rendered by those whom *faith has actually justified*; that, *before we believe*, we cannot do anything well pleasing in God's sight, or render to Him any obedience; that, *when we believe*, we are *justified*; and that *then, and not till then*, does *faith* bring forth its fruits of love and obedience. And this, I hope, is enough to show that, though what is said in the Sermon may seem to furnish an opportunity for a retort, it is really not exposed to one.

NOTE I. PAGE 33.

On Eph. ii. 8.

Among the texts to which I have here referred, in proof of the position that *faith is the gift of God*, is Eph. ii. 8. The interpretation of the text which makes it pertinent to the point is the ancient one; but as it has been disputed by many modern commentators, from Calvin down, I ought to give my reasons for adhering to the earlier authorities. The 8th and 9th verses are: Τῇ γὰρ χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν. Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον· οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἵνα μὴ τις καυχῆσθῃται. Dean Alford's Note gives the chief authorities on both sides, together with his own reasons for preferring the more modern interpretation:—"And this (not *your faith*, as Chrys. οὐδὲ ἡ πίστις, φησὶν, ἐξ ὑμῶν; so Thdrt., al. Corn.-a-lap., Beza, Est., Grot., Beng., all.:—this is precluded [not by the gender of *τοῦτο* but] by the manifestly parallel clauses οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν and οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, of which the latter would be irrelevant as asserted of *πίστις*, and the reference of ver. 9 must therefore be changed:—but, as Calv., Calov., Rück., Harl., Olsh., Mey., De W., Stier, al., 'your salvation.'"—See, to the same effect, Ellicott *in loc.*

The objection to the ancient interpretation, which is here stated, seems to be a very serious one; but I do not think that it is conclusive. Griesbach and Scholz put the words, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν. Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον· οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, in a parenthesis. I collect from Alford that Lachmann, Harless, and De Wette parenthesize only the words, Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον. I would propose to take an intermediate course, and regard the words καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον, as parenthetical. And then οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων will be connected with σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως, without any irrelevance*.

* After this Note was written I saw that, though Beza's text is printed so as to give no intimation of any such construction, his translation exhibits the parenthesis proposed above. But he would interpret καὶ τοῦτο, so as to combine both references—to the word *πίστις*, and to the fact stated, that we are saved by it. His note is:—"Et hoc, καὶ τοῦτο, id est, et hæc fides, itidemque quod fidei interventu servamini: ne quis fide nos ut qualitate justificari arbitretur. Est autem totum hæc membrum parenthesi includendum." I should think that this twofold reference would be almost universally rejected as wholly inadmissible.

This would remove the only serious objection to understanding *καὶ τοῦτο* to refer to *τῆς πίστεως*, and there seems to be this decisive reason for so understanding it, that the phrase *καὶ τοῦτο* will then be used with strict propriety, which it does not seem to be, if it be understood to mean "your salvation." The meaning of the words *καὶ τοῦτο* (or *καὶ ταῦτα*) is simply *and that*, or *and this*. But their proper office (when they refer elliptically* to what has gone before) seems to be to introduce and draw attention to some addition to what has been said,—something which adds to its force,—something which was from the first before the mind of the writer, but which he feels that he has not presented to his readers, or at least has not so presented that it is not liable or likely to be overlooked if attention be not directly drawn to it. Examples of its use in classical authors may be found in Viger (Hoogeveen's notes), Buttman, Matthiæ, and Kühner. I need only add here a few from the New Testament. Thus in 1 Cor. vi. 6, *καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ ἀπίστων*, the phrase introduces the aggravation of the offence of brethren in the faith going to law at all, viz., that the judges before whom they appear are unbelievers. So too, just after, verse 8, *ἀλλὰ ὑμεῖς ἀδικεῖτε καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο* (Rec. *καὶ ταῦτα*) *ἀδελφούς*. In the preceding verse, he had said that they were to blame in going to law at all; that they ought rather to allow themselves to be wronged and defrauded. But he adds that, so far were they from bearing patiently wrong and fraud in the spirit of Christ's followers, that they actually inflicted both, *and that* (increasing the aggravation) upon their brethren. Again, Phil. i. 28, *καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*, it seems to introduce an enhancement of the value and importance of the sign (or, as some think, of the thing signified, or, as others, of both), viz. that it is from God. And, Heb. xi. 12, *καὶ ταῦτα νεκρωμένων*, where the fact plainly adds to the wonder of the original statement.

Now, in the case under consideration, *καὶ τοῦτο* is used in the customary and proper way, if we interpret this text with the ancient fathers. But it seems hard to account for the use of it, when the modern interpretation is adopted. In the former part of the verse, the Ephesians were told that they were saved by grace,

* In Hoogeveen's note on *Viger de Idiotismis*, ed. Herman, p. 176, (referred to lower down in this Note,) there is an example from Demosthenes (*pro Phorm.* p. 605, in which the ellipsis is supplied, but in general the reference as stated above is elliptical.

through *faith* (i.e. that this was the way in which sinners were saved under the Gospel). But no addition seems to be made to this information, nor any new strength or emphasis given to the statement, if it be said that *their salvation was not of themselves*. Something additional, however, and important too, is told them when they are informed, that this *faith* by which they are saved is not *of themselves*—not an acquisition of their own, nor the spontaneous growth of their own minds—that it is *the gift of God*. If *salvation* be *by grace*, it cannot be *of ourselves*; but though it be *by grace*, yet the instrument employed—*faith*—might be an acquisition of our own*, and the grace of the act might consist entirely in *counting faith for righteousness*. We receive, therefore, some additional information in being told that that is not the case—that this *faith* is *not of ourselves*—that it is *the gift of God*. The grace of our salvation is evidently enhanced, when it appears not only that God accepts *as righteousness* at our hands that which indeed is *not righteousness*, but moreover that He Himself graciously gives us that which He thus graciously accepts.

I should be sorry to insist dogmatically on the ancient interpretation as undoubtedly the right one. But it does appear to me a sufficient reason for abiding by it, that in it, the emphatic phrase *καὶ τοῦτο* discharges its proper office, which it cannot be thought to do when the modern interpretation is adopted; I mean that this is a sufficient reason for holding by the former interpretation, when the objection to it which Dean Alford puts forward is satisfactorily disposed of, as I think it is by the proposed parenthesis. The verses will then stand thus: Τῇ γὰρ χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἑμῶν, Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον), οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μὴ τις καυχῆσθῃται. And I should hope that my readers will see that, when the passage is thus pointed, the ancient interpretation is entirely relieved from the only serious objection that, so far as I know, has ever been urged against it.

* Indeed Chrysostom, who maintains very distinctly the gratuitous nature of our *salvation*, goes very far—to a very heterodox length, as it seems—in representing faith as *of ourselves*. Τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν πιστεῦσαι τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐγνωμοσύνης ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ὑπακοῦσαι κληθέντας· μετὰ δὲ τὸ καταβληθῆναι τὴν πίστιν, τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος δέουσα βοήθεια, ὥστε μένειν αὐτὴν διηκεῶς ἀσειστον καὶ ἀπερίτρεπτον. Hom. liv. t. v. p. 371 (Eton, 1612), quoted by Suicer, sub voc. *πίστις*.

NOTE J. PAGE 44.

The Repentance essential to Faith.

The Reformers taught that faith was only wrought in a mind which the Spirit of God had alarmed and humbled, had softened and subdued to receive it. But they discouraged, wisely, a curious scrutiny into the quality and amount of the emotions of remorse, and sorrow, and fear, which preceded the consolations of the Gospel: well knowing how fitted such inquiries were to delay and impede such consolation, and to mislead as to its proper source. I have prefixed, to this second Sermon, a passage expressing their views upon this subject, which are given elsewhere with great clearness. For example, in the second Augsburg Confession, Art. iv.: "Cum Evangelium arguit peccata nostra, corda perterrefacta statuere debent, quod gratis nobis propter Christum donentur remissio peccatorum et justificatio per fidem. Quanquam igitur Evangelium requirit pœnitentiam, tamen ut remissio peccatorum certa sit, docet eam gratis donari. . . . fieret enim incerta remissio, si ita sentiendum esset, tum demum contingere remissionem peccatorum postquam eam præcedentibus operibus meriti essemus, *aut satis digna esset pœnitentia.*" And, again, in the Art. *De Fide*: "Quanquam igitur *contritio aliqua seu pœnitentia necessaria est*, tamen sentiendum est donari nobis remissionem peccatorum et fieri nos ex injustis justos, id est reconciliatos seu acceptos et filios Dei, gratis, propter Christum, non propter dignitatem contritionis, aut aliorum operum præcedentium aut sequentium. Sed fide hoc beneficium accipiendum est," &c. And in the Saxon Confession, Art. xvi. *De Pœnitentia*: "Et dicimus partem pœnitentiæ seu conversionis primam esse contritionem, quæ est vere expavescere agnitione iræ Dei adversus peccata et dolere quod Deum offenderis: et dicimus in his qui convertuntur *aliquos tales veros pavores et dolores esse oportere*, nec agere pœnitentiam eos qui manent securi et sine dolore. . . . Hic autem taxamus adversarios, qui fingunt contritionem mereri remissionem peccatorum, et *oportere contritionem sufficientem esse.* In utroque errore magnæ tenebræ sunt. Nam remissio datur propter Mediatorem, gratis. Et quæ potest esse contritio sufficiens?

Imo quo magis crescit dolor sine fiducia misericordie eo magis corda fugiunt Deum," &c.

As the point is one of much importance, I must add another remarkable quotation. The Articles from the University of Louvain, 1544, declaring the Romish doctrine, drew a bitter reply from Luther, which was weakened, however, by unbecoming levity. A work by Melancthon [1546], in a different tone, which refers to these Articles, supplies the following valuable evidence of the principles of the Reformers upon this question: "*De contritione nos quoque docemus omnino oportere aliquam, in iis qui convertuntur, contritionem existere; quia Deus damnat carnalem securitatem, et vult aliquo modo agnosci iram suam adversus peccatum. Ideo Paulus sic orditur suam concionem, Revelatur ira Dei, &c. Et contritio est vere expavescere agnitione iræ Dei adversus peccata, et dolere propter Deum, et Filium ejus Dom. nostrum J. Christum. Sit verus dolor et pavor, nec disputetur an sit sufficiens, quia nostra contritio non meretur remissionem, et si cresceret pro magnitudine peccatorum extinguerentur homines. . . . Sit igitur contritio, sed accedat fides, qua unusquisque vere credat et statuât sibi ipsi remitti peccata gratis propter Filium Dei, non propter propria ulla merita. Hac fide consequitur homo remissionem peccatorum certò, et rursus oritur cor, et vivificatur, id est, mitigantur pavores, et concipitur Spiritus Sanctus, et nova vita et lætitia ut Rom. v. dicitur, *Justificati fide pacem habemus.*"—*Disp. de tota Evang. Doct.**

More cannot be needed to show the views entertained by the early Reformers of the right use of this doctrine of repentance, and their apprehensions of the abuse of it; that they held that its use was to lead the sinner to the consolations of the Gospel; and that they feared that it might be abused, to drive him from them into despair; to keep him in affliction and alarm notwithstanding them; or to direct him to other and self-righteous consolations for relief. What just grounds for such apprehensions the Romish doctrine of Repentance furnished cannot be unknown to my readers; but to many of them, I should suppose, there will be something new in the specimen of Protestant divinity which I am about to subjoin. Bishop Bull, having proved that *Repentance* is no less required to *Justification* than *Faith*, proceeds thus to settle what Repentance is: "Id porro notandum est, resipiscen-
tiam non esse opus unicum, aut simplex, sed multorum

aliorum operum quasi complexionem. Suo enim ambitu comprehendit sequentia opera nec pauca neque ignobilia." Of these *opera penitentiae* he enumerates *eleem*, making the last, "Opera beneficentiae sive eleemosynas. Quae quanti valeant ad remissionem peccatorum a Deo impetrandam, satis liquet ex celeberrimo loco Dan. iv. 27. [24.] Ubi sanctus Propheta Regi *Nebuchadnezzari* adhuc in peccatis haerenti hoc consilium suggerit: *Peccata tua eleemosynis redime**, et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum. Vides quam late se diffundant pœnitentiæ opera; vides ea omnia ad veniam peccatorum consequendam a Spiritu Sancto omnino necessaria statui."—*Har. Ap. Diss. prior. Cap. II. § 7.*

This note is already too long; but I cannot refrain from further extending it, by appending to Bishop Bull's exposition of his principles a striking and, on various grounds, most interesting exhibition of their genuine effects. It will be easily conceived that I must feel, at times, tempted to give examples of the views that I maintain, and of those that I oppose, in actual operation. But I certainly cannot be accused of yielding often to the temptation. I have, on the contrary, avoided carefully the introduction of any matter of that kind hitherto, for reasons which, I dare say, will readily occur to every one. But, I think, most readers who have gone so far will not be displeased at the deviation from my plan which makes them acquainted with the passage subjoined, or brings it back to their recollection.

It is from Boswell's account of a dinner with his illustrious friend at Mr Dilly's in April, 1778. CROKER'S 'Boswell,' Vol. vii. pp. 138, 139.

* How far the Bishop's strange theology has the appearance of any support in this passage from Daniel, depends, of course, on the correctness of this translation of פָּרַק, which our translators render *break off*. That they are not without respectable support in thus translating the word will be seen by referring to Poole's *Synopsis*, in which there is, as usual, a fair account of the authorities on both sides. To those which he gives in support of the translation *break off*, some additions are to be made, but the most important of these is Buxtorf's great name: see his *Lexicon Chal. Talm. et Rab. in voc.* And then, though they will still be outnumbered, I do not think that, considering the nature of the question, they will be outweighed, by the authorities on the opposite side. For some of my readers, the question must be settled by such a comparison; but I hope I shall have some who will be able and willing to consider it upon its own merits. And being anxious to give such readers such help as I can, I have set down some remarks upon the point at issue; but they have run out to too great length to be added here, and will be found at the end of this Note.

"I expressed a horror at the thought of death.

"Mrs KNOWLES.—'Nay, thou should'st not have a horror for what is the gate of life.'

"JOHNSON.—(Standing upon the hearth, rolling about, with a serious, solemn, and somewhat gloomy air.) 'No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension.'

"Mrs K.—'The Scriptures tell us, *The righteous shall have hope in his death.*'

"J.—'Yes, Madam; that is, he shall not have *despair*. But, consider, the hope of salvation must be founded on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be applied to us, namely obedience, and when obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But, what man can say that his obedience has been such as he would approve of in another, or even in himself upon close examination; or that his repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain salvation.'

"Mrs K.—'But divine intimation of acceptance may be made to the soul.'

"J.—'Madam, it may: but I should not think the better of a man who should tell me on his death-bed he was sure of salvation. A man cannot be sure himself that he has divine intimation of acceptance; much less can he make others sure that he has it.'

"BOSWELL.—'Then, Sir, we must be contented to acknowledge that death is a terrible thing.'

"J.—'Yes, Sir, I have made no approaches to a state which can look on it as not terrible.'"

Being justified BY FAITH, we have peace with God, is not more certain than that, while we seek to be justified in any other way, we shall want peace, unless we be given over to utter darkness concerning God's nature and our own. "Our great moralist" was never delivered over to this delusion; and, in consequence, while he seems to have entertained no doubts that this religious system—which sent him first to his own obedience to obtain the application of the SAVIOUR's mediation to himself, and then to repentance as suppletory to obedience—was really THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST, yet he never found, or professed to find, a ray of comfort in it,—although it is likely that his obedience was as exact as most men's, and that, when it came to reckoning up the *opera pœnitentiæ*, he could come as near as most to the *just tale*. But the mercy,

which was shown in keeping him ever alive to the utter inefficacy of the Gospel which he professed, was, we have reason to believe, accomplished at the last in teaching him a better. And we may hope that it was through the Spirit, the Comforter, that he attained that tranquillity in death which, in the progress of the conversation from which I make the above extract, he treats as always the result of want of thought, or of the dogged resolution with which men meet what they feel to be inevitable. In the midst of much that is painful and perplexing in the closing scene of his life, Boswell has preserved one comfortable testimony from Dr Brocklesby (for whose freedom from *fanaticism* he answers), which gives good ground for the hope that *the God of hope* gave to this eminent man *the peace*, if not the *joy*, in believing, which is the portion of those who are reconciled to Him by faith in His Son. "For some time before his death all his fears were calmed, and absorbed by the prevalence of his faith and his trust in the merits and propitiation of JESUS CHRIST."

Continuation of Foot-note, p. 313.

Bi-hop Bull gives the following Note in vindication of the Latin translation which he adopts:—"פָּרַק Chaldeum respondet Hebræo פָּדָה. Vid. 2 Sam. iv. 9; Num. iii. 49, et xviii. 15. Recte ergo Theodotion vertit, λύτρωσαι. Vide Grot. in locum."

This is merely an abridgment of the Note of Grotius, to which he refers. "פָּרַק Chaldeum respondet Hebræo פָּדָה quod hic in interpretationem posuit Iacchiades. Apparet id, 2 Sam. iv. 9, Esaie xxxv. 9, Num. iii. 49, xviii. 15, et alibi. Quare optime vertit Theodotion, λύτρωσαι redime." *Grot. in loc.*

What is stated in these accordant Notes is literally true; but it does not warrant the inference drawn from it. And, on the other hand, they agree in a curious suppression of a fact which is very important to the question.

The Hebrew verb פָּדָה, which is sometimes rendered by the Chaldee פָּרַק, means primarily (see Gesenius in verb.) *to loose (by cutting)*, cognate with פָּרַד, *to cut, sever, separate*; then, *to redeem* by paying a price; then, *to let go or release* that which is so re-

deemed; then *to deliver* (from slavery), *to rescue* (from danger). But in none of these meanings can it be joined with *sins*, as *redimere*, and even *to redeem*, may be: it only means *to redeem* in the sense of *rescuing* and *delivering* that which was *captured*, *lost*, *forfeit*, *condemned*, &c., so as to *recover*, *restore*, *preserve*, &c., it; and not, at least so far as I know or believe, in the sense of *atoning for*, *making satisfaction for*, or in any sense which would make it applicable to *sins*. And, accordingly, though often used in reference to *sinner*s, it is not, I believe, found anywhere applied to *sin*. So that though it is true that פָּרַק *Chald.* does sometimes correspond to פָּדָה *Heb.*, and that this latter word does mean *to redeem*, it is not in any sense which would warrant this translation. It also stands for נָצַל and הוֹשִׁיעַ, but still only in the same sense. And כָּפַר (Pih. from כָּפַר, *to cover*), which signifies properly *to atone for*, *to make atonement*, is not translated by פָּרַק but by כָּפַר. The correspondence of the Chaldee verb פָּרַק with the Hebrew פָּדָה does not, therefore, make as much for the translation for which Grotius and Bull contend, as might at first sight appear. But on the other hand פָּרַק corresponds to the Hebrew verb פָּרַק, of which undoubtedly a common meaning is *to break*, *to break off*. And it seems strange that these learned men concur in having this important fact unnoticed. A modern writer, who upholds the translation for which they so emphatically declare, deals more boldly with the objection which this fact seems to offer to it. In the Preface to AVRILLON'S *Guide for passing Lent*, one of a series of 'DEVOTIONAL WORKS, edited and adapted to the use of the English Church, by the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D.,' what is said to be *undoubtedly a true and Catholic doctrine, found in all antiquity, with reference to fasting, tears, almsdeeds, &c.*, is stated; and the text, Dan. iv. 27, is quoted as a part of the proof that it is also the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures. The text is thus translated:—"Redeem thy sins by righteousness, and thine iniquities by showing mercy to the poor;" and upon the word *redeem* we have the following note:—"The same sense would result from the English Version 'break off,' but the versions agree in the other rendering: our translators have given to the Chaldee word the sense most frequent in the Hebrew, *but which in the Chaldees it is never known to have.*" This absolute assertion, being

made by so high an authority as the Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford, is likely to have been received by a great many of his readers without any doubt of its correctness. It is, however, strangely rash and ill founded. There can be no doubt that פָּרַק is often used for Hebrew words which signify *to redeem*; but, as is above remarked in connexion with that one of them which is specified by Grotius and Bull, פָּדָה, it is not in the sense of *to atone for, to expiate, make satisfaction for*, or any sense which applies to sins. And, on the other hand, it is used by the Targumists, earlier and later, for the Hebrew verb פָּרַק, where that verb signifies (as Dr Pusey admits it most frequently does) *to break, to break off*, or something akin thereto.

Thus, Exod. xxxii. 2, E. V., “*break off* the golden earrings,” &c., is Heb. פָּרְקוּ נִזְמֵי הַזָּהָב and Chal. פְּרִיקוּ קִדְשֵׁי דְרַהָבָא. In the next verse, E. V., “*And all the people brake off*,” &c. וַיִּתְּפְּרוּ כָל-הָעָם Heb.; וְאַתְּפְּרִיקוּ כָל-עַמָּא Chal. And again, verse 24, for הִתְּפְּרוּ Heb. we have פְּרִיקוּ Chal. And it is used for verbs of kindred senses, as שָׁפַע (Pih. from שָׁפַע of the same meaning) *to divide, or cut in two*; הוֹרִיד Hiph. (from יָרַד *to descend*), *to take down, to lay down*, applied to *taking down* the Tabernacle, and *laying down* the parts of it which were carried by the Levites [Geier (*Pol. Syn.*) thinks that this sense supplies a suitable interpretation to the text under consideration]: for נָזַח Niph. (from נָחַח not in use, *to remove, to separate, to be removed, or separated*). And so too Jonathan, 1 Kings xix. 11, renders מִפָּרַק Heb. Part. Pihel, *breaking, rending*, by מִפְּרִיקֵן Chal. Part. Pahel. [The difference in number between the participles arises from the curious paraphrase adopted in the verse, where for *a great and strong wind rent*, &c., we have *an army of the angels of wind rent*, &c. מִשְׁתָּרִית מַלְאָכֵי רוּחַא מִפְּרִיקֵן. And so of the rest, *an army of angels of fire*, &c.] Examples, like those given above from Onkelos, may be found in later Targumists also, of the use of the Chaldee verb for some other Hebrew verbs, besides פָּרַק, of somewhat different but still kindred senses. But the case is too clear to require further proof. I will only notice, as throwing some additional light on the question, that the substantive פָּרַק Chal. not only has the same signification as the Heb. פָּרַק,

namely, *the place where two ways meet*, or rather (for that is the notion which the word presents etymologically) *whence two ways diverge*, but also other meanings, in which the Heb. noun is not found, but which agree in the same general conception of a point which is the end of one thing and the beginning of another: as *the neck, the junction of the neck and back, any joint of the hand or foot*. And in Rabbinical writings it is further used for *knots or joints* in plants, as *reeds, stalks*; also a *section, or chapter* of a book, and in other meanings. See Buxtorf *in voc.*

NOTE K. PAGE 46.

On Prayer for Faith.

The error adverted to here is clearly and forcibly exposed in Mr Carlile's 'Old Doctrine of Faith;' and the general question glanced at—of the state of mind which prayer to God supposes and requires—is very well handled in the anonymous Essay on Faith, already referred to, Note G. I do not recur to the question with any intention of treating it at large. The decision in the Sermon is enough for my immediate purpose; and I am persuaded that it must be assented to by all who have followed, and who adopt, the preceding account of the nature of Faith, and of the mode of producing it in the mind. That account not only renders it probable that the principle may often *gradually* develop itself in the mind, under the teaching of God's Spirit; but it suggests, as a very probable stage of the progress of the change through which faith is established in the heart, the one referred to in the Sermon: in which a man sees, and even feels, the value and necessity of faith in the Lord, and sees and feels that he possesses it but imperfectly, if at all; that he is far, very far, from *feeling* that deep, cordial, and undoubting confidence in the Redeemer, which he must *perceive* is the proper result of the truths that he believes concerning Him. And if this be admitted, nothing more can, I suppose, be needed to show the presumption of discouraging one who feels this want from applying to God to supply it; or the weakness of hesitating to exhort him to do so. And with this determination of this particular question, which is all that my immediate purpose required, I must be for the present content.

NOTE L. PAGE 58.

*Upon the Hebrew and Greek Verbs which are rendered by the verb
'to justify' in our Version.*

Whatever be the assistance that might be hoped from etymology in determining the nature of *Justification*, the Romanists must be acknowledged to have looked for it rather perversely, when they proceeded to deduce it from the composition of the Latin verb *justifico*! And it was certainly conceding too much to their outrageous claims of authority for their translation, to discuss the meaning of any word in the Vulgate, as if it could decide a question concerning the meaning of the original term for which it stands. But it seems to have been a rule with the early Reformers—rather a bold than a wise one certainly—to take every adversary upon his own ground. And they appear to have followed that rule here; so far, that is, as to attempt to show that the Romanists were wrong in the point which they endeavoured to make, though I do not believe they were ever guilty of the imprudence of admitting that, if they had succeeded in establishing it, it could decide the real point at issue.

So far as etymology was concerned, the answer was a very happy one. When the Romish writers confidently put forward the composition of the word—*justum facere*—as establishing the sense *to make just* of the compound, it seemed a very sufficient exposure of the value of the argument, to ask whether, when we *glorify* God, or *sanctify* Him, as we are commanded, we really *make Him glorious*, or *holy*? Whether when Mary *magnified* the Lord, she *made Him great*? &c. *Affelmanni Syntax. Exercit.* part. i. p. 530. As to authority, however, the case was not so clear. It is true that Chemnitz tells us that he challenged Andradius to produce any instance, from an approved Latin writer, of the use of *justificare*, in the sense of *making just*; and that the challenge was never answered. *Exam. Conc. Trid. de Decreto 6to.* Bellarmin, however, *De Justificatione*, Lib. ii. cap. iii. not unfairly replies, that, as the word was not used by classical authors, his party could not be reasonably required to produce any ancient authorities for the meaning which they assigned to it. He confesses that they cannot. But in this he says they were in

no worse position than their opponents, who could just as little give any instance of the use of the word in the sense for which they contended. But he maintains that it is otherwise with the Fathers: "Latinae enim linguae non imperiti, verbum, *justificare*, passim, usurpant pro eo quod est *justum facere*."

This large assertion, with respect to the Fathers *passim*, he proves, in his way, by half-a-dozen quotations from Augustin*!

It appears to have been a great mistake to answer such an argument at all; for, even if there were no hazard of being defeated upon it, and of having the value of the victory much mis-estimated, the contest served to divert attention from the points of real importance. It must be confessed, however, that it was by no means easy to bring the Romish controversialists to those points. They were in general but little inclined to engage in a discussion of the original terms: nor is it very surprising, as they must have felt themselves very weak there. But Bellarmin, who seldom wants courage, expresses himself with the utmost confidence on the meaning of the Hebrew verb: "Dico verbum צדק et הצדיק proprie nihil esse aliud quam *justum facere*: sed quia potest aliquis fieri justus tum intrinsece per adaptionem justitiae, tum extrinsece per declarationem, inde eandem vocem ad varia significanda traduci." *Ibid.* The bold assertion with which he sets out is so qualified, that it might be admitted without involving any very decisive consequences; but it certainly seems

* I do not mean to discuss this point, as I stated in the Preface. But I may mention that any one who consults Suicer will see a proof that the true meaning of *δικαιο* was acknowledged and asserted by the Greek Fathers. And I think it right to say that even with respect to Augustin, it is clear, that while, as Bellarmin asserts, he used the word and interpreted it, when it occurs in the Latin Scriptures, in the sense, *to make righteous*, he recognised *to count or declare righteous*, as a legitimate meaning; and that he was prepared so to interpret the word when he could thereby obtain sounder doctrine. Thus one of Bellarmin's quotations is: *Quid aliud justificati quam justi facti?* This is from the *Liber de Spiritu et Littera*, cap. xxvi. § 45. Augustin is there proving that the Apostle's statement, *factores legis justificabuntur*, is not inconsistent with his doctrine, *that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*; a doctrine which Augustin, by the way, often repeats and insists upon strenuously, because they could not be doers of the law if they were not justified. But lest there should be any doubt of the conclusiveness of his proof in this mode of explaining *justificari*, he adds what Bellarmin does not quote: "Aut certe ita dictum est *justificabantur*, ac si diceretur *justi habebuntur*, *justi deputabuntur*: sicut dictum est de quodam, *Ille autem volens se justificare*, id est, ut justus haberetur et deputaretur."

very insufficiently supported, when Bellarmin is able, out of all the instances of the use of the verb in the Hebrew Scriptures, to bring forward but two (Is. liii. 11, and Dan. xii. 3) of what he maintains to be its *only proper signification*. I do not think that either of them is an instance of the sense of *making just*; and I shall proceed to give some reasons for my opinion immediately. But for the moment let it be supposed that they both are; and I would ask, have we not at least a *strong presumption* that this is not *the usual meaning*, and therefore that it cannot be, in the sense in which Bellarmin asserts it to be, *the proper meaning* of the word, when none others are produced by a controversialist who so well understood their value in the case?

But I think it only requires to look at the texts referred to, to see that in neither of them does this important word so *clearly* or *certainly* bear the meaning which Bellarmin contends for, that they can be reasonably held to *determine* the sense of the word in question. In Isaiah liii. 11, the Lord is described as *justifying* many, by the *knowledge of Himself*; which assuredly might be equally said, whether the proper meaning of *to justify* be to *make righteous* or to *declare righteous*. I have already said (Sermon III. pp. 61, 62) that, receiving the latter as the proper sense of the word, we ought to be prepared to find it sometimes used figuratively of certain acts which bear an analogy to this judicial act; and, moreover, that even when *justification* proper is the thing referred to, the word might be expected to be applied not merely to the judge by whom the act is performed, but to any person or thing whereby it is in any way procured. Thus, though it is God who properly *justifies* sinners, yet *grace* is said to *justify* them (to express either the original fount and source from which the whole scheme springs, or to express the gratuitous character of the act); *faith* is said to *justify* them (to express the instrumental cause or mode of their justification). And so CHRIST may be said to *justify* them, not referring to His judicial character, and to the great act of judgment which He is to perform at the last*, but to

* If the explanation which I have given of the meaning of the word involved the necessity of always understanding it as applied to the judicial act which it properly denotes, the judicial character which the Lord is to sustain at the last would easily enable me to interpret this text so as to show that the use of the word in it is not at variance with the explanation. But I have already said that my explanation of the word involves no such consequence; and I think that, in fact, the pre-

His mediatorial character, as the *meritorious* cause of their justification. And it is in this sense that I would understand the word in the text under consideration. "By his knowledge [i. e. by the knowledge of himself] shall my righteous servant justify many; for He shall bear their iniquities," would thus be a prediction of the justification of the great multitude which no man can number, which shall be saved through Christ;—who is said to *justify* them because He is the meritorious cause of their justification, and *to justify* them by the *knowledge of Himself** and, as it would seem to be intimated, more especially the knowledge of Him as bearing their sins, for it is added, *for He shall bear their iniquities*), as the *instrumental cause* of their justification. This appears to me to be the natural interpretation of the text.

And in the way of obviating an objection, I may add, that this interpretation of the text supposes no deviation from the strict meaning of the word as defined by me, which must not also be supposed, in regard to their own definition, by those who regard the word as meaning *to make righteous*. Christ, at the present stage of the Dispensation of Grace, does not sustain a *judicial* but a *mediatorial* character. And, therefore, those who hold the forensic sense of the word *to justify* are obliged to suppose that when He is said *to justify* His people, it is in the sense of *causing* or *procuring* their *justification* at the hands of God the Father, who is presented to us in Scripture as *now judging, accepting* or *condemning* sinners. But is it not equally certain that the office of *making* His people *righteous* is not assigned to Christ, but to the Holy Spirit? The Spirit is the Sanctifier, and

sage does not refer to what Christ is to do in the final judgment, but to the present effects of His atoning sacrifice.

* It is hardly necessary to remark that the *knowledge of* CHRIST is to be understood as including all the affections which ought to flow from it. In Scripture both His *knowledge* of His people and their *knowledge* of Him bear this pregnant sense. When He is said to *know* them, it is meant that He knows them as His; and His gracious favour and love towards them as His own are included in the meaning of the expression. And so, when they are said to *know* Him, it must be meant that they acknowledge and feel their relation to Him; and the feelings on their part which suit that relation are also intended to be conveyed in the phrase. And accordingly this is the language in which the Lord expresses the relation on both sides: "I am the good shepherd, and *know* my sheep, and *am known* of mine." John x. 14. See too how this *knowledge* of Him is made the characteristic of Believers. John xvii. 3, 8, 25.

therefore when Christ is said to *justify* His people, those who hold that the word means to *make righteous* are obliged to suppose that He is said to *justify* them in the sense of causing or procuring their *justification* at the hands of God the Holy Ghost. The figure is the same in both cases; and it is neither violent in itself, nor of unfrequent occurrence in the Bible, nor indeed at all unusual in other writings.

Bellarmin's other instance is just of the same kind. It is Dan. xii. 3, where those who *convert* sinners, or lead them to *justification*, are described as *justifying* them, by a similar figure. Our own excellent version has, *they that turn many to righteousness*: and, for the sense of the passage, no exception can be taken to this translation; for it is doubtless of those who so *convert* sinners that the prophet is speaking. But what he actually says, is, "they that *justify* many;" using the word figuratively of those who can be said to *justify* only as instruments in God's hands in bringing others to that state in which they are *justified* by Him. And, as before, I may remark that those who with Bellarmin maintain that the proper sense of the word is to *make righteous*, must suppose that it is here used not in its proper but in a figurative sense, as just explained. For surely one man can only be said to *sanctify*, or *make righteous*, another, in the sense of being an instrument in the hands of the HOLY GHOST the *Sanctifier*. And this objection being thus neutralized, I have no fear that either or both of Bellarmin's instances will do much for the purpose for which they were brought forward.

Dan. viii. 14, indeed, seems to me a much more plausible text for Bellarmin's purpose than either of those to which he has actually referred. In it, the verb (in *Niphal*) seems to be used directly to express to be *cleansed*, or *made pure*: Grotius, I find, is not content with taking it as a single example of this sense, but says, in commenting on it, "Nota, צדק [*justificare*] sæpe poni pro *mundare*." Of this positive assertion he gives here no proof whatever; and when he does attempt a proof of it, Acts xiii. 39, he takes care to qualify it very considerably; but even in its reduced form he entirely fails to establish it. "Nam הצדיק quod plerumque Græce est δικαιοῦν (*justificare*) significat et *pur-gare*: vertiturque צדק καθαρὸς ἔσται (*purus erit*), Job iv. 17. Καθαριθήσεται (*purificabitur*) Dan. viii. 14." And in the introduction to his Annotatt. in Rom. he says that the conjugations

Pihel and *Hiphil* signify *notius sensu, a vitis purgare, mundare, liberare*; and gives, in addition to Bellarmin's two examples (of which I have spoken already), Ps. lxxiii. 13.

As to what Grotius says of the *proper sense* of the conjugations, *Pihel* and *Hiphil*, it must have been known to him how far that is from deciding the question. It is known to every tyro in the language that these conjugations have, in some verbs, properly, a declarative sense, and express properly *the act of ascribing* to an object the qualities, acts, &c., which *Kal* asserts it to possess, exercise, &c. We saw an instance of this, Note B, p. 260, in אָמֵן הָאֱלֹהִים; אָמֵן, *to be wished*, אָמֵן, *to declare wished, to ascribe*; כֹּבֵד, *to be*, רַבּוֹי, *to consist of falsehood*, are other examples of the same kind for *Hiphil*; and for *Pihel*, which is much less important in the case, we are not without similar examples—נִטְמָא *to be sanctified*, נִטְמָא, *to pronounce or declare sanctified*; מְדַבֵּר, *to be clean*; and מְדַבֵּר, *to pronounce or declare clean*, are well-known ones. And from all this it appears, that when the question is raised about any particular verb, it cannot be decided merely upon grammatical principles; but that it is to be determined finally by the use of it in Scripture. This Grotius, indeed, seems to admit, by subjoining examples of the meaning for which he contends: but how little they contribute to establish it, any one will see who examines them.

Of two of them (Is. liii. 11, and Dan. xii. 3) I have already spoken. And a glance at the additional pair will be enough to show, that they do very little indeed to strengthen the very weak proof of his assertion which the former pair supplied. As to the first (Job iv. 17), the Greek version quoted by Grotius may be allowed to prove, what would be easily admitted without it, viz. that it is an example of the use of the verb in *Kal* in the sense *to be pure*. But I have said above enough to show that that would not warrant the inference that in *Hiphil* it means *to make pure*. And as to the second, from Ps. lxxiii. 13, the reference to it must certainly be a mere lapse; for, though it is a clear instance of the use of *δικαιόω*, in the version of the LXX. (where it is Ps. lxxii. 13) to express *making clean*, the word in the Hebrew is not from קָדַשׁ, but from נָקַד (Pih. from נָקַד *to be pure*); so that it has no bearing on the point at all. Indeed, even if the examples given by Grotius were more unexceptionable, the fact that they

are so few would amount to something like a confession that he was rash in asserting that **קָדַשׁ** often signifies to purify. But I have more direct reason for believing him wrong than his failure in proving himself right; for I have examined almost all, if not all, the texts in the Bible in which the verb occurs, and can be quite sure that **קָדַשׁ** is not often taken for *mundare*. I can even say that I do not know a single text in which it is really so used; and scarcely one in which such a meaning could be reasonably thought of for it.

With respect to this text, Dan. viii. 14, in which it is so rendered in our own translation and others,—instead of taking it as a solitary instance of the use of the word in the sense of *making clean*, I greatly prefer, with Calvin, receiving it in its ordinary meaning there, and regarding it as used by a figure, which he thus excellently explains: “Quod dicit hic *Sanctuarium justificabitur*, quidam vertunt, *expiabitur tunc S.* Sed libenter recinens verbi proprietatem. Scimus enim Hebræos *justificandi* verbo uti quoties de jure loquuntur. Ubi ergo restituitur jus suum spoliatis, ubi asseritur in libertatem qui servus fuerat, ubi causam obtinet qui fuit injuste gravatus, hoc totum est *justificari* Hebræis. Quum ergo Dei sanctuarium infamie esset subjectum quantisper illic conspectum fuit simulachrum Jovis Olympii, et ita nulla esset amplius ejus dignitas.....quum ergo tanto dedecore oppressum esset templum, tunc justificatum fuit, ubi Deus iterum crexit sua sacrificia, voluit restitui purum cultum quem lege sua prescriperat. *Justificabitur* ergo sanctuarium, hoc est, vindicabitur ab illo probro cui ad tempus obnoxium erit.”—Calv. in loc. I think this offers an easy explanation of the text, consistently with the established meaning of the word; and I think, also, that what I have said of the two passages given by Bellarmin shows that they are not examples of the sense which he wishes to prove. But I am well content, as I said, that all three should be esteemed clear instances of **קָדַשׁ** in the sense of *making righteous*; and, I ask, is it credible that, if this were the proper sense of the verb, but three, out of forty-one instances of its use in the Bible, could be found to favour it?

This is a point which the student may investigate for himself. And in examining the Old Testament in the original, to determine the meaning of the word, he will find it useful to remember what has been said in the text (Sermon III. pp. 61, 62) of its

derivative senses, and of their connexion with its primary sense. I hope that those who engage in this inquiry may be aided by the following references to the texts in which the verb is found, which I have arranged according to the different senses in which it seems to be employed; and, as a further aid, I have set down in each case the conjugation in which the verb occurs.

To be righteous, innocent, right, just, Kal: Gen. xxxviii. 26; Job iv. 17, ix. 15, x. 15, xv. 14, xxii. 3, xxxiii. 12, xxxiv. 5, xxxv. 7; Ps. xix. 10, li. 6 (!); Ez. xvi. 52. *To be accounted, declared or treated (in God's judgment or men's), as righteous, innocent, right, just, Kal:* Job ix. 2, xi. 2, xiii. 18, xxv. 4, xl. 8; Ps. li. 6 (!), cxliii. 2; Is. xliii. 9, 26, xlv. 25. *To account, &c., one righteous, &c., Pihel:* Job xxxiii. 32. *Hiphil:* Ex. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kings viii. 32; 2 Chron. vi. 23; Prov. xvii. 15; Is. v. 23, l. 8. *To prove (by words or acts, one's self or another) righteous, &c., for to attempt to prove, or to maintain his righteousness, &c.), Kal:* Job ix. 20. *Pihel:* Job xxxii. 2; Jer. iii. 11; Ez. xvi. 51, 52. *Hiphil:* Job xxvii. 5. *To prove one's self righteous, &c., Hithpahel:* Gen. xlv. 16. *To do justice to, or decide in favour of, Hiphil:* 2 Sam. xv. 4; Ps. lxxxii. 3.

These, with the three considered in the former part of this Note, are, I believe, all the texts in which the verb occurs in the Old Testament. A different classification of its derivative senses might perhaps be made. And, even adopting the foregoing one, it may perhaps appear that one or more of the texts ought to have been placed in some other division rather than the one in which they stand*. But this is of little importance, and what is really important seems hardly to admit of any doubt. I do not think that any one who fairly goes through the foregoing list in the Bible will entertain any doubt of the following points, which seem to contain all that is of any moment with reference to the question:—

1. That in *Kal* the proper meaning of the verb is—
 - a. *To be righteous, innocent, right, or just* (the proper word to be supplied in each instance according to the context and the circumstances of the case).

Thus I have placed Ps. li. 6 in two divisions, marking it interrogatively in each, because the verb may be translated in the meaning *belonging to either*, and in either way of translating it the text yields a good sense. And perhaps some few others ought to have been marked in the same way.

β. *To be counted, or declared, or treated as righteous, &c.,* (or perhaps to appear, or to be made to appear righteous, &c., so as to deserve such a judgment or declaration) in God's judgment or man's.

2. That in *Hiphil* its proper meaning is *to count or declare, or treat one as righteous, &c.*: and that the same meaning belongs to it in *Pihel*, though there seems to be but one clear instance of its use in that meaning.

3. That in no conjugation does the verb mean *to make righteous, &c.*, nor in any does it mean *to be made righteous, &c.*, unless it be settled that the single text, Dan. viii. 14. furnishes an instance of its use in that sense in *Niphal*. Upon that point (which is of no very great importance) I have said enough already; but I may add here that the improbability that the verb in *Niphal* means *to be made righteous, &c.*, is greatly increased when it has been shown that in *Kal* it never means *to make righteous*.

The case is even clearer in Greek, where it is of most importance to us to be certain about the meaning of the word. For, whatever may be said of the use of *δικαίω* and *δικαιόομαι* in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, they never admit the senses *to be righteous*, or *to be made righteous*, in the New Testament. And the Protestant divines, who held that the verb has the former meaning, and the Romanists, who contended for the latter, were, curiously enough, both driven to the same text, Rev. xxii. 11, *ὁ δίκαιος δικαιοθήτω ἔτι*: the Protestants understanding it, with our translators, "he that is righteous *let him be righteous still*;" and the Romanists rendering it, "*let him be justified still*,"

* This is the Douay translation;—and it might perhaps be doubted whether it meant, *let him continue still in a justified state*, or, *let him be justified yet more*. There is a note upon the verse, but it does not touch upon this clause: and what it says upon the one to which it refers does nothing to decide this question. But that the latter is the sense in which the Roman Church understands the text is clear, from the use which is made of it by the Council of Trent. In the Decree *De Justificatione*, cap. x, *De accepta Justificationis incremento*, it is quoted as one of the Scripture proofs of that part of the Romish doctrine of Justification, "Sic ergo justificati..... in ipsa justitia per Christi gratiam accepta cooperante fide bonis operibus, crescent, atque magisificentur; sicut scriptum est Apoc. ult. Qui justus est, justificetur adhuc." And Bellarmin, quoting the text as one of the Scriptural proofs that *Works justify*, explains it in this sense, or rather

in support of their doctrine of a second justification. It would be hardly spending time well, to discuss the meaning of a solitary text, when the true sense of the word may be established from the concurrence of such a number. But the fact is, that *δικαιωθήτω* was always a suspected reading; and that it has been rejected absolutely by Griesbach, upon what appear to be conclusive grounds, and *δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω* substituted for it. The same emendation of the *Textus Receptus* is adopted by Matthäi, Alter, Scholz, and Theodoroff. On that point, therefore, I presume it is unnecessary to say more.

Omitting all passages involving the *doctrine* of Justification, the forensic sense of the verb in the New Testament appears sufficiently from the well-known texts, Matt. xi. 19, xii. 37; Luke vii. 29; Rom. ii. 13: the second and fourth of those texts being plain examples of that sense strictly; the two others of a sense naturally derived from it. That its use in the doctrinal passages is in this forensic meaning, I think I have shown conclusively in Sermon V., p. 122—124. And if the point were one about which reasonable doubt could be entertained, there would be no difficulty in putting it beyond question by other arguments. But, in fact, it is so clear that some of the most determined and able opponents of the doctrine of *justification by faith only* have felt it much easier to assail that doctrine by enlarging the meaning of *faith* than by restricting or altering that of *justification*, so that, upon this point, we have the advantage of their testimony. Thus Bull writes: "Pro certo igitur statuatur vocabulum *justificationis* in hac materia *forensam* significationem obtinere; atque actionem designare *Dei more judicis*, ex lege Christi gratiosa *absolventis accusatum, justum promittentis, atque ad premium justitia h. e. vitam æternam acceptantis*."—*Har. Ap. Dis. Prior*, cap. 1. § 6. And he asserts, avowedly with reference to Grotius, that a man must be nearly blind not to see that this forensic signification, *of accounting or declaring righteous*, is the most obvious and common meaning of the word in the Bible generally, but especially in the New Testament. "Duo tantum annotabimus: Primo vocem *δικαιοῦν*

assumes this to be its undoubted meaning: "Sextum testimonium Apocal. ult., *Qui in sordibus est, sordescat adhuc; et qui justus est, justificetur adhuc*. Certè qui magis sordescunt, per mala opera et nova peccata condempnantur, igitur et qui magis justificantur per bona opera et novam obedientiam justificantur." *De Justificatione*, lib. iv. cap. xix.

(cui respondet apud Hebraeos **הצדיק**) ab eo [S. Jacobo] in *usitatione* suo significato usurpari, h. e. *sensu forensi* pro *justum canere* sive *pronunciare*. Eam enim esse vocabuli hujus in Sacris Literis, praesertim Novi Testamenti, significationem maxime obviam ac familiarem, *pene cæcus est qui non videat*. Ut mirum sit reperiri virum longe doctissimum et alioquin in hac ipsa justificationis doctrina de veritate optime meritum, qui id neget, vocem *justificationis* fere semper in hac questione (praesertim, ubi fidei tribuitur) purgationem a vitiis, seu liberationem a peccandi consuetudine significare strenue contendens (*In Prolegom. in Epist. ad Romanos*). Fatetur quidem Grotius (nam illum designamus) *δικαιοῦν* a Jacobo in capite secundo sumi pro aliquem ut *justum tractare*; additque totum ejus Sermonis contextum hunc sensum necessario exigere. Sed hanc esse usitationem vocis hujus significationem, praesertim in Paulinis Epistolis, omnino negat. (*In secundis Annot. ad Jac. ii. 21.*) Nos autem (quamquam fortasse locus huic rei alius commodior esset) vocem *δικαιοῦν* in eo, quem diximus, sensu in Novo Testamento constanter ac fere semper usurpari, facile evicturi sumus." BULL, *Harmonia Apostolica*, Diss. Prior. cap. i. §§ 1, 2.

If the reader should desire to prosecute the investigation farther, for himself, he may recollect that, although to *count or declare a person just*, &c., is not one of the *classical* senses of *δικαίω*, yet no doubt can be made that it is among its *Scriptural* meanings. The question really is, whether, in the statements of the doctrine of *justification by faith*, to *justify* is to be taken in this sense or not. The texts to be examined are so easily made out, and have been referred to to such an extent already, either in the Sermons or in this Note, that I shall not subjoin a list of them; but, instead of it, transcribe a list of references from Gerhard, to show that the proceeding of the justification of a sinner is, throughout, a judicial one: which is one of his modes of fixing the true sense of the term. "Exprimitur per *Judicium*, Ps. cxliii. 2. *Judex*, Joh. v. 27. *Tribunal*, Rom. xiv. 10. *Accusator*, Joh. v. 45. *Testis*, Rom. ii. 15. *Chirographum*, Col. ii. 14. *Debitum*, Matt. xviii. 24. *Advocatus*, 1 Joh. ii. 1. *Absolutio*, Ps. xxxii. 1."

NOTE M. PAGE 61.

Protestant Declarations of the meaning of Justification.

Most Protestant authorities, of any real weight, are very decided upon this sense of Justification; and some, who differ somewhat in their statements of the meaning of the *word*, so explain their views of the *doctrine* as to show that the difference is of no real importance.

Our own Eleventh Article shows (as has been pointed out, p. 124) that, by our Reformers, *Justification* was understood to mean *being created righteous before God*. And this further appears from the Homily of Justification.

The views of the German Reformers are equally clear.

Confessio Augustana.

Significat autem Justificatio in his Pauli sententiis remissionem peccatorum seu reconciliationem, seu imputationem justitiæ hoc est acceptionem personæ.

Confessio Saxonica.

In declaratione vocabuli *justificari* usitate dicitur. justificari significat ex injusto justum fieri: quod recte intellectum huc quoque quadrat. Ex injusto, id est, reo et inobediente, et non habente Christum, fieri justum, id est absolutum a reatu propter Filium Dei: et apprehendentem fide ipsum Christum qui est justitia nostra, ut docuit Hieremias et Paulus: quia ejus justitia nobis imputatur; et quia dato Spiritu Sancto nos vivificat et regenerat sicut et Johan. 5 dicitur.

Confessio Helvetica.

Justificari significat apostolo, in disputatione de justificatione, peccato remittere, a culpa et pena absolvere, in gratiam recipere, et justum pronunciare.

Confessio Wittembergica.

Homo enim fit Deo acceptus, et reputatur coram eo justus propter solum filium Dei, Dominum nostrum Jesu Christum, per fidem: et in judicio Dei non est ullo earum virtutum quas nos habemus merito, sed solo merito Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quod fit nostrum per fidem, confidendum.

Confessio Bohemica, 1535, Latine Auctior, 1572.

Ex hac justitia seu justificatio est remissio peccatorum, sublatio

pœnæ æternæ quam Dei severa justitia deponit, et Christi justitia seu imputatione hujus convestiri, eumque Deo reconciliatio, in gratiam receptio per quam *gratosi facti sumus in dilecto, et eadem redes vitæ æternæ, &c.*

LUTHER. *Disputationes*, 1635.

Justificari enim hominem, sentimus, hominem nondum esse justum, sed esse in ipso motu seu cursu ad justitiam. Ideo et peccator est adhuc quisquis justificatur; et tamen velut plene et perfecte justus reputatur ignoscente et misericorde Deo. . . . Recte igitur dicitur justificari nos ex fide sine operibus legis. Quod *justificari* ista includit: fide, scilicet propter Christum, reputari nos justos, nec peccatum ullum, sive præteritum sive reliquum in carne manens imputari, sed, velut nullum sit, remissione interea tolli.

In Ep. ad Galat. cap. 2.

Justificat ergo Fides quia apprehendit et possidet istam thesaurum scil. Christum præsentem; ubi enim vera fiducia cordis est, ibi adest Christus in ipsa nebula et fide. . . . Ergo fide apprehensus et in corde habitans Christus est justitia Christiana propter quam nos reputat justos et donet vitam æternam.

MELANCTHON. *Loci Theologici*, 1543.

Justificatio significat remissionem in peccatorum, et reconciliationem, seu acceptationem personæ ad vitam æternam. Nam Hebræis justificare est forense verbum, ut si dicam, *Populus Romanus justificavit Scipionem accusatum a tribunis*, id est, *absolvit seu justum pronunciarit*. Sumpsit ergo Paulus verbum justificandi ex consuetudine Hebræi sermonis pro remissione peccatorum et reconciliatione, seu acceptatione.

Propositiones complectentes præcipuos articulos doctrinæ celestis traditæ in schola Wittembergensi.

Comprehendi remissionem peccatorum in vocabulo justificationis etiam ex illo dicto Pauli, Rom. iv. manifestum est; ubi Paulus expresse inquit, sicut et David inquit, *Beatitudinem esse hominis cui Deus imputat justitiam sine operibus. Beati quorum tecta sunt peccata*. Ibi enim nominat imputationem justitiæ ut ostendat non solum remitti peccata, sed etiam recipi personam propter alienam justitiam imputatam scil. Mediatoris Dei et hominis.

In Ep. ad Romanos, 1529.

Cap. 3. Sit autem nota phrasis, *justificamur*, id est, ex reis

pronunciamur non rei, donamur remissione peccatorum, reconciliatione, seu imputatione justitiæ cum qua conjuncta est vivificatio quæ fit per ipsam filium Dei cum fide verbum vocale accipimus cum quo vere est efficax filius Dei Quamquam sunt in conversatione plures motus tamen vocabulum *justificari* significat laudabiliter accipere remissionem peccatorum reconciliationem ac imputationem justitiæ. Hanc autem cum accipimus simul vivificamur.

BUCER.

[Bucer's view of justification is, especially in his earlier writings, not a little embarrassed by his desire to repel the calumnies by which the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only* was assailed, and to obviate some abuses of it. He endeavours, for this purpose, to combine, in the signification of the term, both the effects of faith:—its effects upon our state before God, and its effects upon our character,—or, to make it include our justification both before God and men. His view does not affect his conformity in doctrine with the other Reformers, as he labours very anxiously to show in his Prefata in Enar. Epist. D. Pauli, cap. 8; his statement being that we are pardoned and accepted by God *by faith*; and that thus we are *justified before God* by faith; but that this is a faith which is fruitful in works, so that they who possess it are acknowledged by men to be righteous, and that therefore we are *justified before men* also by faith. So far there is no difference between him and the other Reformers. But he thinks that in using the word *justification*, though St Paul chiefly regards the first, he has also respect to the second. In this latter point, then, he differs from the other Reformers at this period; but he is very anxious to show that the difference is only verbal, and that, so far from overthrowing *free Justification before God by faith only*, he only more fully established it by his statement of the doctrine.—“Ad hoc non negamus justificationis primum caput et substantiam esse gratuitam peccatorum remissionem, nostrique apud Deum, propter Dominum nostrum Jesu Christum, acceptationem, qua fides tota nititur, ut istuc etiam confirmemus. Etenim illa justitia et bona opera, quæ in nobis Spiritus Christi operatur, testimonium sunt illius nostræ apud Deum gratuitæ acceptationis. Nam nisi nos ipsos Deus bonos justosque habeat, nihil nostri bonum aut justum censi potest. Mala arbor edit fructus malos. Proinde dum dicimus, justitiam et bona opera nobis fide constare, simul dicimus fide nos Deo acceptos, gratosque reddi Ita

quum dicimus fide percipi justitiam quam Deus nemini nisi apud se justificato donat, ostendimus et ipsam nostri apud Deum justificationem fide nobis contingere." This would seem to make the point, which Bucer endeavours here to establish, innocent as far as the doctrine is concerned. I need not say, however, that I think he was in error in it; for, though the Apostle is careful to show that faith produces that obedience which secures the justification of believers in this latter sense, he does not include this effect in the meaning of justification in any statement of the doctrine. This, however, is no place for discussing this point. And I mention Bucer's early difference from his brethren partly to settle the amount of it—which is, I believe, misunderstood; but chiefly because I think it right to notice it, before I give from his last work his final views upon the subject, which, my readers will see, agree perfectly with those quoted from other authorities.]

Scripta Anglicana. Disputatio publica Cantabrigiæ, 1550.

Justificari, ut hoc verbo Spiritus Sanctus in Scripturis subigitur, opponitur, ei quod dicimus *condemnari*; et significat condonari homini peccata recipique eum in gratiam Dei; cum nimirum agitur de justificatione vitæ, id est, qua homini vita æterna adjudicatur.....Hoc intellectu utuntur verbo justificationis Scripturæ cum loquuntur de justificatione qua reconciliamur Deo et recipimur in gratiam vitæ æternæ. *Justificari* quidem prædicant Scripturæ et factores legis bona scil. operantes, sicut Jacobus scripsit justificatum fuisse Abraham ex voluntate immolandi filium; et Rachab, &c.....Sed in his locis *justificari* hominem nihil aliud significat quam laudari et remunerari hominem propter bona opera. Porro plerique scriptorum ecclesiasticorum sequentes etymon verbi Græci δικαιόσθαι et Latini *justificari*, intellexerunt per hæc verba hominem donari inherenti justitiæ, quæ emulat fide, spe, charitate, quæ nunquam quidem deest remissioni peccatorum; tamen Scripturæ non hoc, dari donum justitiæ, significant per verbum *justificari*, sed, sicut dictum est, vel condonari peccata et recipi in gratiam Dei; vel benefacta comprobari a Deo et remunerari. Ex hac vero varia significatione horum verborum *justificari* et *justificationis*, dum Scripturæ per hæc intelligunt peccatorum remissionem atque vitæ æternæ, ex penitus gratuite Dei misericordia et gratia, adjudicationem; Sancti Patres vero inherenti justitiæ, id est, virtutum omnium, pie rectique vivendi

donationem et infusionem, multi sibi periculosas accersunt tenebras.

It would be very easy to extend these quotations; but I am sure my readers will think that enough has been done to show the sense in which the first Reformers understood the term *Justification*; and I dare say they will be as much at a loss as I am to understand how an author so well acquainted with the controversial writings of these men as Archbishop Laurence is, could have fallen into the strange mistake that the word was used by them as simply equivalent to *remission of sin*. He says (Bampton Lectures, Sermon 6)—“But here, to avoid a misconception of the argument, it seems necessary previously to state in what sense the word *Justification*, which comprehends the sole ground of contention, was used by the opposing parties. Upon both sides it was supposed *entirely to consist in the remission of sin*.”

This is, certainly, a most extraordinary statement from one who is professedly aiming at exactness; and who shows, elsewhere, considerable acquaintance with works which prove its very great inaccuracy. The fact is, that the early Romish and Protestant divines could not be truly represented as concurring in any view of the *entire* meaning of *Justification*; but it seems a curious infelicity, that the sense of the term which the Archbishop describes as agreed upon by both, was, in fact, admitted by neither. How far it is from a fair statement of the meaning assigned to this important word by *one* of “the opposing parties” the foregoing extracts afford ample materials for judging. And how strangely it misrepresents the views of the *other*, will appear by referring to the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent. It will be found, not only that the Council expressly decrees (Sess. vi. cap. 7) thus—“*Non est [Justificatio] sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis, per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum;*” but also, that in what Chemnitz happily calls its *profusa anathematum liberalitas*, it pronounces a distinct *anathema* upon every one who ventures to assert that men are justified *sola peccatorum remissione*.—Sess. vi. can. 1.

If ever, then, Romanists speak of *Justification as consisting entirely in the remission of sins*, it is, certainly, only in opposition

to the reformed doctrine, that it includes also *the imputation of righteousness*; and, on the other hand, whenever the Reformed writers speak of it in the same terms, they are to be understood as meaning to reject the Romish addition of *the infusion of righteousness*.

From Calvin, for example, very strong declarations that Justification *consists entirely in the remission of sins*, might, doubtless, be produced. But, as Bellarmin (*De Just.* lib. ii. cap. 1) very truly remarks, other and neighbouring parts of his writings do not allow us to fall into any mistake concerning the sense in which such declarations are to be received. “*Igitur cum idem Calvinus in eodem capite [cap. ii. lib. iii.] sect. 21 et 22, et in Antidoto Concilii ad Sessionem 6, contendit justificationem non esse positam nisi in peccatorum remissione, non excludit imputationem Justitiæ Christi, sed internam renovationem et sanctificationem.*” *De Just.* lib. ii. cap. 1. And Bull, referring to Calvin on Rom. iv. 6, 7, 8—“*Ubi quod Calvinus dicit, Justitiam nihil esse quam Remissionem peccatorum, ex aliis ejusdem Calvini locis exponendum est, in quibus aperte fatetur præter Remissionem peccatorum, Justitiæ etiam imputationem in Justificationis notione contineri.*” *Resp. ad Animadv.* vii. And the same is true of all the rest*, as a review of the foregoing extracts from their writings will abundantly prove. Indeed, the Archbishop quotes, in support of his assertion, Melancthon’s declaration, given above, that Justification signifies, “*remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem seu acceptationem ad vitam æternam.*” And, had Melancthon written nothing else upon the subject, I cannot conjecture how this express addition, *et reconciliationem seu acceptationem ad vitam æternam*, could be considered so insignificant, that he might be described as supposing Justification *entirely* to consist in the remission of sin. But, if his language here left his view of the nature and amount of the addition doubtful, I have given above ample materials for determining it.

As evidence of the opinion on the other side, the Archbishop quotes, from Aquinas, *Quæstiones disputatæ*, the determination,

* Bull, having quoted the inference which Pareus draws from the same passage: “*Quod Apostolus Justificationem in sola Remissione peccatorum constituit palam est ex iv. 6,*” adds, “*Ubi si cui offendiculo sit vox sola, sciât eandem medelam hic præsto esse, quam modo Calvinî verbis adhibuimus.*”

ex remission peccatorum est justificatio, quest. xxviii. art. 1; which certainly seems to exhibit an unhappy difference between the Oecumenical Council and the Angelical Doctor. If any one, however, be anxious to accommodate the difference, he will, I think, find it no very difficult matter to effect: for it is sufficiently evident that Thomas did not intend the above for a perfect definition of Justification. Vasquez tells us that the proposition is to be understood “non identice, neque formaliter, sed ut aiunt *concomitanter*.” And Montesino, that it is meant that “*Justificatio impii est remissio peccatorum concomitanter*.” But, in fact, it seems intended chiefly to determine from what the act *ought to receive its denomination*. The question appears again in the *Summa*, and is the 113th 1ma. 2da. And, in the discussion of the various Articles, he seems to lay down that, in the *motus de contrario in contrarium* by which the Justification of a sinner is effected, the remission of his sins is the *termination* or *consummation* of the whole, and, for this reason, is employed as equivalent to it. “Et quia motus *denominatur* magis a termino ad quem quam a termino a quo, ideo hujusmodi transmutatio qua aliquis transmutatur a statu injustitie per remissionem peccatorum *veritate nominatur* a termino ad quem et vocatur justificatio impii.” And the Cardinal de Vio Cajetan, in commenting upon Art. 6 (in which it is wisely inquired *whether remission of sins ought to be enumerated among the things required to Justification; one of the objections being that it is the thing itself*)—says “Justificatio impii dicitur esse ipsa remissio peccatorum secundum quod omnis motus *accipit speciem* a termino: tamen ad terminum consequendum multe alia requiruntur.” And, in the edition of the *Summa*, Paris, 1639, *post Locanensiam atque Dauncensium theologorum insignem operam*, in which there is annexed to each article a statement of the point established in it, it will be seen, by the conclusion of Art. 1, how far the editors were from imagining that Thomas’s determination went to decide that Justification *entirely consisted in remission of sins*. *Conclusio*. Ea justificatio que fit per modum simplicis mutationis non est remissio peccatorum vel solum justitie acquisitio; que vero dicitur *impii justificatio* (de qua hic solum sermo est) cum per modum motus de contrario in contrarium fiat, est remissio peccatorum *cum acquisitione justitie*. Thomas himself, indeed, says expressly, upon Art. 7, that “*tota Justificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratia*

infusione; per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur." *Justification*, in its general sense, might, according to him, apply to angels or to unfallen man; and would, in such an application of it, express *merely* the infusion or ingeneration of righteousness; but when it is applied to fallen man, it not only necessarily includes, *in addition*, the new operation of a remission of sins, but this latter being the end, or consummation of the whole, is rightly employed to describe it, or properly expressed by it.

I do not subjoin any extracts from our own divines, to establish their concurrence with the German Reformers upon this point; partly because this Note has already extended unreasonably far; and partly because I think their views of the nature of *Justification* appear with sufficient clearness, in citations made or to be made from them on other occasions.

NOTE N. PAGE 74.

On Imputed Righteousness.

As some divines hold that the doctrine of IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS, in every form, is to be abjured as part and parcel of CALVINISM, I have prefixed to this Sermon a quotation* which may serve to show them that they are in this, as in some other matters, *Arminio ipso Arminianiore*. That questions should be raised concerning details in that doctrine seems perfectly natural; that, after the fullest discussion, differences should remain upon minor points connected with it, is not strange; but that any doubt should be made of the general principle—that the *imputation of righteousness to the sinners whom God justifies, is as much a part of their justification as the remission of their sins*—has always appeared to me truly amazing. In this third Sermon I have occupied myself very much with the establishment of this general principle; attempting chiefly to show that it follows from the proper meaning of *justification*, and from the nature of the divine law; to remove some of the most common difficulties connected

* As the typography of the extract from Arminius may seem somewhat strange, I add, that it is exactly copied from his *Orationes in quibus Tractatus, &c.* Lugduni Batavorum, 1613.

with it; and to answer a few of the most popular objections against it. And in these objects I trust I have, to some extent, succeeded. But I perceive, upon reviewing the Sermon, that I have not shown, with sufficient distinctness, that the conclusion concerning the nature and extent of God's justification of sinners, to which such reasoning leads (p. 62), is fully confirmed by St Paul's detailed statement of the doctrine. I have supplied, indeed, materials for this proof (pp. 71, 72), but I have not pointed out with sufficient clearness the entire concurrence of these two modes of learning the true meaning of *justification*. What follows will, I hope, in some measure supply this defect, and perhaps some others, in what I have already said on the subject.

It will be convenient, however, before I enter upon a consideration of the doctrine as stated by St Paul, to fix what is meant by the phrase, *to impute righteousness*.

The word translated *to impute* is, in the original, λογίζομαι: and the most important forms in which it is used are, ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, Rom. iv. 3, &c. λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, 5. ὃ ὁ θεὸς λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην χωρὶς ἔργων, 6. ὃ αἰ μὴ λογίσται κίριος ἁμαρτίαν, 8. And, in all, its meaning appears to be simply *to count to, to be counted to: to set down to the account of, or to be so set down, or something to the same effect*. Davenant, *de justitia habituali et actuali*, says, "*Imputare aliquid alieni idem est in hac questione atque, inter ea quæ sunt ipsius et ad eam pertinent illud connumerare ac recensere.*" And this, which seems the simple meaning of the Latin verb, *imputare*, would, of course, be a good explanation of the English verb directly derived from it, *to impute*; except that use appears to confine this latter to cases in which something morally good or evil, deserving praise or blame, is ascribed. Indeed, the noun, *imputation*, is only capable of even so extensive a use, when employed by ethical writers, as a technical term; for, in common parlance, it is confined to cases in which something *blameworthy* is attributed to one, and is nearly equivalent to *charge* or *accusation*. It appears likely that our translators, who render the original verb very variously, chose here, of the different words which would suit the place, *to impute*, from its appropriation to cases of morals. And it seems a very fit rendering. But English readers will probably have a more correct conception of the meaning of the entire passage, when they are informed that the word translated so often in Rom. iv. *to im-*

pute, is, in the original, the same as that which, in other parts of the same chapter, is rendered by *to count*, and *to reckon*. So that, though the phrase, *imputed righteousness*, is generally understood to mean, righteousness ascribed to a man *which is not his own* (I have myself used it in that sense, p. 72), it will be seen that this is not properly conveyed by the word *imputed*; that it simply expresses that the righteousness spoken of is *counted to a man*, or *set down to his account*, without intimating whether it is his own or another's.

But, as this plain point has been curiously misunderstood, I will dwell a little longer upon it. The notion, indeed, that λογίζομαι, *imputare*, had some more occult meaning seems to have been a very early one. Chemnitz tells us that in the well-known controversy raised by Osiander, a divine, whom he leaves anonymous, unintentionally caused no little mirth by maintaining that *imputare* was *verbum hortense*; and that, as *putare* meant *to prune*, *to lop off*, so *imputare* meant *to ingraft*, *to implant*! The eminent persons who have since been looking for some recondite sense in this simple word, would probably have joined cordially in the laugh at their too ingenious predecessor: but though their own researches have led to nothing quite so ludicrous as this discovery of a horticultural metaphor in the word, I do not think the result of their labours has been much sounder, or more valuable*.

Erasmus holds *imputatio* to be equivalent to the legal term,

* I was not aware when I met this strange figure in Chemnitz that it had been reproduced by a more modern authority. In Robertson's 'Clavis Pentateuchi' *in loc.*, we find—"וַיִּחַסֵּב ה' אֶל אָדָם חֶסֶב חֶסֶב", Et imputavit illud: 3 pers. sing. fut. 5 sp. cum. aff. ה', a חֶסֶב חֶסֶב, origo est in putare vitem, arbores; computavit: prop. polivit summam, i.e. eam purgatissimam, exactissimam et solidissimam reddidit; *to reckon exactly with precision* with one in pecuniary matters: hinc, 2, imputavit, cum quid, ratione bene subducta et perpurgata, veluti aliquod alteri transferemus; sic hic imputavit in justitiam, quæ adfert admirabilem emphasis quæ aliquod alicui pleno jure assignatur, atque in ejus rationes transferibitur; *to put to one's account, to impute, to lay to one's charge, and also to one's credit*."

If there were any difference among Arabic scholars as to the meaning of a word, I should not venture to interfere as if I had a right to moderate in such a debate. But in the present case I can discover no grounds for ascribing to حَسَب the sense of *to prune*, except the double meaning of the Latin verb *putare*, by which it is rendered in Arabic and Latin dictionaries.

*acceptilatio**. Piscator, *de Justificatione hominis coram Deo*, says, "Propria autem iniquitate dicitur aliquid alieni imputari quod ipse non fecit, quodve in ipso non est; et contra non imputari dicitur id quod aliquis fecit quodve in ipso est." I should have thought that the second member of this sentence sufficiently exposed the unsoundness of the first; but Arminius, *Responsio ad xxxi. Artt.*, adopts the point as one which Piscator, he says, *bene observavit et probavit*, Art. 4. (i. e. 4th, of the eleven last Artt., the 21st from the beginning.) Notwithstanding this emphatic commendation, however, I do not think they agree exactly as to the meaning of the word. They both, indeed, hold that it conveys that there is some impropriety or irregularity in the ascription to us of the act or quality spoken of. But Piscator conceives that this properly lies in taking that for ours which is not ours; so that, though the term is used properly, when it is said that *righteousness is imputed to a sinner* (because he has not righteousness himself), it is used improperly, when it is said that *faith is imputed to him for righteousness* (because he really has faith). And this latter phrase, therefore, he thinks is to be interpreted in accommodation to the former. Arminius, on the other hand, while he holds also that *imputatio est gratiosa aestimatio*, seems to think, so far as I can collect (*Theses de Just. Thes. 10*), that the grace of the act may lie either in ascribing to us what is not ours, or in ascribing to us as righteousness what is not really righteousness. And this is certainly the notion which Jonathan Edwards (a strange conjunction!) puts forward in his able sermon on Justification. He says that the phrase, *it is counted or imputed to him for righteousness*, imports that "God of His sovereign grace is pleased to take and regard that which indeed is not righteousness, and in one that has no righteousness, so that the consequence shall be the same as if he had righteousness;" which is certainly very true; but he adds that "it is manifest that the apostle lays the stress of his argument for the free grace of God, from that text which he cites out of the Old Testament about Abraham, on that word *counted* or

* "Apud Ictos est ficta quedam, et imaginaria solutio, et liberatio, ut docet *Modestinus Digest. l. 46, tit. 4, leg. 1*, quæ fit per interrogationem, et responsionem, qua utrisque contingit ab eodem nexu absolutio. Dicenti enim, *Quicquid tibi per stipulationem promisi, vel ex stipulatu debeo, habesne acceptum?* tu respondes, *Habeo, acceptumque fero*; quasi dicas, *Perinde habeo, ac si accepissem abs te per veram solutionem*."—FACCIOLATI LEXICON, sub voce.

imputed." And again: "The Scripture uses the word *impute* in this sense, viz. for reckoning anything belonging to any person, to another person's account." In this view of the meaning of the word he seems to me to fall into a curious though perhaps no very important error; and he certainly supports his view by very strange reasoning.

He derives this force of the verb, λογίζομαι, partly from the force of the kindred verb ἑλλογέω, and partly from the apostle's reasoning upon the passage given above from Romans iv. 3. The verb ἑλλογέω has plainly, he thinks, some such force in Philemon 18, where Paul, taking on himself the debt of Onesimus, says, τοῦτο ἐμοὶ ἑλλόγει: whereas, it is plain, on the contrary, I think, that it has in that passage no such force; nor any meaning beyond *count* or *charge*; and that, accordingly, the direction given by the apostle is rightly translated in our version, *set that down to my account*. There seems, indeed, a curious confusion of ideas in what Edwards says about this simple passage. We know, it is true, that the effect of what Paul desired Philemon to do would be, the substitution, for the real debtor, of one who, in fact, owed nothing, except by his voluntary engagement to discharge the debt contracted by the former. But we manifestly know this from the circumstances of the case, and not from the word. To find all this in *the word* is a mode of proceeding which would introduce us to very strange definitions. In fact, not to go beyond the case before us, any reasoning which would enable us to conclude that ἑλλογέω meant, properly, *to charge a man with what another owed*, because Paul, in engaging to discharge the debts of Onesimus, says, τοῦτο ἐμοὶ ἑλλόγει, would serve to prove that ἀποτίω means, properly, *to pay another man's debts*, because he adds, on the same occasion, ἐγὼ ἀποτίσω!

The only other text in which the verb occurs in the New Testament is ἀμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἑλλογεῖται μὴ ὅτιος νόμον. Romans vi. 13. And it seems strange that Edwards could have referred to that text (as he does) without seeing how little the force which he ascribes to the verb can properly belong to it: for assuredly assigning any such meaning to it there would destroy altogether the sense of the passage. But I suppose too much has been said upon a point so manifestly untenable.

Something of the same confusion appears in what he says about the reasoning of the Apostle on the text ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς

δικαιοσύνην, Romans iv. 3. He thinks that, in what follows, the Apostle plainly assumes that there is here conveyed some substitution of one thing for another, or the setting down to a man something which properly does not belong to him, or something of that kind. And so he manifestly does. But it is by no means true, as Edwards strongly supposes, that this is conveyed *principally* by the word ἐλογίσθη. It is not, as I have said, conveyed by that word at all. And of this Edwards might have satisfied himself if he had considered that the Apostle's reasoning is just as good in English as in Greek; yet no one, I suppose, imagines that the English word, *counted*, has anything of this pregnant sense which he attributes to the Greek word for which it stands. But, indeed, a glance at the passage in the original from which his argument is drawn ought to show how little foundation there is for it—τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα:—Moses says nothing of κατὰ χάριν, Edwards reasons, unless by using the word ἐλογίσθη; and hence, he concludes, that the verb must convey something of this kind naturally and of itself. But (not to insist upon the point that, if this were the case, St Paul would hardly have added κατὰ χάριν; for ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται would then express all that he wanted) the remaining part of the sentence shows that the word is equally fit to be employed when the reward set down is a strict and proper debt, κατὰ ὀφείλημα: as would, indeed, further appear conclusively in verse 8, from μακάριος ἀνὴρ ᾧ οὐ μὴ λογίσται κέρπος ἀμαρτιῶν; where, as it is *sin* that is spoken of, it cannot be imagined that there is any intention of intimating that there is any impropriety in setting it down to the individual.

But where, then, does St Paul find κατὰ χάριν in the original record which he quotes? Evidently in εἰς δικαιοσύνην. What is told of Abraham was clearly not *righteousness*; and when Moses records that *it was counted to him for righteousness*, it must manifestly have been by an act of God's grace, and not in the way of strict dealing. And so St Paul most legitimately assumes in reasoning upon it.

But all this will, I doubt not, appear evident without further explanation. And there seems, indeed, so little ground for giving λογίσται in the original passage any other meaning than the simple one which it so often bears, and which our translators give it in rendering the text, to count, *to be counted to*; that I may

be thought to have misspent time in combating, at such length, such feeble reasoning in support of so manifest an error. But it is hardly safe to regard an error as manifest, which has been adopted by Edwards and so many other divines of high reputation, or to treat as unworthy of refutation reasoning which has passed current with them*. It may be that their mistake as to the meaning of this word has not led them into any error as to the important doctrine contained in the passage in which it occurs. But that would be a very bad reason for overlooking or thinking lightly of such a mistake. When we are careless about fixing exactly the meaning of the words of any portion of Holy Writ, and are satisfied with collecting its sense by some less certain process, we are not only dealing irreverently with the Word of God, but are throwing away our best, indeed our only, security for obtaining and preserving the precious truths which it contains. I shall not be disposed, therefore, to regard this long digression as a waste of time if, as I trust, it has effectually cleared away this strange misinterpretation of the word under consideration, and has at the same time fixed its true sense†.

To reckon, then, to count, to impute, righteousness to a man, all mean the same thing. And if reference be made to Romans ix. in which St Paul so often uses the word in vindicating and explaining the statement which he had made of the doctrine of *Justification by faith* in the preceding chapter, it will be found that he infers from the Scripture record of Abraham's *justification*—viz., that *Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness*—that the father of the faithful could not have been justified by works; for that, had he been, the record would not

* Indeed, even still, from time to time, we see this popular misinterpretation of λογίζομαι put forward by competent scholars, writing with all the aids of the advanced criticism of recent times. See some examples in the addition to this Note.

† I have no doubt that enough has been said to effect both objects. But it may be thought that I ought to have gone on to explain more fully the whole phrase, of which the word is but a part, or at least to support the explanation which I have given; and, moreover, that as the phrase is derived from the Old Testament, some examination of it as it stands in the Hebrew Scriptures ought to have been added. If any of my readers should be disposed to complain of any deficiencies of this kind here, he will, I hope, feel that these are satisfactorily supplied by some additional matter which he will find at the end of this Note, and which is not introduced above, where it might naturally be looked for, only because it would interrupt inconveniently the course of the reasoning in the place.

thus represent him as rewarded gratuitously, but as paid his due. He reasons that the statement that *his faith was counted to him for righteousness* conveys distinctly, that the case recorded was that of one *who worked not, but believed on that God who justifieth the ungodly*; and, he adds, that the blessedness of one so justified,—the blessedness of the man to whom God thus *imputeth righteousness without works*,—is that which David extols when he says, “*Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord doth not impute sin.*” He then enters into a proof that this blessedness extends to all who believe, as Abraham did, whether they be Jews or Gentiles; and that *righteousness shall be imputed to them also*; and finally declares that the main purpose of this record about which he has been reasoning was to establish this: that *it [righteousness, or faith for righteousness] shall be imputed to us also if we believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead.*

Here, then, is a distinct and full statement of the nature of the Justification of sinners, which perfectly coincides with the account arrived at in a different way (page 62). I showed there that when we are *justified* we are *declared innocent*; that innocence, under either divine law, whether natural or revealed, requires an abstinence from acts forbidden by the law, and a performance of those enjoined by it; and that, therefore, in *justifying* us, God must not only obliterate altogether the guilt which we have contracted, but that He must ascribe to us the righteousness which we have not earned. I grant that such an account as this of Justification, however strongly supported it be by reasoning, requires some direct confirmation from Scripture: but is there not here a complete and literal confirmation of it! Here the Apostle not only distinctly informs us that God *justifies the ungodly*—*those who have not worked, but who have believed upon Him*,—but he tells us that when they are so justified *their iniquities are forgiven, their sins are covered*; that God *doth not impute sin unto them, and that He doth impute righteousness unto them.* The coincidence is perfect, and, as appears to me, irresistible.

Here are two modes of arriving at a knowledge of the nature of Justification, perfectly distinct, and leading precisely to the same conclusion: and can any reasonable doubt remain of the correctness of this conclusion? Whatever doubts might fairly be

entertained about it, while the statement rested almost or altogether upon reasoning, are they not wholly taken away by this direct, express, and unequivocal testimony of the Apostle? I speak thus of the testimony of the Apostle, in the passage to which I have referred, with the full knowledge that some respectable divines have assigned a very different meaning to his language there; but my general respect for their authority cannot persuade me to think of them in this case in any other light than as men led by strong prejudice to reject the *direct, express, and unequivocal* testimony of Scripture. And upon this point I refer with confidence all unprejudiced readers to the place: not merely with confidence that they will arrive at the same conclusions that I have, with respect to the Apostle's meaning, but that they will be unable, as I am, to discover any reasonable grounds for questioning it. They will find that he does not throw out casually or in ambiguous terms *the imputation of righteousness to all believers*; but that, through the entire chapter, he keeps it studiously before us; stating it distinctly, recurring to it repeatedly, reiterating the phrase by which he first expressed it, or varying the form of expression while he carefully preserves its meaning; so as to make the point as clear as language can make it, and to render, I cannot avoid repeating, the denial of it as extraordinary an example of the rejection of direct Scripture testimony as the whole history of religious controversy can furnish.

Archbishop Tillotson, however (Sermons, Vol. xii. Sermon 8), not only holds that *to justify* means nothing more than *to pardon*, but he proves it principally from this passage! He says: "Thus the word justify doth signifie variously according to the subject or matter it is applied to; but when it is applied to a sinner it signifieth nothing else but pardon of his sin. Nor can I possibly apprehend what other notion men can frame to themselves of a sinner's being justified, distinct from pardon and remission." And he supports this by a reference to Acts xiii. 38, 39, and to the passage of Rom. iv. with which I am concerned. "The other text is Rom. iv. 6, 7, 8, *Even as David describes the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works*. . . The man unto whom God imputeth righteousness is the man whom God justifies. Now how does David describe the blessedness of the man whom God justifies?—Thus, *Blessed is the man whose iniquities are pardoned, and whose sins are covered*, which is a

metaphorical expression of the same thing : covering of sin is the pardoning of it. From hence I reason, if, according to the Apostle, those propositions be equivalent, Blessed is the man whose iniquities are forgiven, and Blessed is the man whom God justifies; then, according to the Apostle, justification and forgiveness of sin are all one; but those propositions are equivalent, if the Apostle cite the text pertinently*.”

Every one will be ready to admit, as the Archbishop expects, that the Apostle has cited the passage from the Psalms pertinently. The question with most persons will be—Is it necessary, in order to vindicate the pertinence of the citation, that we should hold that the two descriptions of the man whom God justifies are precisely equivalent? Let us, therefore, consider this. Archbishop Tillotson cannot, of course, mean that, if there were an hundred distinct felicities of the justified man recorded in Scripture, it might not be pertinent to the Apostle's purpose to quote them all. What he must mean, is, that St Paul's mode of introducing the quotation (*ecce as*) intimates, naturally, that what he is about to cite from the Psalms, concerning this character, is equivalent to what he has already cited from Genesis. And, no doubt, the form of expression does fairly intimate—not the equivalence of the two passages—but that they both bear upon the same point; and that the latter confirms the conclusion to which the former led. Any one who considers the place fairly will see.

* In his *Apologia Disputationis de causa meritoria Justif. hom. a Deo*, Piscator not only maintains the same view as Tillotson's, but supports it by precisely the same reasoning; with the difference that he states the argument more formally. “Quod autem in loco illo Paulino *imputari homini justitiam* idem sit quod *peccata ei remitti*, quivis non contentiosus et prejudicio occupatus facile ex ipsa sententiarum coherentia, videre potest. Verba apostoli hæc sunt, Rom. iv. 6, 7. *Sicut etiam David, &c.* Ille probaturus apostolus hominem illum beatum esse cui Deus imputat justitiam, adducit testimonium ex Psal. 32. At in illo dicto sententia probanda nempe beatus est homo cui Deus imputat justitiam non habetur. Ergo aut nihil probat, aut probat vi æquipollentie. Dicere autem quod nihil probet blasphemum esset. Necesse est igitur fateri quod probet vi æquipollentie.”—*Consideratio, Thes. xxxv.* The only equivalence, however, established by this argument, as I have remarked, is that *the person* described as having his sins pardoned, being *the same as the person* before described as having righteousness imputed to him, the second passage confirms the inference concerning the gratuitous nature of Justification which the Apostle had drawn from the first; not that the meaning of both passages is precisely the same; which is the equivalence plainly that Piscator wants.

not only that this is actually the case, but that it renders a sufficient account of the purpose of the second citation, and of the form in which it is made. He will see that the first quotation, from Genesis, was designed to prove the gratuitous character of justification, and its total independence upon works; and that the quotation from the Psalms establishes the same point, even more distinctly to common apprehensions: the former passage conveying, as the Apostle explains it, that this object of God's favour has no righteousness of his own which can be set down to his account, and that he is accepted by having his faith set down for righteousness; the latter, that he (for it is the same character to which it relates, as the Apostle declares), has *iniquities to be pardoned, and sins to be covered*. Does not this give a satisfactory reason for the *even as* of the Apostle? And, when a reasonable account is given of this form of expression, I cannot believe that there is anything in the argument of Tillotson which would justify me in dwelling longer upon it. Assuredly, no one can require to be guarded against the obvious sophism which would infer the identity of the imputation of righteousness, and the pardon of sin, because each is used to describe God's justification of sinners. If we were at liberty to take two assertions about the same thing, and infer that, because they *mean the same thing*, in the sense of designating, or being applied to, the same thing, they must *mean the same thing*, in the very different sense of being equivalent propositions, there are scarcely any propositions so diverse that we might not prove identical. Yet this is plainly what is done here; with the additional unfairness that, in fixing the common sense of the assertions, it is derived, not from the one which expresses most, but from that which expresses least. •

It cannot be necessary to say anything more upon this attempt to defend so plain an evasion of Scripture. Indeed, in a case in which Scripture speaks distinctly, perhaps the best mode of answering such attempts to misrepresent its testimony is simply to transcribe the passage misrepresented, and to leave it to have its fair weight with fair minds. In the present case, the testimony is so explicit that, when I want to express that *the imputation of righteousness to believers forms an essential part of their justification*, I find myself continually led to use the language of the Apostle; not merely for the authority which it lends the declaration, but for the clearness with which it expresses my meaning.

And, if such language do not set at rest the question, I am unable to conceive what can or could. If such reiterated and explicit declarations of the fact, from such authority, do not compel belief of it, it seems vain to seek to secure assent to it in any other way. I desire, however, once more to remind the reader, that the fact to which this testimony is given is not one requiring any extraordinary testimony from its own nature, but that it is, on the contrary, one which, as I have shown pp. 58, 62, we could have anticipated from the nature of justification, and from the nature of the divine law; that we could be sure, that, if God *justifies* sinners, He *declares them innocent*; and that, if they are accounted *innocent*, they must not merely be pardoned their offences against his law, but accepted, too, as though they had performed what it requires.

After what I have said, pp. 65, 66, it cannot be necessary for me to add anything in the way of precaution against the misconception, that, in labouring at this point, I am dividing *justification* into distinct or successive acts; or, that I suppose that God can *pardon* any to whom He does not, at the same time *impute righteousness*, or *impute righteousness* to any whom He does not *pardon*. I am sure that, in the justification of sinners, these gracious acts are not only in fact, but, necessarily, united; and I have so said distinctly in the place referred to, and elsewhere. By one, therefore, who had right notions of Justification, *pardon* might be used to express it. It is actually so used, not only in the Bible, but in various Protestant writers, who yet assert, in the most distinct terms, *the concomitance of the imputation of righteousness* with the *pardon of sin* in the *justification* of sinners. I am, of course, therefore, not labouring against any such interchange of the words, but seeking to guard against the inadequate notions of *justification* to which it is calculated to lead.

The express testimony of Scripture, then, concerning the nature of God's justification of sinners, is that, besides what is naturally conveyed by the *pardon of their iniquities*, the *covering of their sins*, it includes also *the imputation of righteousness* unto them: that to those whom He justifies *He does not impute sin*; and that *He does impute righteousness to them*. We are further informed, not only that those who are so justified are *believers* in Jesus, but that it is *by their faith*, and not by any thing that they have done or shall do, that they are so justified, for *their justifica-*

tion is by faith, without the deeds of the law, they are those who work not, but believe on Him that justifieth the ungodly; upon Him who raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead; and He imputes to them righteousness without works, counting their faith for righteousness. All this with respect to the extent of God's justification of sinners, and the mode of it, is contained in a passage (Rom. iii. and iv.) professedly treating on the subject. It involves, in the form in which I have given it, not a single text of doubtful construction, or, at least, does not rest upon a disputed interpretation of any text. And, finally, it is unmingled with any inferences from Scripture testimony; but is the testimony itself, pure and distinct.

The questions of most importance concerning the doctrine of justification are thus *explicitly* determined. No question of equal interest can be raised concerning the source of the righteousness thus imputed to us; because all must agree to find this in the work of the Redeemer, and in it alone. There are, no doubt, very many questions connected with this doctrine left undecided by what has been said; but, while I think that they do not admit of the like direct determination by express declarations of Scripture, I cannot regard them as of the same vital importance to the truth. I think he may be taken to hold all that is strictly essential to the Scriptural doctrine of justification, who holds:—that *we are justified by faith only; justified freely, by God's grace, without works, when we believe upon Him that justifieth the ungodly, and raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead; that, in this justification, our sins are blotted out, and we are counted righteous before God; and that of this free justification,—of this pardon of our offences, and of the righteousness thus imputed to us, Christ's work in the flesh is the proper meritorious source.* This, I think, comprehends what is strictly essential to the doctrine. I, at least, desire to have no controversy with those who believe it in this form, and to this extent; whether, upon the points which remain undecided, their belief goes beyond mine, or falls short of it.

Additions to NOTE N.

I.

Before I perform the promise made above, p. 343, note, of adding to this long Note some further consideration of Rom. iv. 3. I think it advisable to look at an objection which has been urged against the Doctrine of Imputed Righteousness; and which, I believe, has created a strong prejudice against it. I take the objection as it is found in one of the Archbishop of Dublin's works, because it is nowhere else stated with more clearness and force. But I must first quote his account of the doctrine against which the objection is directed. It is as follows:—"The system at present in question, as far as I have been able to collect its import, may be briefly stated thus: that when our first parents had fallen from a state of innocence, they transmitted to all their posterity (over and above the proneness to sin which we are born with, and our liability to natural death), the guilt also of the actual transgression committed by Adam—this being imputed to every one of his posterity: for, it is said, he being the federal head or representative of the whole human species, his act is considered as theirs to all intents and purposes; and each descendant of Adam is considered by his Almighty Judge as actually guilty, from his birth, of the actual sin of having eaten of the forbidden fruit; and is, for that sin, sentenced not merely to undergo natural death, but also everlasting punishment in the next world, independently of any sins committed by himself."

"Then to relieve mankind from this sentence, and to procure for them immortal happiness in heaven, our Saviour Christ, it is said, not only in His death offered up an effectual sacrifice for the sins of the whole world,—bearing in His own person the punishment due both to the imputed transgression of Adam and to the actual sins of men,—but also, during His abode on earth, *performed for them* those good works of perfect obedience to the law, both ceremonial, civil, and moral, which are *imputed* to true believers in Him, and considered as theirs, even as the transgression of Adam is imputed to his natural descendants. Thus, and thus only, it is said, could the evil introduced by Adam's transgression be (as far as respect the adopted children of God) effectually re-

paired; for, as Adam was the representative of the whole human race, so that his sin is, by imputation, made theirs, and they, all and each, lay under the sentence of eternal punishment, so it was necessary that the obedience and personal holiness of Christ, who stands as the representative of His faithful servants, should be in like manner imputed to these, and thus give them a title to eternal happiness; that He should, in short, not only by His death undergo the punishment due to man from God, but also, in His life, fulfil the righteousness due to God from man—in each instance suffering and performing what He did, vicariously, *for*, and in the stead of, His people; who are thence regarded as having themselves both paid the penalty of sin, and also performed perfect obedience to the Divine law—both having been accomplished by their substitute and representative. And some there are who go so far as to maintain that, as God imputes to believers the good works of Jesus Christ, and transfers to them the merit of His obedient life, so He also imputed to Jesus, at the time of His crucifixion, the actual guilt of those sins for which He suffered, and regarded Him, for the time being, as the actual transgressor—‘bearing our sins,’ not only in respect of the penalty of them, but of their intrinsic guilt and the Divine wrath* against it.

“This, however, is not, I believe, held by all who maintain the imputation of Adam’s sin, and of Christ’s obedience. Some other slighter variations of statement are to be found, as might be expected, in the works of different authors; but such, in the main, as I have described, is the system taught, not in abstruse theological disquisitions merely, but in several popular treatises and sermons; and taught as the very foundation of Christian

* In a note on this word, the Archbishop says: “There are many writers who never think of reminding their readers, and, indeed, appear to have themselves gradually learnt to forget that *wrath* is attributed to the Deity only in a figurative, not a literal, sense. See King’s *Discourse on Predestination*.” This opens a wide subject, upon which I have, of course, no thought of entering here. But I may remark that those who hold with Archbishop King upon this point ought to feel that it rather mitigates than aggravates the difficulties which they find in the representative character of our Blessed Lord. For the utmost that the strongest maintainers of that Doctrine would state is, that Christ, standing in the place of sinners, was regarded by God for the time as if He had been Himself a sinner. And if sinners be not literally, but figuratively, an object of Divine *wrath*, Christ would be, according to them, in the same way an object of *wrath* figuratively and not literally.

faith,—of which, indeed, if true, it must form no insignificant part.”—*Difficulties of St Paul*, pp. 189—193.

Upon neither of these views of the Doctrine do I wish here to pronounce any opinion; but I am anxious to remind my readers that I have nowhere maintained or put forward either of them. I have taken the doctrine at a lower stage, at which it is less symmetrical, but at the same time, I think, more distinctly revealed. I have not spoken of our relation to the first Adam at all; and in speaking of our relation to the second Adam, I have exercised more reserve than some, as stated by the Archbishop, have thought it necessary or right to do. I have been content to take the doctrine of justification as it is fully and clearly set forth in the first four chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, in which no reference to our relation to our first parent occurs, though the fruits of the relation are very fully stated. We have there a full proof of the guilt of man, and a full declaration of God’s gracious plan for his deliverance. And finding it distinctly stated, not only that sinners are justified by *faith*, but that *righteousness without works is imputed to them, their faith being counted for righteousness*. I have not hesitated to state that believers are justified by *imputed*, not by *inherent* righteousness. That this is Christ’s righteousness, in the sense that it is the fruit and purchase of His work in the flesh, cannot be doubted: but that it is His, in the more strict and exact sense in which, as the Archbishop truly says, it appears in the statements of some supporters of the doctrine, I have nowhere asserted, but have been, and am still, content with the sober statement with which the passage quoted from Hooker (Sermon v. p. 125) begins—“Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in Him.” And on the other hand, seeing (not as a matter of reasoning or inference, but in express statements) that *Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us*—that *the Lord laid on Him the iniquities of us all*—that *He bare our sins in His own body upon the tree*—that *He who knew no sin was made sin for us*:—seeing this, I say, not to go beyond express texts, I have not hesitated to speak of His standing in our place, as our representative, and in that capacity having our sins imputed to Him.

Though I have been anxious to note distinctly the form in which I hold the doctrine in question, yet I do not think it likely that the Archbishop would regard mine or any other modification

of the Doctrine which included in substance the imputation to believers of a righteousness which is not their own, as differing very materially from even the strongest of the statements to which he has referred. And, at all events, I feel bound to notice that part of his objection which is derived from the limited amount of Scriptural evidence on which the Doctrine rests—as that may seem to apply to the view of it which I hold, no less than to the view or views of it against which the Archbishop's remarks are more expressly directed.

He lays down, as a principle from which he does not appear to apprehend any dissent, that the nature of this Doctrine—which he describes as “paradoxical, remote from all we should naturally have expected, and startling to our untutored feelings”—furnishes reasonable grounds for expecting revelation to be more full and precise upon it than if it were more conformable to the suggestions of reason, and contained no mysterious difficulty. He adds more at length: “Any doctrine, which, like that now in question, is wholly at variance with every notion we should naturally be led to form, we may be sure will be revealed, if revealed at all, in the fullest and most decisive language. The Doctrine, too, which I have been considering, must, if it belong to the Gospel scheme, be as important as it is mysterious, it must be the very key, as it were, to eternal happiness; since, according to this view, it is only through the obedience of Christ imputed to us, that we can have any claim or hope to be admitted to the glories of His heavenly kingdom.

“It is not once or twice, therefore, it is not obscurely or obliquely, that we might expect to find Paul speaking to his converts of this imputed sin and imputed obedience. As the foundation of salutary dread, and of consolatory hope,—as connected most intimately with every question relative to the punishments and rewards of the next world,—we might expect him to make the most explicit declaration respecting a point of such moment, to dwell upon it copiously and earnestly, and to recur to it in almost every page.”—*Ib.* pp. 194, 195.

Now I am sure that these will appear to many, as they do to the Archbishop himself, to be “most reasonable expectations.” It will, indeed, be thought by many, perhaps by most persons at first sight, that we are laying down something like a truism, when we say that we may confidently expect that the clearness with which

doctrines are stated in the Word of God, and it may be their prominence and the space which they occupy there, will vary with their importance and difficulty; so that what is most mysterious and of most importance will be most explicitly stated, and oftenest repeated, and most earnestly pressed upon us. But, however this proposition may sound, it really rests upon no firm foundation. We could hardly be warranted in laying it down, unless we were sure that the *only* object of the evidence upon which the truths of Revelation are offered to us is that they may be received and believed by us. But we are so far from being sure that this is the case, that we can have no doubt that there are other very important objects to be accomplished by it. In answering the objections to the truth of Revelation which are drawn from the defectiveness of its proof, Bishop Butler shows that their strength is entirely derived from overlooking the part which that proof has to perform in the state of probation and discipline in which we are placed in this life—the test and exercise which it supplies of honesty and seriousness, patience, docility, and other qualities of mind: that this is to some a very important part of the whole probation and discipline under which they are placed by religion; and that for such persons, what are regarded—and in another aspect rightly regarded—as the defects of the proof, fit it to perform an office which it could not perform, if it were more theoretically perfect—if it left no difficulties unremoved, no objections unanswered, and were in every point conclusive and complete.

I believe that the depth and soundness of this reflexion are generally acknowledged. But surely it has an obvious bearing upon the case before us. Indeed, when it is once settled that there are other important ends to be answered by the way in which truths are presented to us in Holy Scripture, besides the primary and important end of procuring our belief of them, we must feel that these other ends must have some share in determining the manner in which such truths are to be stated, and the extent to which they are to be explained, sustained, and enforced. Every one must see that this is the case; and, upon consideration, every one, I think, must feel that we are wholly incompetent to determine what is the amount of the effect to be assigned to these other ends in each particular case; and that, therefore, we cannot, without great rashness, venture to graduate the evidence which we have to look for in each case. We may be certain that we are

safe in anticipating, that for every thing that we are required to believe, be it fact or doctrine, sufficient evidence to warrant our belief, and sufficient, indeed, to make disbelief or unbelief a sin, will be provided. But when we go beyond this, and lay down that the evidence will be multiplied and strengthened, in proportion to the difficulty and importance of the doctrine proposed for our belief, we are plainly going beyond our depth: we are demanding more than we have any right to expect. And we are, therefore, taking a perilous course, when we reject a doctrine or withhold our belief from it, because such demands are not complied with, or because the doctrine is not stated as explicitly or as repeatedly as we think its obscurity, or its importance, or its difficulty requires.

But do we in fact find any more warrant in Scripture for this position, than in reason? I do not mean, do we find that some doctrines of great importance are laid down distinctly, and repeatedly, and in various forms, so as to guard against all possibility, apparently, of mistaking them or disbelieving them: for this we certainly do. But are there any doctrines of great difficulty, and of great importance, that are less distinctly stated, and less repeatedly put forward, than others which are easier and of less moment,—which are more of a nature to be readily admitted, and to which the same importance cannot be attached?

Let us take an example. Can any doctrine be regarded as more important than the doctrine of the Trinity?—and can any other be regarded as more mysterious? If the Archbishop's principle were well founded, might we not say very confidently of it, that it is a doctrine which “we may be sure will be revealed, if revealed at all, in the fullest and most decisive language?” And with more especial reference to St Paul as the sacred writer who has set forth the Doctrine of Justification most distinctly and copiously,—dwelt on it most and enforced it most,—might we not expect that, if only from its intimate connexion with that great Doctrine, we should find the doctrine of the Trinity fully and clearly unfolded in his writings: that it is essentially connected with *the peace, and hope, and joy* of the Believer that, if it could be said of any doctrine, we might say it of this, *that we might expect St Paul to make the most explicit declarations respecting it,—to dwell on it copiously and earnestly,—to recur to it in almost every page.*

And is this the case? The Archbishop says, with reference to the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness, "Now when we proceed to the actual examination of Scripture, do we find these most reasonable expectations confirmed? Far otherwise: it is not, perhaps, going too far to say that the whole system is made to rest on a particular interpretation of *one* single text (Rom. v. 19)—'As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.' For, though there are other passages which have been considered as alluding to and confirming the text in question, there is none that could, without great violence, be construed into an express declaration of it."—*Ibid.*

Now, admitting this statement for the present, is it very different from the account which an opponent of the doctrine of the Trinity might give, with the same appearance of fairness, of the Scripture evidence on which that great truth rests? Might not such a one say—'There is but one passage in the Bible (1 John v. 7) which can be fairly described as an express and formal declaration of the doctrine of the Trinity as it is stated by theologians, and that is given up as spurious by all Biblical critics to whose opinion any real weight is to be attached. After this, there is not a single passage in Scripture that can be regarded as expressly stating the doctrine. Those that would be first thought of are the Baptismal Formula (Matt. xxviii. 10), and the Apostolic Benediction (2 Cor. xiii. 14). But even the strongest advocates of the doctrine do not allege those texts as express enunciations of it: the utmost that they maintain is, that the doctrine is to be inferred from them. And as to the other texts which are brought forward on that side, however they may have been considered as confirming the Doctrine in question, there is none of them which could be construed, by any amount of violence, into an express declaration of it.'

Is not this about as fair an abstract of the Scripture evidence for the doctrine of the Trinity as the Archbishop's of the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness? And if it be, does it not show—first, that a doctrine may be established to the entire conviction of our minds, though the Scripture proofs, on which our belief rests, do not comprehend even a single express enunciation of it, but are made up of passages from which it is inferred, and passages—whether allusions, or assumptions, or partial statements—

by which the inference is confirmed; and, secondly, that such may be the proof which God in His wisdom may see fit to provide even for the most mysterious, difficult, and important doctrine of Revelation?

I must add, however, that I am not prepared to acquiesce entirely in the Archbishop's statement of the Scripture evidence of the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness. He says, as we have seen, that "the whole system is made to rest on a particular interpretation of *one* single text (Rom. v. 19)," and that, with the exception of this single text, "there is none that could, without great violence, be interpreted into an express declaration of it." I think, however, not merely that this is not the only express declaration, but that this text is by no means the clearest and strongest declaration of the doctrine which is to be found in Scripture.

Indeed, I so far agree with the Archbishop with reference to this text, as to think that so much may be said to show that it speaks not of imputed, but of inherent (imparted) righteousness, that, if the doctrine rested entirely upon it, it would not have a very satisfactory foundation*. But I think the text, 2 Cor. v. 21,

* I wish, however, that it should be specially noted that this concession only applies to the question, What is the blessing spoken of in the text referred to!—and that it does not touch the other question, By what was the blessing procured? It may be that, as the Archbishop contends, the blessing was not *imputed* but *inherent* righteousness. But whichever it were, surely it is *expressly* stated that it was by Christ's *obedience* that it was procured: οὕτω καὶ διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί. If there could be any doubt that this is the express testimony of this clause, it would be removed by the clause with which it is directly connected: ὥσπερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ καταστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί, οὕτω κ.τ.λ. There can be no more doubt that the clause first quoted declares that man's *righteousness* came by Christ's *obedience*, than there is that the clause now quoted declares that man's *sinfulness* came by Adam's *disobedience*.

It may be asked, how does this declaration thus understood agree with the repeated testimonies in Scripture one of them in this very chapter, verse 9: δικαιοθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ, and again, 10: καταλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, which point to Christ's *death*,—His *blood*,—as the procuring cause of all the benefits of redemption? In reply, I would say that these different declarations of Holy Writ, one of which ascribes to His death the same efficacy that the other ascribes to His obedience, only appear to be at variance when His mediatorial work is divided strictly into obedience and suffering; and that when these are regarded as united, so that His death was the crowning act of His obedience, all opposition between such declarations disappears. This view of the Atonement is explained in Sermon III.

offers a much more certain basis for it. The Archbishop does not leave this text entirely unnoticed; but he disposes of it inci-

p. 89. And I may remark here, that it supplies a satisfactory answer to an objection which one often hears against this doctrine, viz., that Scripture speaks continually of Christ's death in connexion with our redemption, and but rarely of His obedience. It is plain that what is said above in the body of the Note in abatement of the Archbishop's objection applies to a great extent to this one also, as relying upon the scantiness of the Scripture testimony to the doctrine. But I wish, in addition, to remark that whatever force this objection may seem to have when directed against the artificial view of the Atonement above referred to, it can hardly be thought to touch mine, for, according to it, whenever mention is made of His death, there the highest act of obedience is spoken of. I do not, of course, mean to intimate any doubt that there was a special efficacy in His death as a sin-offering which was not derived from its being an act of obedience; but merely that it was an act of obedience, and as such a meritorious ground of our justification. Indeed, if it is to be regarded as a part of the Redeemer's course of obedience at all, we could hardly doubt that it is to be regarded as the highest part of that course. And though a more convenient place might be found for the remark, I must add, that setting aside all other texts which might be brought to bear upon the question, we seem to be clearly directed to the Lord's death as the culminating point of His obedience, in that most important passage in Phil. ii. which sets forth His voluntary humiliation. The words are, *γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ*; and that they present the death of the Lord as a part of His obedience can hardly, I suppose, be doubted. For though, so far as the force of the preposition is concerned, it cannot be determined whether the object of *μέχρι* is a part of the course which it terminates, or whether it is simply the termination, without forming any part of the course, yet this is often to be collected from the known circumstances of the case, or from something subjoined which explains them. Thus, Matt. xiii. 30, *ἄφετε συναρξάνεσθαι ἀμφότερα μέχρι θερισμοῦ* might, perhaps, leave it doubtful whether the growth was to terminate with the harvest or not, but what follows shows that, when the time of harvest comes, the growth is to come to an end: *ἐν ᾧ κακοπαθῶ μέχρι θανάτου* might be said, so far as the words are concerned, if the Apostle's sufferings had fallen short of actual bonds, but as we know from history that they did not, we conclude that the object of *μέχρι* is here included in the course of suffering of which he speaks. And in the place in question, if the sentence ended with *γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου* we could not be sure that the Lord's death was a part of the obedience spoken of: the words might be only intended to convey that he was obedient as long as he lived. But when it is added *θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ*, it is plain that his death was a part of the obedience spoken of, because, in that mode of understanding it, the nature of His death is pertinent, for its severity magnifies His obedience. But, on the other hand, if the design were only to mark the point at which His obedience terminated, or to state that He was obedient His whole life long, the first simple mention of His death would have been enough:—there would be no good reason for subjoining the specification of the nature of the death which He died, and that in a way that directs attention to its severity, as *ὡς* certainly does. That His death was therefore a part of His obedience cannot be doubted; and, if it were, it can as little be doubted, it would seem, that it was the crowning act of His obedience.

dentally, not imagining, as it seems, that the same importance could be attached to it.

“And this should teach us how to interpret the passages in which we are said to be made ‘the righteousness of God in Christ,’ and He to be ‘made sin for us;’ viz.—not that he was considered in the sight of God as actually sinful, but that He was made a ‘sin-offering’ for us; *ἀμαρτία*, which is, literally, ‘sin,’ being commonly used by the Septuagint translators in the sense of a sin-offering.”—*Ib.* p. 206.

This is the common interpretation of this remarkable passage; indeed, Archbishop Magee thinks that there is no other that deserves any consideration. He says—“In this passage the word *ἀμαρτία*, which is translated SIN, is considered by Hammond, Le Clerc, Whitby, and *every respectable commentator*, to mean a SIN-OFFERING, or SACRIFICE FOR SIN: it is so translated expressly by Primate Newcome in his new version. That this is the true meaning of the word will readily be admitted, when it is considered that this is the application of it in the Hebrew idiom; and that Jews, translating their own language into Greek, would give to the latter the force of the corresponding words in the former. And that they *have* done so is evident from the use of the word through the entire of the Greek version of the *Old Testament*, to which the Apostles, when speaking in Greek, would naturally have adhered.”—MAGEE *on the Atonement*, 5th ed. Lond. 1832, Vol. i. p. 230.

There can be no doubt that not a few respectable names might be added to those enumerated by Archbishop Magee as favouring the interpretation of the word which he maintains. But he goes a little too far when he counts *every respectable commentator* on his side. Some eminent names have been added to the list of authorities, which might have been made out when he wrote, in support of a different view of the proper meaning of the word. But even then, it would have been easy to bring forward some who could scarcely have been excluded from the class of *respectable commentators*.—For example, Hammond, Le Clerc, and Whitby are not more decidedly *for* his interpretation of *ἀμαρτία*, than Calvin, Beza, and Bengel, are *against* it.

I will only quote the last, because he is, as usual, much the briefest; but the others are not less decided.

“*Eum, qui non norat peccatum; qui nulla eguerat reconcilia-*

tionē. Elegium Jesu proprium. Maria non erat ἡ μὴ γνοῦσα, qui non novat peccatum.—ἀμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, peccatum fecit) peccatum inā, uti nos justitia. Quis auderet sic loqui, nisi Paulus praeriret? Conf. Gal. iii. 13. Ideo Christus etiam derelictus in cruce.—ἡμεῖς) nos, qui non novimus justitiam, qui delinqueramus consumi, nisi reconciliatio inventa esset.—ἐν αὐτῷ, in eo) in Christo, pro nobis."

As Archbishop Magee has named but three authorities in support of his interpretation of the text, I should be content with the same number on the other side; but I do not wish to withhold from my readers the pleasure and advantage of a very luminous comment upon the text by a more recent writer. The passage which I am about to quote occurs in Mr Davison's work on *Primitive Sacrifice*, to which I do not wish to refer without stating distinctly that I dissent entirely from the solution which the ingenious author offers of the question with respect to the origin of the rite. But there are several subordinate points in the controversy, and particularly points of criticism, upon which I am obliged to agree with him rather than with those whom he opposes; and the interpretation of this text is one of them.

In the progress of a very ingenious and able argument in which he combats the translation of Gen. iv. 7, which Archbishop Magee supports, he is led to investigate the meaning of ἀμαρτία in the Greek versions of the Old Testament. He shows that the statement that ἀμαρτία stands in the Septuagint (and the other Greek translations) for ἁνυσ, when it signifies *sin-offering*, is only true with a qualification, even in the *Levitical Code*. And he adds, "But out of the Levitical law, in the pure moral or historical parts of Scripture, I venture to lay it down as a point certain, that ἀμαρτία neither could express sin-offering, nor be so used by any translator not wholly inattentive to the propriety of his expression." He then passes thus to the consideration of the single passage in the New Testament in which the word has been supposed to bear this meaning:

"One passage there is in the New Testament wherein ἀμαρτία simply is thought to be used for sin-offering. Τὸν γὰρ μὴ γνόντα ἀμαρτίαν, ἐπὶ ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς γνέσωμεθα δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, 2 Cor. v. 21, which is commonly explained thus:—'He made him a *sin-offering* for us;' and the text is usually quoted as the authoritative *example* of that definite sense. But in this

passage of St Paul, one of the most expressive and energetic in the whole of his writings, I consider that we only enervate the exquisite force of his sentiment and doctrine, by introducing the idea of *sin-offering*. ‘Him who knew no sin, He made to be *sin* for us, that we might be made the *righteousness* of God in Him.’ Christ was made *sin* (a sinner) for us: we *righteousness* (righteous) in Him. His being made a sinner, is the being treated as such. But all this force is condensed in the term *sin*: and the precise notion of *sin-offering* not only is unnecessary, but even detrimental to the pathos and argumentative eloquence of the Apostle’s saying. It is a part of the intellectual grandeur of his style to write in that manner. So he often does. Galat. iii. 13: ‘Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made *a curse for us*’ (κατάρα not κατάρτος).—Ephes. v. 8: ‘Ye were sometimes *darkness*, but now are ye *light* in the Lord’ (σκότος, φῶς).—Rom. xi. 7: ‘*The election* hath obtained it.’ It is therefore a cold officious criticism, and not a true sympathy with the pregnant and emphatic style of the Apostle, which would convert *sin*, in this passage, into *sin-offering*; and although this substituted idea has had a considerable success among later commentators, it is only by a specious poverty of thought which really robs the passage of its force. For what is there extraordinary, if the *sinless* should be made an *offering for sin*? It is of the very nature of offerings that they be *pure* and *spotless*. But when we read that the *righteous* was made a *sinner*, that we *sinners* might be made *righteous*, then we are at home with St Paul’s striking energy of mind, and the mutual transference of character between the Redeemer and the sinner becomes perfect. Our translators, therefore, have here shown a justness of conception, to which many later critics, and those of no mean talents, have not attained; or rather from which they have been carried away by a suggestion of their philological erudition unskilfully applied.”—*Primitive Sacrifice*, p. 63—65.

My own view of the important text referred to is so much better expressed in the foregoing passage than I could hope it would be if I were to state it myself, that I am very glad to give it in the words of the distinguished writer from whom I have quoted rather than in my own.

Besides the proofs derived directly from Scripture for and against the doctrine of Imputed Righteousness, there are others,

from general reasoning, upon which some of the advocates and some of the opponents of the doctrine are disposed to rely. I attach but little importance to arguments of that class in support of the doctrine, even as auxiliary to the Scripture proofs of it, and none at all to them in an independent capacity. But there are some of those *against* the doctrine which one is not at liberty to disregard, I mean those which profess to show that it is inconsistent in itself, or inconsistent with acknowledged principles of the divine government. And as the doctrine is one of such importance, I think it well to notice briefly one or two of this class, which I do not remember to have ever seen in print, but which I became acquainted with by finding that they were weighing heavily upon the mind of a pious friend, whose life might have been said to have been spent, as literally as that of any one I have ever known, in the study of God's Word. Perhaps if I had learned them in any other way, I should have attached but little importance to them. Under the circumstances, however, I could not but feel anxious to remove them, and what I am about to subjoin is the substance of a paper which I drew up at the time for this object. I may premise that the difficulties which I am about to notice, like that which I have just considered, apply more directly to the doctrine in some of the other forms in which it is often held and stated, than to the one to which I have thought it right to confine myself. But still I think it advisable, as in the former case, to look at them on account of the general principles which they involve, or which the consideration of them will naturally bring out.

It is thought a very strong objection to the doctrine in question, if not a complete refutation of it, that while the law only requires us to obey *or* to suffer, this doctrine seems to require us to obey *and* to suffer, because, according to it, Christ, as our representative, obeyed *and* suffered for us.

But there is an ambiguity in the word *requires*, which renders it necessary to fix its meaning, before we can judge what this argument is worth. To make it of any value, *requires* ought to mean *requires for our justification*. This is its sense in the second proposition; but the same sense cannot be given to the word in the first proposition without making it false. The law does not propose *suffering* as a substitute for *obedience* in procuring *justification*; but sets it forth as the penal consequence of disobedience.

If the law says, obey or suffer, it is not as proposing two means to the same end, either of which you may take with the same result. It is an alternative of a different kind—one in which, if you do not choose the first, you must take the second. And the law does not represent those who take the second, and who do suffer accordingly, as objects of God's favour and justified by Him, but as condemned by Him and objects of His wrath. It cannot be said, therefore, that we have suffered in Christ, and are therefore justified before God. No other way of justification but obedience is proposed to us by the law. Reasoning, therefore, on these principles, the conclusion would seem to be that we cannot regard ourselves as justified before God, until we can say that we have obeyed in Christ.

But then it may be said, 'Suppose that in this way you show that Christ's suffering for us does not render His obedience for us superfluous, would not His obedience for us render His suffering for us not only superfluous but something more? If we had ourselves obeyed, could we have been justly punished? And if He has obeyed for us, can it be justly required that He should suffer for us also? This seems to be as good reasoning as the other. And is it not a decisive *reductio ad absurdum*? Is it not enough to overthrow any view of the Gospel plan of redemption, that, according to it, Christ's death was unnecessary, not to say unjust?

This reasoning appears plausible, but it is really founded upon an inadequate statement of the case. For Christ's obedience has been rendered for man, not simply as subject to the law, but as a sinner against the law. No obedience rendered *by* such a one, and therefore no obedience rendered *for* him could expiate his past guilt, or could secure his justification while his guilt was unexpiated. And for this, the other part of the Lord's work was necessary.

But then, it will be said, that this is making a great deal too much rest upon what is plainly a non-essential point. The argument turns altogether upon the fact that Christ was not manifested in the flesh until after man had sinned. But the time at which His work was wrought here upon earth does not affect either its nature or its effects. Though the time of His coming was fixed by Divine wisdom with reference to the accomplishment of all the Divine purposes, and was no doubt of great importance in various ways, it was of no moment as to the relation that

sinners bear to His work. Those who lived before and those who lived after are alike saved by it, so that the declaration that he was not only *the Lamb foreordained before the foundation of the world*, but *the LAMB slain from the foundation of the world*, is not to be regarded as a mere figure but a great reality. His offering dates not from the accomplishment of it in this world, but from the appointment of it in the unseen world. But if this be the case, and if His work for man is to be regarded as wrought before man was called into being, then obedience for man cannot be a part of it, for this would make the other part, His suffering for man, unnecessary.

But what, we may ask, did make this other part necessary? Nothing that had actually occurred. Man had not sinned, for, according to this hypothesis, man had not been yet created. Why, then, was it necessary that his representative's foreordained work for him should comprise *suffering*? Doubtless, it would be replied, because it was foreseen that man would sin. No one can object to this answer. But does it not plainly abandon the former use of the text, and confess that the nature of the Lord's work for man is determined by the actual condition and wants of man at the time that it was wrought? And this is, no doubt, the only legitimate use of the text referred to. The efficacy of the Lord's work does not depend in any degree upon the time at which it was wrought. It is plainly in its own nature as applicable to sinners who lived before as to those who lived after it was accomplished. And when it was determined in the Divine councils, it might be regarded as already wrought; so that all its benefits might be bestowed upon all whom God connected with it, even though they lived before it was actually wrought. But though it might in this way be treated as actually wrought, yet it is plain that this anticipation (in our mode of speaking and of apprehending too) of the work made no alteration in the mode of accomplishing it, or in its nature or objects. All of these were just the same as they would have been if it had not been foreseen or foreordained. They were in fact determined by the nature and requirements of this emergency, which was foreseen, and provided for beforehand, and they were, therefore, in every respect the same as if the emergency had not been foreseen, or any provision made for it until it had actually arisen.

In looking at the question in this way, therefore, we are to

collect the nature of the work from the nature of the case for which it was to provide. And this brings us back to the point at which we started, at which, considering the actual condition and wants of man when the work was wrought, we seemed, so far as reason could carry us in such a case, to see that the grounds for requiring that the Redeemer's work should comprise obedience for sinners are as strong as those which we have for requiring that suffering for sinners should be a part of it.

It is not, of course, meant to say that we can see that the former is an absolutely essential part of the work, so that it was not possible that God could be just in forgiving and accepting sinners on account of Christ's death simply. That would be an irrational and most presumptuous forgetfulness of the proper limits of our reason. But it seems that the justice of the procedure appears more clear in the one case than in the other: and with reference to the declaration of the Apostle (Rom. iii. 25) that Christ was set forth to be a propitiation for our sins, not merely that God might *be* just, but that His justice in showing mercy to sinners might be *manifested*,—this seems to be of some importance.

II.

I proceed to the further consideration which I promised to give of the form of expression *καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. I have said a good deal about it, as it is found in the New Testament; but as it is borrowed from the Hebrew it will be satisfactory to look at some of the places in the Old Testament in which such forms of speech occur.

The verb *חָשַׁב*, which corresponds to *λογίζομαι*, signifies chiefly (1) *to think, to think upon, to think out, to plan, &c.*; (2) *to count for or as, to reckon for or as, to regard as*, in judging, forming an estimate of, dealing with; (3) *to reckon to, or count to, or set down to the account of, or impute*.

It is only with the meanings (2) and (3) that we are immediately concerned. And with those, chiefly in the cases where the person or thing *counted, reckoned, &c.*, is in some way, more or less, different from that *for* which it is *counted, &c.* It will be

easy to give examples of the cases to which I refer, as the verb is used in that connexion much more frequently than in any other.

I shall first give examples of the meaning (2) *to count for*, &c., in this connexion; premising that the word signifying that for which the object is counted may follow the verb without any prefix, or with ל or כ (*port.* כמו) prefixed.

Thus the daughters of Laban say of their father, Gen. xxxi. 15, **הָלוֹא נִכְרִיתָ נְחֻשְׁבָנוּ לְךָ**, LXX. οὐχ ὡς αἱ ἀλλότριαι λελογίσμεθα αὐτῷ; and E.V. *Are we not counted of him strangers?* And Job says of himself, Job xix. 15, **וְאִמְרָתִי לְךָ נְחֻשְׁבָנִי**, LXX. ἀλλογενὴς ἤμην ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ, and E.V. “*And my maids count me for a stranger.*” And God Himself says of His people, Hos. viii. 12, **כְּמִזְרָר נְחֻשְׁבֵנוּ**, LXX. καὶ τὰ τόμιμα αὐτοῦ εἰς ἀλλότρια ἐλογίσθησαν, E.V. “*They [the great things of my law] were counted as a strange thing.*”

In these texts, it will be remarked that the word denoting the person or thing *for* or *as* which, the actual person or thing is *counted*, stands in the first without any prefix in the original (ὡς appearing in the LXX.); in the second, it is preceded by ל (to which there is nothing corresponding in the LXX.); in the third, by כְּמו (translated by εἰς, LXX.). But the force in all of them is evidently the same; insomuch that the form might be interchanged in any pair of them, without any alteration of the sense. And, indeed, the same is true of the corresponding texts in our version. To count one *a stranger*, *for a stranger*, and *as a stranger*, evidently mean the same thing. The case is so plain, therefore, that I need not multiply quotations to prove it. But for those who wish to look further at the point, I subjoin a list of texts, arranging them in three divisions.

A. Deut. ii. 11, 20; Neh. xiii. 13; Prov. xvii. 28; Is. xl. 17, liii. 4.

B. 1 Sam. i. 13; 1 Kin. x. 21; Job xiii. 24, xxxiii. 10, xxxv. 2, xli. 19 (E.V. 27); Lam. iv. 2.

C. Job xviii. 4, xix. 11, xli. 21 (E.V. 29); Ps. xlii. 23 (E.V. 22); Is. v. 28, xxix. 16, xl. 15; Dan. iv. 32 (E.V. 35).

It will be found upon looking at the foregoing texts that they all express the same act or operation of *counting* or regarding a person or thing *as* or *for* something more or less different from

what it actually is. But as in the three texts quoted at length above, the word which denotes the person or thing *for* or *as* which the actual person or thing is counted is found, in the texts in div. A., without any preposition; in those in B., it is preceded by ל; and in those in C., by ב.

In the Greek, the form of expression is sometimes so changed as not to admit of a detailed comparison with the original. But setting aside such cases, we find, as we should expect, that ל is generally rendered by εις, and ב by ὧς or ὡσπερ; and that where neither of the prefixes appears in the original, neither of the corresponding Greek particles is given in the translation. But while this holds as a general rule, there are exceptions which are quite sufficient to show that all the forms referred to were regarded by the LXX. as equivalent both in the Hebrew and in the Greek. For sometimes, when neither of the prefixes occurs in the original, we find one of the Greek particles, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, in the translation; while, on the other hand, at times, when one of the prepositions appears in the Hebrew text, it is left unrepresented in the Greek. And, finally, the ordinary translation of the prefixes is at times interchanged, ל being translated by ὧς, and ב by εις.

We may now pass to the third meaning of חָשַׁב, *to count, or reckon to one; to set down to his account; to impute to him.*

And the verb may be used in this sense both when the thing set down to a man's account is a quality which he actually possesses, or an act which he has actually done; and also when it is something that he does not possess, or that he has not done. And this applies both to men's dealings with each other, and to the dealings of God with them.

Thus in Shimei's petition to David, 2 Sam. xix. 20, אֶל-חֲשֹׁב־לִי עוֹן אֲדֹנָי, E.V. (ver. 19) "Let not my lord impute iniquity unto me," he does not mean to deny that he is guilty. He says, indeed, that he knows that he is, and he goes on to confess expressly the iniquity which he had committed. So, too, Lev. vii. 18, וְחֲשֹׁב לוֹ, "Neither shall it be imputed unto him." E.V. is said with reference to a peace-offering which a man had vowed, and which he has really offered, but in the eating of which there is an irregularity which vitiates and annuls the offering, so that it is not set down to the man's account.

And so, too, Ps. xxxii. 2, before referred to, אֲשֶׁר־אָדָם לֹא יִחַטֵּב יְהוָה לוֹ עֹן. "Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity," E.V.; where the verse before shows (if it were needed) that this is spoken of one to whose account iniquity might be, and, in strict justice, ought to be, set down.

Sometimes, however, that which is set down to a man's account is some quality that he does not possess, or some act that he has not committed. But here (as was shown to be the case with regard to the corresponding word λογίζομαι in the former part of this Note) the verb, though used in a different connexion, is not used in a different sense. The fact that the man is not really entitled to that which is set down to his account is not expressed or intimated by the verb, which means in such cases exactly what it means when what is set down to a man is something that he actually possesses or has actually done. The rest is to be collected, sometimes entirely from the circumstances of the case, and sometimes also from the form of the remainder of the sentence.

Thus, when we read Lev. xvii. 4, כֶּם יִחַטֵּב לְאִישׁ הָהוּא, *Blood shall be imputed to that man*, the verb is plainly used in its ordinary sense. There is nothing, indeed, in the words but what might have been said, and would have been said, if the case referred to were that of one who had actually committed murder. It is from the context that we know that it is not such a case that is spoken of, but the case of one who had violated a positive commandment by which the killing of an animal for food was made, for the time, a religious service, to be performed in a prescribed place and manner. And a breach of this commandment was treated as an unpardonable offence, to be punished as the shedding of a man's blood.

And the same is to be said as regards the verb, even when the process of substituting one thing for another in a man's account is more distinctly expressed. We have an example of this, Num. xviii. 27. The children of Israel were required to set apart for the Lord the tenth of the increase of their lands, and herds, and flocks. These tenths were to be offered to Him as a heave-offering, and then to be given to the Levites for their support. The Levites could not make offerings in the same way, because they had no part or inheritance in Israel. But when God provided for them thus in another way, by giving them the tithes, they

were commanded to offer to Him the tenth of this provision which He made for them. The tenth of the tithes which they received was to be a heave-offering to the Lord and then given to the priests (or, as some think, to the High Priest) for their support; and it was promised that this their offering should be counted to them even as though it were made, like the offering of their brethren, from the increase of their land. וְנִחְשַׁב לָכֶם תְּרוּמַתְכֶם

כִּדְגֵן מִן-הַגֶּזֶן וְכִמְלֵאָה מִן-הַיֶּקֶב; in the LXX. καὶ λογισθήσεται ὑμῖν τὰ ἀφαιρέματα ὑμῶν ὡς σῖτος ἀπὸ ἄλλω καὶ ἀφαίρεμα ἀπὸ ληροῦ; and E.V., "And this your heave-offering shall be reckoned unto you as though *it were* the corn of the threshing floor, and as the fulness of the wine-press*."

It is hardly necessary to say that חֲשַׁב is used here in the ordinary sense, inasmuch as there is no ground or pretext for supposing it to have any other meaning than that which it bears, when that which is counted to a man is what really belongs to him, or what has really been done by him.

Again, in Prov. xxvii. 14, "He that blesseth his friend with a loud voice, rising early in the morning, it shall be counted a curse to him." קָלָלָהּ תִּהְיֶה חֲשַׁב לוֹ, *a curse shall be set down to his account*, rendered sufficiently as to sense by the LXX., καταπομπόμενον οὐδὲν διαφέρειν δόξει. And here again it must be plain that whether the blessing which he had uttered, or the curse to which it was regarded as equivalent was to be set down to his account, the same word חֲשַׁב would be used to express the process, and used in precisely the same sense.

We may now proceed to examine the important texts (Rom. iv.) for the consideration of which this extended reference to the Old Testament was intended to prepare. St Paul appeals to the record of Abraham's justification in the book of Genesis in proof

* In the original it is the same particle וְ which is used in both members of the sentence and in both translated by ὡς in the LXX., though in our version it is expressed by the explanatory periphrasis "as though *it were*" in the first member; while in the second, it is rendered, as usual, simply by "as;" which is the rendering of the particle in both members of the corresponding verse 30: "Therefore thou shalt say unto them, when ye have heaved the best thereof from it, then it shall be counted unto the Levites as the increase of the threshing floor, and as the increase of the winepress." In the LXX. it is translated as before by ὡς in both members of the verse.

of his assertion that he, the father of the faithful, was not justified before God by works. "For what saith the Scripture?" he asks; and his answer is *Ἐπίστευσε δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ λογιώθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. This is a quotation from Gen. xv. 6, as it is found in the LXX.* The original is, וְהָאֱמֵן בִּיהוָה וַיַּחְשְׁבֶהָ לוֹ צְדָקָה, "And he believed in the LORD; and He counted it to him for righteousness." E.V.

Of the first member of the sentence I need say nothing here, as it belongs to another Note†. But in the second member it will be seen that the Greek version differs from the original in two points: (1) in the former, the Divine proceeding is expressed by the passive verb; in the latter, by the active; and (2) the preposition corresponding to *εἰς* is wanting in the Hebrew. No one would be disposed to regard the first change of form as in any respect affecting the meaning to be conveyed. It plainly leaves the act and the agent the same. And as to the second, I should hope that those who have read what has been said upon the texts of the Old Testament quoted and referred to to illustrate this phrase will see that no change in the sense is made by the introduction or omission of the particles either in the original or in the Greek translation. And, indeed, it happens that the present case furnishes a confirmation of what was then stated with respect to the equivalence of the phrase with and without the particles in question. For the record which is here found of the *faith* of Abraham is repeated in the Psalms of the *zeal* of Phinehas (as related Num. xxv. 7, 8). But in this latter case the verb is in the passive and the preposition is inserted, so as to make it correspond exactly in form with the translation of Gen. xv. 6, in the

* Except that for *καὶ ἐπίστευσε*, St Paul writes *ἐπίστευσεν δὲ*. There is, however, some authority in MSS. versions and the Fathers for omitting *καὶ*, though not enough to justify its removal from the text; but the deviation is of no importance. And how little St Paul aimed at exactness in quotation, where it was of no importance to his immediate purpose, appears by his giving the father of the faithful the name of *Ἀβραάμ*, while in the LXX. the name is, of course, written *Ἀβραάμ*, as it was not changed for more than a dozen years after.

† I may however remark that while in the second member of the sentence, as afterwards noticed, the LXX. introduce most legitimately the preposition *εἰς*, though there is no prefix to the noun in the original, in rendering the first member they drop the preposition *בְּ*, and translate *וַיַּחְשְׁבֶהָ לוֹ צְדָקָה* (rightly translated E. V., "And he believed in the LORD,"), *καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβραὰμ τῷ Θεῷ*.

LXX. וַתִּשָּׂב לוֹ לְצִדְקָה, Ps. cvi. 31, and so to supply additional evidence, if it were needed, that in translating the text in Genesis the LXX. were fully warranted in introducing *διὰ* before *δικαιοσύνην*, and that our translators were safe in following their example, and putting in “for” in the corresponding place, as they do, without marking it as an addition to the original by printing it in italics.

But, indeed, if we were unable to prove, in this way, the equivalence of the Hebrew and LXX. texts in the place, St Paul’s quotation of the latter for the purpose of reasoning upon it as *what Scripture says* concerning the justification of Abraham must be decisive evidence to us that it correctly represents the sense of the original. We may therefore take the record of Abraham’s justification as it stands in Rom. iv. 3, Ἐπίστευσε δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην. This is translated in our version by “Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness,” and as this is a literal translation of the Greek, its general correctness is not likely to be disputed; but it is necessary to notice some parts in detail in order to find its meaning accurately.

And first of ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ, *it was counted to him*, I should have a great deal to say, but that I have said so much already upon it in the first part of this Note. I have, I trust, said enough there, to exhibit and correct the error of supposing that here or anywhere in this chapter λογίζεσθαι τι means anything more than to *count to one, to set down to his account, to reckon to him*, and that I have also shown that it is not necessary to supply any addition to this simple sense of the word in order to make this passage a sufficient foundation for all that the Apostle builds on it in the course of his reasoning upon it. I do not mean to go over my refutation of Edwards again; but I am anxious that my readers should not pass lightly over what I said, as if it were directed against an exploded error. The error, in fact, appears in some form or other, more or less distinctly developed, in modern commentators down to the very latest.

It is found, as might be expected, in the fullest form in Stuart. He says, upon ver. 3, “In order further to illustrate the meaning of λογίζεσθαι κ. τ. λ. *to impute or reckon*, &c. it may be remarked (1), that the word sometimes means *to reckon to one what he actually possesses, to impute that to him which actually belongs to*

him, i.e. to treat him as actually possessing the thing or quality reckoned to him; e.g. Ps. cvi. 31 (cv. 31), &c. (2) It also means *to impute something to one which does not actually belong to him; to treat him as possessing what he does not actually possess; or as having done that which he has not actually done*: e.g. Lev. xvii. 4. Such is plainly the sense in Rom. iv. 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 24. So also ἐλλόγει Philem. ver. 18." And further on, upon ver. 6, he says, "For through vers. 3—6, and for the most part in the sequel, λογίζομαι is used in the *second* sense mentioned under ver. 3, viz. that of imputing to one what in reality does not belong to him."

It is needless to say that through all this the same mistake runs—of supposing that the verb changes its meaning as the nature of the case in reference to which it is used changes. Whereas, as I have sufficiently explained both with respect to it and the corresponding Hebrew verb, it expresses the same act of *counting to a man, reckoning to him, imputing to him, setting down to his account*, whether the thing set down really belongs to him or not.

But the notion that one of the meanings of λογίζομαι is to *reckon to a man what does not belong to him* seems to have laid a firm hold upon some better scholars and clearer-headed men than Stuart. Indeed, some appear to think that this is its strict and proper meaning. I collect, for example, that this is the view both of Michaelis and Tholuck, for the latter quotes the following passage from the former with high praise, as *expressing with great precision* that exposition of the words τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, which he himself regards as *the weightiest,—more conformable to the usual diction of St Paul, and not less agreeable to the context than the others**. "To him who does works, the reward is not said to be *reckoned*, an expression which makes it appear as if it were given from grace, but he obtains it because it is his due."

The same view of the proper meaning of the word seems to have been in Dean Alford's mind, though it is not so distinctly expressed: "τῷ ἐργαζομ[.] (q. d. τῷ ἐργάτῃ, but the participle is used because of the negative τῷ μὴ ἐργαζ. following)—'to the workman (him that works for hire, that earns wages, comp. πρῶσ-

* I quote from Tholuck's 'Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans,' translated by the Rev. Robert Menzies, Clark, Edinburgh, 1833. I have neither the original nor Michaelis within reach.

εργάσατο, Luke xix. 16) his wages are not reckoned according to (as a matter of) grace (favour), but according to (as a matter of) debt.' The stress is on *κατὰ χάριν*, not on *λογίζεται*, which in the first member of the sentence is used hardly in the strict sense of *imputing* or *reckoning*, but of *allotting* or *apportioning*: its use being occasioned by the stricter *λογίζεται* below*."

And the same erroneous notion of the *proper* meaning of the word, and the same distinction (which is founded upon the error) between its senses in the different members of the sentence occur still more distinctly in Mr Jowett's commentary on the passage.

"That the stress of the Apostle's argument falls partly upon *λογίζεται* seems to follow from the threefold recurrence of the word, as also from its signification of 'imputed,' 'reckoned.' Faith was imputed, reckoned to Abraham for righteousness. But it cannot be said that reward is 'imputed' of grace to him that doeth works; it is his due. A slight obscurity arises from the in-

* I will add, though the point is not connected with the object for which I refer here to his Commentary, that I do not think that the Dean explains correctly the contrast intended between *τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ* and *τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ* (verse 5). What he says upon the former is given above. Upon the latter, he says: "5. | 'But to him who works not (for hire,—is not an *ἐργάτης* looking for his *μισθός* but believes on.'" &c.

It would seem from this that the difference in the two cases is in the object for which the work is done,—in the one case, *for hire*, and in the other, *not for hire*: whereas I think that the difference intended is, that *the work is done* in the one case, and that in the other, *it is not done*. Both the men spoken of are *ἐργάται*: the difference between them being, that the first does the work which entitles him to his hire, and to him, therefore, the hire is set down as earned and due; the other does not do the work, and, therefore, to him, if the hire is to be set down, it cannot be set down in the same way, as earned. But in stating the difference, there is something very characteristic of the Apostle. A strictly didactical writer would have presented both parts of the general case—the case of a workman and his employer—by which Abraham's was to be illustrated, and then have proceeded to point out how it applied. But St Paul's genius was not didactical but essentially rhetorical. And having stated the first part of the illustration regularly in general terms, and having begun to state in the same way the second part, he leaves it to the reader to fill up the rest, and suddenly passes from the illustration to the case which was to be illustrated (or rather to the general case of justification by faith, of which Abraham's was a particular instance and the type), and he completes his statement not in the language of common life, which was proper to the illustration, but in the Scriptural language which was only proper to the actual case. But this raises no difficulty and creates no uncertainty as to the meaning of *τῷ ἐργαζ.* and *τῷ μὴ ἐργαζ.*, which are plainly, I think, intended to present the case of the man *who works* and the man *who does not work*: not of the man *who works for hire*, and the man *who does not work for hire*.

accurate use of the same word in both cases, the real meaning being οὐκ ἐλογίσθη κατὰ χάριν ἀλλὰ ἐστι κατ' ὀφείλημα."

I cannot be sure that I understand all this. "But it cannot be said that reward is 'imputed' of grace to him that doeth works"—is the very thing that St Paul himself says; but, in the connexion in which it stands in the above passage, it seems to be intended to express some dissent from him, and to furnish the foundation of Mr Jowett's correction of his language. And if this be what it is intended for, then "of grace" has no business in the sentence. What is required for Mr Jowett's purpose is, that it cannot be said that the reward is *imputed* to him that doeth work. Nothing less than this would suffice as a foundation for what follows. And if I am right in my conjecture (it is nothing more) as to the purpose which this sentence is intended to answer, then what I have said in the first part of this Note upon the meaning of λογίζομαι is enough, I should hope, to show that the position which it lays down involves a great mistake as to the meaning of that word. But whether my guess, as to what is intended in this part of the extract from Mr Jowett, be right or wrong, it is very certain that the whole rests upon the erroneous view of the word which I have taken such pains to expose. And wherever the mistake occurs, the portion of the first part of this Note, to which I have referred, may spare me the trouble of saying anything to correct it. Any one who reads what I have said will require no further help to enable him to see that *no part* of the stress of the Apostle's argument falls upon λογίζεται; and, moreover, that there is no inaccuracy whatever in the use of the same word in connexion with κατὰ χάριν and κατ' ὀφείλημα; but that, in both connexions, ἐλογίσθη is used with strict propriety in exactly the same sense.

The Apostle is speaking of a record, not of the act of payment, but of the act of *counting* or *reckoning* to a man with the view to payment hereafter. In common life what was in this way counted to a man would ordinarily be only what he had really earned; and so what was counted to him, or set down to his account, would be what was actually due to him as a matter of right. But, even in common life, there might be a case in which no work had been done, but in which, by the favour of his master, the man was to be dealt with just as if there had been. The act of reckoning or counting to the man would be the same in both cases, and would

naturally be expressed by the same word in both. But if there were a record made of such cases, we might expect to find—at least no one could be surprised to find—that though the same word was used to express the act in both cases, there was still something in the record which would enable us to distinguish between them,—between the case in which the work was done, and the reward set down to the man's account as a matter of right, and the case in which the work was not done, and the reward was set down as a matter of favour.

How St Paul finds in the record of Abraham's justification in Genesis evidence that his was a case of the latter kind, I have already explained, and I need not return to the point. And, indeed, the whole case ought to be so clear by this time, that it is with some hesitation that I say anything in addition, with a view to throwing further light upon it. But as such very strange difficulties seem to be felt about this language in various quarters, I am tempted to suggest, as, perhaps, making it easier to some minds to receive it in its proper meaning, that it seems to be used throughout with reference to that view of judgment in which it is presented to us as a final reckoning with men, and an awarding to them what is due to them, as it appears recorded in a book or books. This view is found both in the Old and New Testament. Thus in Dan. vii. 10, having described the Judge, and his throne, and his retinue, and the multitude awaiting His sentence, the prophet says, "The judgment was set, and the Books were opened." And the procedure is expressed more at large in Rev. xx. 12: "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God, and the Books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the Book of Life, and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the Books, according to their works*." Now this figurative description of judgment seems to furnish a key to the meaning of the language that we have been considering which ought to obviate all the difficulty that seems to be felt about it. When once this figure of the Book in which each man's account is kept,—by a reference to which he is to be judged,—has

* The Book of Life—the record in which the names of the righteous are enrolled—meets us very often in Scripture, as Exod. xxxii. 32; Ps. lxi. 28; Dan. xii. 1; Phil. iv. 3; Rev. iii. 5, xiii. 8, xvii. 8, xx. 15, xxi. 27, xxii. 19. We have, too, the figure of a Book in which the sufferings (Ps. lvi. 8) and the good deeds (Mal. iii. 16) of His servants are written.

fixed itself in the mind, it would seem perfectly natural to speak of *counting to a man, reckoning to him, settling down to him*, anything that he has done, whether it be good or bad, or whatever he has deserved, be it praise or blame, punishment or reward. And in this way we ought to find it easy to understand, when it is said that *sin is reckoned, counted, or imputed to a man*, or when the same phrase is used with respect to *righteousness*.

This is enough to say upon the verb, but it may be necessary to add a word upon the preposition *eis*. It is translated by *for*, meaning thereby *as*, or *in the place of*. This is a sense in which *eis* is not found in classical Greek, though it stands there for other senses of the word *for*. But so many instances have been given or referred to in what has gone before, in which it is used in the LXX. as the translation of לִּי , and also for בְּ , that it is unnecessary to add any quotation to show that by the LXX. it was familiarly used to express the sense of *for*, i.e. when *for* is equivalent to *as* or *in the place of**. And there can be no doubt that this use of the preposition was adopted by the New Testament writers. Several of the examples, indeed, of their use of it in this sense, are quotations from the LXX.; but the manner in which they are made, without preface or explanation, shows the writers to be perfectly familiar with this use of the preposition. Indeed there is one instance of this kind in which the proof is somewhat stronger. In the course of St Stephen's speech, Acts vii. 21, speaking of Moses, he says, that when he was exposed, ἀνέλατο αὐτὸν ἡ θυγάτηρ Φαραὼ καὶ ἀνεθρέψατο αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ εἰς οἶόν. This is not a quotation from the LXX.; for there the words are καὶ ἐγενήθη αὐτῇ εἰς οἶόν. Nor is it a literal translation of the original made by the speaker; for the LXX. gives a perfectly literal translation of the Hebrew words in the place. It is evident that it was the substance of the narrative that was in St Stephen's mind, and that he was expressing it in his own language.

Rom. ii. 26, seems to be a good instance unconnected with this doctrine:—ἐὰν οὖν ἡ ἀκροβυστία τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φιλάσση, οὐχὶ ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται.

* I may however add a very decisive example which I did not before quote: καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἡ πλίνθος εἰς λίθον, καὶ ἀσφαλτος ἦν αὐτοῖς ὁ πηλός.

Again, ix. 8, οὐ τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκὸς, ταῦτα τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας λογίζεται εἰς σπέρμα.

There can be no doubt then that εἰς is used by St Paul and especially in connexion with this verb,—even when he is not quoting from the LXX. or referring to it,—in the sense in which we saw that it is so often used in that version, viz. in the sense of *instead of, in the place of, as, as though it were.*

The only other question as to the meaning of the passage seems to be, What was it that was *counted unto Abraham for righteousness?* The natural answer seems to be, *his faith.* And that this is the true answer seems to be distinctly declared by the Apostle himself in verse 5; and again, even more expressly, in verse 9, where he says, plainly referring to this verse 3, λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐλογίσθη τῷ Ἀβραὰμ ἡ πίστις εἰς δικαιοσύνην. If there were any room to question what *it* means in verse 3, it is here shown beyond any doubt to be the *faith* which Abraham is described as exercising when it is said that he *believed God.* And it is this that makes what is said further on, of the severity of the trial to which Abraham was subjected, pertinent and important, as evincing the genuineness of his *faith.*

But though it seems that in this way the Apostle's meaning here is put beyond the possibility of doubt, there is no part of this remarkable exposition of the process of justification about which more serious difficulties have been raised than this. They are chiefly founded upon, I will not call it extreme, but certainly very misdirected, jealousy for the freeness of the Gospel. It is apprehended that the statement which the Apostle makes in verse 3, cannot be taken in the natural and obvious sense, to which it seems authoritatively fixed by verse 9, without ascribing some *merit to faith.* And not seeing any more legitimate mode of escaping from what they rightly regard as a very inconvenient consequence, some have adopted the violent expedient of treating ἡ πίστις here as put by metonymy for the object of faith—Christ Himself. I do not mean that there is anything intolerably violent in the proposed figure, considered in itself. For though there is no direct and literal precedent for it, I believe, yet there are examples of similar metonymies which might be taken to justify it, if the connexion admitted it. But no one can read the whole chapter (or, which is rather better, the portion of the Epistle from iii. 21, to the end of iv.) without seeing how decidedly the con-

text repudiates such an interpretation. The verse is, in fact, only one out of a number of texts in that space, in which *justification* is connected with *faith*; and all these texts, though differing somewhat in form of expression, agree in substance in making justification follow faith and depend upon it. In none of them would it appear reasonable, and in some of them it would be plainly impossible, to suppose that any such figure, or any figure of any kind, was intended. In all of them, *πίστις* naturally expresses, as it does elsewhere, the state of mind of the person spoken of, and in some of them it cannot by any possibility be understood to mean anything else. It is in this sense of *faith* that *justification* is connected with it in the different ways of expressing the connexion. And even in this general way of stating the facts of the case, it would appear a very violent proceeding to put a different sense upon *faith* in this verse from that which it bears in so many others clearly connected with it, and with each other. But the violence of this change would be very much more striking if we were to go through these texts in detail. I will not, however, add to this very long Note by such a detailed examination of the passage to which I have referred, partly because it may be safely left to every reader to go through it for himself, but principally because I have already shown elsewhere, that there is really no reason whatever for adopting any questionable proceeding to escape from the plain meaning of verse 9, for that it involves no such consequence as is apprehended. I have noticed a similar difficulty in Sermon IV., pp. 97—101, and also in the beginning of Note S.; and I trust that any one who reads what is said there will be satisfied that such fears arise from ignorance or forgetfulness of the true instrumentality of *faith* in *justification*, and indeed of the true nature of *faith*.

NOTE O. PAGE 85.

On Rom. iii. 28.

The reading from which our version was made, λογίζομεθα οὖν....., is not without respectable support, but the preponderance of authorities seems to be in favour of λογίζομεθα γάρ....., which, accordingly, has been preferred by Griesbach, Scholz, and most editors since, including Tischendorf. It has been urged, too (see Alford *in loc.*), that the translation requires correction: “λογίζομεθα, not ‘we conclude,’ but ‘we hold,’ ‘we reckon’ (see *reffi.*): the former is against New Testament usage, and has, probably, caused the change of γάρ into οὖν, by some who imagined that this verse was a conclusion from the preceding argument. ‘For we hold (as explanatory of the verse preceding,—on the other supposition the two verses are disjointed, and the conclusion coming in most strangely) that a man is justified by faith, without the works of the law (not *works of law*); and therefore boasting is excluded.’”

This correction seems to be made not without reason. As to the connexion between the verses, it certainly does, I think, appear easier and clearer in the proposed translation than it is in our version. But this only goes to support the change of the conjunctions, which is established sufficiently by external evidence. The connexion between the verses is the same whether we translate verse 23, “For we *conclude*.....” or “For we *hold*.....” In the former case, the reference would seem to be to verse 20 (which Alford justly describes as, “*The solemn and important conclusion of all the foregoing argument,*”) and to all the explanatory and confirmatory matter which is to be found in the intervening verses. But, I think, the very same reference must be understood to be made when the second is taken to be the Apostle’s meaning. If he says, *For our conclusion is*..... the foregoing passage would be the materials from which the conclusion was drawn. But if he says *For our position is*..... then the same passage is the evidence that this is the position which he holds. But in both cases alike a reason would be assigned for what is said in the preceding verse; and, indeed, the same reason in both; for the reason depends upon the truth set forth by the Apostle, whether he gives it as a deduc-

tion from other truths which he had laid down, or as a restatement of what had been in substance laid down by him in the preceding verses.

So far, therefore, as the connexion of verses 27 and 28 is concerned, the translation of *λογίζεσθε* in the English version might be allowed to stand. But the objection to it derived from New Testament usage seems to be well grounded. Besides its common meanings *to count, to reckon, to think, to hold*, it appears to stand for *to reason*, Mark xi. 31, καὶ ἐλογίζοντο πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς..... But this seems to be only the reasoning which is preliminary to a conclusion, and not to include the actual drawing of the conclusion. And of the use of the simple verb in this latter meaning, I do not think there is any clear instance in the New Testament. It is safer, therefore, to adopt the proposed translation. But it is hardly necessary to remark that, whichever way the verse may be translated, the doctrine which it declares remains the same. It is as clearly an authoritative declaration of the great doctrine of *justification by faith only* in the new translation as it was in the old, though made in a somewhat different form and connexion. It is, therefore, equally available for my purpose in either version; and, accordingly, I have not thought it necessary to make any change in it as the text of Sermons IV. V. and VI., though, adopting the proposed translation, I have been obliged to make some alteration in the way in which the verse was originally introduced in the passage in Sermon IV., to which this Note refers, and elsewhere.

NOTE P. PAGE 88.

On Rom. iii. 25.

The text is: ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον διὰ πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ . . . I have referred to it as if ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι were to be connected with διὰ πίστεως, as it is in the English version. But this construction has been for a good while questioned. In Poole's Synopsis it is said that the words ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι are connected

with ἱλαστήριον by Paræus, Beza* (from Erasmus), and Toletus (from Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Ambrose). And Wolff, *Curræ Philologæ*, says upon the former words: "Referri hæc [ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι] nonnulli volunt ad vocem ἱλαστήριον, non autem ad διὰ πίστεως. Videtur enim illis hæc phrasis nec Græca satis, nec Biblica satis esse: ἡ πίστις ἐν τῷ αἵματι."

The first of the two points made against the phrase by the objectors referred to may be freely admitted. The phrase, certainly, is hardly (classical) Greek. But the same is true of ἡ πίστις ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, or εἰς Χριστόν, or ἐπὶ Θεόν, &c. which yet are certainly Biblical Greek, notwithstanding.

While the first point, then, is plainly unimportant in itself, it does not infer the second, which sounds as if it were of some importance. And so it would really be, if it meant that the clause was in its form or construction at variance with Biblical usage. But this is not what is intended. In fact, πίστις, followed by that which is the object of *faith*, governed by a preposition (ἐν being one of the prepositions employed), is a form which occurs too often in the New Testament to leave any room for any objection to the clause in question on that score. What is meant is that this particular object is not found anywhere else, so that there is no other example of the phrase π. ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι. This is a very different, and a very much less important, objection, though it has been treated as a very serious one.

Mr Jowett, indeed, relies entirely upon it. Instead of the rendering in the E. V., "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood ..," he proposes, "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith by His blood..." And, in a note, he thus justifies the proposed change: "No such expression occurs in Scripture as faith in the blood, or even in the death of Christ. Hence, the two clauses are better separated, 'Through faith—by his blood.'"

And to the same effect, but more fully, Dean Alford says: "διὰ πίστεως, 'by faith,' as the subjective means of appropriation

* It seems strange to find Beza here, for though in a note on the verse he states that Erasmus followed this construction, and accordingly translated ἐν τῷ κ.τ.λ. by *interueniente ipsius sanguine*, yet he gives also the other construction, without stating on which side his own preference lay, which indeed could hardly be necessary, as he had distinctly adopted the latter in his translation: *Quem prout Deus propitiamentum per fidem in sanguine ipsius*.

of this propitiation : not to be joined with ἐν αὐτοῦ αἵματι (but the om. of τῆς is no objection to this : see above, on ver. 22), as Luth., Calv., al. Olsh. Rückert,—for such an expression as πίστις, or πιστεύω ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰ. Χρ. would be unexampled,—and (which is decisive) the clause ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι required a primary, not a subordinate, place in the sentence, because the next clause, εἰς ἔθ. τ. δικ. αὐτ., directly refers to it. As διὰ πιστ. is the subjective means of appropriation, so ἐν τῷ αἵμ. αὐτοῦ is the objective means of manifestation of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice. αἷμα does not = θάνατος, but refers to propitiation *by blood*,—the well-known typical use of it in sacrifice.”

Notwithstanding this, I am not disposed to adopt the proposed construction, and for the following reasons :—

1. It is true that there is no other instance in which the expression π. ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰ. Χρ. is used, but neither is there any in which the expression ἱλαστήριον ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰ. Χρ. is used. So that, though the proposed construction gets rid of an unexampled expression, it introduces an expression equally unexampled.

2. It may be said that there is a great difference between the two cases. Ἱλαστήριον does not occur anywhere else, and, therefore, whatever words are supposed to be combined with it, the expression must be unexampled. But πίστις is used continually by the Apostle, and is followed by various words, in different constructions, expressing its object, as GOD, CHRIST, the LORD, *His name, the truth, the Gospel*, but nowhere does it appear in connexion with *the blood of CHRIST*. Is it not likely that, if he meant to give here the object of faith at all, he would have given one of the usual ones, rather than this unexampled one? And this being the case, is it not safer to conclude that he did not intend this for the object of π., and that we are only following his mind, in connecting αἷμα αὐτοῦ, as proposed, with ἱλαστήριον?

How far this answers what I have just said (1), I need not inquire, for there is no lack of instances which cannot be so set aside : e. g. δικαιῶν and δικαιῶσθαι are very often used by the Apostle in connexion with the means by which justification is, or is supposed to be, effected : we have δ. ἐξ ἔργων, ἐκ πίστεως, πάντα, τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, ἐν Χριστῷ, ἐν νόμῳ. In one place, and in one only, is the verb followed in the same connexion by αἷμα. In Rom. v. 9 we find δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ. Here seems a

perfectly parallel case, which yet raises no difficulty. No one ever doubts that this unexampled expression was used by the Apostle. And if we acquiesce in it, why should we be perplexed by the one in question, or be anxious to get rid of it?

We have even a more direct parallel in Col. ii. 12, διὰ τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. Here is a clearly unexampled instance in which the word πίστις itself stands in a connexion in which neither it nor the verb is anywhere else found*.

3. These examples would seem sufficiently to show that the fact that the proposed construction gets rid of a phrase in which π. is assigned an object with which it is not found connected elsewhere, ought not to be regarded as a reason of much weight in its favour. Of course, if the object were in any way an unsuitable one, that of itself ought to be regarded as conclusive against the other construction. But this cannot be alleged. If we are told that the BLOOD of Christ was shed *for the remission of sins* (Mark xiv. 24); that we are *justified by His BLOOD* (Rom. v. 9); that *we have redemption through His BLOOD* (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14); that *He made peace through the BLOOD of His cross* (Col. i. 20); that those who *were afar off were made nigh by His BLOOD* (Eph. ii. 13); that *He purchased the Church of God with His own BLOOD* (Acts xx. 28); that *He has washed us from our sins in His own BLOOD* (Rev. i. 5); that it is *through His BLOOD that we have boldness to enter into the holiest* (Heb. x. 19); if all this, not to look for anything more, is declared concerning the efficacy of *His BLOOD*, it can hardly be thought strange that it should be anywhere stated that *His BLOOD* is the object of the *faith* of His people.

4. No objection, then, lies against the expression, except that it does not occur elsewhere; and, as I have already stated, and not without giving reasons for the opinion, I cannot think that this is a very serious objection; while I also think that nothing

* There are several other instances which might be put forward, as ἡ π. τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, Acts iii. 16; ἡ π. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, Phil. i. 27; π. ἀληθείας, 2 Thess. ii. 13; all of which are expressions that occur nowhere else. But as the point which Dean Alford makes against the construction is, that "such an expression as πίστις or πιστεύω ἐν τῷ αἵματι 'Ι. Χρ. would be unexampled;" and as each of the nouns in the above examples, though it does not occur elsewhere in connexion with πίστις, yet is found after πιστεύω, I have only adduced a case in which πίστις has an object which is not found anywhere else, either in connexion with it or with the verb.

short of very strong objections against the expression would justify the adoption of the construction by which it is proposed to get rid of it. For I cannot but believe that if the Apostle had intended that both διὰ πίστεως, and ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι should be connected with ἱλαστήριον, he would have placed them after it in the opposite order to that in which they actually stand. When the words ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι follow πίστις immediately, it is natural, and indeed at first unavoidable, to regard them as connected with it—as expressing its object. And it appears to me in the highest degree improbable that, if this were not what the Apostle intended, he would have adopted an order which is so calculated to mislead, when the other arrangement—ἱλαστήριον ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι διὰ πίστεως—would express his meaning without any ambiguity.

5. And I may add that this improbability is aggravated by the fact that upon the supposition that the Apostle intended that ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι should be connected, not with διὰ πίστεως, but with ἱλαστήριον, the latter arrangement would seem to be the natural one, independently of the object of securing his meaning against mistake. For when both were to be stated in connexion with ἱλαστήριον, it would seem the natural order of thought to give the precedence to *the means by which the propitiation was effected*, rather than to *the means by which it is to be made available to us*. And so in our Eleventh Article we find: “We are counted righteous before God only *for* the merit of our Lord Jesus Christ, *by* Faith.”

This is enough to say upon this objection to the translation in our Version; but it is not the only one stated by Dean Alford, nor apparently the one which he chiefly relies on. He adds another, which, he says, is *decisive*: “The clause ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι requires a primary, not a subordinate, place in the sentence, because in the next clause, *ὡς ἔδ. τ. οὐκ. αὐτοῦ*, directly refers to it.”

I am obliged to confess that I am unable to see much force in this reason. No doubt the next clause does require that the one under consideration should contain something which would serve to manifest the righteousness of God in justifying sinners. But this seems to be provided in the statement that he had set forth Christ Jesus as *a propitiatory offering*. Surely it is *the fact* that

Christ was made a *propitiatory offering* which renders God just, when He passed over sins in the Old Dispensation, and when He justifies sinners under the New Dispensation; and it is *the showing forth of this fact*—the setting Christ forth as a propitiatory offering—which *proves* God to be righteous—*manifests His righteousness*—in this forgiveness. So that the sense would be perfect if the sentence ran, ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον εἰς ἃδειξαι τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. And what is subjoined to ἱλαστήριον is to be regarded as supplementary and explanatory, not as containing anything essential to the manifestation of the righteousness of God, but noting incidentally the mode in which the *propitiatory offering* which establishes God's righteousness, in the forgiveness and acceptance of sinners, is made efficacious to them.

On the whole, I see no reason to depart from the English Version of this text. And this being the conclusion to which I was led, I was pleased to find that it seems to be the one which Tholuck adopts: “πίστις ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι for εἰς τὸ αἷμα stands, by metonymy, for *bloody death*, the ἀκμὴ of his holy and love-devoted life. This clause is best conjoined as an epexegetis with ἱλαστήριον.” *Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans*, in loc.

NOTE Q. PAGE 95.

The Reformers' Declarations of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only.

The universal concurrence of the early Reformers in this doctrine of Justification by Faith only, must have already appeared, to a great extent, in the quotations which I have given from their writings. It was impossible, unless I had mutilated the extracts in a way that would have rendered them unintelligible, to have given the Reformers' definitions of Faith and of Justification, without also giving the views of the writers concerning their connexion. This will somewhat abridge the authorities which ought to be adduced in support of the strong assertion in the Sermon to which this Note refers; but I cannot allow myself to be prevented from making so important a point perfectly clear, even by the apprehension of being led into a little repetition.

The question is not, whether all the first Reformers professed the doctrine that *we are justified by Faith only*,—for every one knows that they all did,—but, what did they mean by the declaration? I shall endeavour, in the quotations that follow, to put that point beyond doubt; but I desire to remind the reader that I have already supplied quotations in abundance to show what they meant both by *Faith* and by *Justification*; and that he should not expect generally to find that those who have so fully explained the meaning of these terms, should always accompany their statements of the doctrine by a repetition of definitions already given in the same documents, or just about to be subjoined. Such, however, was their sense of the great importance of the doctrine, its great liability to misconception, evasion, and abuse, that they frequently do take this additional precaution, to render a mistake of their meaning impossible,—as will appear by the citations which I am about to give. But, when they do not, reference should be made to the definitions contained in the former quotations. As before, I shall begin with the confessions.

Confessio Augustana. 1530. Art. 4.

Item docent [ecclesie apud nos] quod homines non possint justificari coram Deo propriis viribus meritis aut operibus, sed gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi et peccata remitti propter Christum qui sua morte pro peccatis nostris satisfecit. Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro justitia coram ipso. Rom. iii. iv.

Confessio Saxonica. 1551.

Cum autem hac voce arguente peccata mens perterrefacta est, audiat promissionem Evangelii propriam de Filio Dei, et statuatur sibi remitti peccata gratis propter Filium Dei, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum propitiatorem, per misericordiam, non propter contritionem aut dilectionem nostram; hac fide cum erigitur, certum est donari remissionem peccatorum, reconciliationem, et imputationem justitiæ, propter ipsius Christi meritum; et Christum in nobis efficacem esse et Spiritu suo vivificare credentes, et ex æterna morte nos liberare et facere nos simul hæredes vite æternæ.

Confessio Bohemica. 1535. *Latine Auctior.* 1572.

Hæc sola fides et hæc intimi cordis in Jesu Christum fiducia justificat, seu justum facit hominem coram Deo absque ullis operibus quæ ipse addat conferendo, aut ullo merito ipsius; de qua Sanctus Paulus dicit *ei vero*, &c. Rom. iv.

Confessio Tigurina. 1545.

Quapropter hoc et solido hujus nostre vere, indubitatae, et Christianae fidei argumento instructi, nullis humanis vel operibus vel meritis sed per solam Dei gratiam, id est per sanctam illam crucifixi Filii Dei passionem et innocentem mortem homines justitiam consequi, a peccatis mundari, vel eorundem satisfactionem aut expiationem impetrare posse, docemus. Et quod meritis Christi innocentiae et meriti tunc participes reddamur cum Dei Filium nostrum esse, et propter peccata nostra, ut nos nimirum justos et beatos redderet, mortem subiisse, vera et constanti fide credimus.

Confessio Helvetica. 1536.

Proprie igitur loquendo Deus solus nos justificat, et duntaxat propter Christum justificat, non imputans nobis peccata sed imputans ejus nobis justitiam Quoniam vero nos justificationem hanc recipimus non per ulla opera sed per fidem in Dei misericordiam et Christum, ideo docemus et credimus cum apostolo, hominem peccatorem justificari sola fide in Christum non lege aut ullis operibus.

Confessio Belgica. 1561. Latine reddita, 1581.

Merito igitur jureque dicimus cum D. Paulo, nos sola fide justificari, seu fide absque operibus legis. Cæterum proprie loquendo nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem per se seu ex se nos justificare, ut quæ sit duntaxat velut instrumentum quo Christum justitiam nostram apprehendimus. Christus ergo ipse est nostra justitia qui omnia sua merita nobis imputat, fides vero est instrumentum, quo illi in societatem seu communionem omnium bonorum ipsius copulamur atque in ea retinemur. Art. xxii.

Confessio Gallica. 1559. Latinè reddita, 1566.

Credimus totam nostram justitiam positam esse in peccatorum remissione, quæ sit etiam, ut testatur David, unica nostra felicitas. Igitur cæteras omnes rationes quibus homines existimant se coram Deo posse justificari plane repudiamus, omnique virtutum et meritorum opinione abjecta, in sola Jesu Christi obedientia prorsus acquiescimus, quæ quidem nobis imputatur, tum ut tegatur nostra peccata, tum etiam ut gratiam coram Deo nanciscamur.

Art. 20. Credimus nos sola fide fieri hujus justitiæ participes.

Apologia Conf. Augustanæ.

Utrumque enim clamant [adversarii nostri] et quod negamus homines propter sua merita consequi remissionem peccatorum; et quod affirmamus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, et fide in Christum justificari.....

Sola fide non per dilectionem non propter dilectionem consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem.

Cum autem sola fide accipiamus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, propterea sola fides justificat; quia reconciliati reputantur justi et Filii Dei non propter suam munditiam sed per misericordiam propter Christum, si tamen hanc misericordiam fide apprehendant. Ideoque Scriptura testatur quod fide justī reputamur.....

LUTHER. In Ep. ad Galat. Cap. 2.

Hic observandum est, ista tria, fidem, Christum, acceptionem seu reputationem, conjungenda esse. Fides apprehendit Christum, et habet eum præsentem, inclusamque tenet, ut annulus gemmam. Et qui fuerit inventus hac fiducia apprehensi Christi in corde, illum reputat Deus justum. Hæc ratio est et meritum quo pervenimus ad remissionem peccatorum et justitiam: quia credis, inquit Deus, in me, et fides tua apprehendit Christum quem tibi donavi, ut esset Mediator et Pontifex tuus, ideo sis justus. Itaque Deus acceptat seu reputat nos justos solum propter fidem in Christum.....

Concludendum cum Paulo; sola fide, non fide formata charitate, nos justificari. Quare non isti formæ gratificanti tribuenda est vis justificandi sed fidei, quæ apprehendit et possidet in corde ipsum Christum salvatorem. Ista fides sine et ante charitatem justificat.

In Genesis. Cap. 22.

Quia vero tam impudenter apertæ veritati contradicunt, operæ pretium est tractare et negativam seu adversativam nostræ doctrinæ quam ipsi statuunt, una cum nova glosa quam recens commenti sunt ad palliandum suum errorem. Non enim simpliciter operibus justitiam tribuunt sed operibus conjunctis cum fide. Quia vident se in manifesto et turpi errore deprehensos, quod opera tantum et sine fide, et quidem traditionum humanarum docuerunt. Jam ergo paululum sese inflectunt et pro traditionibus suis opera et justitiam legis ad justificationem exigunt. Verum cum ne id

quidem ad declinandam justam ignominiam satisfit, eo decurrunt ut adsuant fidem operibus et dicant, neque opera sola nec sola fidem justificare, sed fidem cum operibus, quia fides sine operibus mortua est.....At huic propositioni callidam declarationem sive limitationem addunt: licet exigamus opera tanquam necessaria ad salutem, inquit, tamen non docemus confidendum operibus. Est satis astutus diabolus, sed nihil agit tametsi fucum imperitis et rationi facit.....Non negamus nos facienda esse opera, sed hoc improbamus quod adversarii commiscant fidem justificantem et opera justificatorum per fidem. Bene quidem conveniunt, et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides et opera. Sed sola fides est quae apprehendit benedictionem. Ideo solam fidem justificantem predicamus quia sola benedicit, opera non habent gloriam quod benedicant, sed sunt fructus benedictæ personæ.

MELANCTHON. *Responsio ad Bavar. Articulos.* 1559.

Etsi autem verum est cum in conversione sit vera consolatio fide per Spiritum Sanctum, habitare Deum in cordibus et inchoari novam obedientiam. Tamen semper statuendum est in hac vita personam justam esse coram Deo, sola fide, id est habere remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem seu imputationem justitiæ, placere seu acceptam esse personam Deo ad vitam æternam et hæreditatem vitæ æternæ, sola fide, id est fiducia mediatoris. Ut quamquam in Paulo renato habitat Deus, ut sunt excellentes virtutes, tamen quia adhuc in eo peccatum est, in hac vita personam habet remissionem peccatorum reconciliationem et imputationem justitiæ, et est justa, placens Deo, et accepta ad vitam æternam, sola fide, id est propter solum mediatorem.

Enarratio Symboli Nicæni ultima. 1557.

Conclusio. Recte explicatis vocabulis recito propositionem quæ est summa evangelii recitata a Paulo, Rom. iii. et deinceps, propter Filium Dei Mediatorem, et quidem propter ejus obedientiam, gratis non propter ulla nostra merita, recipimus in veris pavoribus sola fide remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, et in ea consolationem cum Fide sustentamur, Filius Dei ipse in nobis est efficax, dicit consolationem, voce evangelii ostendit misericordiam Patris, et liberat nos ex doloribus inferorum, et dat Spiritum Sanctum; ac reputamur justi coram Deo propter obedientiam Mediatoris, et simul sumus hæredes vitæ æternæ propter Mediatorem, non propter nostram dignitatem aut nostras virtutes seu opera.

Acta Wormacensia. 1557.

De justificatione retinemus doctrinam quæ pio consensu in ecclesiis nostris juxta Confessionem et Apologiam proponitur; ac pie et constanter retinemus propositionem; *sola fide coram Deo justificamur.* Et hanc propositionem intelligimus et declaramus juxta consensum perpetuum traditum in Prophetiis et Apostolicis Scriptis: quod homo in conversione ex injusto fiat justus, id est, ex reo habens remissionem peccatorum, reconciliatus et acceptus Deo ad vitam æternam, per misericordiam gratis propter solum Mediatorem filium Dei, sola fide, id est, fiducia Mediatoris, juxta promissionem; quæ fides nititur obedientia Mediatoris propter quam persona credens jam est justa, id est habens remissionem peccatorum, et reconciliata et accepta Deo justitia imputata..... Cum igitur de justitia coram Deo dicitur, semper fides nitatur obedientia Mediatoris. Hac fide persona justa est coram Deo etiam post regenerationem. Nec recipimus Synechoclen Origenis, Monachorum, Papistarum, libri Interim, Stencfeldii, Osiandri, Funcii, et aliorum, qui sic interpretantur propositionem, fide justificamur scil. preparatione, ut simus deinde alia re justi id est accepti coram Deo, scil. novitate seu dilectione, seu inhærenti justitia essentiali. Nam hi modi loquendi idem significant. Nec volumus abjici justitiam imputatam de qua Paulus expresse inquit, *Fides imputatur credenti ad justitiam.*

Instead of multiplying extracts to the extent that I easily could, without giving any of a less unequivocal character, I shall be content with subjoining two—to which, however, I invite particular attention; as I think they are peculiarly calculated to show how decided and cordial was the concurrence, upon the main points of this fundamental doctrine, even of those who differed widely upon some points of minor importance directly connected with it, and very widely upon some collateral questions. The first is taken from the proceedings of the Altenburg Conference, held 1568—1569, between the Divines of the Elector of Saxony, and those of the Duke of Saxe Weimar, to arrange some differences connected with this doctrine, which belong to a class that I have upon system avoided in these Sermons and Notes. They were of a kind, however, which, though they admitted a good deal of subtilty and trifling, led naturally to explicit statements of the views of the conferring divines upon the most important questions, and to very full discussions of them. The

following are among the positions laid down by one side, and admitted by the other as not controverted:—

Passione et obedientia ipsius [Christi] pro nobis esse satisfactum. Impletionem legis per Christum nostra vice præstitam, fieri et esse nostram fide. Justiciam qua peccatores fide coram Deo justificantur esse obedientiam Christi pro nobis exhibitam. Justicia imputata nos coram Deo justos et acceptos et reconciliatos esse. Fidem esse organon quo Justiciam Christi apprehendimus, esseque donum Dei quod per vocem evangelii datur. Gratis ex sua misericordia, et dilectione Dei, imputari justiciam credentibus. Donari ei qui sic justificatur Spiritum Sanctum qui novitatem inchoat in hac vita, quæ perficietur in altera vita.

It is true that these Articles are stated by the divines of the Duchy, whom Bellarmin calls *Lutherani rigidi*: but they are assented to, thus warmly, by those of the Electorate (Bellarmin's *Lutherani molles*): “Has formas recipimus et nos cum collocutoribus, et sic nos docentes sentire testamur; semperque ita nos docuisse ac sensisse libri testantur in corpore doctrinæ comprehensi, quos ut normam nos sequi sæpe affirmavimus.” *Epilogs* iii. *Collationis Electoral. Theolog.*

The other quotation which I shall give is from the *Disputationes Privatae* of Arminius: it will show no less clearly how little the widest differences upon points of doctrine, which latter discussions have forced into an artificial connexion with this doctrine of Justification, affected the concurrence of the earlier Protestant divines upon this emphatically Protestant principle.

Thesis 48. *De Justificatione.*

II. Justificatio est actio Dei Judicis justa et gratiosa, qua de throno gratiæ et misericordiæ hominem peccatorem sed fidelem, propter Christum, Christique obedientiam et justitiam, a peccatis absolvit, et justum censet, ad justificati salutem, et justitiæ gratiæque divinæ gloriam.

III. Actionem Dei Judicis esse dicimus, qui licet ut supremus legislator de lege sua dispensare potuerit et reipsa dispensaverit, tamen non ex absoluta infinitæ potestatis plenitudine dispensationem administravit, verum inter justitiæ limites sese continuit, quam duplici modo demonstravit. Primo, quod non nisi præeunte reconciliatione et satisfactione per Christum in sanguine ejus peracta; secundo, quod non nisi peccata sua agnoscentes et in Christum credentes, justificare voluit.

IV. Gratosam et misericordem actionem dicimus non respectu Christi, ac si Pater ex gratia contra strictam et rigidam justitiam distincta Christi obedientiam acceptasset pro justitia, sed nostri respectu, tum quia Deus ex gratiosa misericordia erga nos Christum pro nobis peccatum, et nobis justitiam fecit, ut nos essemus Dei justitia in illo; tum quia in fide Evangelii communionem Christi, illumque per fidem propitiatorem posuit.

VI. Objectum justificationis est homo peccator, talem se cum dolore agnoscens, et fidelis, credens nempe in Deum qui justifieat impium, et in Christum traditum propter peccata nostra, et resuscitatum propter justificationem nostri. Qua peccator justificatione ex gratia indiget, qua [quam] fidelis justificationem ex gratia obtinet.

VII. Fides est causa vel actio instrumentalis qua Christum nobis in propitiationem et justitiam a Deo propositum apprehendimus, juxta præscriptum et promissum evangelii, quo dicitur *qui crediderit justificabitur et servabitur; qui non crediderit condemnabitur.*

VIII. Forma est ipsa gratiosa æstimatio Dei, qua Christi justitiam nobis imputat, hoc est, peccata nostra nobis fidelibus, propter Christum fide apprehensum, remittit justosque in illo censet; quæ æstimatio junctam habet adoptionem in filios et collationem juris in hæreditatem vitæ æternæ.

The omitted and remaining Articles relate to less contested or less important points; or are included in the foregoing: and, to the whole three Corollaries are appended; the first of which is, *Fidem et opera ad justificationem concurrere est impossibile.* It is right to add his account of evangelical Faith.

Thesis 44. *De Fide in Deum et Christum.*

III. Fides Evangelica est adsensus animi a Spiritu Sancto per Evangelium in peccatoribus, et peccata per legem agnoscen-
tibus, deque iisdem pœnitentibus productus, quo tum certo sibi persuasum habent, Jesum Christum a Deo constitutum esse auctorem salutis obtemperantibus ipsi, et suum quoque si in ipsum crediderint, *tum in illum tanquam talem credunt, et per eum in Deum tanquam Patrem benecolum in ipso ad salutem credentium et gloriam Christi et Dei.*

This is not so expressed as to remove all doubt about his views upon the point: but, as he makes a *belief in Christ* as our Saviour an essential part of *evangelical faith*, and also describes

this as founded upon a belief that Christ is the author of salvation *to all who obey Him*, this would seem to infer that a part of the work of the Spirit upon the heart, producing *faith* there, is the establishing a full confidence that we shall be enabled by the Lord to render to Him all the obedience which He requires of His followers; and, if this be his meaning, his account of the principle does not perhaps differ so much in substance as in form from the more simple statements of the earlier Reformers. That in his view of the state of mind of a Believer it includes this confidence would appear from his account of a believer in Art. VI. Thes. 48, quoted above; but it would appear also that he does not conceive it to be a part of evangelical faith from Art. V. of this 44th Thesis, in which he makes knowledge the antecedent of faith, and confidence its consequence:—"Fiducia autem consequens: per fidem enim fiducia collocatur in Christum et per eum in Deum." But in a letter to Uytendogaert (*Præstantium ac erudit. Virorum Epistolæ*. Ep. 70) he declares more distinctly the necessity of their connexion, and their close conjunction in point of time. "Fieri autem nequit ut fides vera, qualem Deus in se postulat, non producat ex se illam fiduciam, et quidem *eo ipso momento* quo primum Deum talem concepit; hæc enim est nativa inter intellectum istum affectivum, et hunc affectum qui fiducia dicitur, relatio."

This leaves a difference with the earlier Protestant Divines concerning the principle; but it shows that there was none concerning the character justified, and the state of mind of all who are justified: and though I think, that, so far as Arminius differed here from the older authorities, he was in a real, and by no means an unimportant error; yet it is manifest how much the practical importance of the error is lessened by the extent of his agreement with them about the character and state of mind of a believer. This agreement appears sufficiently by what I have already quoted: but I add a striking passage, bearing upon the same point, from his *Oratio de Certitudine Sacrosanctæ Theologie*. After saying that the certainty of faith which God requires for His word is not satisfied either by *implicit* or *historical* faith, he continues:—"Sed postulat Deus *verbo* suo illam haberi fidem, qua sensus illo enunciati, quantum quidem ad salutem hominum et gloriam Dei est necesse, intelligantur, atque ita divini esse certo cognoscantur, ut non modo veritatem summam

sed etiam summum bonum hominis complecti credantur: quæ fides non tantum credat *Deum* et *Christum* esse; neque tantum *Deo* credat et *Christo* aliquid enuntiantibus: sed in *Deum* et *Christum* credat talia de se affirmantes, quæ fide adprehensa faciunt ut in *Deum* tanquam *Patrem* et in *Christum* tanquam *Salvatorem* credatur: quod non theoretici modo, sed et practici intellectus munus esse arbitramur. Qua de causa fidei veræ et vivæ non modo ἀσφάλεια in Scripturis tribuitur, sed et πληροφορία et πεποιθήσις. Atque istiusmodi *certitudinis* et fidei postulator et exactor est Deus.

Copious as these references have been, I must give in addition a few from our own writers. To the proof given in Sermon IV., page 116, of the declared principles of the Church of England, and the confirmation of it in the following Sermon (p. 138-140), I have no wish to add anything; but I shall subjoin some evidence of the views of the most eminent of her early divines; beginning as before, with the excellent Tyndall.

A Pathway into the Holy Scripture.

By faith are we saved, onely in belevyng the promises. And though fayth be never without love and good workes, yet is our saving imputed neither to love, nor unto good workes, but unto faith onely.

Parable of the wicked Mammon.

That fayth onely, before all workes, and without all merites, but Christe's only, justifieth and setteth us at peace with God, is proved by Paul in the first chapter to the Romans. [And after alleging and explaining the most important texts connected with the doctrine, he says] And of such like ensamples are all the Epistles of Paul full. Marke how Paule laboureth with him selfe to expresse the exceedyng misteryes of fayth in the epistle to the Ephesians, and in the Epistle to the Colossians. Of these and many such like textes, are we sure that the forgiveness of sinnes, and justifying is appropriate unto fayth onely without the addyng to of workes.

CRANMER. *Catechismus. General Preface.*

Wherefore, good children, it is necessarie for you to learne the doctrine of faith, for without it we can not be justified, or brought agayn into God's favour. For no man is just or righteous

before God, that hath not the Holy Gost, and he that will receyve the Holy Gooste, muste beleve in Christe (for by faith we receyve the Holy Gooste,) therefore, by faith we be iustified. Agayne, yf we wyll be saved we must knowe God and our Lord Jesus Christe, as it is wrytten John the xvii. But we can not knowe God and hys sonne Jesus Christ, but by fayth, therefore fayth iustificeth vs, and bringeth lyfe euerlastyng.

The Lord's Prayer. The seconde Petition.

For fyrste by faythe we be iustified before God (for fayth maketh vs partakers of the iustice of Christ, and planteth us in Christe) and he that by true faythe doth receive the promise of grace, to hym God gyueth the Holye Ghoste, by whome charitie is spred abrode in our hertes, whiche performethe all the commandementes. Therefore, he that beleveth in Christ, and truly beleveth the gospel, he is just and holy before God, by the iustice of Christe, whiche is imputed and gyven unto him, as Paul saith, Romans iii. We thynke that man is iustified by faith without workes. He is also just before the world, because of the loue and charitie which the Holy Ghost worketh in his herte.

Secondly, faith worketh peace and quietnes in oure heartes and consciences. For by faith we be certified that our synnes be forgyuen. Therefore, saythe Sayncte Paule to the Romanes: Beyng iustified, we haue peace and quietnesse wyth God, by oure Lorde Jesus Christe.

Thirdely, this peace bryngethe vnto vs a great and synguler ioy in our hertes and consciences, and maketh vs, for this exceeding benefite of God's mercy and grace towarde vs, feruently to loue hym, gladly to laude and prayse him, to honoure hys name, and to professe the same before all the worlde euermore, to gyue vnto hym moste herty thankes, and to be swift and redye to do all things that maye please God, and to eschewe those things that maye displease hym.

BECON. *The Christian Knight.*

In myself I am a sinner; but in Christ, my righteous Maker, I am righteous. For he hath forgiven me all my sins, and hath taken me into his grace, favour, and tuition. He is always ready to help me; he forgiveth me the remnants of my sins, and purgeth them in me daily, till he maketh me altogether new . . . Behold, therefore, [Satan] that thy accusation which thou attemptest against me, cannot have place in me. For, although I fulfil not

the commandments of God in the law with mine own works, yet I fulfil them in the gospel with the most perfect works, and the satisfaction of Christ, in whom I believe. This faith is reckoned to me unto righteousness, although my works of themselves be imperfect. And this is the only and true manner of fulfilling the law of God, that I believe in Christ, the only fulfiller of the law and justifier, without whom the law can never be fulfilled. All these things can I prove by the word of God, &c.

Therefore, it is all one whether we say faith justifies without works—as Paul saith, “God saves us through his mercy, and not for our works”—and as Peter saith, “We believe to obtain health through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ”—or if we say with the ancient Catholic doctors, Faith alone justifieth or saveth. For we mean none other things by those words than that our righteousness and everlasting salvation comes of the free and mere grace of God promised in Christ: that Christ hath deserved these so great benefits for us, and not we ourselves; that we can none otherwise than by faith lay hand on the mercy of God or on Christ.

And this is the Confession and Faith of all the Catholic church.

The demands of the Holy Scripture.

Who is just or righteous? He that hath faith; for through faith we are justified. To be justified is to have our sins not imputed unto us, but to have them forgiven in Christ and for Christ. Even as David saith, Blessed are they, &c. Now, because the faithful man alone receives and enjoys this mercy, forgiveness, and this not imputing of sin through faith, therefore, he is called just; and we, through faith, are said to be justified.

See further, *The Sufferings of Christ*, p. 469. *The Office of the Holy Ghost*, p. 487, in the valuable collection of Becon's writings, published by the Tract Society.

HOOPER. *Declaration of Christ* (from the edition of the Tract Society) Chap. VII. of *Justification*.

Paul declares that for the death and merits of Christ we are saved, and not by our own virtues. So that faith not only shows us that Christ died, and now sitteth at the right hand of God; but also applies the merits of this death unto us, and makes Christ ours. Faith lays nothing to gage unto the justice of God, but the death of Christ, and thereupon claims mercy and God's promise.

the remission of sin, and desires God to justify and deliver the soul from the accusation of the law, and the right of the devil, which he is bound to do for his promise' sake.

And mark this manner of speech: "We are justified by faith;" that is, "we are just through the confidence of mercy." This word, faith, comprehends as well a persuasion and confidence, that the promise of God appertains to us for Christ's sake, as the knowledge of God. For faith, though it desires the company of contrition and sorrow for sin, yet it contends not in judgment upon the merits of any works, but only for the merits of Christ's death. In case it did, it avails nothing, &c. . . . We must, therefore, only trust to the merits of Christ, which satisfied the extreme jot and uttermost point of the law for us. And he imputes and communicates this his justice and perfection to us by faith. . .

This example of Nicodemus declares that neither the works that go before justification, neither those that follow justification, deserve remission of sin. Though sole faith excludes not other virtues from being present at the conversion of every sinner, yet sole and only faith excludes the merits of other virtues, and obtains solely remission of sin, for Christ's sake, herself alone.

Confession of Christian Faith.

Art. XIV. I believe and confess Jesus Christ to be the fullness, the end, and accomplishment of the law, to the justification of all that believe, through whom, and by whom only, all the promises of the Father are accomplished, yea, even to the uttermost. Who also alone hath perfectly satisfied the law in that which no other amongst men could perform; as the law doth command things impossible, which, nevertheless, man must accomplish, not by working, but through believing: for so is the law accomplished, through faith, and not through works; and by this means shall men find the righteousness of faith to be available before the Lord, and not the righteousness of works, which leadeth nothing unto perfection.

JEWEL. *Defence of the Apologie of the Church of Englande.*

Two other great quarrelles M. Hardinge moveth; the one of onely Faith; the other, as he calleth it, of the presumptuous certaintie of salvation. Wherein judge thou uprightly, good Christian reader, howe juste cause he hath to reprove our doctrine. As for the firste hereof, St Paule saith, *Justificamur gratis ex gratia ipsius. Wee be justified freely of his grace: wee judge that a man*

is justified by Faith without the woorkes of the lawe: wee knowe that a man is not justified by the woorkes of the law, but by the faith of Christe. M. Hardinge will saie, yet hitherto of *sola fides*—that is, of *only faith*, we hear nothinge. Notwithstanding, when St Paule excludeth al manner woorkes bisides onely faith, what els then leaveth he but faith alone?

With this I shall end my extracts from the writings of British divines, though I could very easily add to these express testimonies, both from the writers referred to, and others of the same period, and carry them down to a later date. Indeed, my own acquaintance with the eminent divines of the Church of England, so far as it extends, fully corroborates the strong assertion of one who had a much larger and more exact knowledge of them—that, up to the year 1640, they were entirely agreed upon all the important parts of this fundamental doctrine. See Bp. Barlow's *Letters on Justification*: reprinted, 1828, pp. 86, 110. I cannot refer to this excellent little work without expressing my sense of the obligation which its republication has conferred upon all students in divinity. Its general scholastic form may probably repel other readers, but rather favours the closeness of reasoning for which the letters are remarkable, and therefore is an additional recommendation to the class of whom I have spoken. I do not agree in every point with the Bishop. I should not wish, indeed, to be understood to profess a perfect accordance upon all points with any even of the writers whom I have quoted oftenest, and most commended. But I agree with him, as I do with them, upon all points of real importance connected with this doctrine; and I consider his work of the highest value, for distinct statements of this great truth, and clear and close reasoning in support of it.

NOTE R. PAGE 95.

On the title 'The Homily of Justification.'

The Article *Of the Justification of Man* sends us to one of the Homilies for a larger and fuller expression of what it has itself laid down concerning that great doctrine. The Homily is referred to compendiously as *The Homily of Justification*, but it nowhere appears in the volume under that name. Its full title is: *A Sermon of the Salvation of Mankind, by only Christ our Saviour, from Sin and Death Everlasting*; while in the table of contents it is stated, *Of the Salvation of all Mankind*; and the running title at the top of the page is *Sermon of the Salvation of Mankind*. Most of my readers are probably aware of this discrepancy, but I should suppose that few of them have attached any importance to it. It has not always, however, been regarded as of trivial moment. In the course of a controversy on the authority of the Homilies, which was carried on in Ireland more than thirty years ago, the fact was put forward as having a very serious bearing on the question. The controversy engaged some of the most eminent persons in the Irish branch of the Church at the time*, and led to a very full discussion of some most important points. I am only concerned here, however, with the particular one just referred to,—of the difference between the title of the Homily in question, as given in the Article and in the Book of Homilies.

And I think the best mode of noticing the point will be by quoting what is said with reference to it in a review of the controversy which appeared in the 'Dublin Christian Examiner,' a religious periodical of that day, which has survived to our own time, and is still carried on under the same title, though in a different form. The following extract is from Vol. iv. pp. 453—456 :—

"What we have said and quoted might serve as an answer to Mr Knox, as he adopts in substance the views of the Bishop of Limerick. However, since it is with some difference, and sup-

* Bishop Jebb, the Rev. Dr Elrington, Mr Alexander Knox (see Note X.), and the Rev. Richard Graves were among the controversialists.

ported by different arguments, we must, according to our system, notice him distinctly. His statement of the amount of the obligation incurred by subscription to the Eleventh Article is so curious that it must be given in his own words :—

“ And here, I assuredly think, a matter of attention is fairly presented to every theological reader. Nor can it be deemed excusable in any one who subscribes the Thirty-nine Articles to remain ignorant of a document to which his notice is called by such venerable authority. But more than this cannot be reasonably inferred.

“ But even in this very reference something, perhaps, will be found which may be thought to give it the character of a prudential recommendation, rather than of an authoritative injunction.’
—*Knox*, pp. 10, 11.

“ It would appear from this—and we assure the respectable author, if we are misstating his meaning, it is from a *bond fide* misconception of it—that every subscriber to the Articles incurs, by the Eleventh, the obligation of reading and acquainting himself with the Homily of Justification, and nothing more. This would seem light enough; but the following paragraph shows that even this needs some abatement, and that we are still more leniently dealt with by our indulgent mother. At first view it would appear that the Church says, *Read the Homily of Justification*: but upon closer examination it is found that she does not say so much, but at most—I think you had better read the Homily of Justification; but you need not, unless you choose.

“ It is hard to believe this to be the view of any sensible writer, and yet Mr Knox’s language seems so plain as scarcely to allow us to doubt that we understand him: certain it is, that it would require very solid arguments indeed to establish such a view. In fact, it seldom falls to our lot to meet with an argument which we should not find it less difficult to presume fallacious (even if we were unable to find any fallacy in it), than to believe that our Church deviated from the grave and imperative tone which she maintains in her Articles, into such a trifling and purposeless parley as the foregoing.

“ But let us see the reasoning upon which this rests :—

“ It is a well-known fact that there is literally no such Homily as that referred to in the Eleventh Article. The Homily supposed to be meant is that of the Salvation of Mankind. But

it is natural to ask, Why should it not have been named by its proper title? The history of the case seems to furnish a probable explanation. The Eleventh Article, as it now stands, was modified by Queen Elizabeth's divines, from the former Article in King Edward's reign on the same subject. It was evidently an object to make no unnecessary changes; and yet this Article, "*Of Justification by Faith*," was not a little altered. A statement of the doctrine was briefly but comprehensively given; whereas, in the former Article, there was no doctrinal proposition, but all was to be learned from "*The Homily of Justification*." The new form of the Article, as actually propounding the doctrine, made the reference to the Homily no longer indispensable. But, probably, it was considered that to omit the mention of the Homily entirely might be misunderstood, and that the respectability of a necessary means of present public instruction might be thereby diminished. From this motive, as it would seem, the reference to the Homily was in a certain degree retained; but, manifestly, without consulting any other document than the former Article. This is evident from the continuance of Cranmer's misnomer; for had there been a recurrence to the Homily itself, the error would have been detected, and the attention to correctness of expression, which those divines everywhere else evince, would have been observed in this instance also.

"I mean no charge of negligence against those learned and sagacious men. Their works bear testimony to their wisdom, and in no one particular more than in the new form they gave to the Article now adverted to. Concise as the doctrinal part of it is, it bears evident marks of deep consideration; but it is no less clear that they referred to the Homily without having the Homily itself before them. That they ran no risk of doctrinal error, by such a qualified reference, from general recollection without direct inspection, they must themselves have felt, and there is no just ground to dispute; but that they intended to attach any great importance to a document thus referred to it is not easy to believe. It would seem rather a matter of almost moral certainty that such a reference, had it then remained to be made, would not have been made at all.'—*Knox*, pp. 11, 12, 13.

"It may arise from some unhappiness in the constitution of our minds, but certain it is, that what brings Mr Knox thus to moral certainty seems to us but a tissue of gratuitous and, we

may add, eminently improbable assumptions, which lead us to nothing beyond some speculations (of no great value) upon the unprofitable skill employed in the fabrication of it. We shall not give these to Mr Knox, or our other readers: but we shall present both with a specimen of the inconveniences which flow from this piece of reasoning, desiring them very earnestly to consider it closely.

• If we would ask, the appearance of the misnomer which Mr Knox notices in our Thirty-fifth Article prove it to have been written without a recurrence to the Homily, does not the same misnomer occurring in Edward's corresponding Article prove that it, too, was written in the same way,—that the writers had not, at the time of writing, the Homily before them? And again, if a carelessness about the document misnamed be fairly inferred in the one case, from this mode of writing about it, may not similar indifference concerning it be inferred in the latter case also, in which it is equally evident that the same mode of writing about it was adopted? And finally, if we be released from much concern about this Homily by the indifference to it thus exhibited by the framers of our Articles, were not the ministers in Edward's time in like manner left at liberty by the indifference concerning it, which was equally apparent in the divines who composed his Articles? Unless we flatter ourselves strangely, this is a chain composed of rather stronger materials than Mr Knox's; and yet to what an inconvenient conclusion does it conduct us! And to what further difficulties does it lead! Bishop Jebb is of opinion (in which he has, we believe, the support of universally concurrent tradition) that Crammer was the author of this Homily, and he certainly was a very influential member of the conclave by which Edward's Articles were framed. Is it not strange that he should have forgotten the name of his own Homily? Again, following up Mr Knox's principles, we have found in this Article evidence of the writer's indifference to this Homily. Bishop Jebb, following out his own principles (page 7), finds in the same Article traces of the writer's *fatherly partiality* for it! Is not this a disagreeable collision? Had principles of interpretation of so refined a kind been matured in Edward's time, the result might have been a curious one. For as to many, undue partiality for the Homily in the writers of the Articles would seem about as good a reason for disregarding their approbation as indifference

concerning it; dissenters from the doctrine of the Homily might quiet themselves in either of two ways—either by deriving from the Article the partiality or the indifference of the writers towards it—either of which, it seems, it will equally yield, merely by a change in the alembic!

“But, we may be asked, how do we dispose of the difficulty? If we might say so without being regarded as deficient in respect towards the ingenious person who has made it a matter of such importance, we should reply that we do not consider it a difficulty at all, but a thing of the most ordinary occurrence. The name—the Homily of (or concerning) Justification—seems naturally given to the Homily in question from its chief subject; and either the fitness of the title recommended it to common use, and the writers in Edward’s time, finding it current, continued the use of approving of it—or they, for the first time, bestowed it upon the Homily. It is quite impossible, at least we have no means to determine which of these suppositions is the true one; they seem both about equally probable: but either is, we fear not to say, infinitely more so than the hypothesis which makes the writer of the Homily forget its name. In whichever way it came to be used by the first Reformers, it is plain that its fitness, and their use of it, would probably combine to render it general. So that it can hardly be thought strange that the Reformers in Elizabeth’s time should have adopted a title probably in general use, and certainly an exceedingly proper one; and, moreover, one already employed upon a similar occasion by the person by whom the Homily was written. This is, as we said, a thing of almost everyday occurrence. Indeed, we are sure that it will be thought a puerile course to produce any proofs how usual it is, not only that a document should acquire a name from its chief subject, and that this name should supersede its more regular title in common use; but that the same should take place on the most solemn occasions, and in the most exact and technical proceedings. Nevertheless, as the following instance is so pertinent, we cannot deny it a little space:—

“One of the charges against Sacheverell was, that he had maintained ‘that the *toleration* granted by law is unreasonable, and the allowance of it unwarrantable.’ To which charge, *advised*, we presume, *by his learned counsel in the laws of this land* *sergeant*, he ingeniously replies, ‘that upon the most diligent inquiry, he

hath not been able to inform himself that a toleration hath been granted by law; but admits that an Act did pass in the first year of King William and Queen Mary, entitled, an Act *for exempting their Majesties' Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the penalties of certain laws,* &c. This ingenuity meets with but little indulgence from the managers for the Commons.

“*Sir Peter King.*—Indeed it is almost difficult to be serious in giving a reply to that part of his answer, that he cannot inform himself that a *toleration* hath been granted by law.

“’Tis true, the word *toleration* is not mentioned in the Act, neither is the word *indulgence* to be found in that law; but everybody knows that the exemption granted in the Act is commonly called the *toleration*, and the Act itself the *Toleration Act*..... It [toleration] is now become a word of art, that not only in common conversation, but even in the most public acts of state, the exemption granted by the Act is called the *Toleration*: did not her Majesty, in her speech to both Houses of Parliament from the throne, declare that she would always inviolably maintain the *Toleration*? In the free conference between the Lords and Commons about the bill for preventing occasional conformity, in the year 1702, is not this Act of I. William and Mary called the Act of Toleration?”

“*Lord William Paulett.*—‘It is well known that the Act of Parliament he alludes to is everywhere, not only in courts of justice, but even in Parliament, called the Toleration Act *.’”

* “*Sacheverell's Trial*, p. 77. At p. 204 of the same volume is given an attested copy from the Cottonian Library, of Queen Elizabeth's well-known letter for suppressing the exercise called ‘Prophecyeing.’ One of her directions for this purpose is intended to enforce the reading of the Homilies. And if any of the ‘Busshopps’ to whom it is addressed, finding the book curiously styled in this document ‘the publique Homelines’ for such and so gross, we grieve to say, is the caecography of that ‘bright *Occidental Star*’ were to have concluded, as he fairly might, that she must have written without looking at the title-page of the volume, and to have inferred from this her indifference concerning it, and finally collected therefrom his own liberty to slight her injunctions; he would, we doubt not, have had but little reason to felicitate himself on the ingenuity to which he owed this well-linked chain.”

NOTE S. PAGE 99.

True Connexion of Faith with Justification.

There was no point connected with this doctrine upon which the Reformers were more anxious to be explicit than the one insisted on here: that it is not as *one* of our virtues or good qualities, taken as the substitute for all; or as the one which is the source and spring of all the rest, that *faith* justifies us. “Neque intelligi (says Luther) neque defendi potest hæc sententia, *Quod sola fides justificat*, si quis imaginatur ideo fide homines justificari quia fides in nobis sit novitas quædam seu nova qualitas.” And, in the Augsburg Confession, 1540: “Cum igitur dicimus *fide justificamur*, non hoc intelligimus, quod justi simus propter ipsius virtutis dignitatem. Sed hæc est sententia, consequi nos remissionem peccatorum et imputationem justitiæ per misericordiam propter Christum.” The same point is most laboriously pressed in our own Homilies: “So that the true understanding of this doctrine—we be justified freely by faith without works, or that we be justified by faith in Christ only—is not that this, our own act, to believe in Christ, or this our faith in Christ, which is within us, doth justify us, and deserve our justification unto us—for that were to count ourselves justified by some act or virtue that is within ourselves—but the true understanding and meaning thereof is, that, although we hear God’s word and believe it; although we have faith, hope, charity, repentance, dread and fear of God within us, and do never so many good works thereunto; yet we must renounce the merit of all our said virtues of faith, hope, charity, and all our other virtues and good deeds, which we either have done, shall do, or can do, as things that be far too weak, and insufficient, and imperfect, to deserve remission of our sins, and our justification. And therefore we must trust only in God’s mercy,” &c.—*Sermon of Salvation*, Part 2. And other equally express declarations to the same effect, both from public documents and eminent divines, could be very easily added. Nor can any one, indeed, understand the doctrine without perceiving the vital importance of the position which they so carefully lay down, in explanation of it.

But it would seem still less easy to mistake these sound and necessary explanations of the true instrumentality of faith in man's justification, for declarations that it has none. Bishop Bull, however, having quoted several such passages from our Homilies, and the Confessions of other Protestant Churches, adds :

Ex his autem testimoniis sole meridiano clarius est, quam perperam omnino veterum Protestantium doctrinam de justificatione ex sola fide, acceperint plerique sequioris ævi Protestantes, qui eos fidei præ ceteris virtutibus proprie dictam instrumentalitatem in negotio justificationis, tribuisse existimarunt. Merum hoc somnium est. Nam ex ipsorum doctrina jam fusius a nobis explicata, liquido liquet, nihil illos proprie dictæ efficaciæ adeoque nec instrumentalitatis fidei præ ceteris virtutibus adscripsisse: sed id tantum voluisse, fidem ex omnibus virtutibus unam respectum commutare ad gratuitam Dei misericordiam, per Christum promissam, quæ primaria justificationis nostræ causa est, ideoque figurata quidem, sed non incommoda locutione dici posse, nos sola fide justificari.

This certainly contains some truth; but no reader who has gone through the testimonies with which these notes have supplied him, can be at a loss to see how greatly it misrepresents the views of the Reformers which it professes to explain. To make out, indeed, that their declaration, *that we are justified by faith only*, expresses merely what *faith does not do* in the matter of our justification, and that it conveys nothing about what *faith actually does*, or, rather, conveys that it *does nothing*, is a mode of interpretation which it would be very hard to vindicate to the satisfaction of unprejudiced men. The true statement, as must be sufficiently apparent from all that I have cited from these writers, is, that having asserted so expressly that *we are justified by faith only*, they are naturally solicitous to guard against the mistake—that this justification is effected by *faith*, received by God in the way of compromise, a part, instead of all, that His law requires—or by *faith*, as the principal virtue, the spring and source of all the rest—or in any way which ascribes any meritorious efficacy of any kind to *faith*. They explain distinctly that this faith is *trust in another*; that it not only *is not trust in ourselves*, but that it includes a renunciation of *all trust in ourselves, or in any thing in ourselves*; and that, in the things thus renounced, of course *faith is itself included*. Faith is not only the

state of mind which becomes a sinner to whom the revelation of mercy is made in the Gospel, but it is required and commanded by God. It is evidently, therefore, an act of obedience itself; and the Reformers also declare and show that it is the source of all Christian obedience; and so it might easily become a ground of dependence before God, like any other of our virtues or good qualities: nay, from its appointed instrumentality in our justification and in our sanctification, we are more peculiarly liable to be thus misled with respect to it than with respect to any other. So that, when this instrumentality has been so distinctly declared, the caution seems obviously to be required, that *trust in our faith*, under this view of its nature, is no more *justifying faith* than trust in our works, or our holiness, or our repentance, or any thing else wrought by us, or appertaining to us; that, on the contrary, such trust is opposed to justifying faith, and subversive of it; and that the faith by means of which we are justified is *trust in Christ, and in His work*.

When they join faith then with the other virtues, as not less to be excluded from our grounds of dependence before God, they do indeed assert that it has, *in this way*, no more and no other efficacy than the rest, that is to say, none whatever. But, is this asserting that it has *in no other way* a part to perform which the rest have not? It is so far from this, that it is intended to be a description of the real nature of that *faith*, by which *only* it has been previously asserted that *we are justified*. For, *faith* being *trust*, a statement in any particular case of what are and what are not the objects or grounds of trust, may be taken as the only account of the nature of the principle which can be needed. But, further, this instrumentality of faith is distinctly re-asserted—often in the course of these explanations, always by the writers who thus explain themselves,—so as to leave no doubt of the extent and design of the explanatory passages. I might refer to past quotations for evidence of this: but I will subjoin one or two new passages from the same sources.

Bishop Bull's great argument against the peculiar instrumentality of faith is, that in the sense in which other virtues are not instrumental (i. e. in any sense which ascribes merit to them) neither is *it* so: and that in the only sense in which it is instrumental (i. e. as a condition) so are all others. The point now is not how far the second position is *true* (the first is not questioned),

but how far it is the doctrine of the Protestant Churches and Divines. I have given, as I said, ample materials for the decision of this point: but I add the following passage from the Homilies: expecting that, with any fair man who reads it, it cannot fail to be conclusive as to the principles of our own Church. Having explained the cause and effects of the Lord's death, the Homily proceeds to point out the mode of applying it, *as a medicine to our wounds, so that it may work the same effect in us wherefore it was given, namely, the health and salvation of our souls.* "Almighty God commonly worketh by means; and in this thing he hath also ordained a certain mean whereby we may take fruit and profit to our soul's health. What mean is that? Forsooth, it is faith! Not an inconstant and wavering faith, but a sure, steadfast, grounded, and unfeigned faith..... By this, then, you may well perceive, that the *only mean and instrument of salvation required of our parts is faith*; that is to say, a sure trust and confidence in the mercies of God: whereby we persuade ourselves that God both hath and will forgive our sins; that he hath accepted us again into his favour; that he hath released us from the bonds of damnation, and received us again into the number of his elect people, not for our merits or deserts, but only and solely for the merits of Christ's death and passion; who became man, &c..... This faith is required at our hands. And this, if we keep steadfastly, there is no doubt but we shall obtain salvation at God's hands, as did Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; of whom the Scripture saith that they believed, and it was imputed unto them for righteousness. Was it imputed unto them only, and shall it not be imputed unto us also! Yes, if we have the same faith as they had, it shall as truly be imputed unto us for righteousness as it was unto them. For it is one faith which must save both us and them, even a sure and steadfast faith in Christ Jesus..... Therefore, I say unto you, that we must apprehend the merits of Christ's death and passion by faith; and that with a strong and steadfast faith, nothing doubting but that Christ, by his own oblation and once offering of himself upon the cross, hath taken away our sins, and hath restored us again into God's favour so fully and perfectly that no other sacrifice shall hereafter be requisite or needful in all the world.

"Thus have you heard, in few words, *the mean* whereby we must apply the fruits and merits of Christ's death unto us, so that

it may work the salvation of our souls—even a sure, steadfast, perfect, and grounded faith. For as all they which behold steadfastly the brazen serpent, were healed and delivered, at the very sight thereof, from their corporal diseases and bodily stings, even so all they which behold Christ crucified, with a true and lively faith, shall undoubtedly be delivered from the grievous wounds of the soul, be they never so deadly or many in number.

“Therefore, dearly beloved, if we chance at any time, through frailty of the flesh, to fall into sin—as it cannot be chosen but we must needs fall often—and if we feel the heavy burthen thereof to press our souls, tormenting us with the fear of death, hell, and damnation; let us, then, use *that mean which God hath appointed in his word, to wit, the mean of faith, which is the only instrument of salvation now left unto us.* Let us steadfastly behold Christ crucified with the eyes of our heart. Let us only trust to be saved by his death and passion, and to have our sins clean washed away through his most precious blood; that in the end of the world,” &c....*Sermon on the Passion, Part 2.*

Nothing need be added to this in proof of the views of our Church, concerning the reality and the nature of the office of *faith* in our *Justification*. As to the Continental Churches and Divines, the reader is desired to look at the passages from *the Apology for the Augsburg Confession* prefixed to Sermons IV. and VIII. Or this short extract from the Confession itself—“Cum igitur dicimus *Fide Justificamur*, non hoc intelligimus quod justi simus propter ipsius virtutis dignitatem. Sed hæc est sententia, consequi nos remissionem peccatorum et imputationem justitiæ per misericordiam propter Christum. Verum hæc misericordia non potest accipi nisi fide, et fides hic non tantum historie notitiam significat, sed significat credere promissioni misericordiae quæ nobis propter mediatorem Christum contingit.” *De Fide*.—And the Saxon Confession: “Itaque et correlative intelligenda est hæc oratio, *Fide Justificamur*, hoc est, fiducia Filii Dei justificamur, non propter nostram qualitatem, sed quia ipse est propitiator, in quo cor acquiescit, fiducia promissæ misericordiae propter eum. *De Rem. Pecc. et Just.*—And again in Art. IX. *Quomodo placeat nova obedientia*: “Primum statuatur renatus se reconciliatum esse Deo, sola fide, id est, fiducia mediatoris, et quanquam jam habitant in eo Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus juxta illud, *veniemus ad eum*, &c. tamen statuatur personam justam reputari propter Filium

Dei mediatorem et deprecatorem, gratis propter ipsius meritum." And Art. XVI. *De Penitentia*: "Sed qui credit sibi remitti peccata propter hunc mediatorem, jam certo accipit remissionem peccatorum propter Christum, qui efficax est in eo, et vivificat et sanctificat eum Spiritu suo sancto: et reconciliatus jam certo reputatur justus propter mediatorem, et est heres vite æternæ." In the Belgic Confession, Art. XXII. "Merito igitur jureque dicimus cum D. Paulo, *Nos sola fide justificari*, seu *fide absque operibus legis*. Ceterum proprie loquendo, nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem per se, seu ex se, nos justificare, ut quæ sit *duntaxat, veluti instrumentum, quo Christum justitiam nostram, apprehendimus*. Christus igitur ipse est nostra justitia, qui omnia sua nobis merita imputat, *fides vero est instrumentum, quo illi in societatem seu communionem omnium bonorum ipsius copulamur atque in ea retinemur*; adeo ut illa omnia nostra effecta, plus quam satis nobis sint ad nostri absolutionem a peccatis." And, finally, the Helvetic Confession, upon the same point testifies in the same way:—"Proprie ergo loquendo, Deus solus nos justificat, et duntaxat propter Christum justificat non imputans nobis peccata sed imputans ejus nobis justitiam. Quoniam vero nos justificationem hanc recipimus, non per ulla opera, sed per fidem in Dei misericordiam et Christum: ideo docemus et credimus cum Apostolo, hominem peccatorem justificari sola fide in Christum, non lege, aut ullis operibus. Dicit enim Apostolus. . . . Ergo quia fides Christum justitiam nostram recipit, et gratiæ Dei in Christo omnia tribuit, ideo fidei tribuitur justificatio, maxime propter Christum, et non ideo, quia nostrum opus est. Donum enim Dei est. Ceterum nos Christum fide recipere multis ostendit Dominus apud Joan. in Cap. vi. ubi pro credere ponit *manducare*, et pro *manducare*, *credere*. Nam sicut manducando cibum recipimus, ita credendo participamus Christo. Itaque Justificationis beneficium non partimur, partim gratiæ Dei vel Christo, partim nobis aut dilectioni, operibusve vel merito nostro, sed in solidum gratiæ Dei in Christo per fidem tribuimus. Sed et non possent Deo placere dilectio et opera nostra, si fierent ab injustis: proinde oportet nos prius justos esse quam diligamus, aut faciamus opera justa. Justi vere efficimur, quemadmodum diximus, per fidem in Christum, mera gratia Dei, qui peccata nobis non imputat, sed justitiam Christi, adeoque fidem in Christum ad justitiam nobis imputat."—*De vera Fidelium Justificatione.*

The reader who has gone through these extracts is in a better condition to determine whether any special instrumentality in the Justification of sinners is ascribed to *faith* by the Reformers, and what that instrumentality is, than when he had only Bishop Hall's account of their principles, though backed by an argument which the author warrants as *sole meridiano clarius*. Indeed, any one who reads carefully the foregoing extracts will not only be enabled to correct his misstatement, but will be in full possession of the Protestant doctrine of Justification. And as the point at issue is of such vital importance to that doctrine, I am tempted to add a few passages from two eminent divines, rather with the view of enlarging the explanations already given, than of adding to their authority. Thus *Luther*: "Quando igitur fide in verbum Dei edoctus, apprehendo Christum, et tota fiducia cordis (quod tamen sine voluntate fieri non potest), credo in eum, hac notitia justus sum. Sic fide seu hac notitia me justificato," &c.—*In Ep. ad Galat. Prefat.* And on Chap. 2: "Quare fides pure est docenda, quod scil. per eam sic conglutineris Christo, ut ex te et ipso fiat quasi una persona, non possit segregari sed perpetuo adherescat ei; ut cum fiducia dicere possis; ego sum Christus, hoc est, Christi justitia, victoria, vita, &c. est mea. Et vicissim Christus dicat, Ego sum ille peccator, hoc est, ejus peccata, mors, &c., sunt mea quia adhæret mihi, et ego illi; conjuncti enim sumus per fidem in unam carnem et os. Eph. v. &c." And on Genesis, Chap. xv. "Quomodo igitur acquisivit justitiam? Hoc solo modo, quod Deus loquitur et Abraham loquenti Deo credit. Accedit autem Spiritus Sanctus, testis fide dignus, et affirmat, hoc ipsum credere, seu hanc ipsam fidem esse justitiam, seu imputari ab ipso Deo pro justitia, et haberi pro justitia." *Melancthon* has already supplied (Note 14) equally distinct declarations of this special instrumentality of faith; and, in adding a few from him, I am chiefly anxious to choose them of moderate length:—"Estque semper hæc propositio correlative intelligenda, Fide sumus justificati, id est, fiducia misericordiæ propter Christum sumus accepti non propter nostras virtutes Ideo necesse est sic intelligi hoc dictum, Fide habemus remissionem, id est, hac fiducia quod propter Filium Dei recipiamur."—*Loci Theol.* "*Adseveramus igitur justificari hominem sine operibus legis.* Est ergo sententia propositionis, asseveramus hominem accipere remissionem peccatorum, reconciliationem, et imputationem justitiæ propter Filium Dei me-

diatorem per misericordiam gratis non propter legem, seu nostras virtutes, seu opera. Et hanc misericordiam accipi oportet fide." —*In Ep. ad Rom.* Cap. 3. His Theological Disputationes from 1523 to 1534 were originally published with a commendatory preface by Luther, and republished by himself, 1558. "2. Impossibilis est remissio peccatorum nisi fide in Christum, cum apprehendimus Christum mediatorem et opponimus eum iræ Dei. Hæc fides consolatur et erigit conscientias." "5. Igitur manifestum est quod sola fide justificamur, hoc est, ex injustis accepti efficiamur et regeneremur." "17. Promissio fide accipitur. Prius ergo fide justi sumus quia accipimus promissam reconciliationem, quam legem facimus." "24. Ideo nec postea reputamur justi coram Deo propter illam legis impletionem sed ideo quia fide habemus accessum per Christum." "33. Cum dicimus, *sola fide justificamur*, intelligi hoc debet non tantum quod fides initio accipiat remissionem peccatorum, et convertat, sed etiam quod deinceps sola fides reputatur a Deo pro justitia, tametsi impletio legis necessario sequetur, verum hæc impletio legis non est accepta coram Deo nisi propter Christum qui apprehenditur Fide." In his reply to the propositions of Malvendt in the Conference at Ratisbon, 1546: "Constat autem ex illis quæ hætenus disputavimus: solo Christi Jesu merito, sola Christi justitia, plene purgari fideles: nec ulla ratione alia vitam nobis restitui in primo parente nostro amissam, *nisi Christo qui solus vita est inseramur. Inscrinor autem ei per fidem* unde alibi legimus fide purificari corda nostra; et iterum, fide, non lege non ullis meritis aut operibus, sed fide justificari credentes."

I may, I think, stop here. Indeed, if I could hope that a reference to the quotations already given in preceding Notes would send my readers back to them, I need not have swelled this to such a size. But the point is one which has derived considerable importance from the unfair mode in which the argument has been managed upon the opposite side; so as to justify all the pains which are necessary for setting it right. The Reformers, as I have said, declare expressly, and in various forms, that *we are justified by faith only*, and they declare, too, that *faith sanctifies us*: such statements of the operation of faith require cautions lest it should be supposed that so much is ascribed to this principle in our justification on account of its proper worth, or of its effects upon our character. Such cautions are accordingly added.

and they necessarily are a good deal occupied in stating what faith does not do; and it is easy to see how, by enlarging upon this part of them, and neglecting the rest, a plausible case may be made for the position that the writers maintain, that faith has no instrumentality distinct from the other graces, and no office except such as it shares with the others. My readers have now the means of satisfying themselves how grossly this misstates the whole truth, even when the assertions are so framed as to contain a part of it.

Bishop Bull is sometimes very successful in producing a false impression in this way: besides, affected as his style is, its real spirit and point, his confident tone, and ostentation of the forms of exact reasoning, would account sufficiently for his great success with careless and prejudiced readers. But he is so pugnacious and discursive that he involves himself in many difficulties from which a quieter and closer writer would have escaped, and falls into some inconsistencies so glaring that no prepossession in his favour can lead his more discerning admirers to rely altogether upon him. And they, I think, judge wisely in being more disposed in general to trust their cause to Archbishop Laurence, by whom it seems on the whole more effectively, though less brilliantly, maintained. He is much less flippan, and noisy, and absolute, than Bull; makes fewer positive assertions, and constructs fewer syllogisms; lauds himself less strenuously, and vituperates his adversaries more mercifully. But, though he does not display his skill so studiously, or stop so often to admire it, his readers must, I think, feel that he possesses more real dexterity, as well as more temper and judgment. The Bishop stands *with his hair on end at his own wonders*; certifying every argument that he gives as *omni exceptione majus: luce clarius, or sole meridiano clarior*; and qualifying every one who hesitates as *talpâ cæcior*, or something worse. The Archbishop proceeds steadily, neither praising himself nor abusing his opponents; and, by quietly suggesting his own views, while he seems to allow others to speak for themselves; putting forward prominently undoubted and important parts of the true doctrine, while he keeps back the obnoxious parts altogether, or assigns them an obscure position, or assails them by assailing erroneous views with which he confounds them; he contrives, I think, to convey as low a view of the doctrine of justification, and as unfaithful a repre-

sentation of the Reformers' principles, as the Bishop; though he certainly does not lay himself open to so many direct contradictions, and throughout makes better provision against any brief objections to his statements.

I cannot, of course, attempt a detailed analysis either of Bull's work, or of the part of the Archbishop's with which I am concerned: but, as they are likely to be considered the principal writers on their side, and as they seem to be really the most effective, at least of those with whom I am acquainted, I have thought it right to notice occasionally in these Notes everything in either that appeared to me most likely to mislead: and I will now subjoin a word or two upon a fallacious mode of treating the question, which is common, in substance, to both of them, and which I think it may be an important safeguard to my readers to be made distinctly to understand.

The Archbishop takes very great pains to fix the attention of his readers upon the monstrous errors of the scholastic scheme of justification; and he then represents the doctrine of *justification by faith only*, not as the assertion of an important truth concerning the *mode of our justification*, so much as a form devised to combat and overthrow these errors concerning the *grounds of it*. "Never, therefore, should it be forgotten that when they spoke of justification by faith alone, they solely opposed the scholastical system so frequently alluded to, which attributed to our merits the expiation of crime, and a readmission into the favour of God; this, with an inflexibility not greater than the occasion demanded, they constantly laboured to annihilate, and to restore in its stead the plain doctrine of a perfect propitiation and satisfaction for sin, by the death of Christ," &c.—Bampton Lectures, Ser. vi. p. 140.

Bishop Bull has pursued the same course in his attempt to fix the doctrine of justification as delivered by St Paul. He states the errors of the different parties, both Jew and Gentile, with whom the Apostle had to deal; and thinks himself warranted in interpreting the Apostle's most explicit and direct statements of doctrine, as if they were less designed to convey saving truth than to overthrow these dangerous errors.

The effects of such representations, when they succeed, are manifest. They lead those who receive them to be satisfied with the *loosest* interpretation of the most exact and express state-

ments; and, in fact, not to look for the meaning of a writer in his own mode of expressing it, however precise, but, to take up contentedly with the most inadequate, forced, and vague explanations of his language, however ill they agree with what he says, or with each other, provided they make him contradict something which it is supposed he designed to contradict. I think it cannot be necessary to say anything to show how perverse and hazardous a mode this is in general of seeking for an author's sense, and how calculated it is to favour evasions or misrepresentations of his meaning. And, after all that I have said of the statements of this great truth, both in the Scriptures and in the writings of the Reformers, I hope I need not add much to show how peculiarly inapplicable the principle of interpretation is to them, and how certain it is to mislead us when applied to them.

It is true that St Paul, and those fearless maintainers of his doctrine to whom we owe so much, had to deal with errors of the kind described by Bull and Laurence; but it is no less certain that their chief mode of combating these errors is by distinct statements of the truth: and they manifestly feel that, altogether independently of this object, their highest and most important duty was the publication of the truth: and they discharge that duty by express and reiterated declarations of it in forms fitted to convey it to all—not merely to those infected with such errors—but to those who were as ignorant of these corruptions of the Gospel as of the Gospel itself. St Paul declares, as I have often shown, not only the true grounds of a sinner's justification, but the true mode of it; and the one as distinctly as the other. And I have given abundant proof, even in this Note, that the Reformers were solicitous to be as distinct in declaring the latter as the former. Indeed, as we have seen (p. 78), the Reformers who signed the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, declare *that it is not more essential to the truth to maintain the Lord's work as the sole meritorious ground of justification, than it is to maintain faith as the sole instrument or means of effecting it.* And, in fact, I do not think it is difficult to see that the latter cannot be let go, without soon losing hold of the other. But, at all events, it must be felt that the Scriptural provision against the error of exalting our works into meritorious grounds of justification, must be a more effectual safeguard than any declarations against it, however strong. If our works are not allowed to be *means* or

conditions of our justification: if we can perform no work that is good or acceptable in the sight of God until after we are justified; then there is no possibility (to those I mean who so believe) of regarding these works as in any respect, in whole or in part, the meritorious cause of our justification; of which they are not even made the instrumental cause, but the consequences and effects. This must be abundantly clear. And the Reformers, doubtless, perceived and prized this effect of the doctrine of *Justification by faith only*: but we have abundant reason to know that it was not upon any calculation of its results that they so strenuously asserted it, and rejected the opposite doctrine, but because they found it distinctly asserted in Scripture, and the other distinctly denied.

I must not, however, suffer myself to be led beyond my limited purpose in introducing the subject, which was to guard against this dangerous scheme of interpretation, by showing upon what false principles it is grounded; having elsewhere sufficiently shown how widely it has misled those who have employed it. Archbishop Laurence asserts, we have seen, that, in speaking of justification by faith alone, the Reformers *solely* opposed the scholastical system, which ascribed justification to human merits. The Apologists, when they undertake to prove that *we are justified by faith*, assert the proposition to be as necessary as the one which declares that *we are justified through Christ*,—*ubi primum monendi sunt lectores quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri quod Christus sit Mediator, ita necesse sit defendere quod fides justificet*. The Archbishop says (Lectures, p. 124) that the effective principle or meritorious cause of justification was the great point contested, and he does not tell us of any other. The Apologists assert that there was another point objected to in their Confession; and, as they have expressly informed us that they regarded the maintenance of it equally important, so they give us no intimation that their adversaries assailed it with less hostility: *Utrumque enim damnant, et quod negamus homines propter sua merita consequi remissionem peccatorum; et quod affirmamus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, et fide in Christum justificari*. This would seem to show that the Reformers' declarations of the doctrine of Justification by faith only were felt, both by those who made them, and those who opposed them, to contain something beyond the great truth, that *we are justified only for the merits of our blessed Lord*

And I add one reiteration of their views, not merely because it contains so strong a declaration of the instrumentality of faith, but because it distinctly states the doctrine as it is found in St Paul. Et ne putemus temere excidisse Paulo sententiam *quod fides justificat*, longa disputatione munit et confirmat eam in IV Rom. et deinde in omnibus Epistolis repetit.....Hic clare dicit fidem ipsam imputari ad justitiam. Fides est illa res quam Deus pronunciat esse justitiam: et addit gratis imputari, et negat posse gratis imputari si propter opera deberetur.

NOTE T. PAGE 111.

Origen.

Origen has abundance of errors to answer for on many points, and no lack of them upon this particular doctrine; but I have some reason to think that I have charged him with this one wrongfully. I mentioned his name upon the authority of Calvin, who, both in his Institutes, and in his Commentary, ascribes to him the invention of this strange exposition of the meaning of *law* in this passage of the Epistle to the Romans. Chemnitz makes the same charge, and I think I have seen it elsewhere. Calvin and Chemnitz must have had some grounds for the assertion. They probably, indeed, had very sufficient grounds for it. But certainly Origen's commentary upon the passage furnishes none. It contains some strange misrepresentations of the Apostle's meaning, but I have been unable to discover this particular one. He, on the contrary, lays down distinctly the reality and obligation of the law of nature, as forming a part of the Apostle's argument. He thinks that in his language the written law is *the law of Moses*, and that the law of nature is *the law of God*, distinctively; and that it is by means of this latter that the Apostle is able to bring in the whole world guilty before God. It is this law, he thinks, which is meant in vv. 19, 20, 21; except that in this last verse the law of Moses also appears in ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν; and he takes occasion thence to lay down a rule of interpretation which shows that he could not have understood the

ritual law to have been intended in v. 28: namely, *that when the law of Moses is meant, the word has the article; but that it is anarthrous when the law of nature is intended.* I did not feel it necessary to continue the examination any further. He commits, as I have said, some most extraordinary mistakes about the Apostle's meaning, but they are intermixed with some judicious remarks, and occasionally some sound doctrinal statements. Instead of dwelling on his errors, I will atone for my false charge against him (for such, so far as I am able to see now, it was) by giving one or two examples of the soundness which he at times exhibits; premising that his commentary is only preserved in the Latin translation of Rufinus. "Rom. iii. 27, 28. Dicit sufficere solius fidei justificationem ita ut credens quis tantummodo, justificatur, etiam si nihil ab eo operis fuerit expletum." He gives as an example the thief on the cross; and says, that no good work is set down to him in the gospel but this, that he cried to the Lord, "*et pro hac sola fide ait ei Jesus, Amen dico, etc.;*" and that here boasting was excluded plainly by the law of faith, and not by the law of works. "Per fidem enim justificatus est hic latro sine operibus legis; quia super hoc dominus non requisivit quid prius operatus esset, nec expectavit quid operis, cum credidisset, explet, sed sola confessione justificatum comitem sibi eum paradisu ingressurus assumpsit." He then refers to the story of the woman in Simon's house, Luke vii. 36—50; and, having spoken of the parable told by the Lord, adds, "Et ex nullo legis opere sed pro sola fide ait ad eam, *Remittantur tibi peccata tua, et iterum Fides tua te salvam fecit, eade in pace.*" The phrase *pro sola fide* may suggest to some that he is putting *faith* for the merits of the Saviour, but he had before laid down His office in the justification of sinners, and sometimes with great clearness. "Deus enim justus est, et justusificare non poterat injustos, ideo interventum voluit esse propitiatoris, ut per ejus fidem justificarentur qui per opera propria justificari non poterant."

It is much more pleasant to dwell upon such a man's sound statements of the truth than his corruptions of it; and it is comfortable to believe in his case, as well as in that of others, that the former represent his abiding feelings, and the latter his occasional notions. "Etsi autem interdum veteres Scriptores negligentius locuti sint, tamen non dubium est omnes conversos ad Deum testari hanc sententiam veram esse, quam multi didicerunt etiam in

sua conversione, quanquam in explicando alias magis, alias minus plane loquantur.”—*Melancthon. Responsio ad Bucerianum Articulus*, 1559.

NOTE U. PAGE 115.

Evasions of the Proof, furnished by Articles XI, XII, XIII, of our Church's Views of Justification.

The evasion noticed here in this Sermon is the one adopted by Burnet when he comes to Art. XII. He had, in his Commentary on Art. XI, endeavoured to prove that “by *faith only* is not to be meant faith as it is separated from the other evangelical graces and virtues [it is hardly necessary to point out the ambiguity of the word *separated*, and how it affects the truth of the statement. If by *separated* be meant *considered apart from all such graces, and to the exclusion of them all*, it, no doubt, *was* the sense in which *sola, only*, was annexed to faith in the Article. If it mean *existing in a mind in which no other grace or virtue exists*, the Reformers certainly did not mean this, but, on the contrary, unanimously denied that the principle ever did or could so exist], but faith, as it is opposite to the rites of the Mosaic dispensation.” That “our faith, which includes our hope, our love, our repentance, and our obedience, is the condition that makes us capable of receiving the benefits of this redemption and free grace.” And, amidst much shifting and confusion, he plainly labours very anxiously to establish this point: that *these Christian graces and this Christian obedience, are, together with our faith, and in the same way, conditions of our Justification*.

But when he comes to Art. XII, he finds that this obedience, which he has thus laboured to present as a part of the condition of our justification, is not only declared to be the fruit of our faith, but to follow after Justification*. And he then, with all

* This position of Art. XII. is but a repetition of the well-known dictum of Augustin—*Bona opera sequuntur justificatum non preecedunt justificandum*; which has given much annoyance to many of Burnet's way of thinking, who all desire, very naturally, to have Augustin on their side; and some of whom, indeed, not very reasonably, determine that he shall stand with them whether he consents or not. Bull's mode of getting over the difficulty is not an unfair specimen of

mirable coolness, turns about, and tells us that, provided obedience be allowed to be *necessary to salvation*, it is very little matter how, why, where, or when it comes in! And thus he quietly dismisses the direct contradiction which this Article gives to his representation of the doctrine of the preceding one; first, however, pretty severely condemning the framers of the Articles for setting about the determination of such a nicety: and, indeed, not obscurely intimating that he thinks that they have determined it erroneously; but that it is no great matter! “Whatever subtleties some may have set up, to separate the consideration of faith from a holy life *in the point of Justification* [the very subtlety of this Article, be it remembered]—yet none among us have denied that it was absolutely necessary to salvation; and so it be owned as necessary [see pp. 115—118, for the ambiguity of this word] it is a nice curiosity to examine whether it is of itself a condition

his style, at once imperious and evasive, under such embarrassments:—“Nimirum intelligendus est Augustinus non de operibus quibuscunque, sed de longa et jugi operatione; ut sensus ejus sit, pauciora ac minora esse opera quæ justificandum præcedunt, quam quæ justificatum sequuntur. Absque hoc grano salis axioma illud (adeo ab omnibus decantatum) a manifesta falsitate vix ac ne vix quidem purgari possit.”—Diss. Post. cap. iii. § 2. This is pretty well; but his editor, Grabe, furnishes even a better example of the sort of relief which will be hailed by a man in distress:—“Isti Augustini dicto cum clarissimam lucem afferant verba supra laudati et nunquam satis laudandi, Gulielmi Forbesii, in considerationibus suis pacificis de Justificatione, Lib. I. cap. 3. § 3, ea hic annotare opere pretium duxi. ‘Quod, inquit, ad nauseam usque ex Augustino de Fide et Operibus, cap. 14. repetunt *Bona opera sequi justificatum, non autem præcedere justificandum*, næ illi mentem Augustini nunquam sunt assequuti. Loquitur eo loci Augustinus de operibus justitiæ quæ percepta et professæ Fide (ut ipse ait, fidelibus deinde diligenter toto vitæ cursu præstanda sunt, seu de operibus illis quæ per justitiam habitualem, i. e. in ipsa justificatione infusam, inherentem et permanentem, efficiuntur, atque sic speciali quadam ratione dicuntur bona opera: non autem de iis, quæ per Spiritus Sancti gratiam assistentem et preparantem fiunt ante et ad justificationem peccatoris, &c.’” By which the reader will see that Augustin does not mean to tell us any thing of good works generally, but merely to inform us, that the good works which are wrought *by faith*, are not wrought by any man *before he has faith*; and that those good works which are wrought *by that righteousness which is infused into us at justification* are not wrought *until a man is justified*! One cannot say that this is very profound; but then it seems, in recompense, highly probable, if not absolutely certain. And if the illustrious father upon whom W. Forbes *supra* laudatus et nunquam satis laudandus has thrown such bright light, had always dealt in such apophthegms, the Christian world might have lost some important truth, but it certainly would also have escaped some angry controversy.

of justification, or if it is the certain distinction and constant effect of that faith which justifies. These are speculations of very little consequence, so long as the main point is still maintained, that Christ came to bring us to God, &c. . . . And, therefore, even when *the thread of men's speculations of these matters may be thought too fine, or in some points of them wrong drawn*; yet so long as the foundation is preserved, that every one who assumeth the name of Christ does depart from iniquity, so long the doctrine of Christ is preserved pure in this capital and fundamental point." Upon the XIIIth Article, as connected with the doctrine, he says nothing.

Bull's mode of dealing with this embarrassing Article is no less extraordinary. Having determined that to justification or remission of sins is necessarily required repentance, as an antecedent condition, without which none can obtain pardon of his sins from God, he settles, as we saw, that repentance comprehends *eleven works, all of which* are declared by God's Spirit to be absolutely necessary to the obtaining of pardon of sin. Har. Ap. Diss. I. Cap. 2. §§ 6, 7. To which notable piece of theology his learned editor, Grabe, thus emphatically sets his seal: "*Per bona opera, speciatim per actus pœnitentiæ, nos gratiam Dei, ac remissionem peccatorum impetrare, vir Reverendus pluribus sacrorum Scriptorum testimoniis solidissime probavit*:" while Bull himself refers to his proof of this comfortable principle with equal complacency, *Diss. Post. Cap. 3.* *Nemo enim (ut supra argumentis omni exceptione majoribus evicimus) vel ad primam justificationis gratiam pervenire potest, qui pœnitentiæ opera non præstiterit.*" He, however, subjoins the qualification that these works which precede the *first Justification*, are far less and fewer than those which follow it, and that it is after Justification that we are enabled to bring forth *opera egregia ac vere Heroica.* At length, however, it becomes necessary to take some notice of the Article. And certainly to one who had proved, to his own satisfaction, that *good works do not only accompany justifying faith, but that they are no less necessary to justification than faith itself, and that the same kind of causality is to be ascribed to faith and to works*; i.e. that *faith and works conjointly are the condition of Justification solummodo prescribed in the gospel covenant,* (*Diss. Prior. Cap. 6, § 3*), this Article which describes *good works as the fruits of faith*, and as *following after Justification*, would seem to be

rather embarrassing. But the difficulty is solved by a *distinguo*. We are, the Bishop tells us, carefully to distinguish between the first and second Justification, and so between the good works required for each. "Atque hic statuendum omnino est ad primam Justificationem opera tantum interna fidei, penitentiae, spei, charitatis, &c. esse absolute necessaria; cætera vero externa opera, quæ in factis externis, sive in actuali singularum virtutum quas modo enumeravimus exercitio conspiciuntur, signa tantum esse fructusque iustitiæ internæ, et Justificatione posteriora eaque demum lege præstanda si non desit opportunitas."—*Diss. Post. Cap.* 18, § 8. And he adds that this is, without doubt, what is meant by the Church in Article XII. But, without attending at present at that point, what foundation does this Article or any other supply for this distinction of a *first* and *second justification*? Any one who reads these Articles in connexion must see that the *justification* which they describe, as effected by *faith*, and which good works *follow*, and which no good works precede, that this is the only *justification* of which they speak—the *justification* which we have *for* the merits of Jesus Christ, *by* faith. If there be another justification, the Articles do not speak of it, or even glance at it. They tell us, indeed, of a justification before which no good works are done, and after which all good works are done. But they do not intimate to us, in any way, that this is but inchoate, and that there is another justification, to the obtaining of which *all these good works are necessary*.

Would not this be a strange way of presenting this important doctrine.—that there should be three, and but three, Articles given on the subject of Justification, its causes and effects; and that we should be left in ignorance of what this second Justification is*—how it is to be obtained—or even that it has any existence? Is this credible?

Bull's proceeding in bringing the point forward is a curious specimen of his style. When he has to explain St Paul's dictum, *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, Justification is allowed to be (as we have seen, pp. 328, 329) *the act of God as judge, absolving, according to Christ's gracious law, the*

* "And when Mr More," says Tyndall, "is come to himselfe, and sayth, The first fayth, and the first justifying is geven us without our deservyng, God be thanked; and I would fayne that he would describe me what he meaneth by the second justifying."

accused, pronouncing him righteous, and admitting him to the reward of righteousness, viz. eternal life. He even thinks, we saw (*ib.*) that Grotius must have been blind not to have perceived that this forensic sense of *regarding, or declaring one righteous*, is the common sense throughout the Bible, and specially the New Testament. But then he is able to settle that faith means *faith, and everything else*; that *faith without the deeds of the law means faith with the deeds of the law*, only they must not be done as prescribed in the Mosaical law, or as parts of that covenant, &c.: and so far the matter is left on a sure footing. When we come to the Protestant principle, *that we are justified by faith only*, which is so often declared, by all the old writers who maintained it, to be only another form of expressing Paul's doctrine, it would seem that *Justification* and *Faith* would necessarily bear the same signification as in the Apostle's own enunciation of the same truth. And so the matter would of course be left, but for this XIIth Article; which renders it impossible to receive *faith* as expressing the whole condition of the gospel covenant— as comprehending all the works of Christian piety, &c.; and, therefore, since practising upon *faith* is put out of the question, *Justification* and *Works* must be tried; and the matter is pretty safe again when it is settled that by *Justification* is meant the *first Justification*; and that by the *works* which follow it are only meant external acts; that to this first Justification all the internal virtues, from which these external acts spring, are essential. *i.e.* faith, repentance, hope, charity, &c.; and that this is undoubtedly *dubio procul*, what our Church means in this XIIth Article, that is, that it means that external obedience is a necessary condition to the *second Justification*, and inward obedience, to the *first*.

Such a proceeding might be left without any further remark, but the subject seems to deserve to be exhibited a little more distinctly. It would appear that it cannot be denied that *faith*, in Art. XII, is *faith* and nothing else. I do not venture to say so from my own notion of the sense of the Article, but because Bull, in commenting upon it here, speaks of "*opera interna fidei, penitentia, spei, charitatis, &c.*;" so that I suppose it is admitted by every one that by *faith*, in Article XII, is meant a *state of mind*; and one, moreover, distinct from these other states enumerated by the Bishop. It will hardly be maintained, then, I suppose, that in Article XI, in which we are said to be justified by

faith only, *faith* means anything different from what it does in Article XII, unless it be thought that it was the *purpose* of the framers of the Articles to mislead or to perplex us about this important doctrine which they profess to declare. Indeed, as I have before intimated, I believe it was because Article XII. determined so clearly the sense of *faith*; and the connexion between the two Articles rendered it so hopeless to attempt assigning a different sense to the term in Article XI. that this new experiment upon *Justification* was resorted to. But, however that be, so far appears pretty clear, viz. what the faith of Article XII. is, and that by *that faith*, and *by it only*, we are said, in Article XI, *to be justified*.

But what is *Justification*? Why, whatever it be, I presume it will be in the same way allowed by all who do not regard our Articles as dangerous enigmas, that it means the same thing in all these three Articles upon the Doctrine; and that, fixing its sense in any of them, is fixing its sense in all. What is its sense, however, in Article XI. we have, as I before have shown, various means of determining. The Article itself, as I notice (p. 124), establishes that *to be justified*, and *to be counted righteous before God*, mean the same thing. And this would be quite enough. But, moreover, all Protestant writers who put forward the declaration contained in the XIth Article, *that we are justified by faith only*, maintain that it is exactly equivalent to Paul's declaration, *that we are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*. We saw, for example, in p. 479, that Jewel defends the Protestant declaration expressly on the ground that it is precisely equivalent to the Scriptural one; and the same language is uniformly maintained by the other Reformers. I suppose, therefore, that it cannot be questioned that by JUSTIFICATION in *their* enunciation of the truth, these men intended to express whatever Paul designed that the term should stand for in *his*. What that is we may let Bull himself settle: he determines, as we have seen, pp. 328, 329, that it is the act by which God, as judge, remits our sins, acquits us, counts us as righteous, &c. This is the Justification, therefore, of the XIth Article; and therefore, as I said, of the other two also. This is the Justification which we have by *faith only*—Article XI; which *good works follow*—Article XII; and which *no good works precede*—Article XIII. Of this justification, which includes our acquittal by our Almighty Judge, the recognition

of our righteousness by Him, and the plenary acceptance by which *we have peace with God*, the Articles are careful to give us distinct information: of the other they tell us nothing. If this be but our *first Justification*, it is the only one of which the Articles speak. If there be a *second justification* which is *not by faith only*, and which *good works do precede*, our Articles are certainly silent about it, and we may very safely leave it in the same obscurity.

Having gone so far upon these corruptions of the truth, I can add little to what has been said in the Sermon upon others, except to give the authors of those adverted to there. The first explanation of what *faith* is (p. 112), and what *counting faith for righteousness*, means, is from Dr Clarke's XVII. Sermon, Sermon XI. The metonymies in the next page are Bull's. The account (pp. 120, 121) of Paul's sense of *Justification* is from a Sermon by Mr Manning, of whom I know nothing beyond what is given about him in a strange publication by the Rev. H. J. Todd, entitled, 'Faith and Justification;' which consists of a Sermon by Archbishop Sharp on Justifying Faith; the one by Manning, referred to, on Justification; and an Appendix, in which are collected, with considerable diligence, certain interesting testimonies, which Divines of the Church of England, eminent and obscure, have from time to time borne against that *most wholesome doctrine and very full of comfort,—that we are justified by faith only*. As Mr Todd only requires of his authorities some declaration of hostility to this doctrine, it may be imagined that some want of harmony in their views at times appears. This does not, perhaps, lessen the right of any enemy of the doctrine to count them all, in the gross, upon his side; but, when we come to details, it sometimes assumes a form that makes it hard to understand what is the value of the aid that they give to one who is determined to have them all as auxiliaries.

Thus, Mr Manning holds that, when the Apostle asserts that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law, "his doctrine is clear beyond a doubt, *that we are justified by faith, and that without works of any kind, even works of moral righteousness*." And, moreover, he gives it as his opinion, that it is attributing to the Apostle a mode of expressing himself *unworthy of so able a reasoner* to suppose that he meant to say that "man is justified by faith alone, exclusive of any works, and to tell us at

the same time that by faith alone he meant gospel faith." "which," Mr M. adds, "we all know, does include works of moral righteousness." So far very well. Bishop Bull then comes, who, we have seen, teaches us another meaning of this expression, of *faith without the works of the law*—viz. that the works which it intends to exclude from justification are not evangelical works, or such acts of obedience as are done in, and proceed from, faith in Christ. And, as to faith, we have seen (p. 254), that *faith* does, according to him, in Paul's statements of the doctrine of Justification, include all *works of Christian piety*.

"But these Divines agree, notwithstanding." Yes, they agree, but it is by means of another difference upon the Apostle's meaning,—by assigning different senses to *Justification* in his doctrinal statements. Mr Manning holds, that in the passages in which St Paul "speaks so repeatedly as he does of being *justified by faith without the works of any law*, he means that *first* kind of Justification whereby converts, whether Jew or Gentile, whether of his own or succeeding times, are admitted into the body of Christ's visible church in this present world." And he says, and repeats, that this first Justification *is the chief subject of Paul's argument when he treats of Justification* at all. What Bull thinks on this matter, we have seen; and, from Dr Jackson, Mr Todd gives what he describes as a "perspicuous and impressive sentence," on the same point: by which it appears that he thinks this *second, or final Justification*, is the sense which the word bears *most frequently* in St Paul. "There is another acceptation of Justification yet behind, *most frequent with St Paul*, to wit, the actual sentence of the judge acquitting or absolving us, or for *final absolution*, or actual acquittance of the parties so qualified as St James requires."

But of what importance can it be that one of these men thinks that St Paul generally uses the term in one sense, while another thinks that it is generally used by him in a different sense? Of no importance whatever to me, certainly. But it can hardly be treated as of little importance to any one who intends to avail himself of their authority in the case. For, I presume, it is not as confident propounders of their own views, but as sound interpreters of St Paul's language, that they can be expected to have any weight. They agree, it is true, in the end, in deriving from his writings pretty nearly the same views of the way in

which a sinner may be reconciled to God; and if we were shut out from all knowledge of the process by which they have arrived at the conclusion, one who from indolence or modesty would be disposed to leave it to any eminent persons to settle the sense of Scripture for him, might find in the agreement of these high authorities with each other, some added reason for acquiescing in their decision. But we are let behind the scenes too much to allow any man such a plea for following their guidance. The declaration of the Apostle, *that we are justified by faith without the deeds of the law*, is to be interpreted:—What does he mean by our JUSTIFICATION? He means, say Bull and Jackson, our acquittal by God's sentence, and our acceptance by Him as Judge. And this *is the most frequent sense with St Paul*, adds Jackson; and a man must be blind not to see that it is the most frequent sense of the word through the whole of the New Testament, subjoins Bull. He means no such thing, cries our other guide; he means, *our admission into God's visible church*: and not only here, but generally, when St Paul speaks of our Justification, this, and not the other, is the sense in which he uses the word.

So much for the thing effected: now for St Paul's account of the mode of effecting it; that it is *by faith without the deeds of the law*. What does he mean by *faith*? What by, *without the deeds of the law*? Bull tells us that *faith* here includes evangelical righteousness, and that *without the deeds of the law* is not meant to exclude *works of obedience*: and Jackson concurs with him as cordially as before. Manning testifies, on the contrary, not only that *without the deeds of the law*, does mean *without deeds of any law*, without any *works even of moral righteousness*; but that if we hold that in *faith*, the Apostle includes works of moral righteousness, we disparage his reasoning powers, and therefore, I suppose, prove our own to be but indifferent.

It is not, perhaps, very strange that a violent opponent of the doctrine of Justification by faith only, should feel some gratification at finding, in any writer of repute, any evidence of an agreement with his own opinion of the falsehood or the danger of that doctrine. And if he were a diligent man, as Mr Todd is, it is not extraordinary that such testimonies should find their way separately into his common-place book. But that, reviewing them together there, he should think it served his cause to show to the public upon what different and even incompatible grounds

the doctrine had been assailed, and how widely and irreconcilably the great opponents of it differed in their explanation of the leading texts, from which a knowledge of the true doctrine is to be derived; this certainly seems passing strange. I would recommend the book strongly in the hope that these diversities will produce the proper impression; and that the readers of the volume will make the best use of it—taking Jackson's or Bull's notion of what St Paul means by *Justification* in his doctrinal statements, and Manning's view of the mode in which he describes Justification effected,—and they will have something like Scriptural views upon this important subject.

I do not know whether some of Mr T.'s authorities would not be found to be pressed into the service;—at least, in the quotations which he gives, some of them appear assailing, not the doctrine itself, but abuses, or misrepresentations of it. But I am content to leave him all of them except one. He endeavours to show that CRANMER's authority is clear for the distinction of Justification into first and final. His chief proof is that *The Erudition of a Christian Man* contains it; and that it is likely that it was introduced into that tract by Cranmer. His proof of the probability of this is rather curious, but I will not stop to notice it, as the point is of so little consequence. I only wish to remind my readers that we have Cranmer's own examination of that book with the view of supplying such corrections as it required. It must be felt, I should suppose, fair to collect his principles from this review, rather than from the work without these corrections, whatever part he may be supposed to have had in its composition. And, if my readers consent to take this obviously fair course of informing themselves of his views of Justification, I desire nothing more. They will find (as I have mentioned, p. 303) the entire of these notes upon the King's book in Richmond's 'Fathers of the English Church;' and the most important parts of them in the volume of the Tract Society's BRITISH REFORMERS, which contains Cranmer.

NOTE V. PAGE 145.

*Upon the Objection to the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only,
derived from James ii.*

It will be seen that in the mode in which I have attempted to obviate this objection, I differ somewhat from other defenders of the true doctrine of Justification. And I feel it necessary to say a few words in explanation and defence of the difference.

Some eminent writers think, that by Justification, St James means, not, as St Paul does, our Justification *before God*, but our Justification *before men*. This is, I believe, much the most general mode of accommodating the apparent difference between the Apostles; it is the one adopted by Tindall, Bishop Jewel, Bishop Barlow, and a host of more recent writers. Hooker holds that in St James, Justification means that *acquisition of righteousness* by obedience which is a part of the course of every Believer. I do not know that he is followed by any maintainer of the true doctrine of Justification. Bucer's view is also, so far as I know, a singular one: he thinks that the word means, in St James, the public honouring and rewarding by God of some special act of obedience to His will.

When I say that I am dissatisfied with all these modes of reconciling the Apostles, I hope the amount of my dissatisfaction will not be overrated. I should wish to be understood to hold that the least probable of them is attended, in my apprehension, with infinitely less difficulty than the process to which they are opposed:—that of taking the doctrine of the Justification of sinners literally from St James's position, that *a man is justified by works, and not by faith only*; and then, wresting Paul's reasoning, and distorting and mutilating his statements, to bring about his agreement with a doctrine which he has so often clearly argued against, and expressly contradicted. I would take any of them, I repeat, unhesitatingly, rather than acquiesce in what appears to be so preposterous and irrational a proceeding. Nay, if I had not so good an explanation of St James as any of them furnishes, I should (as I have said, p. 139) be content to say, St James appears to me, here, to contradict what I know to be

the truth. I am sure, if I understood him rightly, his meaning would be found to be perfectly consistent with it; but I am obliged to confess that I cannot explain the passage so as to show their consistency: and I leave it unexplained without feeling my conviction of the doctrine which I have learned from St Paul in the slightest degree disturbed by a contradiction which I know can be but apparent. I think, however, that the explanation which I have offered removes this difficulty, and does not itself involve any of moment: but before I speak of it, I must state what I think are the unsatisfactory points in the other modes of getting over the objection.

The first has the recommendation of being perfectly consistent with the particular fact, of representing the Apostle as stating a principle undoubtedly true, and of doing no violence to his language. For these reasons, and on account of the high names of all periods by which it has been sanctioned, I feel some difficulty in saying anything against it; still I am constrained to confess that it does not appear satisfactory to me. For, first, whatever errors men may have fallen into connected with this doctrine, I can hardly think that it could ever be necessary to prove formally, or declare authoritatively, to any, that we can only be justified *before men* by outward actions which men can see and judge; that it is impossible that we can be justified *before them* by an internal principle which they cannot discern. I say, I cannot conceive it possible that any man could be in a condition in which it should be necessary to prove such a point as this to him. And, secondly, when it was proved, it would seem to fall far short of meeting the case for which it was intended. Suppose that, to one who was abusing the doctrine of justification by faith only, it was thus declared or proved—that “we are justified *before men* by works, and not by faith only; and that Abraham himself was justified *before men* by works.” Might not such a one be expected to say, ‘Be it so. And let all that desire to be justified *before men* do the works whereby they may be so justified. For me it is enough to be justified *before God*. And you do not venture to deny that, *before Him*, a man is justified by faith only.’ For these reasons,—because, that is, it represents the Apostle as proving what it is hard to believe that any one could doubt, and what he does not seem to gain much by proving.—for these reasons, I cannot regard this popular mode of explaining the pas-

sage as a correct one. And, against Hooker's, without inquiring to what extent it is open to this latter objection, I have the decisive one that it assigns a meaning to the word which it nowhere else (see note L, pp. 327, 328) bears in the New Testament. Bucer's sense of the term is not so inadmissible; for, as this honouring or rewarding is the result of the recognition of a man's innocence or righteousness, it would not be strange to find it used in the meaning which he ascribes to it in this place; but his solution is evidently open to the evasion which I have supposed applied to the first, and does not, independently of that, give so natural a sense to the passage.

As to my own explanation,—I believe I have with me almost all who have attempted to explain the passage upon any thing of sound principles, when I regard St James as using *faith* in the false sense in which those with whom he had to do understood the term. I consider the proof in this point given in the Sermon pp. 141, 142, as satisfactory, and as not requiring any addition. Nor do I think there is any real force, though there is some appearance of it, in Bull's argument—that it must have been true faith that St James meant, as he says that a man is not justified *by faith only*, whereas, if it were false faith he could not be justified by it *in part*. *Har. Ap. Diss. Post. Cap. ii. § 3.* This is a sort of reasoning in which this able writer deals largely; and it is very showy, but not equally solid. When a man, for the purpose of condemning a doctrine, states it in the very words of those who hold it, he very clearly tells us what he rejects, but he does not give us the same direct information as to what he admits. And we are liable, manifestly, to fall into great mistakes concerning his views, when we proceed to make them out from the statement which he quotes and denies, in this way:—by laying an emphasis upon a part of it, and, fixing that he only means to reject it in the sense which this emphasis assigns to it; and that he would admit the proposition in the sense that it would bear, if the part which we have selected as the ground of his special objection were taken away.

If the insecurity of such a process do not appear upon a simple statement of it, it may be seen by a striking example of its effects. The Council of Trent anathematize those who hold that we are justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness *only*, *Sess. 6. Can. 11.* And hence Chemnitz infers that they admit

that we are justified by it *in part*. Bellarmin, however, takes him to task, and I think very fairly, for this precipitancy; and tells him, that the Church of Rome, desiring to condemn the error of those who hold that we are *justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness only*, does expressly, and in terms, condemn that doctrine; but that it would be most hasty and unfair to collect her adoption of the other error, that we are *justified by it merely*, even if she had not elsewhere expressed her dissent from it also. And this not only seems fair in the particular case, but it will be taken, I hope, as a sufficient proof generally, how precarious a mode of arriving at a man's opinions we are taking when we attempt to collect them in this way.

But, indeed, the direct proof of the point is too strong to be overthrown by a better argument than Bull's: and I do not think that any one who considers fairly the whole passage, and weighs the form of St James's introduction, and two illustrations referred to p. 142, can doubt that by *faith* he expresses what these false professors with whom he was dealing understood by the term. And in this, as I said, I do not differ from any of those who hold the true doctrine. I only suppose, in addition, that he *throughout* adopts the language of these persons; that he uses *justification* in their sense too, and speaks of *justification by faith only* in the sense in which they spoke of it, for the purpose of impressing upon them the conviction that their view of it must be erroneous. This supposition, which makes the whole proceeding of the Apostle consistent, supplies me with an easy sense of this declaration of his—that *Abraham was justified by works*; and of the general principle which he lays down—that *a man is justified by works, and not by faith only*. He seems, in this, to assert a falsehood, and to deny a certain truth; but this mode of explaining his language shows that he does neither; that he adopts a practical mode of correcting the error which all must, I think, allow to be the very error with which he had to deal.

Every one must, I think, allow that the error with respect to the doctrine into which these men fell, was the notion that they who were justified by faith were not required to perform works of obedience; that to be obliged to perform such works was *to be justified by works, and not by faith only*. Now, if there were persons who mistook this belief of devils which they possessed for real faith, and who so far misconceived the doctrines of justification by faith,

and justification by works, as to think that they differed in this: that the man justified by faith only, when a demand was made upon him of obedience to God, could reply, "I have been justified *by faith*, you are treating me as if I were seeking to be justified *by works*. No doubt, this obedience of which you speak would be needful if I desired to be justified by works, but such bondage is not to be imposed on any who are *justified by faith only*,"—could there be a better mode of removing this error adopted than by taking, as St James does, the very *type* of the whole class of those who are justified *by faith only*, and showing that ~~resolving to live a life~~ of the nature of *justification by faith* and *justification by works*, he was *justified by works, and not by faith only*? And does not this too assign a true and consistent meaning to his declaration that every one [who is justified] is *justified by works, and none by faith only*? St James, indeed, sufficiently shows that he did not mean that these words should be taken literally, when he subjoins that, to every one who understands the doctrine, this act of Abraham was not a contradiction of the Scripture record of his justification by faith, but a clear confirmation of it. But, without dwelling upon this, I hope that I have said enough to vindicate my exposition to all who like to take the trouble of understanding it: and that the only suppositions which I make as the foundation of the explanation, are such as there ought to be no difficulty in admitting, namely, that these persons were in the habit of using language which expressed distinctly, what (whether they so expressed it or not) must be allowed to have been their real error about this doctrine; and that St James adopts their language *throughout*, as he confessedly does at the outset.

NOTE W. PAGE 149.

Upon the Objection—Faith is itself a Work.

The thing that hath been is that which shall be, applies to few things *under the sun* more emphatically than to religious controversy, and to no controversy certainly more entirely than to this one concerning justification. The first principle of the truth appears to have been assailed by the strongest objections which

have ever been devised against it; and there is scarcely one of the many minor evils against his doctrine which we hear at the present day, that the first revivers of the truth upon the Continent and in England, do not seem to have been called upon to answer. This, for example, which passes generally for a very recent sophism, appears among the objections answered by Melancthon in his *Enarratio Symboli Niceni Ulmæ*, 1557.—*Fide sumus justi, Fides est opus, ergo operibus sumus justi*. And his answer, while it sets in a clear light the mistake upon which the cavil rests, shows very clearly too what I have often attempted to exhibit from the Reformers' writings,—their sound views of the real place which *faith* holds in the justification of sinners. His answer to the major is—"Hæc propositio, *Fide sumus justi*, correlative intelligenda est, videlicet propter Filium Dei sumus justi. Sed hanc oportet fide apprehendi audita voce evangelii; quia certe aliquid esse oportet quo fiat applicatio misericordiae." He then notices the minor, "Postea et de minore dicas, *fides est opus*, sed non sumus justi propter ipsius operis dignitatem, sed quia apprehendit misericordiam propter filium promissam. Alii respondent fidem non esse opus, quia sit donum Dei. Hæc responsio est aliena, quia cum dicitur *non sumus justi ex operibus*, etiam illæ virtutes intelliguntur, dilectio, castitas, patientia, quæ sunt accensæ a Spiritu Sancto." The same cavil is examined and exposed upon the same principles in his *Enarr. in Ep. ad Rom. Cap. iv.*

The reader will notice how, in exposing the erroneous view of the meritorious efficacy of our faith (upon which this cavil is grounded) the true instrumentality of the principle in our justification is re-asserted and explained. But further, the grounds upon which Melancthon declines adopting the answer, *Faith is no work, for it is God's gift*, deserve especial notice. He says, the reply would be nothing to the purpose, for it would apply equally to all those virtues or good qualities which are excluded from the office of justifying us under the name of *works*, which are no less God's gifts. This is evidently the meaning of his answer, and it shows at once the error of those who hold that *works* were only denied a share in the office of justifying us, *as they are results of our own unaided strength*; and that of those who hold that the *works* excluded were *those acts of superstition, for which this place was claimed by the Church of Rome*. The former is Bull's theory,

proposed with his usual courage; the latter is put forward by Archbishop Laurence, in the following cautious form. "Our Reformers, indeed, frequently reprobated in the strongest language, the idea of a justification by *our own* works. But, how harsh soever may have been their censures upon this head, we are not surprised at their zeal when we turn to the Injunction of Billes, in the year 1550; for there we perceive from the various superstitions enumerated with the proscribed doctrine, what those works of *our own* properly were which they principally kept in view when they expressed themselves on the occasion with so much severity. 'Item, that none maintain purgatory, invocation of saints, the six articles, bedrowls, images, reliques, *rubric primæ* with invocation of saints, *justification of man by his own works*, holy bread, palms, ashes, candles, sepulchre pached, creeping to the cross, hallowing of the fire or altar, or any such like abuses and superstitions now taking away by the king's grace's most godly proceedings.'—Burnet, Vol. II. p. 206. Records." *Notes on Sermon VI. note 20.*

If there be anything strange in the place which this false doctrine holds in this enumeration of superstitions, it is certainly not half so extraordinary as the speculation which the Archbishop founds upon it. He evidently wishes it to be understood, though he does not seem prepared to say so expressly, that if the Romanists, in maintaining *justification by our own works*, had included among these works none of a superstitious character, our Reformers would not have opposed the doctrine so strongly, or, at least, that they ought not! We are in no want of proofs that this is greatly to mistake the true grounds upon which the Reformers reject the Romish doctrine of justification. "*Alii sic interpretati sunt, fide, id est, operibus a Deo mandatis, justi sumus non operibus traditionum humanarum. Alii hoc modo depravant, fide, id est, interiore cultu non externis operibus justi sumus.*" *M. Hammon Arg. in Ep. ad Rom.* would of itself sufficiently show that it was not the nature of the works required, which formed the great difference between the doctrine of the Reformers and their opponents. Indeed, in the first Augsburg Confession, it is undeniably that the Romish doctrine had in such points undergone important improvements. "*De quibus rebus olim parum docebant concionatores; tantum puerilia et non necessaria operi urgebant, ut certas ferias, certa jejunia, fraternitates, peregrinationes, cultus*

sanctorum, rosaria, monachatum et similia. Hæc adversarii nostri admodum nunc deliscunt, nec perinde prædicant hæc inutilia opera, ut olim. Propterea incipiunt fidei mentionem facere, de qua olim mirum erat silentium. Docent, nos non tantum operibus justificari, sed conjungunt fidem et opera, et dicunt, nos fide et operibus justificari. Quæ doctrina tolerabilior priore, et plus afferre potest consolationis, quam vetus ipsorum doctrina." XX. *De bonis Operibus.* Lest this last sentence should be interpreted, however, into an admission that this modified doctrine is *tolerable*, I add an extract from Melancthon's Disputations, already referred to, p. 412. He says, that there are two classes of persons who hold that we are justified by faith and works: the first assign the higher place to works, and make faith mere knowledge: and these are easily refuted; the second opinion is "homines principaliter justos esse fide, id est, fiducia misericordiae minus principaliter propter dignitatem operum, eo quod legi nemo satisfaciât, ideoque fiducia misericordiae succiat id quod deest. Hæc secunda opinio concinna est in specie, idem diligenter executienda." And, accordingly, he proceeds to examine and expose it. Luther, on Gen. xxii. (quoted p. 388) contains a still more distinct condemnation of all such modifications of the doctrine: and I could give various other proofs, if it were necessary, that, though the nature of the works joined with faith, might be allowed so far to qualify the error as to make it more or less gross, every statement in which they were united with it as means of justification, was rejected by these assertors of the truth as equally false and equally subversive of the true doctrine of justification.

NOTE X. PAGE 151.

Knox's Remains.

The writer referred to in the text was Mr Erskine, who is alluded to in Sermon I. p. 10; and expressly spoken of in Note A, p. 254. He was very much better known when these Sermons were written than he is now. Indeed he is now so little remembered that it may be doubted whether, in reprinting this volume, I ought to have preserved what I then thought it neces-

sary to say of him. At all events there can be no doubt that time would be misspent in any further notice of writings which, though they produced a strong impression in the religious world in their day, have long since passed out of view, and have left behind them no permanent effects. We shall be much better employed in noticing a writer to whom, though he is of a very different school, a great deal of what is said in the text concerning Mr Erskine applies, and whose works not only are still read, but are likely to be read for a long time, and to live even longer in the effects which they have produced.

Mr Knox's 'Remains' were not published when this volume first appeared. They present, in the form of Letters and Essays, the views of an active and serious mind upon many subjects of interest and importance, and, among these, upon the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION. The work has had extensive circulation, so that very many of my readers are probably long since aware that Mr Knox is among those who are most decidedly opposed to the view of that great doctrine which I have endeavoured to explain and establish in the foregoing Discourses. The subject seems to have engaged his mind deeply and constantly, and it is brought forward in various shapes in his volumes. But whether he treats it incidentally or formally, his object is either directly to overthrow the true doctrine (as I must be allowed to designate that which I hold and have attempted to prove to be the true doctrine), or to establish a very different one.

In his reasoning against the view which I have been maintaining, there is little that is new, in substance, and nothing new in the view which he proposes to substitute for it. There is, in fact, nothing in either, at least nothing of importance, which has not been in some way considered either in these Discourses or in the Notes. Still what he says requires some distinct notice. I have no doubt, indeed, that it would deserve much more space than I can allot to it. For though Mr Knox's matter may be, to a great extent at least, common to him with others, his manner is entirely his own. And it is highly effective. Insomuch that I am not surprised to find, that what he has written has made a wider and stronger impression than anything which has been in recent times brought out in support of the same views.

There is quite enough, indeed, to account for such an effect in the leading characteristics of his mode of handling the question.

His style is clear and interesting. He writes evidently from long and anxious thought, and certainly under a deep conviction of the truth and importance of what he says. What he says, taken apart from its intended application, is often true and important. And, indeed even the charges which he urges against the doctrine that he opposes, however little they apply to any true views of it, do apply to it in the form in which it is at times taught; so that, for some of his readers, he only offers to supply deficiencies which they have often felt. And as so few will look beyond what they have been taught, either for the nature or effects of the doctrine, it is to be expected that many will readily acquiesce in the statement that these deficiencies belong to the doctrine itself, and will be more disposed to receive gladly the supply which is offered, upon the terms and in the way in which it is offered, than to set about considering whether it were not always within their reach, and only withheld from them by the unskillfulness, or narrowness, or false views of their teacher, and their own inertness in acquiescing so entirely in the adequacy of his teaching.

These are elements which ought to go a good way in accounting for the impression which Mr Knox's Essays on this subject have produced. But I have no doubt that it is also to be ascribed in no small measure to a very different quality in his controversial writings—I mean the extent to which they misrepresent the case which he has to combat, and the extent, too, to which they exaggerate the force of his arguments in support of the one which he has to establish.

I can hardly say this, I fear, without appearing to intend something offensive, which is very far from my purpose. I do not suppose that such misrepresentations were ever designedly made by him. I am sure he felt too deeply the importance of his subject, and wrote too conscientiously upon it, to employ any artifice in treating it. I believe they were the unconscious result of mental habits, which affected as much the reasoning by which he formed his views for himself as that which was intended to commend them to others. For his mind was, both by nature and habit, much more rhetorical than logical. His logic, indeed, was altogether insufficient to guide or restrain his rhetoric. It neither kept him from reasoning fallaciously, nor enabled him, upon consideration, to detect or even to suspect the fallacies into which he fell. So that he never felt, and therefore never exhibits, any mis-

givings as to his perfect success in refuting all that he ought to refute, and proving all that he ought to prove.

This is an important constituent in impressiveness, as regards the large class of readers of whom Butler says that, whatever mental activity they may show in other ways, they, "from different causes, never exercise their judgment upon what comes before them, in the way of determining whether it be conclusive and holds." The old maxim with reference to our emotions holds true of our convictions: if we would impart them, they must be genuine, not assumed. But where a writer's confidence in his own reasoning is real, it is extensively contagious, he requires the aid of readers just referred to; and their confidence in him will be more readily given, if he writes perspicuously, as Mr Knox—so far, at least, as regards his sentences taken separately—always does; for with such persons, a clear writer always passes for a clear thinker. And when he at the same time writes, as Mr Knox also does, with evident sincerity of purpose,—in a genial spirit and an earnest tone,—he will find them ready to believe that he has actually proved what he is plainly convinced that he has proved, and that his argument is exactly at the stage that he thinks it is.

Thus, a large class of Mr Knox's readers may be regarded as entirely in his hands. And even those who do not so entirely commit themselves to his guidance are often perplexed by the qualities by which others are altogether misled: and, though in possession of all the materials for answering what he says, find it difficult to use them, from the extent to which they are led away from the true question, and need some help to extricate themselves from the maze of false issues in which they are involved by his mode of managing the controversy.

I am anxious to supply my readers with a safeguard and help where I believe both are greatly needed. But it is not easy to do this effectually within such limits as I must prescribe to myself. My own conviction is, that there is scarcely anything in Mr Knox's volumes on the doctrine of Justification which is not erroneous either in itself or in its intended application. To exhibit this fully would, of course, require so detailed an analysis of all that he has written on the subject as could not be comprehended within any moderate space. I cannot attempt anything of that kind. But I think I may be performing a useful

service to many, by directing attention to some of the leading fallacies in his mode of treating the subject, against which his readers have especially to be on their guard. In what I am about to say, I shall of course use perfect freedom in pointing out what I believe to be erroneous in his principles or in his reasoning. The subject is too serious for any other mode of treating it. But I trust that, so far as is compatible with such freedom, my remarks will not be found chargeable with any want of due respect for this gifted and pious writer, and that neither in matter nor in manner will they be calculated to wound the feelings of those by whom he is remembered with affection and reverence*.

I. Mr Knox reasons continually as if the difference between him and his opponents were about the true *end* of the GOSPEL, and not, as it really is, about the true and Scriptural *means* of attaining that *end*. I do not mean to say that he never anywhere admits the actual state of the case. But I mean that he does so rarely, and that when he does, he soon loses sight of it again, and returns to his habitual misrepresentation of it, so that the general current of his reasoning proceeds upon a false assumption of the point at issue. The reader who collected from Mr Knox's volumes the views of those whom he opposes, would be very little prepared for the fact, that they do not merely acknowledge distinctly, but that they maintain as strenuously as he does, that the deliverance which Christ has wrought for us comprehends a deliverance from the power of sin, and from its pollution, as well as from the guilt and the punishment of it.

This is so distinctly and so often stated in the foregoing Sermons, and they are, indeed, so much occupied in explaining the nature and extent of the *moral* deliverance, and its connexion with the *legal* deliverance, that it cannot be necessary to say anything to satisfy my readers that it is in this sense that I hold and maintain the doctrine of *Justification by Faith only*. And I am sure that I have said nothing on this point which,

* The portions of Mr Knox's volumes chiefly referred to in the following remarks are—the *Letter to Mr Parker on JUSTIFICATION*, Vol. i. p. 256; *On the leading Design of the Christian Dispensation* as exhibited in the Epistle to the Romans, Vol. ii. p. 12; *On Redemption and Salvation by Christ*, p. 41; *On the Nature of our Salvation through Christ*, p. 283.

either in distinctness or in strength, goes beyond what is to be found in those writings in which it would be most natural and fairest to look for authentic statements of the doctrine. Even as to the question of the place in the Christian scheme, to which the moral effects of Christ's work are entitled, I should suppose that but little room for difference with Mr Knox is left, when I say, as I have said, p. 152, that *the renovation of our fallen nature, if it be not the only intelligible end of Revelation, is, doubtless, with respect to us, its highest and most important end**. And in this, too, I only say what is to be found though perhaps not in words, yet in substance, in the same writings.

I do not mean to assert that this part of the gospel has never been put out of sight, in the conflicts which have been maintained for the other parts. It is not to be denied, that, in maintaining controversially, as has been so often necessary, the freeness and fulness of the forgiveness of sins, and of the acceptance which the Gospel secures to all Believers, the further blessings which it had to bestow have been at times for a little thrown into the shade. It is the very nature of a fervent contest that the object which is in jeopardy attracts for the time all anxiety and interest to itself, as if it were the only thing which the combatants prized or cared about. And I by no means undertake to say that, in the protracted contest to which I refer, this has not often taken place, with respect to those parts of the Gospel scheme which were most constantly the object of attack and defence. But no one can read the works of those who were most deeply engaged in the contest, even when it was fiercest, without finding abundant evidence that they really never let out of their view of the Gospel the moral renovation which it promises to all upon whom it bestows forgiveness and acceptance. This is true of the Reformers of the Continent and of Britain. And it is true of all since who are best entitled to the names of their successors, including those who most strenuously maintained the doctrine of Justification by Faith amongst ourselves, when,

* I use REVELATION here emphatically for the *disclosure to us* of the Divine counsels, dealings, will, &c., not meaning to speak of the ends of what God has done for us, what He designs for us, and what He requires of us, but of the ends of *making this known* to us. And what I mean is, that all the immediate impressions produced by this knowledge, and all their further effects, are but parts of the great work of our moral renovation, or but preliminary and subservient to it.

after it had fallen into long neglect, it was again revived, and found in the bosom of our own Church as determined opponents as it had encountered at the beginning in the Church of Rome.

The first thing, then, to be borne in mind in reading Mr Knox is, that when he proves that Moral Renovation is an end of the Gospel, or its chief, or (as regards us) its ultimate end, he proves nothing which is not as strenuously maintained by his opponents as by himself; and that every such proof, therefore, is to be set aside as an *ignoratio elenchii*, the real question being as to the *means* by which this *end* is to be effected.

II. This question, however, about the *means*, Mr Knox regards as involved in the question about the *end*. If it be admitted that to effect this moral change in us is the great *end* of the Gospel, he regards it as hardly requiring proof, that the way of attaining it must be by engaging our minds directly about it, by making *it* the great object of our desires and of our exertions, and so the great subject of our thoughts. When once these two points are established—first, that our moral deliverance is the great boon and blessing of the Gospel, and secondly that it remains to be obtained by each of us for himself—he thinks that it must be evident, that it is about this deliverance that our thoughts and feelings should be engaged—that it is to what Christ is to do for the deliverance of each of us, in this higher sense, and not to what He has already done for the deliverance of all of us, in the lower sense, that each of us ought to be looking. And he concludes further, that if we rightly apprehend what it is that we are to seek, and steadily seek it, it cannot be necessary that we should possess distinct apprehensions of what Christ has done to render it attainable by us: inasmuch that He does not hesitate to lay down the position, that *distinct apprehensions of the expiatory design of our Redeemer's sacrifice of Himself, and explicit reliance on the satisfaction made thereby for sin, as the ground of reconciliation with God, and of re-admission to His favour*, are not essential to complete the character of evangelical or saving faith; in which he sees, he says, no reason for including *the belief of more than the Catholic Verities and their inseparable consequences*: that is to say, the Trinity in Unity, the Incarnation of the Second Person, and the efficacious grace of the Third, together with

the undeniable results of these two *latter verities in the salvation of man**.

This conclusion is sustained, he says, alike by Holy Scripture, by the reason of the case, and by the course of things exhibited in the Christian Church. I am at present only concerned with the support which it receives from *the reason of the case, on which* Mr Knox seems much to rely. He seems to think that when once it is acknowledged that our moral renovation is the *great and ultimate end of the Gospel*, it will be immediately apparent that the way of attaining it must be by directly pursuing it; and that it must be felt not merely that the contemplation of the atoning work of Christ, by which only a lower end was effected, must be an inefficacious way of accomplishing it, but that the direction of our thoughts from what is to be done to what has been done—what cannot be undone by our ceasing to think about it, or better done by our thinking about it—is a purposeless waste of

* “Remains,” Vol. II. p. 283, 284.

I need hardly say that when saving faith is described to be *belief in Christ as a Saviour, or reliance upon the satisfaction which He has made for sin, as the ground of reconciliation with God and re-admission into His favour*, it is always understood that the apprehensions of this work which lie at the foundation of such reliance have been drawn from Scripture. And as it is needless to point out that a Scriptural apprehension of the work of Christ includes a right apprehension of the Catholic Verities, it is to be remembered that, under this view of *saving faith*, these Verities are not excluded from its objects, but absolutely included in them. On the other hand I do not mean, of course, to say that an explanation of the *inseparable consequences of the Catholic Verities, or of the undeniable consequences of the two latter of them in the salvation of man*, might not, or that an adequate explanation of them would not necessarily, include the expiatory design of Christ's death and the accomplishment of this design for all Believers. I am sure that it would. But it is plain that Mr Knox could not intend that it should. From the very purpose of his Essay he must have intended that these great truths concerning Christ's death and its effects are not included among what he calls the *inseparable and undeniable consequences of the Catholic Verities*. Otherwise there would be no difference between him and those from whom he treats himself as differing widely and decidedly upon the nature of saving faith. The real question, therefore, is not whether *saving faith* may exist *without a belief in the Catholic Verities*; for that is not held by those whom Mr Knox opposes, nor does he charge them with holding it. The real question is, Whether *saving faith* is constituted by such a belief in the Catholic Verities, and their consequences, *as leaves out of them the expiatory design of the Redeemer's death, and the satisfaction for sin thereby effected as the ground of our reconciliation with God, and of re-admission into his favour?* This is the *real question*, and I am sure it is a very important one.

invaluable time and of energies for which there is enough and more than enough of occupation in their proper business.

This is said in various forms, and not only with a firm conviction of its truth but, apparently, with a full persuasion that it must commend itself to every fair and reasoning mind as an obvious practical truth. And yet I do not think it too much to say that it is but very rash and very superficial speculation. I might perhaps be using language too high for the occasion, if I called it very *unphilosophical*; but I must say that it exhibits a strange forgetfulness of what is best ascertained and most familiar in the natural and moral systems with which we have to do. For in both it is certainly a matter of continual experience, not only that the most efficacious means often do little to connect us in conception with the end which they are securing; but that, on the contrary, they turn away our attention from *it*, and engross our thoughts and engage all our energies for themselves.

I need say nothing of the extent to which, by God's providential arrangements for us in our early years, we are engaged in promoting most important ends of our physical and moral training while we are as yet incapable of forming any conception of these ends. But in our after life, when we propose distinctly such ends to ourselves, how often are they attained by the diligent use of means which are so far from depending for their efficacy upon a constant remembrance of the end which we have in view in employing them, that, on the contrary, we should be taking a sure way of impeding their successful operation by making it a point to bear constantly in mind the purpose which they are intended to promote, and by marking carefully the way in which they are promoting it?

A man who has been set upon a course for the preservation or recovery of health by a sense of the value of that blessing, may find it necessary to recall from time to time the end which he has in view, that he may be kept from deviating from the course which is intended to secure it. But this use of having the end which he proposes to himself present to his thoughts is but occasional; and to have it constantly before his mind—in his rest, and his recreation, and his exercise—would be manifestly not a help but a hindrance to his attaining it. It would be, so far as it acted at all, an interference with the natural operation of the means employed, from which the benefit was to spring.

And this is even more obviously true in morals. Inasmuch that if, as I presume will be generally allowed, our moral constitution is to be restored from the disorder and disease under which it suffers, by a course in which our faculties are engaged and our attention exercised about their proper objects, then it would hardly be questioned, I suppose, that however, as before, the occasional recollection of the great end which this course is intended to secure may be needful as a restraint or a stimulant, according as either is required, it can hardly be made the subject of contemplation, without interfering with the engagement of the thoughts, and the exercise of the affections which are to promote it. And the effect of such interferences is more evidently disadvantageous in this latter case than in the other; for physical operations might go on, though with diminished force, when the mind was engaged in thinking about them and about their efficacy; but when the actions or emotions of the mind itself become the subject of our thoughts, the former cease altogether, and the latter become necessarily more languid.

This cannot be doubted; and it is sufficient to show that Mr Knox is not warranted in concluding against the importance and necessity of any views of the ATONEMENT merely because they do not engage us directly about the moral renovation of our nature, or because they engage us about something distinct from it. I mean that he is not warranted, even upon his own principles. Supposing that he is right, as I think he is, in the sense in which I have before explained it, in saying that the great end of the Gospel is our deliverance from the thralldom and pollution of sin; and supposing that he is right, which I think he is not, in assuming that nothing *can be* essential to evangelical or saving faith except what is fitted to promote that end*: still, were he right in both these points, I think he would be wrong, and plainly wrong, in the inference, that certain views of the Atonement cannot be essential to saving faith, *because* they do not engage the mind in the contemplation of that end, or in the conscious pursuit of it; for we have seen, and every one knows, that *notwithstanding this*, they may be really means—nay, the *fittest* the

* I need not say that I hold that, in point of fact, evangelical or saving faith really does promote this end: but I do not think that we could beforehand determine that this must be the case, that is, that nothing could be fixed on by God as saving faith except what had such tendencies.

most necessary, and the most efficacious means—for securing that end. Whether they are or not cannot be determined in this compendious way : it can only be determined by an examination of them, with the view of ascertaining what effect they really produce upon the mind.

I trust it is unnecessary for me to add, that I do not intend, by anything that I have said, to deny that the direct devotional pursuit of this great end is a proper and efficacious mode of attaining it. This would be to escape from Mr Knox's one-sided view of the subject, by running into another not less one-sided. I hope I need not say here that I hold that it is only by God Himself that this great change can be effected in us, and that the proper and appointed way of obtaining the agency by which it is to be effected is by prayer. And the whole work might doubtless be wrought by the Spirit of God directly and secretly, in answer to such prayers. But it is in nowise derogating from His infinite power to suppose that He acts through means; and, if He does use *means*, no one will be disposed to doubt that they have some natural fitness to accomplish the end proposed. But all this being admitted, what I intend to say is, that we have no right to conclude that this or that is not among these appointed means, *because* it does not engage our minds directly about the end. And this I suppose, after what I have said, must be sufficiently apparent.

Even with respect to prayer as the means of procuring those Divine influences by which the needful change is to be wrought in us, it is to be remembered that to be efficacious it must be offered earnestly in *faith*, that we must really desire what we ask for, and *we must ask in faith, nothing wavering*. Now those views of the Atonement of which we have been speaking may be highly useful, or even absolutely necessary to give us a sense of the importance of what we are asking for, and to give us confidence in asking. And whether they be fitted or not to do this is not to be determined by the degree in which they engage the mind directly about our moral renovation, but by their fitness to impress us with a sense of the deadly nature of the disease under which we naturally labour, and of God's readiness to relieve us from it.

III. From what has been said, I trust it appears sufficiently, that the fitness of a contemplation of the atoning work of Christ

to promote the great end of our moral renovation is not to be determined by any such considerations as those on which Mr Knox so confidently relies, as—that “it turns our thoughts away from the highest end of redemption, and fixes them upon a lower end;” or, that this work upon which it fixes them “was wrought eighteen hundred years ago;” or, that “it was wrought alike for all;” or, that “it only procures *salvability*, and not *salvation*,” or by anything of the same kind. I hope it will be felt by all who have followed me so far, that this question is only to be determined by considering what effects such contemplations are fitted to produce upon the mind and heart, and how far these effects constitute the moral renovation of which we speak, or are a part of it, or tend to produce it.

Now upon this question, Mr Knox’s mode of speaking of the views which he opposes is calculated to give a very false impression. He speaks of these views as if they offered to our thoughts the benefit procured by the Lord’s sacrifice, apart from the mode of procuring it,—as if they made the forgiveness of sins thereby procured merely the object of the sinner’s contemplations and the ground of his hopes. But it must be felt that this is a most fallacious representation. It must be known to every one that when we direct the thoughts and hearts of sinners to the CROSS OF CHRIST, as to the true ground of *faith*,—of confidence in GOD as a reconciled Father,—the true foundation of trust for pardon and acceptance with Him, we do not speak merely of what was *procured* there, but of what was *done, and suffered, and exhibited* there. In every exposition of such views, this is distinctly explained and dwelt on. And in every statement of their nature and effects, it is supposed that we know, Who it was that bore the pain and the shame of the Cross, and why, and for whom, He bore it. And when we know this, do we not find in this sacrifice for sin a manifestation at once of God’s hatred of sin and His love for sinners, to which no other exhibition of Himself makes any approach?

And if this be the case, assuredly in estimating the moral effects of a belief in the expiatory efficacy of the Redeemer’s sacrifice, Mr Knox was not at liberty to leave out of consideration what it exhibited of the Divine character in relation to sin and sinners. That those whom he opposes do not leave this out of consideration,—that, on the contrary, they do not attempt to trace the

moral effects of a belief in the Atonement to what it effected, apart from the way of effecting it, but that they rely always and much upon the latter, is well known: and this would be enough to make Mr Knox's proceeding unfair, even if they were wrong in laying such stress upon it.

But, in fact, I think it requires but little consideration of the case to see the reasonableness of ascribing to it all that is usually ascribed to it. I suppose it is generally felt that one of the greatest evils of the Fall, both in itself and in its effects, is that God no longer holds the place which He ought in our thoughts and affections; and that restoring Him to this place would be the surest means of restoring us to our lost estate: that as the alienation and fear with which we regard Him, are at once a proof of how low we have fallen, and the cause of still deeper degradation, so, if we were made to look upon Him with filial reverence and filial love, we should have at once evidence that we were raised from the depths into which we had sunk, and the surest pledge of the future progress of our renovation, because we should be brought under the operation of the most unfailing means of carrying it on. Now this change may certainly take place in us by an act of Almighty power: but it seems more consonant with analogy, as well as more in accordance with Scripture, to look on it as effected by means, which, however they need to be accompanied by Divine grace to give them efficacy, are yet in their own nature fitted to produce the effect: that as fear is excited in us by having danger presented to our apprehensions, and hope, by objects of desire offered to our expectations, so love, and every other feeling which religion demands of us are to be produced in our hearts in the same way; and that, if God is to be made an object of love and reverence to us, it is by having Him set before us in an aspect which is naturally fitted to raise these affections of our nature.

How eminently above all other manifestations of His character, that which we have in the *Atonement* is fitted to do this, I need not attempt to show here. It has been often shown by others; and I have in the preceding Discourses, and especially in the last four, endeavoured myself to show that the sacrifice of Christ furnishes us at once with a measure of God's holiness and of His love infinitely transcending all others; and moreover, that it does this in a way which is not merely fitted to convince the understanding, but to soften and subdue the heart. And if that stupendous sacri-

fice for sin furnishes, as nothing else can, the true measure of God's hatred of sin, and of His love towards sinners, we cannot doubt, that in including in saving faith, *distinct apprehensions of the expiatory design of our Redeemer's sacrifice of Himself, and explicit reliance on the satisfaction made thereby, as the ground of reconciliation with God, and of readmission to His favour*, we have in *faith* an instrument incomparably more efficacious in securing our moral renovation than it could be, if it did not include these apprehensions and this reliance. If such *faith*, in its immediate effects, *turns us away from the highest end of Redemption, to contemplate a lower end*, it thereby engages us in the consideration of objects which are above all others calculated to raise and refine the mind, and to melt and subdue the heart—it brings us under the influence of the character of God in the way most fitted to draw us near Him, and to make us like Him.

But though, in its immediate effects, it does not make our moral renovation present to our thoughts, or engage us in the direct pursuit of it, it does not follow that it exerts no influence upon this pursuit. As I remarked a little while ago, everything that gives us a deep sense of the malignity of the disease under which we labour, and a deep conviction of God's readiness to deliver us from it, cannot but be efficacious in engaging us and sustaining us in prayer for this blessing; and if we have, as I have said, in the Atonement, the most impressive proof that has ever been given of the odiousness of sin in God's sight, and at the same time the most affecting evidence of His readiness to receive sinners, to pardon them, to bless them, to do everything for them that remains to be done, we have in it too the strongest motive to pray for deliverance from the thralldom and the pollution of sin, and the firmest ground for the unwavering confidence which is necessary to make such prayers effectual. And moreover when, to maintain this confidence, we turn in this way, or direct others to turn, to the evidence which God has given us of His love in giving His Son to die for us, we may be sure that we cannot be wrong, for it is thus that the Apostle uses this proof of His love: "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?"—Rom. viii. 32.

IV. But, after all, it is according to the Scriptural promise on

which they rest, that the views which Mr Knox advocates, and those which he opposes must stand or fall. However unfair or weak his general reasoning may be—whether against what he calls “the forensic hypothesis,” or in support of the *hypothesis* which he attempts to substitute for it, under the name of “the moral idea of justification”—still, if the view which he advocates be sustained by sufficient proof from Holy Scripture, it is to be *thoroughly received and believed*; and that which he opposes, if it be found wanting in such proofs, is to be abandoned, whatever may be the apparent cogency of the reasoning by which it is supported.

It may seem, therefore, that what we have now to do is to examine the Scripture proofs on both sides. But when it is considered that the main purpose of this entire volume has been to establish the doctrine which Mr Knox rejects, (though I should not be disposed to uphold it in the form in which it sometimes appears in his statements of “the merely forensic system,” or “an exclusively forensic justification”); and that, moreover, for its establishment I have chiefly relied upon proofs from Scripture; and that I have not only given such proofs at length, but have considered at length the most important of the objections which have been urged against them, it will be felt that it would be preposterous to set about this work over again here. I must be content to refer to the text and Notes of this volume for those proofs and confirmations, and confine myself to a specimen or two of the Scriptural proofs on which Mr Knox relies for the establishment of the theory of justification which he upholds.

But first I shall quote one or two passages from which it will be seen what his theory really is. “I have largely allowed in the above paragraphs that *δικαίω* (to justify) means our being made just or righteous in the opinions of others, as well as being made actually so in ourselves. I have also meant fully to grant that St Paul often gives a prominence to the former sense when he ascribes the agency to God; and, indeed, I doubt not but, in this case, it is always included. It is included in the fact, and it must, of course, be so in the mind of so just a thinker. But what I am impressed with is, that our being reckoned righteous *coram Deo* (before God), always and essentially implies a substance of *δικαιοσύνη* (righteousness) previously implanted in us; and that our reputative justification is the strict and inseparable result

of this previous efficient moral justification. I mean that the reckoning us righteous indispensably presupposes an inward reality of righteousness on which this reckoning is founded."—'Remains,' vol. i. p. 278. And in another place he says of the Fathers: "They could not read the New Testament without conviction, that, though in some instances (as Rom. vi. 7, already quoted, and Rev. xxii. 11), it [*justification*] may descend, *strictly*, a moral interpretation; yet it very often, and for the greater part, implies what God in His gracious reckoning esteems us to be, as well as that which, by His almighty energy, he makes us to be."

What the doctrine held by this ingenious writer is does not lie open to any reasonable doubt, though there is some obscurity and uncertainty as to the meaning really assigned by him to the word *δικαιόω*. When it is said that the word "implies" a reputative as well as an efficient act, and that it "always includes" the former, it would seem that it must always *imply and include* the latter also. And thus it would appear to be intended that the word always stands for, not one act, but two! However, I do not believe that Mr Knox really meant to put forward this preposterous position, but that he was led into the statement which seems to convey it, through timidity. It seems very evident that he was reluctantly convinced of the true meaning of the word *δικαιόω*, but that he could not persuade himself to adopt it frankly and simply. He appears to have been afraid that if he distinctly and without qualification admitted that where the doctrine of *justification* is concerned, this word *expresses* properly what he calls the "reputative act," the advocates of the *forensic system* might be able to make too much of the admission; and, as a safeguard, he used the words "implies" and "includes" instead of "expresses" and "signifies," without clearly seeing the inference to which his language naturally led.

But, looking at the substance of his statements, it appears tolerably clear that his view of the doctrine is, that God first *makes us righteous* and then *accounts us righteous*, and that the *reputative act* is "inseparably dependent" on the previous efficient act, "as when God, in creation, first said, 'Let there be light, and there was light;' and then He saw that 'the light was good.'" So that when God *imputes righteousness* to us, it is the righteousness which he sees in us!

It will probably be thought that this is hardly consistent with the declarations in Scripture that we are *justified freely; justified by faith; justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*; and with the Protestant formula which embodies them, and which has been so decidedly adopted by our Church,—“that we are justified *by faith only*.” But they are reconcilable, it appears, notwithstanding. For even in the Articles, in which it is so distinctly declared that we are *justified by faith only*, it is also declared that *the faith* whereby we are justified is, “vera et viva fides,” from which good works, “necessario profluunt, ut planè ex illis æque viva fides argueri possit, atque arbor ex fructu judicari.” And Mr Knox asks—“Does not this, then, in the strongest and fullest sense describe faith as a root of righteousness, the seminal essence of *δικαιοσύνη*; and when it comes at all into God’s reckoning, must not the estimate accord with the fact. Being His own invaluable and exclusive work in us, must not the Divine idea which directed the efficient act equally direct the reputative act; and must not the Divine approbation of the work wrought be in proportion to the correspondence of the work with the Divine idea?”*

I have in the proper place in this volume considered and explained the most important statements of the doctrine of Justification which are to be found in the New Testament, and have sustained my interpretation of them by various confirmations direct and indirect. The true teaching of Scripture upon this great doctrine, thus explained and proved, is the best refutation of Mr Knox’s representation of the doctrine, and renders any other argument against it superfluous. But it is necessary for my purpose to look at one or two of the texts which he adduces as evidence of the agreement of his own statements with those of the Apostle.

“In order to prove that St Paul had this idea [*i. e.* that the reckoning as righteous indispensably presupposes an inward reality of righteousness on which this reckoning is founded] fixed in his mind, I will adduce two passages. First, 1 Cor. iv. 4, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑμαυτῷ σέβουσα· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τοιῷτῳ δοδικαίωμαι ὁ δὲ ἀνακρίνων με κύριός ἐστιν.

“I ask on what ground does St Paul here place his justification? Does he ever so directly [indirectly?] intimate that it

does not hinge on his own integrity, but depends on a certain extrinsic provision to which he is to look from himself for ultimate support against condemnation? If this had been in all his thoughts, this was the occasion for it to be manifested. The question related to his inmost and most essential welfare; his character in the Divine reckoning. Of his own innocence and uprightness, he is as conscious as he can be,—*οὐδὲν ἐμὰντῶ ἀνείκελ* (I am conscious to myself of nothing); yet, says he, *οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ δεδικαίωμαι* (am I not hereby justified). Why? because it was not the true rule of judging? By no means, this is not once hinted at; but solely because he himself was not the adequate judge. *ὁ δὲ ἀνακρίνων με κύριός ἐστιν*. Implying, as clearly as language can imply, that, in order to his being really justified, he must possess integrity of heart in God's view as well as in his own."

I have given the whole of Mr Knox's comment on the first text that he brings forward, as it furnishes a very fair and, I should hope, instructive specimen of his critical style. I should think that very few will read it without perceiving that all the writer's ingenuity is expended under a total mistake as to the meaning and application of the text. To any one who considers the text in its connexion, it will be plain that it relates, not to the Apostle's *justification* before God, as His creature, subject to His holy law and to His righteous judgment, but solely to his *justification* in reference to the discharge of his duty as an Apostle in connexion with the Church at Corinth, and with a special reference to the charges which had been brought against him by his enemies in that Church. It is strange, indeed, that the very words to which Mr Knox more especially refers—*οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ σέβουδα*—did not protect him from falling into such a mistake, or correct it. That the Apostle should make such a declaration with regard to his general account with God would seem so plainly impossible, that it ought to have been abundantly sufficient, if there were nothing else, to show that it was not about that account that he was speaking; and that, therefore, the text had really no application whatever to the point which Mr Knox wanted to establish.

This cannot be disputed. But it is possible that some of Mr Knox's followers may contend that the text furnishes a good argument in support of his views, though not a direct one. And it may be urged that, 'though it cannot be denied that the text does

refer *immediately* to the discharge of the Apostle's duties towards the Corinthian Church, and more especially to the calumnies against him which were circulated therein during his absence, yet this does not hinder that his views of the general principles of God's government should appear in what he says upon the particular case. His conscience acquits him in this matter, but he appeals to the final judgment as to that which alone can decide the question. He evidently hopes, however, that this judgment will ratify the decision of his conscience: that is, he evidently hopes that God will pronounce him innocent. Why? Because he is and feels himself to be innocent; and he is sure that the righteous Judge will therefore declare him innocent. But this expectation is not founded upon anything peculiar to the point in question, but upon the character of the Divine Judge, and the general principles of His government. And is it reasonable to suppose, that, when the question is not with regard to a part of his life, but the entire, the principles on which the trial is conducted and the sentence pronounced should be so entirely different: and the grounds on which the Apostle hopes, and teaches others to hope, for acquittal, so entirely different?

It is tolerably plain, I think, that this train of argument was not in Mr Knox's thoughts, but that the text was brought forward by him as furnishing a *direct* proof of St Paul's views of Justification. That would be of very little consequence, however, if the *indirect* proof which it supplies were a sound one. It is very easy to show that it is entirely fallacious. But first I think it well to remark that this is a case in which we might fairly refuse to look at any *indirect* proof. If we had been left without any direct evidence of what St Paul held and taught with respect to the justification of sinners, we should, of course, be obliged to endeavour to arrive at some conclusion about his views upon this momentous subject in the way of reasoning and inference; and, if the direct evidence were scanty, we might find it very necessary to extend it by indirect evidence. In either case, such an argument as the foregoing would deserve examination. But every one knows that there is hardly a single subject referred to in the Sacred Volume upon which we have such copious, varied, and conclusive *direct* evidence as this very one of the doctrine of Justification preached and taught by St Paul. And this being the case, to set about discussing the force of an argument which ignores all this

direct evidence, and attempts to derive the Apostle's views upon this subject *indirectly*, from what he says upon another subject, would seem to be very wanton and unjustifiable waste of time and labour.

And such no doubt it would really be, if the object of these remarks were to settle the doctrine of Justification; but my object in writing them is not to do this, but to provide a safeguard which may protect the doctrine, which I have elsewhere settled, from being unsettled. And with reference to that object, it may be worth while to go on to show that, apart from all objections to the use in this case of any argument of the class to which it belongs, this argument is in itself entirely fallacious.

And first I must say that no reader of the Bible ought to find any difficulty in the fact that St Paul had one ground of hope before God, when his discharge of his duty in a particular relation to his fellow men is concerned; and another, and a very different ground of hope, when the discharge of his duty both to God and to his neighbour, at all times and for all his past life, is in question. For the Word of God not only supplies us with the grounds and reasons of the difference between the two cases, but with examples of other servants of the Most High who felt the difference as strongly and expressed the feeling no differently as St Paul does.

Thus Job seems at times to maintain his own innocence in heart and life, and to appeal to, and almost to challenge, the judgment of God, as if he felt confident that the result of a trial before an Omniscient Judge must be a triumphant acquittal. For there is no lack of other passages in which he confesses most unequivocally that he is unable to abide such a judgment,—that no man can be just with God;—that if God pleads against him, *he cannot answer Him one of a thousand*:—that at the bar of his Judge his place was that of a suppliant,—that if he *justified* himself,—maintained his own innocence,—his own mouth would condemn him. These and other earnest declarations to the same effect show a very different state of feeling from that which these men seemed to express. But the apparent inconsistency between such passages is removed, when we understand that the appeals to the Divine judgment, and the deprecations of it, are with reference to different questions;—that he seeks the judgment of God with reference to the question which lay between himself and his neigh-

friends, as to the charges which they brought against him of hypocrisy and secret sin; that he shrank from the Divine judgment, upon the question of his guilt or innocence as the creature of God, and the subject of His righteous government.

Again, every reader of the Psalms must be acquainted with the similar passages, in which David expresses the same difference of feeling with reference to the different cases. When man is concerned, he says, "Judge me, O Lord, according to my righteousness, and according to mine integrity that is in me." But as regards his account with God, his language is: "If thou, Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?" And his prayer, therefore, is: "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, O Lord, for in thy sight shall no man living be justified."

Here are parallel cases, which ought to make it easy to reconcile what St Paul says, 1 Cor. iv. 4, with the true doctrine of Justification as it is elsewhere set forth by him. The Apostle feels conscious that he had discharged his duty to the Corinthians with such zeal and fidelity as not merely left no just ground for the gross charges which they had so readily received against him, but none for any complaint whatever against him on their part. His conscience acquits him perfectly so far. But he says that he does not feel that the question is even thus absolutely decided. Bearing in mind his frailty and the liability of his judgment to err, particularly when his own conduct is concerned, though he will not submit to the judgment of those who had shown themselves so unfair towards him, neither will he rely entirely upon his own: he remits the case between him and his calumniators to the Judge who cannot err. His conscience bore testimony to his innocence both as to his conduct and his motives. And this being the case, he is confident that he may appeal to the judgment of God, even in that great day when all disguises shall be stripped off, and when not merely men's acts but all the secret springs of their actions shall stand unveiled.

There is nothing that is not easily understood in this. That, upon this point, Paul should have felt sure of his innocence, and that, being conscious of his innocence, he should expect that God the righteous Judge would declare him innocent, or *justify* him in this matter, is perfectly intelligible.

But how does this apply to the *justification* with which Mr Knox was really concerned? That *justification* has reference to

a man's conduct and to the state of his heart, in every relation in which he stands, including the highest relation of all, his relation to God, and that at every moment, and during all his past life.

No doubt if a man's conscience testifies to his faithful discharge of all his duties towards God and towards his neighbour, as Paul's bore him witness that he was blameless as regarded the Corinthians, then he may expect plenary *justification* at God's hands, as confidently as St Paul expected to be *justified*, in respect of his duties to the Corinthian Church, and upon the same grounds, namely, that the judgment of God must be in accordance with the truth. But is there any one whose conscience bears such testimony? Did St Paul's? Was it in this confidence that he drew nigh to God for justification?

We are allowed to see little more of the Apostle's conversion in the history than the outward part of the process by which he was brought to God. But while what we are told leaves no doubt that that process ended in his justification by his righteous Judge, there is little to suggest the notion that this justification was sought or obtained in the way or on the grounds in which he expected to be *justified* in the particular case to which the text quoted by Mr Knox relates. When he is arrested in his mad career of opposition to the Lord, we see him smitten to the earth; we hear him in self-abasement and terror asking of the Lord what He would have him to do; we find him then, after three days' fasting, still praying, and we see a messenger sent to restore his sight, to declare to him the gracious purpose for which the Lord had chosen him, and to seal his forgiveness by admitting him to baptism. That the Apostle was then justified, no one can doubt. It is true that, for anything that is told us expressly in the history, he may in the interval have pleaded with God the sincerity of his purposes and the integrity of his heart. He must have acknowledged that the course which he was pursuing was a mistaken one. But he may have urged that he had entered upon it under a real zeal for God's honour, and that all through, he had been acting honestly up to his light; and being "conscious to himself of nothing," he may have humbly but confidently appealed to the judgment of God.

It is possible, no doubt, so far as the history goes, that all this may have taken place. But there are few, I should think, who

will be disposed to imagine that this or anything like this, was what was going on between the chosen Apostle and his Judge, during those three days which he spent in darkness, and fasting, and prayer. But if there were any one found to maintain such a position, there are materials enough, and to spare, in his writings to enable us decidedly to disprove it. I may pass over all his statements with respect to *justification*, of the way in which it must be sought, and the ground on which it is bestowed; because however clear they are, they are, we know, still matter of dispute. We may confine ourselves to what he says of himself before his conversion, as abundantly sufficient to show that he could not have put forward his "integrity of heart" in the course which he had taken, as justifying him in the judgment of his own conscience, and so warranting him in expecting to be justified by the righteous judgment of God. For, years after, when he had been long in the full enjoyment of God's favour as a tried, and faithful, and honoured servant, we find him looking back upon that part of his life, not with the satisfaction with which the retrospect of his course as the founder and pastor of the Corinthian church filled his mind, but with deep and bitter remorse. His conscience is so far from being at perfect ease with regard to this persecution of the Church of Christ, that it testifies against him as, on that very ground, the *chief of sinners*. He does not regard himself as acquitted by the righteous judgment of God, but as spared by His mercy, and made a monument of His grace, for the encouragement of all who should thereafter believe in the Lord, and for the confirmation of their faith.

But enough has been said to show not only that the text which Mr Knox quotes has no *direct* application whatever to the point which he regards it as establishing, but that it cannot be made to furnish an *indirect* argument in its support.

There is a further Scripture proof connected with the same point, which I think worth quoting, if it were only as an additional illustration of his style. He says, "A farther insight into the Apostle's design may be obtained by closely observing his various application of those significant words which he so frequently introduces, *δικαίωσις*, *δικαίωσις*, and *δικαιοσύνη*. It is, in fact, on the precise meaning of these three words, which evidently resolve themselves into one common notion, that the question de-

pends whether the great benefit on which he expatiates be of a forensic or a moral nature.

"That in the course of this Epistle every one of these words is used in a moral sense cannot be disputed. For example, *δικαιῶν*, in Rom. vi. 7, where *δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, is rendered by our own translators, 'freed from sin.' *Δίκαιος*, also, is undeniably used to signify a morally righteous man in Rom. vi. 7; and it is equally clear that in Rom. vi. 13, the *δικαιοσύνη*, to which our members are to be yielded as instruments, can be no other than moral righteousness*."

I need not dwell on the misapprehension of the question which is exhibited in this passage. It is only a particular instance, and by no means an extreme one, of the kind of unconscious sophistry which pervades all Mr Knox's reasoning on this subject. Any instances which could be produced of the use of *δικαιῶν* in a *moral*, or contradistinguished from a *forensic* sense—that is to say, in the sense of *to make righteous*, instead of *to count or declare righteous*—would no doubt be pertinent to Mr Knox's purpose; but it seems strange that he could imagine that his argument gained anything by examples of the use of *δίκαιος*, or *δικαιοσύνη*, in a *moral* sense. It never occurred to any one, I suppose, to doubt, not merely that these words are used in a *moral* sense, but that such is their proper sense; and that it is their common use in Scripture. Indeed it will be seen in Note Z how very little the argument for the *forensic* sense of *δικαιῶν* is affected, if it be supposed that *δικαιοσύνη* is never used in any other sense. But my object in quoting the passage from Mr Knox here is merely to consider the example which he gives of the use of *δικαιῶν* in a *moral* sense.

He seems to think that our version of the text shows that the English translators agreed with him in this view of the meaning of the word. It may be that they did; but certainly it seems strange to find evidence of this agreement in the translation. If the word *δεδικαίωται* stood alone, and they had rendered it by "he.....is freed from sin," his inference might seem to have some foundation. But as it is combined with *ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, there is no more reason for supposing that they thought that St Paul used *δικαιῶν* in "a moral sense," than for supposing that they ascribed any moral sense themselves to the English verb "to free."

* Remains, Vol. II. p. 20.

How *δεδικαιώται* expresses "he is freed" is very intelligible. Its proper meaning, as has been shown, is, "he has been declared innocent," "he has been acquitted," &c. : and, as the fruit or effect of such a sentence is to *set a man FREE*, the word may be used by a common figure to express simply the effect without the cause—the fact, that is, of *being set free*, without including the particular mode of obtaining such freedom,—whether by a judicial sentence or otherwise.

If it were necessary to account for St Paul's use of this word, which expresses his meaning by a figure, in preference to the familiar one which would express it literally, and which he uses elsewhere, I suppose we should not have far to go for a reason. We often see that when an earnest writer has been led in the course of an argument to use important words repeatedly in their proper sense, he will go on to use them *per se tortu*, rather than introduce new words, which would express his meaning more exactly and easily, but with some loss of impressiveness.

And this is peculiarly a character of St Paul's style. Thus, in this Epistle, having had occasion to speak often of *the Law* as furnishing, not only a rule of life, but also a principle of action, he goes on to use the word to express not merely things different from the Law but contrasted with it. Anything, in fact, which, like the *Law*, furnishes an operative principle, more or less efficacious, whether acting in accordance with it or in opposition to it, is for a time a *law*. Thus, there is a *law of faith*, as well as a *law of works*; he finds a *law in his members*, a *law in his mind*; a *law of sin*, as well as a *law of God*; a *law of sin and death*, as well as a *law of the spirit of life*, &c. So here, having used *δικαίωσις* frequently in its full meaning, he prefers going on to use it, though he only wants a part of the entire sense. He wants only to express *released* or *set free*, but he chooses to express it by this verb, which properly expresses a special mode of setting free, though all that it adds to the simple notion seems to be superfluous; or, if pressed closely, rather in the way.

How death may be said to give this freedom may admit of some difference of explanation. The doctrine which he is explaining and establishing seems to be, that Christ having paid the penalty of sin by his death, Believers, having died with Him, are freed from all demands or claims of the Law. But in the words *ὁ γὰρ ἀποθάνων κ.τ.λ.*, he seems to lay down a general principle or

maxim from which this particular case is to be inferred. And therefore the words "For he that is dead is freed from sin" are probably to be understood merely as a statement of the common principle that death pays all debts, cancels all bonds, dissolves all obligations,—“There the prisoners rest together, they hear not the voice of the oppressor.”—Job iii. 18. Or perhaps, more particularly, that it brings a release to the slave: “And the servant is free from his master.”—Ib. 19. This last appears more likely to be what the Apostle intends, from the way in which he afterwards dwells upon our natural relation to sin as a master.

But, however this be settled, it does not affect the question as to the meaning of *δεδικαίωται*. Whatever be the grounds or reasons on which the assertion rests, the meaning of the word is the same. It is simply as our translators have rendered it, “he is freed*.” And unless it be true that when a sentence expresses or relates to a moral state, act, or process, every word in the sentence must have “a moral sense,” there is no reason for taking this text as an example of the use of *δικαίωσις* in “a moral sense.”

Mr Knox refers to another text which he regards as also furnishing an example of this “moral use” of the verb. Having said, “I must strongly question, however, whether it is used, on any occasion, in this latter reputative sense, except as recognising a moral quality in the subject which is in its nature acceptable to God, and therefore meets His merciful, but, at the same time, His righteous approbation. For ‘we know,’ says St Paul, ‘that the judgment of God is according to truth.’—Rom. ii. 2,” he adds “I am strengthened in this persuasion by the import of the word *Δικαιωθέντες* in Rom. v. 9.” I omit for a moment his proof, and only subjoin the conclusion: “That the word expresses *what* the persons were in the Divine estimation is undeniable; but its place in the sentence, and its connexion with the preceding terms, no less certainly oblige us to understand it as implying that God had made them substantially righteous by His gracious influence, as well as accounted them righteous by His own merciful estimation.” Ib. pp. 21, 22.

* In the subsequent part of the chapter the same characters are twice spoken of as *ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, 18, 22.

How far Mr Knox's argument is from proving this conclusion, we shall see by and by. What I am anxious here to point out is, how far the conclusion itself, supposing it to be established, falls short of what he was concerned to prove. In fact, the most strenuous supporter of the "forensic hypothesis" might freely admit, without any detriment to his views, that, in this or any other passage, the word *δικαιωθέντες* is so used as to make it plain that the Apostle understood it as *implying* all that Mr Knox says is here implied by it. This might be admitted, I say, without determining anything that is at issue between him and his opponents as to the meaning of *δικαίω*. For it is to be remembered that *δικαιωθέντες* means *having been justified**: that it is used with respect not to those who were at the time *being justified* by God, but of those who had been justified by Him, and who were in the actual enjoyment of all the privileges and blessings into which sinners are brought by that gracious act. Now, according to the view which Mr Knox opposes, no less than his own, sanctification is one of the blessings and privileges of the state into which they had been brought. According to both views, therefore, all who could be spoken of as *δικαιωθέντες* would be in a course of moral training, and so in a state of holiness more or less advanced: so that, whether *δικαίω* means *to make righteous*, or *to declare righteous*, *δικαιωθέντες* might be used in such a connexion as to *imply that God had made the persons so designated substantially righteous*. And this being the case, if the word were so used,—as nothing would thereby be implied but what according to both views must be true,—nothing would be done to decide between them. It would still remain to be decided whether the act of justification consisted in, or included this moral change, as Mr Knox maintains; or whether the moral change was subsequent to, and in an important sense a consequence of their *justification*, as those whom he opposes maintain.

But the fact is, that the word does not seem to be so used in the particular passage as to imply this truth. And the argu-

* In our version it is rendered "being justified." But *justification* is used both for an act, and for its effect,—for the divine act by which sinners are pardoned and accepted, and for the state of pardon and acceptance into which they are brought by that act. And so, *to be justified* means either *to be in a state of justification*, or *to be put into that state*; and *being justified*, in the former sense, is the consequence of, and therefore equivalent to, *having been justified*, in the latter sense.

ment by which Mr Knox attempts to prove that it is so used is entirely fallacious. I give it in full: "The Apostle had just stated as an enhancement of the Divine love to man, that, when we were neither good nor righteous, but 'as yet sinners, Christ died for us: much more, then,' he adds, 'being justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him.' The argument is simply this: if God was so gracious when the moral disposition had nothing in it engaging, but everything offensive, now when we bear a better character, are we not still more certain of His mercy? The Apostle's reasoning admits of no other construction; and therefore we must attribute a moral meaning to the word *δικαιωθέντες* (whatever else it may include), as otherwise there would be no logical ground for an *à fortiori* conclusion. Besides, it is obvious that as *ἁμαρτωλοί* is opposed to *δίκαιος* and *ἀγαθός*, so in like manner is *δικαιωθέντες* opposed to *ἁμαρτωλοί*: the contrast being not more clear in the former instance, than in the latter."

This is the proof of the conclusion given above. And whatever force it may seem to have when the verses upon which Mr Knox comments are considered *apart*, will at once disappear, when they are looked at in their proper connexion with the following one.

No doubt the words *ἁμαρτωλοί* and *δικαιωθέντες* stand in opposition; but the foundation of the opposition is not the difference of the *moral state* of the parties, but the difference of their *relation* to God—as *enemies* and as *reconciled*. That sinners are in a state of enmity towards God is sufficiently set forth in the beginning of the Epistle. And that the effect of justification is to alter this state, and to re-establish peace between Him and them, is set forth in the outset of the chapter as a clear inference from what had been previously laid down with respect to justification—"Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God." And it is this difference,—the difference in their *relation* to God,—which is the foundation of the *à fortiori* argument that the Apostle employs. The extraordinary mercy bestowed upon them, while they were yet in a state of *enmity*, is the ground for the confident expectation which they are encouraged to entertain, that all that is needed to complete this act of grace will be added to them, now that they are in a state of *reconciliation*. It is not merely that this is a sufficient ground for the argument *à fortiori* in the case, but that

the Apostle goes on to show very clearly that it was actually the ground on which it rested in his mind. Having first stated the argument *à fortiori*, as commented on by Mr Knox, he subjoins an explanation, embodying a restatement of it, which seems to leave no room for doubt upon that point. Here is the argument: "But God commendeth His love towards us, in that, *while we were yet sinners*, Christ died for us. *Much more then, being now justified by His blood*, we shall be saved from wrath through Him." And then follows the explanation: "For, if, *when we were enemies*, we were *reconciled to God* by the death of His Son, *much more, being reconciled*, we shall be saved by His life." It is evident here that the contrast is, as I said, between a state of *enmity* and a state of *reconciliation*; and that the argument is, that when such amazing love and mercy were shown to *enemies*, *à fortiori*, now that they have become *friends*, they may expect that all that is needed will be given to them.

I might go on, but this is quite enough for my purpose. I trust that the remarks in I, II, III, upon the fallacies in Mr Knox's general reasoning, and these examples of the unsoundness of his Scriptural proofs may serve as a safeguard against a work by which many, I believe, have been led into great error upon this fundamental doctrine, and many more are in danger of being beguiled in the same way.

NOTE Y. PAGE 216.

Upon the Gospel Doctrine of Reward.

I am aware that the doctrine of this Sermon is liable to be misconceived and abused by all who are ignorant of the Gospel: and that it is likely to startle and offend many who know and value it. I have felt bound, in putting it forward, to take all reasonable precautions to obviate abuses of it, and to conciliate prejudices against it. But, finding it clearly taught in God's Word, I did not feel that I should be warranted in holding it back, under any apprehensions of the way in which it might be received. And I have the satisfaction of knowing that it has been found in the Bible, in the form in which I have stated it, by those with

whom I am most anxious to agree. I have prefixed to the Sermon an extract from the Augsburg Confession, in which the doctrine is very distinctly laid down, that *after the person is accepted in Christ by faith, his obedience is pleasant in God's sight, and is accounted righteousness in a certain sense, and deserves reward*. Postea vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem et reputari quandam justitiam, et mereri præmia. And the writers repeat the assertion and the caution most distinctly in the Article, *De bonis Operibus*. They say that the grounds on which our insufficient obedience is pleasing to God are necessary to be taught, Non enim ideo placet quia legi satisfaciatur sed quia personæ reconciliatæ et justæ sunt propter Christum, et credunt sibi condonari imbecillitatem suam. Sic Paulus docet, *Nulla nunc est condemnatio, &c.* Quamquam igitur hæc nova obedientia procul abest a perfectione legis tamen est justitia et meretur præmia *ideo quia personæ reconciliatæ sunt*. The same doctrine is taught in the Saxon Confession, Article IX., *Quomodo placeat nova obedientia*, and Article X., *De Præmiis*. And in the XVIth Article of the Helvetic Confession, the question is very fully opened, and the same principles are most distinctly laid down. Placent vero approbanturque a Deo opera quæ a nobis fiunt, per fidem. Quia illi placent Deo propter fidem in Christum, qui faciunt opera bona; quæ insuper per Spiritum Sanctum ex gratia Dei sunt facta. Etenim docemus Deum bona operantibus amplam dare mercedem, juxta illam prophetiæ sententiam, Jerem. xxxi. Isaïæ iv. *Cohibe vocem tuam a fletu: quoniam erit merces operi tuo*. In Evangelio quoque dixit Dominus, Matt. v. x. *Gaudete et exultate, quia merces vestra multa et in caelis*. *Et qui dederit uni ex minimis meis poculum aquæ frigidæ, amen dico vobis, non perdet mercedem suam*. Referimus tamen mercedem hanc, quam Dominus dat, non ad meritum hominis accipientis, sed ad bonitatem, vel liberalitatem, et veritatem Dei promittentis, atque dantis. Qui cum nihil debeat cuicumque, promittit tamen suis cultoribus fidelibus mercedem daturum: qui inferni dat etiam ut ipsum colant. Sunt multa præterea indigna Deo, et imperfecta plurima inveniuntur in operibus etiam Sanctorum, quia vero Deus recipit in gratiam, et complectitur propter Christum operantes, mercedem eis promissam persolvit — And among the Articles agreed upon by both sides at the Conference at Altona-burg was "Bona opera habere præmia tum in præsentibus tum in

eterna vita." But I believe that there is no opposition of views among the early Protestant divines upon the point, though there may be considerable difference in the degree of distinctness or prominence which it has in their statements. Tyndall, it is true, seems to say very hard things against the doctrine, "If I worke for a worldly purpose, I get no reward in Heaven; even so if I worke for heaven, or a hyer place in heaven, I get then no reward. But I must do my worke for the love of my neighbour, because he is my brother, and the price of Christes blood, and because Christ hath deserved it, and desireth it of me, and then my reward is great in heaven."—*Answer to M. More.* In *A Pathway into the Holy Scriptures*, he holds the same language. After exhibiting Christ's free love to sinners as the proper object of their imitation; and shewing that we cannot either do or forbear to do anything, to procure heaven itself, without doing wrong to His blood, he adds, "Neither that I loke for a higher rounne in heaven for that were the pride of Lucifer," and he elsewhere speaks in the same tone. I should be sorry to find myself differing from Tyndall upon any important point. I persuade myself, however, that there is no real difference between us here; but that his disapprobation is directed against an abuse of the doctrine, against which I have attempted carefully to guard, and which I should be ready to condemn in as severe language as any that he employs. He says distinctly that "We know that good deedes are rewarded, both in this lyfe and in the lyfe to come;" but he feels that to make these rewards the motive of obedience to God, is inconsistent with the character of a Christian; and this I have endeavoured to express in Sermon XL.: and to show that the leading principle of Christian obedience is love to God. I have been anxious to assign to this principle of self-love a place strictly subordinate; and, even in this way, I am aware that it can be spoken of safely, only when it is spoken of with very great caution, when the true foundation has been very carefully laid, and is never suffered to pass away from the memory. I have not only laboured to present it in this way, but I hope I have done something in this ninth Sermon to clear up the Christian doctrine of future rewards, by shewing its connexion with Christian discipline, and with the effects of a course of obedience upon the character of the Believer; and I meant to explain, that the only form in which I think it desirable or allowable that it should

operate upon us, is by giving us a deeper sense of the momentous importance of every part of our appointed course; and that it is fitted to do this by showing us upon such intelligible principles, how unending may be the consequences of every part of that course. But my views upon this part of the subject are expressed with even more distinctness in a Discourse delivered subsequently to the same Congregation; and as the question is one of such great importance, and so liable to be misunderstood, I shall venture to subjoin the concluding passage of that Sermon, as the best mode that I can take of setting in a clear light the practical application of the doctrine which I have been anxious here to teach.

“But is it necessary to our advancement in the divine life that we should constantly bear about us the anxieties to which such views seem calculated to give rise? Are we to carry into daily life, and all its most trivial concerns, this painful recollection of the connexion of each with the formation of our character; and through this connexion, the effects of each upon our physical well-being? Certainly not. It is neither necessary nor desirable that we should do thus. This would be to assign a constant anxiety to what was designed to be but occasional in its operation; it would have a tendency to exalt into the chief place that which was designed to be but a subsidiary motive; it would be keeping out of view the main principles which conduct is designed to call into action; and so would be frustrating rather than promoting the main end of the discipline of life. What is most to be desired is that, *having received the kingdom of God as little children, we should so walk therein,—that we should walk in love.* It is not necessary for the full effect of the bodily exercises of childhood in strengthening the frame, that the child who performs them should be aware of their effect upon his health and vigour, and upon the comfort of his maturer years. It is not necessary for the best effects of the mental exercises which parental care prescribes to him in early youth, that he should be able to see in them the materials of all his future powers of intellectual exertion, of his habits of self-command; the foundation of the respectability and happiness of his after-life. The perception of the connexion is in no wise necessary; and it would be manifestly injurious that it should be constantly borne in mind by those who are capable of perceiving it. Still the connexion is not for this

the less real, or the less important; nor are the consequences of neglecting such salutary exercises, mental or bodily, a jot less sure. And, though those who perceive it clearly would certainly impede the best effects of such courses by constantly bearing it in mind, it might manifestly be useful and even necessary to read it occasionally to their recollection, in order to quicken their diligence and to impress upon them more deeply the danger and the folly of negligence and sloth.

“Even so, those who are walking now as God’s *dear children*, who are enabled to wait upon Him in the humble, docile, and tender frame of mind that becomes that endearing relation, to follow the course which He has prescribed to them, looking for no reason beyond this—that their Father has commanded it;—acquiescing meekly in His appointments, submitting patiently to His chastisements, and obeying humbly his commands,—in them, the transforming process, which is to fit them for the *glory, and honour, and immortality* of the life to come, is assuredly going on here, whether they have ever cast a thought upon it or not. They are, doubtless, the blessed subjects of the Spirit’s teaching, and in them is his happiest work advancing, whether they can trace its progress or not:—whether they can understand the mode of its operation or not. But religion embraces wide diversities of character; and, though its aim and its effect are to produce in all, the great features of resemblance which mark the children of one family, it by no means seeks to obliterate those minor differences which are not incompatible with the closest kindred—nay, differences, which are finally to disappear under its teaching, it eradicates patiently, and wisely takes advantage of while they remain. The end of religion is to bring all who *name the name of Christ* under the dominion of THE LOVE OF GOD. But, in the progress of our pupilage, it does not refuse to employ, in their proper place, subsidiary motives in aid of the main one, and to accommodate them to the various intellectual habits of individuals, and to the diversities of their moral state. Under all temptations to delay obedience to the call of duty, there are many who will be preserved by the knowledge that such delay is an act of real disobedience to their gracious Father; of real ingratitude to their dear Redeemer; that it is *grieving THE SPIRIT, by whom they are sealed to the day of redemption*. But there are doubtless some whose resolution against such temptations may be strengthened,

and in whom wholesome habits of caution against their own known deceitfulness may be infixed more deeply, by having thus impressed upon them the views which I have been unfolding, of the peculiar connexion of this world with the eternal world that awaits us; by being taught, hence, to regard in their true character the negligence and sloth, and procrastination, of which we are prone to think so lightly,—to see how awful their effects are, and how enduring they may be; that they are impeding that work in our hearts which it is the great business of the Spirit's teaching to effect there—that they are preparing for us sharp chastisement in the present life, or impairing for ever the glory and the happiness of the life which is to come."

NOTE Z. PAGE 221.

On the word Δικαιοσύνη.

Having settled the meaning of δικαιόω and of πίστις; and shown the connexion which Scripture declares to exist between the things for which they stand,—between the Divine act, which the former word expresses, and that state of mind of the sinner who is the object of the act, which is expressed by the latter word;—and having also endeavoured to fix the proper sense of λογίζομαι; I did not think it necessary to explain any of the other words which occur in the Scriptural statements of the doctrine of *Justification*. But though, strictly speaking, enough had been done for my purpose, yet I have seen reason since to regret that I did not add something on another important word which is connected etymologically with the first of the foregoing words, and which is often found in close connexion with both the others, in doctrinal statements, more especially in the writings of St Paul;—I mean the word δικαιοσύνη.

In proceeding to supply this omission, I shall begin by a quotation from KNOX'S REMAINS, a publication of which I have spoken more fully in another place (see Note X).

The passage is as follows:—

"I beg leave to make one more philological remark, not with reference to these passages, but to the general subject. I wonder

the continual use of the word *δικαιοσύνη* (righteousness), where the subject of justification is treated of, has not led learned men to suspect the soundness of the merely forensic theory. I apprehend that nothing could be more inapplicable than a Greek noun ending in *οσύνη*, to a mere business of *reputation* or *extrinsic change*. All such substantives seem to me, without exception, to express actual and personal habits, rooted in the mind and manifested in the conduct; at least the latter is implied invariably. I allow a vulgar writer, in any language, might overlook such a nicety, but to say nothing of that divine superintendence, and that knowledge of tongues, which St Paul had so abundantly from heaven, he was himself too excellent a critic to have overlooked such a rule in language."

Then follow some examples of St Paul's critical exactness in the use of language, which I must pass over*, and Mr Knox proceeds:—

* One of these examples furnishes so very characteristic a specimen of Mr Knox's style of criticism, that, though I am obliged to omit it above, I must find a place for it, though not a very suitable one, here:—

"It is a curious fact that St Paul has evinced his critical exactness in this identical instance. He says to Festus, *Οὐ μαίνομαι, κράτιστε φῆστε δὲ ἄν' ἀληθείας καὶ σωφροσύνης ῥήματα ἀποφθέγγομαι*, Acts xxvi. 25. But when he expresses exactly the same idea in 2 Tim. i. 7, *Οὐ γὰρ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς πνεῦμα δειλίας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἀγάπης, καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ*, he uses not *σωφροσύνη* (the principle of sobriety), but *σωφρονισμός* (the act of being sober). Why? I presume because he had already inserted the word *πνεῦμα* spirit, in the strict sense of *temper* or *habit* though not excluding the Divine Spirit, whose fruit all virtuous tempers are; and consequently to have used an additional term, which also signifies temper or habit, would have implied a palpable solecism. To escape this, therefore, the Apostle had recourse to a word which signified not *the habit*, but the *abstract act*; and by this means he expressed his meaning, not with strength and clearness merely, but with absolute elegance."—*Remains*, Vol. i. p. 277.

I suppose this might be left to my readers without much risk, but I must make one or two remarks upon it. Derivatives ending in *ία* from adjectives or attributives have just the same signification as those ending in *οσύνη*. Both express the abstract of the concretes from which they are derived. So that if *πνεῦμα σωφροσύνης* would be a palpable solecism, on account of the signification of words of the class to which the latter word belongs, *πνεῦμα δειλίας* to say nothing of either of the other genitives) is, for the same reason, "a palpable solecism." And this being the case, even if one could not see his way through Mr Knox's comment, ought he not to feel some distrust in its soundness, when he sees the Apostle using without scruple, at the beginning of the sentence, the very same "palpable solecism" which he is represented as so careful to avoid at the end? But, taking Mr Knox's explanation of *πνεῦμα* without stopping to question it, is it not easy to show that the

"Is it then credible that St Paul should be almost continually applying a word which he uses oftener than any other single word

solecism is imaginary in both cases? For might not both be regarded as instances of a use of the genitive... in classical Greek, almost confined to poetry, but not uncommon in the New Testament, from the Hebrew... in which it stands in the place of an adjective, though more elevated and emphatic? And so πνεῦμα δειλίας would = πνεῦμα δειλόν; and πνεῦμα σωφροσύνης (if he had used it) would = πνεῦμα σῶφρον, and would be no more a solecism than this latter phrase is.

But it may be asked, If it were thus open to the Apostle to use this familiar word, why did he prefer the more unusual one? This is a question to be answered only under protest, if at all. I am sure that I should be very often unable to give a good reason for my own use of one word rather than another, which, on looking back at what I had written, it might seem more natural to have used. I could hardly be surprised, therefore, at finding a difficulty of the same kind, or a good many difficulties of the same kind, in St Paul's writings or in any others. But at all events I cannot allow that my inability (if I should be unable) to assign a satisfactory reason for St Paul's using *σωφροσύνης* instead of *σωφροσύνης*, ought to be taken as a proof that Mr Knox has assigned the right reason, even if I had not shown that the reason assigned by him was not entitled to any weight, and that, in point of fact, the Apostle did not attach any weight to it.

I say this, however, entirely for the sake of those who may be dissatisfied with the reason which I am about to offer, and not because I myself feel any distrust in its soundness. I think, then, that the Apostle did not use *σωφροσύνης* just because he did not want a word which expressed "the principle of sobriety," or "a sound mind," or any such *habit* or *temper*. If he had wanted a word of that signification, I think it very unlikely that he would have looked beyond the one which was so familiar to him. So far I agree with Mr Knox; but, on the other hand, I do not think that what the Apostle wanted was a word to express *the abstract act of being sober*. Both the principle and the practice were no doubt essential to a ruler in the Church. But I do not think that it is the Apostle's purpose, in the place, to insist upon the power of *self-government*, but upon the power of *governing others*.

In the former quality, there does not appear to be the least reason to suppose that Timothy was in any respect deficient. Indeed, there is something in the First Epistle which seems to show that he was rather too self-denying. In exhorting him to be circumspect and faithful in the exercise of the power of ordaining, the Apostle says: "Lay hands suddenly on no man, neither be thou partaker of other men's sins: keep thyself pure." Here, however, as if, in writing the words *καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ*, it struck upon his mind how very little Timothy needed such an exhortation as regarded his own habits, he pauses to subjoin, parenthetically, a paternal injunction to him to relax the strictness of his own way of living, in consideration of his health. And he then goes on to show that the exhortation to him not to make himself partaker of the sins of others, by laying hands *suddenly* upon those who are unfit for the office, is not an unreasonable one, for that though the sins of some are secret, and not to be known before the great day, those of others are open, and, as it were, *go before them to the Judgment*; and are therefore to be known even now, if the needful time and diligence be expended in the investigation.

whatever*, and the real force of which he could not but know, in an unnatural and inadmissible sense, especially when he had in readiness the much more flexible word *δικαίωσις* (justification), and actually uses it, at least in two instances, where the sense

But however unimpeachable Timothy's character was, so far as self-government is concerned, it is by no means clear that he had not fallen somewhat short in the discharge of the duty of governing others. Warmly affectionate as the exhortations in the Second Epistle are, there is something in them, both in matter and tone, which forcibly suggests that, whether through youth or from some natural softness of character, he had to some extent yielded to the difficulties which he had encountered in the government of the Churches. So that it had become necessary, as it seems, to exhort him to *stir up* the gift which had been bestowed upon him at his consecration—language which shows that the Apostle felt sure that it was not extinct, but which at the same time intimates very clearly that he thought it was dormant. And he reminds him that this gift was not a *spirit of timidity*, but a spirit *δυνάμει, καὶ ἀγάπῃ, καὶ σωφροσμουῖ*. It is evident here that his description of what the gift was, forms a much better contrast to his description of what it was not, if *σωφροσμουῖς* means *rule* or *discipline*, than if it means *moderation*; *keeping others sober*, than *being sober*, or *keeping ourselves sober*. And the whole course of the exhortation (beginning here and resumed ii. 1-7) has so much more reference to the qualities which are required for the exercise of discipline in the Church than to those which are required for self-government, that even if *σωφροσμουῖς* might have either sense indifferently there can be little doubt, I think, that we ought to choose the former, in this place.

But the reasons for regarding this as the proper meaning of the word, everywhere, seem to be very strong. It is true that Chrysostom and Theodoret appear to fluctuate only between the senses of *governing ourselves*, and *being governed* by the Spirit: and take no notice of this sense of *governing others*, which is first brought in, *in addition*, by Theophylact. But, on the other hand, usage is decidedly in favour of this last meaning. The word is found, I believe, only in the sense of *chastisement, correction, ecclesiastical censure* or *punishment*, or something of that kind. It occurs, indeed, but in few instances—only here in the New Testament, not at all in the LXX., and rarely elsewhere—but they all agree with the general rule according to which words of the class to which it belongs derivatives in *μεν*, ought to have an active and not a passive or a middle sense; and usage, though limited, has more weight when it is in accordance with a general rule, than it would be entitled to if it were without such support. And, on the whole, I suppose there can scarcely be any doubt that we are right in interpreting the word in the sense which usage, general rules, and the context, near and remote, concur in assigning to it.

* It is of little consequence to the argument whether this statement is strictly true or not, for there is no doubt that the Apostle does use this word very often. And that would have been quite enough for Mr Knox's purpose, if he had been content with saying so much and no more. But he has chosen to go a good deal further. And it is worth noting, as a curious illustration of the rashness with which strong and precise statements are often made, that the word *πλεον* is used much more than twice as often as *δικαιοσύνη* in St Paul's Epistles!

obviously required it. We find him, also, probably from a like motive, sometimes using the word *δικαίωμα* (just conduct), and, lastly, we actually often meet *δικαιοσύνη* in his writings, where Mr Milner himself would have allowed it could bear no other than its moral meaning."—Knox's *Remains*, Vol. i. pp. 277, 278.

It will appear, I think, by and by, that St Paul's use of *δικαιοσύνη* is not quite so decisive against *forensic Justification* as is here supposed. But first I think it advisable, for various reasons, to look at Mr Knox's mode of arriving at the meaning of the word.

It is not true, as Mr Knox lays down, that all words of the class to which *δικαιοσύνη* belongs "without exception, express actual and personal habits rooted in the mind and manifested in the conduct." Words in *σύνη* (for that, and not *οσύνη* is the termination of the class of words referred to*) express the *abstract* quality,

* In fact, if a definition of *righteousness* were sustained by a rule for the signification of English substantives in *σύνεσις*, it would be very much on a par with Mr Knox's "philological remark." There is no ground whatever for making any distinction between the terminations *οσύνη* and *ωσύνη* as indications of the meaning of the words to which they belong. The difference of form does not in any respect depend upon the meaning of the word; and, in fact, the orthography of some words fluctuates between the two forms; though in general the best MSS. support the common rule, which would lead us to expect in the antepenult of such words (as in comparatives in *τερος*) an *ω* wherever the preceding syllable is short. But it is unnecessary to press this point further, for it will not be questioned by any scholar that the distinctive termination of words of the class to which *δικαιοσύνη* belongs is *σύνη*; and that the general signification of such words is the same, whether the antepenult be *ω* or *ο*.

But it may be thought that though, strictly speaking, Mr Knox's *philology* cannot be defended, yet his mistake is really of very little importance. For that the number of words in *ωσύνη* is so small,—probably not a tenth of the number of those of the other form,—that it cannot be of much practical importance that he has confined his consideration to the latter, and treated them as if they formed the entire class with which he was concerned. And this is so far true, that if he had given a right account of the meaning of the division to which his view was limited, it would have served also for that which he has altogether overlooked, while, on the other hand, it may fairly be thought that if he misunderstood the proper sense of the class of words, when he had before him a subdivision that contains far the greater number of the words which belong to the class, he would hardly have been set right by taking a few more into consideration. I by no means venture to say that he would have been set right altogether by such an extension of his range, but I think that it would probably have prevented him from going wrong in the way and to the extent that he has done. There is one word in *ωσύνη* which is found more than once in the New Testament, and which therefore would probably have come to his mind

property, &c., which is in *concrete* in the adjectives or attributives from which they are derived. They *may* therefore stand for "actual and personal habits rooted in the mind and manifested in the conduct." But it is equally plain that they may stand for what cannot, without great abuse of language, be treated as a *habit*, either of the mind or of the body. And though they *may* denote moral qualities, yet they *may* also denote some things which are purely "extrinsic."

And, accordingly, while we have a good many words, which agree more or less with Mr Knox's rule, there are, as might be supposed, not a few which very absolutely repudiate it. As examples of the former class, we may take ἀγαθότης, or rather ἀγαθοσύνη*, which is *goodness*, that is, the quality or aggregate of qualities by which a man is made ἀγαθός,—belongs to the class of the *good*, and is entitled to the name of good. And, again, ἁγιότης†, is that which makes a person *holy*. So from γνώμων, *prudent*, is derived γνωμοσύνη, *prudence*; from εὐγνώμων, *kind*, *candid*, we have εὐγνωμοσύνη, *kindness* or *fairness of mind*; and in like manner ἐλεήμων, *compassionate*, gives ἐλεημοσύνη, *compassion*. There is an endless number of compound derivatives ending in φρον, as ἄφρον, ἔκφρον, εὐφρον, ἐπίφρον, πρόφρον, ἑλλόφρον, κακόφρον, κειόφρον, μεγαλόφρον, ὀμόφρον, σέφρον, ταπεινόφρον, &c., of these many have (and all might have) derivatives in σονη, which of course, express primarily *mental* states, disposi-

if he had known that he ought to take such words into consideration. I mean ἁγιότητα; and had this word been in his recollection, one would say that he must at least have qualified very considerably the large and positive statement which he has made, with reference to words of this class.

* In the index to his edition of *Clement Alex.* Sylburgius says upon this word, "ἀγαθοσύνη *ubi*, 283, 3, per *ω*. P. MS. 55, 35, et alibi passim; at Flor. ed. per *α*." The edition to which he refers is the Editio princeps of the author, published at Florence, 1550, by Victorinus. The MS. is one which he himself found in the Palatine Library at Heidelberg, and it is likely that he adopted its orthography less out of deference to the authority of the MS. which was very small it was, he tells us, but one year older than the edition, than on account of its conformity with the rule. By the way, the copy of Clement that I have is the Venice Reprint, 1757, of Archbishop Potter's edition, and in it the word is printed with an *ω* in the first of the above references, and with an *ο* in the second.

† H. Stephens, *in rec.*, tells us that his father in his New Testament restored the *ω* from the best MSS.: those known to him were but few; but the correction has not been since disturbed.

tions, or habits, as the adjectives from which they are formed are derived from φρήν.

All these and others may, perhaps, be said to express "habit-rooted in the mind and manifesting themselves in the conduct," but they have this signification, not from their termination, but from the meaning of the words from which they are formed, and will be easily seen by looking at some others. Several even of the words which I have given above, indeed, often stand for something very different from *mental* states or dispositions; but then it seems reasonable to regard the latter as their primitive meaning, and the former a derived one. So when ἐλεημοσύνη is used for *alms*, it seems certain that it is by a metonymy, and that its proper meaning is that state of mind which disposes to *eleemosynæ*. In other words, perhaps, the process would be found to be the opposite, and the sense in which they relate to the mind to be the figurative one*. But it is needless to discuss any doubtful cases, when there are so many in which it is clear that Mr Knox's philology is at fault.

Thus μεγαλωσύνη stands for any kind of *greatness*, and seems to be equivalent, as it is said by Lexicographers to be, to μέγας. Then, if τοξοσύνη, being an art, is to be called a *habit*, it can scarcely be said to be a habit "rooted in the mind and manifested in the conduct." Δουλοσύνη, which is as old as Homer, is the state or condition of slavery. And ἱερωσύνη, standing for the office of Priest, seems a tolerably clear instance of a word of this class applied to a matter of "extrinsic change†;" while it can be just as little doubted that ἀσχημοσύνη and εὐσχημοσύνη express qualities which are external and visible,—as might be anticipated, indeed, from the meaning of σχῆμα. And these clear examples

* Λαβροσύνη would seem to be an example of this process, at least the adjective from which it is derived certainly is. Stephens, indeed, apparently relying on Eustathius, derives λαβρός from λαβρὸν or βαρὺς, and explains it as *nimum corar* or *aridus*. But Passow shows satisfactorily that this derivation and meaning are inconsistent with its earliest use; that in Homer and Herodotus it is used only of the violence of the forces of inanimate nature, as winds, waves, rivers, rain; and that when used of men in early writers, as in Pindar, it is of the unrestrained impetuosity of a rash talker, or the tumultuous violence of a crowd, or something of that kind, and that it was not until later that it occurred in the sense of *greedy*.

† In the LXX. ἀρχιερωσύνη occurs 1 and 2 Macc., and also in Theodoret.

may suffice to show how little ground there is for this *canon* which is laid down so absolutely and with so little misgiving.

As Mr Knox's scholarship was by no means on a par with some of his other qualifications as a critic, I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to bestow so much time upon this "philological remark," but that it has been adopted by some whose authority in such questions stands deservedly high. The Archbishop of Dublin says: "But looking to that which is our present subject of inquiry,—the Apostle's use of terms—it may be established beyond all reasonable doubt, that the word he employs (*δικαιοσύνη*), which is rendered in some versions 'justice,' and in others 'righteousness,' is a word which must have implied to any one acquainted (as Paul doubtless was) with the usages of the Greek language, a *moral habit*; a habit possessed and exercised by the person to whom it is attributed. A mere *acquittal*,—a verdict of 'not guilty,'—an imputation to any one of good actions not really performed by him,—would have been expressed by another very different word (*δικαίωσις*)*." And in a note he says: "I have been told that in some recent publication a doubt was raised as to the rule here alluded to, respecting the nouns ending in *οσύνη*, and that *εὐφροσύνη* was given as an instance against it; but on what grounds I cannot learn. I have always found it used to signify 'cheerfulness,' in perfect analogy, consequently, with the other nouns of like termination†."

In a second note, the Archbishop quotes from Mr Knox the passage given above, and says: "It has been inferred, I understand, from my coinciding in this point with Mr Knox, that I must have derived my views, directly or indirectly, from him." He shows very clearly that this could not have been the case; and then adds: "But the conclusions in which we have concurred are what, I think, any man would draw who, with competent scholarship, should diligently and candidly examine, with a view to the present question, both the classical and the New Testament writers."

More recently, Mr Ellicott, in his *Critical and Grammatical*

* *Essays on some of the Dangers to Christian Faith, &c.* Essay I. London, 1839.

† It must be felt that the writer referred to was rather perverse in his choice of an instance for his purpose, when he had, as I have shown above, not a few unexceptionable examples to prove that nouns of this form do not necessarily mean a *moral habit*, or a *habit* of any kind.

Commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (the first of a series which cannot but be of very great service to students of the New Testament), refers approvingly to Mr Knox in a note on ii. 21. "δικαιοσύνη] 'righteousness.' Brown *in loc.* urges the equivalence of δικαιοσύνη h. l. with δικαίωσις, and cites Whately, *Essays on Dangers, etc.* § 4. This is not necessary. Faith is, to use the expression of Knox (*Remains*, Vol. I. p. 266) the 'seminal essence' of δικαιοσύνη.....On the general meaning of δικαιοσύνη, see Knox, *ib.* p. 276."

Whether δικαιοσύνη and δικαίωσις are equivalent in this place, or not, I need not attempt to settle here. But whether they are or not, it is very hard to understand how any one who holds that they are could have found anything in the Archbishop's Essay to cite in support of his opinion. However, my concern with Mr Ellicott's note is, that it seems to lend the weight of his authority to the process by which Mr Knox determines the meaning of δικαιοσύνη. He does not adopt the process, it is true, expressly, but his reference to the passage seems to imply his approval of it. I do not think, however, that, on reconsideration, any scholar would justify it.

It will be seen, from what has gone before, that the meaning of δικαιοσύνη depends upon the meaning of δίκαιος; which, again, depends upon the meaning of δίκη, being derived from it, and being applied to men and things, as they are observant of, or conformable to, δίκη.

Δίκη—omitting later, though still ancient, senses, with which we are not concerned—corresponds to *jus*, *fas*, and means *right*, *usage*, *justice*, *fairness**. There is no doubt that the earliest meanings of the words are *right* and *usage*, but it is not settled which of these is its original meaning. It is found in both senses in Homer. And the earliest authority thus refusing to decide the question, we are left to determine it as well as we can. It

* I find another meaning of δίκη in Tholuck. Having given as the original meaning of *δίκαιος*, the condition of one who has done all required of him by the law, he says: "This signification had its source in the conception of a certain relation subsisting between two parties of a covenant called δίκη." I am quite sure that this learned writer has not assigned this sense to the word *δίκη* without grounds; but I am not aware of any authority for it. I quote from the translation in *Chambers's Biblical Cabinet*, and have not the original within reach.

would seem more reasonable to assign the precedence to *right*. For the connexion between the two senses appears best accounted for, when we suppose that the word stood *primarily* for *right*, and that it was used to express *custom* or *usage*, *derivatively*, on the assumption that every *custom* was, as it ought to be, drawn from an antecedent principle or rule of *right*, on which it rested, and from its accordance with which it derived, in the first instance, its force and obligation.

And this, whether he arrived at it in this way or not, appears to be Henry Stephens' view of the order of these two senses. But, on the other hand, Passow, for whose authority I have a high respect, makes *custom* the primary sense, *right* being regarded, he says, in early times, as resting upon *usage*. And certainly, though reason seems to me to favour the other view, this one appears to have the earliest mythology rather on its side*.

But the decision of this point is not material to the determination of the meaning of *δίκαιος*, which would, no doubt, denote one who was observant of *δίκη*, in any or all of its senses. It has been distinguished by some from *δῖος*, as though it applied only to the relation of man to his fellow, while this latter word was to be used when his relation to God was concerned. But even in classical Greek, this restriction of the sense of *δίκαιος* does not seem to be certain or absolute, and in Biblical Greek it does not hold at all.

It is, of course, with the meaning of the word in the New Testament that we are chiefly concerned. And this is less to be determined by its etymology, or even by the usage of Greek classical writers, than by its meaning in the LXX.; and this again is to be determined by the meaning of the Hebrew word or words for which it is used in that translation. The principal of these is *צַדִּיק*, which is derived from *צָדַק*, signifying *to be straight, sincere, just*; and its use in the Old Testament accords with the meaning which this derivation would assign to it. It is used of God Himself; of *Rulers* and *Judges*, who represent God; and of *private persons*, in their relations to God and to each other.

1. God shows Himself *צַדִּיק*, *δίκαιος*, in His *just* government of the world; in the *just* exercise of judgment, in the *punishing*

* Hesiod, O. 900, makes *Δίκη* the daughter of Jove and Themis, who was daughter of Uranus and Terra, O. 135.

of evildoers, and rewarding of them that do well; and in faithfulness to His promises.

2. JUDGES and RULERS receive the name, are צְדִיקִים, *δίκαιοι*, when, in imitation of Him whom they represent, they are *just* in the discharge of the duties of their office,—when they exercise the power entrusted to them in accordance with the rules which He has expressly set, or the principles which He approves.

3. PRIVATE PERSONS are צְדִיקִים, *δίκαιοι*, when they do what is *right* as regards God, and more especially when they obey His law, and so are *holy, pious, virtuous, pure*. And secondly, when they do what is *right* towards each other;—when they discharge the duties, whether of perfect or imperfect obligation, which men owe to their fellow men in their several relations, and so are *honest, fair, true, considerate, &c.** But it is to be remembered that in the former case, which is the one with which we are most concerned, the word is sometimes used according to man's judgment of the individual, and sometimes according to God's. And that thus it is applied, sometimes, to all who so obey the law *outwardly* that their fellow men can find no fault with them; sometimes, only to those whose obedience is from the heart, so as to approve itself in the sight of God.

Now, from what has been said before, it will be understood that, whatever be the varieties of meaning of the word *δικαίος*, the same may be expected to be found in the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη*. In regard to the Most High, it would stand for *justice, faithfulness*. And so of rulers and kings. As to men in general, if *δίκαιος* be taken to mean one who *conforms to the law outwardly*, then *δικαιοσύνη* would stand for such *outward conformity*. If the former would be applied more strictly, so as to stand for one who not only conforms outwardly to the law, but whose obedience springs from the motives which God requires no less than the men themselves, then the latter word would stand for that more per-

* See Ezek. xviii. 5—9, beginning with “But if a man be just צַדִּיק and do that which is lawful and right” marg. *judgment and justice* צְדִיקָה וְיִשְׁפָּט—*and ending, after a description in detail of the course of life of such a one, with the emphatic declaration, “he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord GOD.” יְהוָה יְחִיֶּה נָאם אֱלֹהֵי יְהוָה.*

In the New Testament, see Luke i. 6, where the sense in which the word is used is explained in an exegetical clause; and xx. 25, where the context shows the meaning to be *fair, honest, sincere*.

fect conformity which includes the internal principles, dispositions, and affections.

And this might seem to be enough to say as to the meaning of the word, but that there is certainly something more conveyed by it, whether strictly forming a part of its meaning or not. For the law is not merely to be regarded as a rule, but as a penal and remuneratory rule given by God to man. It is a declaration of His nature and His will; an immutable standard of right and wrong, good and evil, both in conduct and in principle, which He has sanctioned by eternal punishments and rewards. And, under this view of the Law—its source, nature, and enforcements,—there is naturally associated with conformity to it, the notion of *merit* and *reward*. If one really kept the Law as God requires, he would not only give evidence of a certain state of the mind and affections, but he would acquire a certain degree of merit, would gain a place in a certain class, and enjoy the estimation belonging to this meritorious class; he would, moreover, as a matter of right, *inherit eternal life* (Mat. xviii. 16, 17); and the great reward would be reckoned to him *not of grace but of debt* (Rom. iv. 4).

Now, all this enters, in some way and degree, into the idea of *δικαιοσύνη*, *righteousness*, so that the word does not stand merely for a moral quality, or an aggregate of moral qualities, disposing and enabling a man to obey God's Law; nor merely for this quality or aggregate of qualities carried out into action: it includes also some idea of the beneficial results which, as I have noticed above, these qualities so carried out secure to the individual in whom they are found,—*the praise and reward* which are due to them under the Law. And in this view, in which *δικαιοσύνη* does not simply express the relation of conformity to the Law but also some of the effects of this relation, it is of the nature of an acquisition and a property, being the possessor's *title to justification*, to approbation and acceptance with God, together with all the blessed fruits of His love and favour in time and in eternity.

This third sense of *δικαιοσύνη* is less obvious, and more difficult to define than the others. But it is not less real. And, when attention is given to it, it is not difficult to form a satisfactory conception of it. And it is worth taking a little trouble to fix it clearly in the mind, for it will be found of important use in explaining the Doctrine of Justification. It is not absolutely

essential in order to enable us to explain the Apostle's meaning but it facilitates the process of drawing the true doctrine from those statements of it in which the word occurs.

This seems quite enough, if not more than enough, as to the meaning of the word. Now as to its place in the controversy, — Mr Knox thinks that the supporters of "the forensic theory" maintains that (at least in St Paul's statements of the doctrine) *δικαιοσύνη* is used as if it were equivalent to *δικαίωσις*. And he evidently imagines that, in correcting this error, he is overthrowing an important, if not an essential, part of the proof of their view of the doctrine.

But this is a mistake. I do not mean to say that no defenders of "the forensic theory" have been guilty of actually confounding these very different words. But I believe that such confusion has been much oftener apparent than real. It is very commonly said, indeed, in commenting upon certain passages in St Paul's Epistles, in which *δικαιοσύνη* occurs, that it is there used for *δικαίωσις*. But I believe that those who make this statement would, generally at least, so explain themselves as to show that they mean that the former word is there used for the latter, not as if the words were properly synonymous, but by a common figure, by which a word signifying one thing is used for a word signifying a different thing, by reason of some connexion which exists between the two things*. And when it is remembered that to *justify* is

* There are, however, some who assign the meaning to *δικαιοσύνη*, without adding any such explanation, and without affording any ground for supposing that they would regard such an explanation as necessary, or even as proper. One of these is Suicer, whose article upon the word is, as usual, rich in Patristical and Ecclesiastical illustrations, but also, as is too usual with that learned writer, very far from clear and satisfactory in division and definition. He enumerates no less than six significations of the word *in genere*, professing, however, to give but a few of its various meanings. The first of the six is *Justificatio*: "Positur pro Justificatione, atque ideo pro remissione peccatorum quam obtinemus merito justitiæ Christi, quæ nobis imputatur per fidem." He quotes a number of passages from the Fathers as examples of this sense. Some of them are, but others of them undoubtedly are not; while some are too doubtful to be adduced as evidence of the sense in which the word was understood by the writer. Ecumenius, for example, seems clearly to give *justification* as a proper meaning of the word in Rom. in 21. 22: *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἢ παρὰ Θεοῦ διδουμένη ἢ ἡ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ δωρεὰ καὶ χάρις, καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*. And again in 2 Cor. v. Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔργων, ἀλλὰ διὰ συγχωρήσεως δικαιοῦνται. But, on the other hand, there

to declare a man *righteous*—that is, to declare that he is possessed of *righteousness*,—and that therefore, *righteousness* in an individual is the proper ground of his *justification*, and so may be said to be its *cause*, it will be seen that, if *δικαιοσύνη* were put for *δικαίωσις*, it would be nothing more than an instance of the common figure by which the *cause* is put for the effect.

It is plain that, in this way, the supposition of such an interchange of the words would be perfectly defensible, if it were necessary, in order to enable us to explain the texts in accordance with the course of the Apostle's argument in the particular place, or with general principles any where hid down by him. But I do not think that any such necessity exists. And, in fact, I do not think that the substitution, if it were effected, would always express the Apostle's meaning in the places referred to. We should seem, indeed, to be nearer his meaning, in some of them at

are quotations from Basil in which the word is evidently taken in its proper sense of *righteousness*. Thus, in a statement of *Justification by faith only*, which could hardly have been stronger or clearer, if it had been coined by Luther himself: *αὐτὴ ἡ περὶ καὶ ἐξουχίας καύχησης ἐν Θεῷ, ὅτε μήτε ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνῃ τις ἐπαίρεται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔγνω μὲν ἐνδεῆ ὄντα ἑαυτὸν δικαιοσύνης ἀληθοῦς, πίστει δὲ μόνῃ τῇ εἰς Χριστὸν δεδικαιωμένον*. It seems strange that the word should be supposed to be used for *justification* here. And the same may be said of two other quotations from the same Father. He gives, besides a passage from Theodoret, one from Theophylact, and one from Macarius, in all of which the sense of the word is too doubtful to make them of any use in fixing the meaning in either way.

However, my object in referring to the place, was not to discuss Suicer's definition and authorities, but to show the grounds which he gives for regarding him as an exception to the general statement made above. Dr Moses Stuart of Andover, though a less important, is a still clearer case of exception. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, i. 17, he says that, "the word *δικαιοσύνη* is the *usual* one employed by Paul to designate the Gospel justification, i.e. the pardoning of sin, and accepting and treating as righteous. So we find this word plainly employed in Rom. iii. 21, 22 comp. ver. 24, 25, 26; iv. 11, 13; v. 17, 21; ix. 30, 31; x. 3, 4, 5, 6, 10; 2 Cor. v. 21 abstract for concrete; Phil. iii. 6, 9; Heb. xi. 7, et alibi sæpe."

In support of this view he gives some reasons which show a strange misapprehension of the point to be proved, but into which I need not enter. But I ought to add that he gives quotations from Turretin's *Praelectiones* on the Epistle to show that that author agreed with him in the meaning of the word. They are quite sufficient for their purpose, as will appear by the second, which I give in preference, for the sake of the very characteristic note of approbation which Stuart appends to it. "Again, '*Justitia Dei*.... est ipsamet hominis justificatio, seu modus quo potest justus haberi apud Deum, et salutis particeps fieri;' a definition of which one may almost say: *Omne tulit punctum.*"

least, if we supposed δικαιοσύνη to stand for *the state of the man who has been justified*, than if we took it for *the divine act by which he was justified*. And translating δικαιοσύνη by *justification* in the former sense would not be open to the objection which lies against regarding it as equivalent to δικαίωσις (which will only bear the latter sense*), nor indeed to any objection derived from the form of the word†. But I do not think that usage would warrant such a translation; and it is not necessary to deviate in any way from the more obvious and common translation of the word. Our translators have rendered it by the word *righteousness*, never by the word *justification*. And I do not think that there is any more difficulty in deriving the true doctrine of *justification* from the English Version than from the original.

But it is time to look at a few of the texts in which the word occurs. I shall take them in the order in which they stand in the Epistles.

I. And the first text in which the word appears in the Epistles, Rom. i. 17, seems to furnish a very good beginning of such an examination. It is the Apostle's account of the Gospel: δικαιοσύνη γὰρ Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πρώτης εἰς πᾶσι. Here γὰρ seems to connect the statement in the text with the preceding statement, namely, that the Gospel of Christ is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile (which is similarly connected with the declaration of the Apostle, that he himself *was not ashamed of the*

* This is said from the form of the word, not from its use; for, though it is found only in that signification, the instances of the use of it are too few to ground any absolute conclusion upon, if the form were indifferent. It occurs but twice in the New Testament, and but once in the LXX. Lev. xxiv. 22, δικαίωσις, Heb. תְּשׁוּבָה E. V., *one manner of law*. It occurs in Sym. Ps. xxxiv. Heb. and E. V. xxxiv. 23, for צֶדֶק, where we have δική LXX., and E. V. *cause*.

† As δουλοσύνη means *slavery*,—the state or condition of the slave, δούλος,—so might δικαιοσύνη mean the state or condition of the righteous man, δίκαιος. But the state or condition of one who is justified in the way that God has provided in the Gospel is the same as that of the man who is himself *righteous*, if such a one could be found. It is arrived at in a different way, but it is the same state.

Gospel, which again is connected in the same way with the profession of his readiness to *preach the Gospel to those that were at Rome also*). The way, then, in which the Gospel is *the power of God unto salvation to every Believer* is, that in it is revealed the righteousness of God from faith to faith.

The difficulties of this passage are of little importance to the matter in hand, and, perhaps, not of much, in any point of view. But it is necessary to look at them for a little.

It is disputed whether ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν is to be connected with δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ or with ἀποκαλύπτεται. And Dean Alford gives what he appears to regard as a decisive reason in favour of the latter construction. "It will be observed that ἐκ π. εἰς π. is taken with ἀποκαλύπτεται not with δικαιοσύνη. The latter connexion would do for ἐκ π., but not for εἰς π."²²—But might it not with at least equal reason be said, that the former connexion would do for εἰς π., but not for ἐκ π. ! It certainly seems to the full as hard to make good sense of ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ π. as of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ εἰς π. I should say, indeed, that it is a great deal harder. For, in fact, I do not think there is any real difficulty in giving a satisfactory explanation of this latter phrase.

I may begin, however, with the easier one, δ. Θ. ἐκ π. The use of ἐκ to denote the *means* or *instrument* by which anything is

* Junius *in loc.* (referred to by Surenhusius, βιβλος καταλλαγῆς, p. 436) obviates this difficulty, without stating it, by a transposition of the words: "Hic Græce et Syre ellipsis relativi, iudicio meo, *Justitia Dei quæ est ex fide, in Evangelio revelatur in fidem*, id est, ut homines efficiantur credentes et credendo salutem assequantur, de qua in antecedenti descriptione Evangelii."

The following is a still bolder mode of dealing with the text which ought to find favour with those who seem to think that a sacred writer cannot have used a word or a phrase anywhere unless it appears that he has used it somewhere else. See note P, pp. 381, 382.

Superrime, quod miror, *W. L. Wallius* in notis criticis super N. T. Anglicè editis p. 225 præter omnium et codicum et versionum fidem lectionem receptam ita sollicitavit ut voces εἰς πίστιν prorsus expungendas censeret. Causas facinoris has affert, quod alibi v. c. iii. 22, iv. 13, ix. 30 et x. 6, ubi itidem ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη commemoretur, nusquam τὸ εἰς πίστιν additum inveniat, quod præterea commodo sensu instrui non possit. At non deesse sensum ex dictis patet, ex quo non minus intelligitur, Paulum causam habuisse cur hoc loco eas voces addiderit, ad rationem justitiæ illius, de qua hic prima vice mentio est, rectius explicandam. *Wolffii Curæ Philolog.* in loc.

procured, or the *condition* (which being fulfilled becomes the *means*) of obtaining it, is by no means uncommon; and it seems to be a very intelligible and easy transition from that which, if it be not the primary use of the preposition, is but one step removed from it, viz. that in which it denotes the *source* or *origin* from which anything is derived: for the means, or instrument, or condition by which anything is procured, may be considered as the source—not the ultimate and proper source, but the immediate and proximate source—from which the thing comes to us. In this sense, ἐκ is equivalent to ἀπὸ with a genitive, and πίστις being the means by which, or the condition upon which, δ. Θεοῦ is given, the phrase δ. Θ. ἐκ πίστεως is easily understood.

Now as to εἰς πίστιν,—it must be felt to be in St Paul's manner when he is upon the subject of *justification*, to leave nothing unsaid which can be thought necessary to make its perfect freeness perfectly clear, and rather to redouble and reiterate explanatory phrases than leave any room for doubt upon that point. So here he is not satisfied with stating that this gift of righteousness comes to us *by faith*. That might be the case, and yet there might be many other qualifications necessary in order that we should receive it at all; and to obviate any doubt upon that point, as it seems, εἰς πίστιν is added. This completes the Apostle's account of *his* Gospel. Not only does it reveal the righteousness of God as given *by faith*, but as given *to faith*; *faith* is not merely the channel *by* which it is given, but it is as it were the object *to* which it is given, so that wherever *faith* is, there is *the righteousness of God*.

It is very evident that this interpretation of the text makes it just what it ought to be, in its connexion with the verse which precedes it. Being connected with that verse, as was remarked above, by γὰρ, it ought to supply some reason or warrant for the assertion made therein, viz., that the Gospel is “the power of God unto salvation to *every one that believeth*.” That, in this way of explaining εἰς πίστιν, it does so is plain. But of the numberless other interpretations of the text which have been proposed, some fail altogether to give the reason required, or give it very imperfectly, as “from the imperfect faith of the O. T. to the perfect faith of the N. T.,” or “from the faith (faithfulness) of God to the faith (trust) of them;” or “from

a lower to a higher degree of faith;" or, "of faith for the increase of faith;" or, "of faith that faith may be given to it;" "of faith in order that we may believe," while some which cannot perhaps be set aside on that ground are open to other objections no less decisive; *e.g.* "by faith only" or "altogether of faith in which works have no share;" which seem to be rather supplying something that the translator imagines to be suitable to the place than interpreting the words used by the Apostle. Neither of these objections applies to the interpretation which I have adopted. And if nothing more could be alleged in its support, it ought to be enough to justify it, that it is a proper translation of the text, and that it draws from it just the sense which the connexion requires.

But we can go much further than this; for we have, I think, the means of proving satisfactorily that the Apostle's language was actually intended by him to express the sense which has been assigned to it above.

In the third chapter of this Epistle we have the following remarkable passage:—*Νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμον δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ πεφανέρωται, μαρτυρουμένη ἰπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν, δικαιοσύνη δὲ Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας.* Rom. iii. 21, 22. No one can doubt that this is a parallel passage with the one under consideration. But the close correspondence of both these statements of the revelation of Divine mercy which has been made to us in the Gospel will be better seen by placing them side by side, leaving out the words which have no connexion with the matter immediately in hand.

Rom. i. 17.

δικαιοσύνη . . . Θεοῦ
ἀποκαλύπτεται

ἐκ πίστεως
εἰς πίστιν

Rom. iii. 21, 22.

..... δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ
πεφανέρωται
δικαιοσύνη δὲ Θεοῦ
 διὰ πίστεως
εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας
τοὺς πιστεύοντας

The bare inspection of these passages, thus placed in juxtaposition, will make it easy to perceive all that I want to draw from their connexion.

1. I have explained above how *εἰς πίστιν* in the first passage may mean *to all who have faith*, and now no one, I think, looking

at the two passages together, and seeing how *ἐἰς πίστιν* in the first corresponds to *εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας* in the second, will be disposed to doubt that this is what it really *does* mean.

2. As *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is expressly connected in the second passage with *εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας* as well as with *διὰ πίστεως*, it will be hardly doubted, I suppose, that it may be connected in the first passage with *εἰς πίστιν* as well as with *ἐκ πίστεως*.

3. And, finally, when it is seen that *διὰ πίστεως*..... is expressly connected in the second passage with *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, not with *πεφανέρωται*, it will hardly be doubted that *ἐκ πίστεως* in the first passage is to be connected not with *ἀποκαλύπτεται* but with *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*.

The repetition, *δικαιοσύνη δὲ Θεοῦ*, puts it beyond any question that it is with the noun and not with the verb, that *διὰ πίστεως*... is to be connected. And the reason why this repetition occurs in the second passage, and not in the first, seems evidently to be this: that, in the second passage, some words follow *δ. Θ. πεφανέρωται* with which, to the ear at least, *διὰ π.....* might seem to be connected; or which, at all events, if they did not render the proper connexion doubtful, so far interrupted it as to make it expedient that it should be distinctly marked. There is no such reason for clearing up the connexion in the first passage. But no one will doubt that if there had been the same reason for explaining himself there, St Paul would have given the same explanation, and have made it clear, in the same way, that *ἐκ π. εἰς π.* is to be connected with *δ. Θ.* and not with *ἀποκαλύπτεται*.

I have allowed the temptation of clearing up this point to take me away much too long from what is my proper business with the text, viz., the determination of the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* in it. But this need not long delay us, because if there be any uncertainty about the words as they stand in the text, it may be removed, as in the case of the other part of the verse which we have just considered, by looking at them in another passage in which they occur, and in which they are explained by the Apostle himself. The passage to which I refer is Phil. iii. 8, 9: Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡγοῦμαι πάντα ζημίαι εἶναι διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχειν τῆς γνώσεως Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου μου, διὰ ὃν τὰ πάντα ἐξωμάρτη.

καὶ ἡγούμαι σκύβαλα εἶναι ἵνα Χριστὸν κερδήσω, καὶ εὔρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ, μὴ ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει). Now from the former passages we learned that the distinguishing excellence of the Gospel of Christ is that in it is revealed a δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ which is ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, Rom. i. 17, or as it is more fully expressed in iii. 21, 22, διὰ πίστεως εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. And here we find that the great blessing which St Paul expected from embracing the Gospel, the blessing for which he cheerfully gave up all his distinctions and privileges, was, that he might win Christ and be found in Him,—having a δικαιοσύνη which he describes as not his own, not derived from [obedience to] the law, but that which is διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, and ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει. While as a farther correspondence between them, the δ. Θεοῦ in Rom. i. and iii. is described in the latter chapter as χωρὶς νόμου, and that in Phil. iii. is specially noted as μὴ τὴν ἐκ νόμου.

That the δικαιοσύνη spoken of in the former passages, and that in the latter are one and the same can hardly be doubted. But in the former passages it is spoken of only as δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, so as to allow the possibility of maintaining, as some have done, that by it he means the *righteousness* which, whether it be understood as *justice* or *goodness*, is undoubtedly an attribute of God, and, moreover, an attribute which is undoubtedly manifested conspicuously in the Gospel. But though the words of themselves bear this interpretation, and though so interpreted they would express a great truth concerning the Gospel, yet, in the connexion in which they stand, this mode of interpreting them would seem to be very unsatisfactory. It would seem much more likely that what was meant was *righteousness* which had its source in God, but which was given to man *by faith*, and was given to *all who had faith*. And that this is really what the Apostle means is put beyond a doubt by the passage in Phil. iii.; for there he expressly describes it not only as τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, but further as τὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει.

It cannot be doubted, therefore, that in the passages which we have been looking at (Rom. i. 17, iii. 21—22) δικαιοσύνη means *righteousness*, as bestowed upon man, and so belonging to him. Whether, however, it were made his as a personal quality, by infusion, or as a personal property, by imputation, could not,

perhaps, be derived from these texts. But there is no want of texts to decide that question. Those of chapter iv, indeed, upon which so much has been said in the Sermons and Notes, particularly Note N, are of themselves abundantly sufficient for the purpose. They show clearly, as has been pointed out, that God's way of justifying sinners is not by *infusing righteousness* into them, but by *counting, reckoning, imputing righteousness* unto them. (See also what is said in No. III. of this Note.)

After what I have said, it can hardly be necessary to add, that I do not agree with those who hold that the proper translation of the words *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως* is *justification by faith*, or *the mode of justification by faith which God has appointed*. I do not question that this is, as to substance, what the passage conveys, but I object to this mode of translating it, because it is not a correct translation of the words *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, and therefore, if it expresses the meaning of the Apostle, it expresses it in a different form of words from that which here and in several other places he himself chooses to employ. He chooses in this place and elsewhere to speak not of *justification*, but of *righteousness*, as procured by *faith*. It is true that, as *righteousness* is the title to *justification*, and as to possess the title is the same thing under God's righteous government as to possess the thing itself, the substance of the Apostle's meaning, as I have said, is given in the proposed interpretation. But it is safer and better to adhere to his own form of expressing his meaning, and to translate rather than to paraphrase him*.

II. In the next place in which the word occurs (Rom. iii. 5), it evidently stands for *righteousness* or *justice* as an attribute of the Most High, and therefore I need not dwell upon it. The next passage is Rom. iii. 21—22, which I have just considered, and therefore may now pass by. I proceed therefore to the consideration of the next, which is a very important one, and is closely connected with this last. Having stated that in the Gospel is revealed the righteousness of God by faith unto all and upon all them that believe, the Apostle adds (23, 24), "For there

* And the same applies to all the other texts in which it is proposed to regard *δικαιοσύνη* as equivalent to *δικαιώσις*. See Stuart's enumeration of them, quoted above, p. 482, note.

is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God*: being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in [or by] Christ Jesus." And then he goes on (25, 26): *ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἰλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι, εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγραμμένων ἁμαρτημάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ. πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ*: Whom God set forth to be a propitiatory offering [becoming efficacious] through faith in His blood†, for the manifestation of His righteousness, on account of [i.e. this is what rendered the manifestation necessary] the passing over of sins committed before, during the forbearance of God [the time, that is, when He suffered all nations to walk in their own ways (Acts xiv. 16), the times of ignorance which He winked at, xvii. 30], for the manifestation of His righteousness in this present time [in which those who had sinned and come short of the praise of God were yet justified by Him freely, &c., verse 24] that He may be [be proved and known to be] just and yet justifying [when he justifies] him who is of the faith in Jesus.

I am passing over a great deal that is very important in this remarkable passage when I confine myself to the inquiry, what is the meaning here of *δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ* [i.e. *God's*]? Is it the *righteousness* (justice) of God regarded as a divine attribute, or the *righteousness* which is bestowed by God upon sinners believing in Christ? I think either gives a consistent interpretation of the passage. On the one hand, the *righteousness* which God bestows upon believers, derived as it is from the propitiatory offering of Christ, when rightly understood, shows how God is just when He justifies the sinner to whom it is given. And on the other hand, when the *righteousness of God* which is manifested is understood to be His justice, the sense of the passage is still easier. Christ was *the lamb without blemish, and without spot, who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world*, but was not to be sent into the world until the fulness of time was come. His

* *τὴν ἰστίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ* seems to mean *of the praise of God*,—that praise which, as a matter of right, would be bestowed by God upon those who had not sinned, but who had by obedience acquired the righteousness which merits and receives His praise. See what is said of the third sense of *δικαιοσύνη*, pp. 480, 481.

† See Note P, ante.

sacrifice was from the first the ground of the forgiveness of sinners; but it was not distinctly made known as the ground upon which they were forgiven, until the offering was actually made. And so, though God was really as just in the forgiveness of sin before as after the coming of Christ, yet His justice was not *manifested* until Christ was *set forth to be a propitiatory offering through faith in His blood*,—not set forth only to those who witnessed his death, but *evidently set forth before the eyes* of all to whom the Gospel was preached, *crucified among them*. So that though I have no doubt that the interpretation which makes *the righteousness of God* here spoken of, *the righteousness* which He bestows on believers, is defensible, I think it is easier, and therefore better, to interpret it as *His justice*.

III. This brings us to chap. iv, which is full of examples of the use of *δικαιοσύνη* in connexion with the doctrine of Justification. And I should have a great deal to say upon them here. but that I have been led to say so much upon them elsewhere. The Apostle is speaking of Justification throughout the chapter; but, except once at the beginning [verse 2, εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη . . .], and once at the end [verse 25, καὶ ἐγέρθη διὰ δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν], he nowhere employs the verb or noun by which the act is directly expressed: everywhere else, he uses some one of the forms in which *δικαιοσύνη* is combined with *λογίζεσθαι*, either in an active or passive sense. These forms have been considered at length already, particularly in Note N., and the second addition to it. I need not, therefore, extend this very long Note by re-examining them here; for though they were not noticed in the place referred to for that which is the chief purpose of the present Note—that of explaining and illustrating the meaning and use of *δικαιοσύνη* in the New Testament—yet, in the course of the consideration which they underwent, it must have sufficiently appeared that that word is everywhere used in them in its proper sense of *righteousness*, as it is rightly rendered in our version; and that there is nowhere any reason for looking for any other meaning for it.

I need only add, therefore, that, besides all the more important uses which these texts may be made to serve in the controversy, they are peculiarly fitted to contribute to what I have

kept in view as a subordinate object in this Note. For as they would be regarded, I presume, by all supporters of "the forensic theory," as furnishing the most important of all the Scriptural proofs of their view of the Doctrine,—inasmuch as they contain the most distinct exposition of the Divine mode of proceeding in the justification of Believers which is to be found in the Bible,—and as in none of them is it necessary to render the word δικαιοσύνη by any other word than that which our translators have employed, viz., *righteousness*; we seem to have in them the most conclusive evidence of the error under which Mr Knox laboured in supposing that it was essential to the maintenance of forensic justification to treat δικαιοσύνη in St Paul's statements of the doctrine as equivalent to δικαίωσις.

IV. Rom. v. 17, εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἑνὸς παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν διὰ τοῦ ἑνός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον οἱ τὴν περισσεΐαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσιν διὰ τοῦ ἑνός Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Here there is no room for any uncertainty as to the meaning which we are to give to the δικαιοσύνη spoken of, for it is expressly described as a *gift*. It is evidently, therefore, the δ. Θεοῦ ἐκ π. (Rom. i. 17), the δ. Θεοῦ διὰ π. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rom. iii. 22), the δ. ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ π. (Phil. iii. 9), of which we have spoken in the preceding number I.

Upon the words οἱ τὴν περισσεΐαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες, Dean Alford says, "The present λαμβάνοντες, instead of λαβόντες, is not merely used in a substantive sense, *receptores* (as Fritz and Meyer), but signifies that the reception is not *one act* merely, but a *continued process* by which the *περισσεΐα* is imparted. (So Rothe, De W., Thol.)"

I have no apprehension that anything in the way of doctrine is really intended here from which I should be disposed to dissent; but I think it requires some notice. It is said just before that δικαιοσύνη "answers to δικαίωμα in verse 16," which is there explained as "a *sentence of acquittal*;" and this it is said "in fact amounts to *justification*." Now some who hold that *justification* is a *continuous process* as regards each individual who is justified, might suppose that they had the support of this passage, as interpreted by the above high authorities, if there were not a word of explanation and of caution added. I therefore think it advisable

to say, that, even if we adopt the interpretation which Dean Alford prefers, we are not to suppose that the *process*—which, as he says, is shown by the use of the present participle to be a continued one—is the *justification* of each individual, but of the whole succession of individuals, who to the end of time, as they become believers, are made partakers of the gift. The *process* is instantaneous in the former aspect, and continuous in the latter. And if we are at liberty to regard the intimation of continuousness or of constant repetition which is conveyed by the present participle as referring to the process in the latter aspect, we undoubtedly ought to do so, as thereby reconciling grammatical accuracy to doctrinal truth.

And if it were doubted whether it is allowable to treat the force of the participle as capable of this application, I do not think there would be any difficulty in justifying it by examples. Thus, Heb. vii. 5, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν Λαὸν τὴν ἱερατείαν λαμβάνοντες ἐντολήν ἔχουσιν ἀποδεκατοῦν τὸν λαὸν κ.τ.λ. Here the receiving of the priesthood was *one act once for all*, as regarded each individual, a *continued process* (in the sense of being constantly repeated), as regards the body. There can be no doubt here that if we are to suppose the present participle used in its distinctive sense, the continuousness which it implies is with reference to the reception of the office by the body, not by the individual.

Thus explained, I can have no objection to the interpretation in question, as regards the doctrine which it conveys; but I must confess that upon other grounds I prefer the simpler interpretation which regards οἱ λαμβάνοντες as taken substantively, and as equivalent to *receptores*. The Dean does not appear to reject this interpretation altogether, but only to insist upon the other as an addition to it. But I doubt that this is allowable. When the present participle with an article is used substantively, I apprehend that it is divested, like a substantive, of all reference to time. We must, therefore, choose between the two interpretations: we cannot combine them. Fortunately the difference between them is not considerable. Those who interpret οἱ λαμβάνοντες as = *receptores* of course understand thereby, not *receivers* but *the receivers*,—not *some* but *all* of those that receive the gift. According to Dean Alford's interpretation the declaration is

equally comprehensive: it cannot be more so. The difference is that he finds in it an intimation that the reception spoken of is not *one act* but a *continued process*. But if the explanation which I have ventured to suggest be adopted, this interpretation would not make the declaration assert anything but what is not only true in itself but consistent with what it asserts under the other interpretation. For *receptores* is plainly indifferent to the question whether there is a succession in the receivers of the gift or not. It does not imply that there is, but neither does it imply that there is not. There is then no difference between the two interpretations, as to any matter either of fact or doctrine, so that it may seem hardly worth settling. But we are not to think lightly of any question which seems to involve a principle of interpretation. And I therefore think it right to state that my judgment is in favour of the interpretation which Dean Alford regards as defective. I do not, of course, doubt that those who know a language vernacularly often observe, unconsciously, many of its proprieties of which they would be little able to render any satisfactory account. And I am sure that we should be liable to be greatly mistaken if we were to attempt to settle beforehand which of these proprieties would be likely to be observed, and which to be overlooked, by uneducated men. But, as a matter not of speculation but of fact, I am inclined to doubt that the sacred writers did observe the distinction referred to by Dean Alford, so steadily that it would be safe to reason backwards, and to infer whether a process was continued or instantaneous from the use of the participle of the present or the Aorist. Thus, in Matt. xxvi. 52 we find, πάντες γὰρ οἱ λαβόντες μάχαιραν ἐν μαχαίρῃ ἀπολοῦνται. Are we at liberty to say here, "The Aorist λαβόντες, instead of the present λαμβάνοντες, signifies that the taking up is not a *continued process*, but *one act*"? This would seem to be just as legitimate an inference as the opposite one from the use of the present participle in the text which we have been considering. And yet, surely, the two cases are precisely the same, as regards every thing that ought to determine the use of the tense. The act referred to by the Blessed Lord is, like that to which the Apostle refers, momentary, under one aspect of it, and under another, continuous. The taking up of the sword is a single act with reference to each individual,

who, like Peter, resorts to arms for offence or defence; but it is a repeated act, and, in that sense, a continued process with regard to those who, in every age, adopt the same course.

It may still be said that the use of a different tense with reference to similar acts, or even with reference to the same act, does not show that the writers or speakers were using the tenses loosely or indifferently. Each may have used the tense that he employed in its strict and proper sense, the difference arising from the fact, that they were viewing the act or event under different aspects. This is, no doubt, true; and I do not venture to say that the reason for the use of the Aorist in this declaration of the Blessed Lord, may not be, that He viewed the act of which He spoke in the aspect in which the use of that tense would be a matter of strict grammatical propriety; but I should find it very hard to believe that it really was. The plain purpose of the declaration was to proclaim the fate which was to attend upon such a course whensoever and by how many ever it might be adopted. To this object, the relation of the act to time was plainly of no importance whatever. Whether it were single or repeated, momentary or continued, would not in any way affect the truth and importance of the warning, or the necessity of giving it, to those who were to be constantly under the temptation of resorting to carnal weapons for their defence. And, therefore, it is not easy to believe that the nature of the act in this respect was at all in the Blessed Lord's mind, so as to regulate the form of the declaration. But, to the matter in hand, this is a question of no moment. For if this mode of accounting for the difference of the tenses in the two cases referred to be admitted, while it would show that, both in the declaration of the Lord and in that of the Apostle, the participles may have been used in the proper sense of their tenses, respectively, it would at the same time show that they might have been interchanged, and that the Lord might have used *λαμβάνοντες*, and the Apostle *λαμβάνετε*, with just the same propriety. And if this be the case, it is plain that an inference as to the nature of the act from the tense used to describe it must be precarious. And, what is of much more importance, supposing Dean Alford, and the eminent foreign critics whom he names, to be right in inferring that the present participle in Rom. v. 17 signifies that the reception of the

gift of righteousness there spoken of is *not one act merely, but a continued process*, I trust that, without adducing any other examples, Heb. vii. 5 will be felt to be enough of itself to show that the inference ought not to lead to any interpretation of the text which would make it in any way inconsistent with the true doctrine of Justification.

Many texts in which the word *δικαιοσύνη* occurs remain, and I should find the investigation of them a very interesting occupation. But the space which I have been led to give to the few that I have examined has exceeded all reasonable bounds, and I feel that I must pass over the rest. I trust, however, that what has been said upon those that have been noticed may be of some use in removing some artificial difficulties which have been attached to the word, and, through it, to the great Doctrine which it is the object of this volume to explain and defend.

QUEMADMODUM A RESTITUTIONE HUIUS SUMMI LOCI DOCTRINÆ CHRIS-
TIANÆ DE NOSTRI JUSTIFICATIONE, TOTA RELIGIONIS NOSTRÆ ET INCIP-
ENDA ET PETENDA EST RECONCINNATIO, ET RESTAURATIO; ET DEBENT
PROPTEREA AD LOCI HUIUS ELUCIDATIONEM ET SOLIDAM EXPLICATIONEM
CONFERRE QUICUNQUE CHRISTI SUNT, ET REGNUM EIUS VERE EXPETUNT;
PRÆCIPUE VERO ECCLESIARUM MINISTRI, QUIQUE PRO SE, QUICQUID OM-
NINO CONFERRE AD HANC REM DONO CHRISTI POTERUNT: CONFIDO HANC
OB REM, ET MEUM HOC QUAECUNQUE MINISTERIUM, QUOD ECCLESIS DEI
IN EXPLICANDO ET ADSERENDO HOC IPSO LOCO PRÆSTARE STUDUI, AMAN-
TIBUS REGNUM CHRISTI HAUD FORE INGRATUM.

BUCER. *Disputationes de Justificatione,*
Ratisbonæ habitæ, 1546. Ep. Dedic.

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